Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “RTCA”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 37 records · Page 2

Unmanned Aircraft Systems Minimum Operations Performance Standards End-to-End Verification and Validation (E2-V2) Simulation

As Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) make their way to mainstream aviation operations within the National Airspace System (NAS), research efforts are underway to develop a safe and effective environment for their integration into the NAS. Detect and Avoid (DAA) systems are required to account for the lack of "eyes in the sky" due to having no human on-board the aircraft. The current NAS relies on pilot's vigilance and judgement to remain Well Clear (CFR 14 91.113) of other aircraft. RTCA SC-228 has defined DAA Well Clear (DAAWC) to provide a quantified Well Clear volume to allow systems to be designed and measured against. Extended research efforts have been conducted to understand and quantify system requirements needed to support a UAS pilot's ability to remain well clear of other aircraft. The efforts have included developing and testing sensor, algorithm, alerting, and display requirements. More recently, sensor uncertainty and uncertainty mitigation strategies have been evaluated. This paper discusses results and lessons learned from an End-to-End Verification and Validation (E2-V2) simulation study of a DAA system representative of RTCA SC-228's proposed Phase I DAA Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS). NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC) was called upon to develop a system that evaluates a specific set of encounters, in a variety of geometries, with end-to-end DAA functionality including the use of sensor and tracker models, a sensor uncertainty mitigation model, DAA algorithmic guidance in both vertical and horizontal maneuvering, and a pilot model which maneuvers the ownship aircraft to remain well clear from intruder aircraft, having received collective input from the previous modules of the system. LaRC developed a functioning batch simulation and added a sensor/tracker model from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) William J. Hughes Technical Center, an in-house developed sensor uncertainty mitigation strategy, and implemented a pilot model similar to one from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Lincoln Laboratory (MIT/LL). The resulting simulation provides the following key parameters, among others, to evaluate the effectiveness of the MOPS DAA system: severity of loss of well clear (SLoWC), alert scoring, and number of increasing alerts (alert jitter). The technique, results, and lessons learned from a detailed examination of DAA system performance over specific test vectors and encounter cases during the simulation experiment will be presented in this paper.

Ghatas, Rania W.↗

Modeling and Simulation Plans in Support of Low Cost, Size, Weight, and Power Surveillance Systems for Detecting and Tracking Non-Cooperative Aircraft

RTCA Special Committee (SC) 228 has initiated a second phase for the development of minimum operational performance standards (MOPS) for UAS detect and avoid (DAA) systems. Technologies to enable UAS with less available Size, Weight, and Power (SWaP) will be considered. RTCA SC-228 has established sub-working groups and one of the sub-working groups is focused on aligning modeling and simulations activities across all participating committee members. This briefing will describe NASAs modeling and simulation plans for the development of performance standards for low cost, size, weight, and power (C-SWaP) surveillance systems that detect and track non-cooperative aircraft. The briefing will also describe the simulation platform NASA intends to use to support end-to-end verification and validation for these DAA systems. Lastly, the briefing will highlight the experiment plan for our first simulation study, and provide a high-level description of our future flight test plans. This briefing does not contain any results or data.

surveillance↗

Unmitigated ACES Simulation Supporting Draft DAA MOPS Alerting

Realization of the expected proliferation of Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) operations in the National Airspace System (NAS) depends on the development and validation of performance standards for UAS Detect and Avoid (DAA) Systems. The RTCA Special Committee 228 is charged with leading the development of draft Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for UAS DAA Systems. NASA, as a participating member of RTCA SC-228 is committed to supporting the development and validation of draft requirements for DAA alerting system performance. A recent study conducted using NASA's ACES (Airspace Concept Evaluation System) simulation capability begins to address questions surrounding the development of draft MOPS for DAA alerting systems. ACES simulations were conducted to study the performance of an alerting scheme proposed by the SC-228 DAA Alerting sub-group. Analysis included but was not limited to: 1) correct alert (and their timeliness), 2) false alert (and their severity and duration), 3) missed alert, and 4) probability of an alert type at the time of loss of well clear. The results will be used by SC-228 to inform decisions about the alerting aspect of UAS DAA systems and future requirements development and validation efforts.

