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At least 37 records · Page 2

R and DE Robotic Sensor Intern Team: Advanced Sensor Suite Prototype

The Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear complex includes many hazardous and challenging environments that must be inspected remotely and routinely for structural integrity evaluation and long-term planning purposes. The H-Canyon Air Exhaust (HCAEX) Tunnel is an example of such an environment where a biannual