alerting↗

The Way to the Future Has Already Started: ICAO Aeronautical Telecommunication Network (ATN) Using Internet Protocol Suite (IPS) Standards and Protocol Evolution Update

Millions of people are able to exchange information over phones, computers, tablets and an array of new interconnected devices such as sensors, cameras, home appliances and others are increasingly becoming networked. At the core of this sizeable interconnection is a set of underlying protocols that enable millions of devices to seamlessly talk to each other. Aviation, as many other industries have, utilizes the internet protocol for ground-to-ground network communications and efforts are underway to bring it to the cockpit.In 2015, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) published the second edition of Document 9896 (Doc 9896) titled: Manual on the Aeronautical Telecommunication Network (ATN) using Internet Protocol Suite (IPS) Standards and Protocol. This manual adopted the Internet protocol version 6 (IPv6) for Internet layer interoperability. Document 9896 defined data communications protocols and services to be used for implementing aeronautical telecommunication network (ATN) using the Internet protocol suite (IPS). The document provided technical specifications that addressed security, network and transport protocols, described applications, supported by ATN/IPS and provided communications guidance. The international aviation community working under the guidance of ICAO initiated work on updates to Doc 9896. Under the ICAO Communication Panel, Working Group Internetworking (WG-I) got this challenging task. Key areas of work for WG-I are related to ATN/IPS Security and ANT/IPS Mobility. Two sub-groups have been assembled to work on these elements. The ICAO anticipates the release of updated Doc 9896 in 2020. Additional ATN/IPS standardization efforts include Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics Special Committee 223 (RTCA SC-223) IPS profile development, Airlines Electronic Engineering Committee (AEEC) A658 Roadmap of IPS future activities and European Organization for Civil Aviation Equipment (EUROCAE) WG-108 development of guidance documentation.This paper describes ICAO WG-I approach to update key areas of the document in closed coordination with AEEC, RTCA and EUROCAE committees supporting the development of ATN/IPS. Additionally, the paper will explore WG-I mobility solutions under investigation, security developments, IPv6 addressing challenges and other proposed updates. Finally, as new operational expectations such as Free Route and Remote Piloted Aircraft System integration are currently pushing the boundaries set by old operational concepts, the paper identifies the emerging new challenges that will drive the ATN/IPS development beyond 2020. They are related to future voice utilization, System Wide Information Management and Remotely Piloted Aircraft System deployment. IPS systems are seen as the only way forward.

Apaza, Rafael↗

Detect-and-Avoid Alerting Performance for High-Speed UAS and Non-Cooperative Aircraft

This paper presents a set of experiments designed to assess the viability of using a smaller Detect and Avoid (DAA) volume for large Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) when they are trying to remain well clear of non-cooperative visual flight rules (VFR) aircraft, in compliance with Federal regulations. The current DAA volume was defined for both cooperative and non-cooperative VFR traffic by the work of RTCA Special Committee 228 in 2017, in what is referred to in this paper as the Phase 1 standards. Subsequent work by the committee has been focused on enabling operations by smaller UAS that cannot carry the heavy radars required for the Phase 1 DAA Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS). The work discussed in this paper will explore whether a Phase 1 UAS using a Phase 1 radar can use the reduced non-cooperative DAA alerting volume being studied for smaller, slower Phase 2 UAS without significantly degrading system safety. The study uses UAS models and background traffic from previous Phase 1 and Phase 2 research to run an unmitigated simulation that will examine alerting performance using different DAA well clear definitions. The primary metrics are also tied to the alerting performance of the DAA system, and include average alerting times, probabilities of missed and late alerts, and the probability of a near mid-air collision given a loss of "well clear," as defined by the DAA system. Results are expected to help RTCA make the determination whether or not the DAA well clear definition for Phase 1 UAS can be reduced for non-cooperative VFR aircraft.

Cone, Andrew C.↗

ACES Study of DAA-Mitigated UAS Operations SC-228 Requirements Sub Group

Realization of the expected proliferation of Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) operations in the National Airspace System (NAS) depends on the development and validation of performance standards for UAS Detect and Avoid (DAA) Systems. The RTCA Special Committee 228 is charged with leading the development of draft Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for UAS DAA Systems. NASA, as a participating member of RTCA SC-228 is committed to supporting the development and validation of draft requirements as well as the safety substantiation and end-to-end assessment of DAA system performance. A recent study conducted using NASA's ACES (Airspace Concept Evaluation System) simulation capability begins to address questions surrounding the development of draft MOPS for DAA systems by assessing DAA performance in a NAS-wide context. ACES analyses were conducted to determine the impact of varying elements of UAS pilot performance and uncertainty mitigations on DAA system performance. Simulations were conducted with recorded cooperative and non-cooperative VFR (Visual Flight Rules) traffic to accurately model UAS encounters with other NAS traffic (ATC (Air Traffic Control) being responsible for separation with other IFR (Instrument Flight Rules) aircraft) and with roughly 25, 000 simulated UAS operations The number of Loss of Well Clear (LoWC) events were recorded across the range of independent variables: pilot response time, horizontal LoWC prediction buffer and horizontal LoWC resolution buffer. The number of LoWC events was compared to the unmitigated case (without the benefit of a DAA system) to determine the resultant risk-ratio for each of 8 simulation conditions. The parameter trades presented by the resultant DAA system performance (risk ratio) will be used by SC 228 to inform decisions about future requirements development and validation efforts.

Detect-and-Avoid↗

UAS Integration in the NAS Project: Fast-Time Simulation Studies

NASA is working on the project for Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) integration into the National Airspace System (NAS) and helping the RTCA's Special Committee 228 (RTCA SC-228) to develop the minimum operational performance standards (MOPS) for detect-and avoid (DAA) systems. The Ames' Separation Assurance-Sense and Avoid Interoperability (SSI) team for the project is supporting this effort through fast-time simulation studies using the Airspace Concept Evaluation System (ACES) simulation platform. This presentation introduces the Ames SSI team's tasks and shows some results from accomplished fast-time simulation studies. It is a part of overall presentations for NASA's efforts for the UAS integration into the NAS project.

fast time simulation↗

Airspace Safety Threshold Study: NAS-Wide Encounter Rate Evaluation Using Historical Radar Data and ACES

Realization of the expected proliferation of Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) operations in the National Airspace System (NAS) depends on the development and validation of performance standards for UAS Detect and Avoid (DAA) Systems. The RTCA Special Committee 228 (SC-228) is charged with leading the development of draft Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for UAS DAA Systems. NASA, as a participating member of RTCA SC-228 is committed to supporting the development and validation of draft requirements as well as the safety substantiation and end-to-end assessment of DAA system performance. With regard to the safety aspect being studied by the SC-228 DAA Safety sub-group, NASA has conducted a study using the ACES (Airspace Concept Evaluation System) simulation capability to determine: 1) the rate at which IFR aircraft encounter other IFR and VFR aircraft, and 2) the rate at which UAS aircraft encounter VFR aircraft as well as the corresponding encounter geometries. Five different separation thresholds were used (two for encounter and one each for well-clear, near mid-air collision, and closest point of approach). The results will be used by the SC-228 DAA Safety sub-group to inform decisions about the safety aspect of UAS DAA systems and future requirements development and validation efforts.

encounter geometry↗

Airspace Safety Threshold Study: Status Update to SC-228 DAA Safety Sub-Group

Realization of the expected proliferation of Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) operations in the National Airspace System (NAS) depends on the development and validation of performance standards for UAS Detect and Avoid (DAA) Systems. The RTCA Special Committee 228 is charged with leading the development of draft Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for UAS DAA Systems. NASA, as a participating member of RTCA SC-228, is committed to supporting the development and validation of draft requirements as well as the safety substantiation and end-to-end assessment of DAA system performance. A recent study conducted using NASA's ACES (Airspace Concept Evaluation System) simulation capability begins to address questions surrounding the development of draft MOPS for DAA systems. ACES analyses were conducted to determine: 1) the rate at which IFR aircraft encounter other IFR and VFR aircraft, and 2) the rate at which UAS aircraft encounter VFR aircraft. Five different separation thresholds were used (two for encounter and one each for well-clear, near mid-air collision, and closest point of approach). The results will be used by SC228 to inform decisions about the safety aspect of UAS DAA systems and future requirements development and validation efforts.

Risk ratio↗

Detect-and-Avoid Alerting Performance for High-Speed UAS and Non-Cooperative Aircraft

This paper presents a set of experiments designed to assess the viability of using a smaller Detect and Avoid (DAA) volume for large Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) when they are trying to remain well clear of non-cooperative visual flight rules (VFR) aircraft, in compliance with Federal regulations. The current DAA volume was defined for both cooperative and non-cooperative VFR traffic by the work of RTCA (Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics) Special Committee 228 in 2017, in what is referred to in this paper as the Phase 1 standards. Subsequent work by the committee has been focused on enabling operations by smaller UAS that cannot carry the heavy radars required for the Phase 1 DAA Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS). The work discussed in this paper will explore whether a Phase 1 UAS using a Phase 1 radar can use the reduced non-cooperative DAA alerting volume being studied for smaller, slower Phase 2 UAS without significantly degrading system safety. The study uses UAS models and background traffic from previous Phase 1 and Phase 2 research to run an unmitigated simulation that will examine alerting performance using different DAA well clear definitions. The primary metrics are also tied to the alerting performance of the DAA system, and include average alerting times, probabilities of missed and late alerts, and the probability of a near mid-air collision given a loss of "well clear," as defined by the DAA system. Results are expected to help RTCA make the determination whether or not the DAA well clear definition for Phase 1 UAS can be reduced for non-cooperative VFR aircraft.

UAS↗

DAA Use Case for Auto Cargo m:N Operations

A detect and avoid use-case was developed to highlight detect and avoid issues associated with m:N operations in the auto cargo domain. This work is being done in conjunction with industry partners and developed for the Operational Scenario and Environmental Description (OSED) for RTCA SC-228. The detect and avoid function is critical, required technology for unmanned aircraft to operation in the national airspace. RTCA SC-228 has published MOPS (phase 1 & 2) detailing the requirements and methods of compliance. This work will help address additional operational aspects of how/when DAA will be employed by unmanned systems. Specifically, this work focuses on “auto cargo” operations. Auto cargo, in this context, refers to regularly scheduled cargo-size aircraft that are flown remotely. The Remote Pilot In Command (RPIC), in this case, is responsible for multiple aircraft, flown simultaneously. The use-case details the use of DAA in this context, the potential issues and gaps that exist.

multi-vehicle control↗

Hazard Perception and Avoidance (HPA) Overview

This short presentation is intended to provide RTCA Special Committee 147 (SC-147) members an overview of Advanced Air Mobility's Hazard Perception and Avoidance (HPA) technical area. This talk includes background on HPA's high-level objectives, as well as quick view of their upcoming simulation and flight test work. The presentation ends with plans for how HPA will coordinate with RTCA going forward.

automation↗

Avionics system design for high energy fields: A guide for the designer and airworthiness specialist

Because of the significant differences in transient susceptibility, the use of digital electronics in flight critical systems, and the reduced shielding effects of composite materials, there is a definite need to define pracitices which will minimize electromagnetic susceptibility, to investigate the operational environment, and to develop appropriate testing methods for flight critical systems. The design practices which will lead to reduced electromagnetic susceptibility of avionics systems in high energy fields is described. The levels of emission that can be anticipated from generic digital devices. It is assumed that as data processing equipment becomes an ever larger part of the avionics package, the construction methods of the data processing industry will increasingly carry over into aircraft. In Appendix 1 tentative revisions to RTCA DO-160B, Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for Airborne Equipment, are presented. These revisions are intended to safeguard flight critical systems from the effects of high energy electromagnetic fields. A very extensive and useful bibliography on both electromagnetic compatibility and avionics issues is included.

Mcconnell, Roger A.↗

A new approach to equipment testing

Considerable controversy has arisen during the recent discussions over a new version of the RTCA DO160C/ED 14C Section 22 document at the European Committee for Aviation Electronics. Section 22 is concerned with lightning waveform tests to equipment. Investigations of some of these controversies with circuit analysis and measurements indicate the impedance characteristics required of the transient generators and the possibility of testing to a voltage limit even for current waveforms.

Hardwick, C. J.↗

The new Section 23 of DO160C/ED14C lightning testing of externally mounted electrical equipment

The new Section 23 is introduced which has only very recently been fully approved by the RTCA for incorporation into the first revision of DO160C/ED14C. Full threat lightning direct effects testing of equipment is entirely new to DO160, the only existing lightning testing is transient testing for LRU's (Line Replaceable Units) by pin or cable bundle injection methods, for equipment entirely contained within the airframe and assumed to be unaffected by direct effects. This testing required transients of very low amplitude compared with lightning itself, whereas the tests now to be described involve full threat lightning testing, that is using the previously established severe parameters of lightning appropriate to the Zone, such as 200 kA for Zone 1A as in AC20-136. Direct effects (i.e., damage) testing involves normally the lightning current arc attaching to the object under test (or very near to it) so submitting it to full potential for the electric, mechanical, thermal and shock damage which is caused by high current arcing. Since equipment for any part of the airframe require qualification, tests to demonstrate safety of equipment in fuel vapor regions of the airframe are also included.

Burrows, B. J. C.↗

Design of lightning protection for a full-authority digital engine control

The steps and procedures are described which are necessary to achieve a successful lightning-protection design for a state-of-the-art Full-Authority Digital Engine Control (FADEC) system. The engine and control systems used as examples are fictional, but the design and verification methods are real. Topics discussed include: applicable airworthiness regulation, selection of equipment transient design and control levels for the engine/airframe and intra-engine segments of the system, the use of cable shields, terminal-protection devices and filter circuits in hardware protection design, and software approaches to minimize upset potential. Shield terminations, grounding, and bonding are also discussed, as are the important elements of certification and test plans, and the role of tests and analyses. Also included are examples of multiple-stroke and multiple-burst testing. A review of design pitfalls and challenges, and status of applicable test standards such as RTCA DO-160, Section 22, are presented.

Dargi, M.↗

Formal methods and digital systems validation for airborne systems

This report has been prepared to supplement a forthcoming chapter on formal methods in the FAA Digital Systems Validation Handbook. Its purpose is as follows: to outline the technical basis for formal methods in computer science; to explain the use of formal methods in the specification and verification of software and hardware requirements, designs, and implementations; to identify the benefits, weaknesses, and difficulties in applying these methods to digital systems used on board aircraft; and to suggest factors for consideration when formal methods are offered in support of certification. These latter factors assume the context for software development and assurance described in RTCA document DO-178B, 'Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification,' Dec. 1992.

Rushby, John↗

DGPS ground station integrity monitoring

This paper summarizes the development of a unique Differential Global Positioning System (DGPS) ground station integrity monitor which can offer improved availability over conventional code-differential monitoring systems. This monitoring technique, called code/carrier integrity monitoring (CCIM), uses the highly stable integrated Doppler measurement to smooth the relatively noisy code-phase measurements. The pseudorange correction is therefore comprised of the integrated Doppler measurement plus the CCIM offset. The design and operational results of a DGPS ground station integrity monitor are reported. A robust integrity monitor is realized which is optimized for applications such as the Special Category I (SCAT-I) defined in the RTCA Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards.

Skidmore, Trent A.↗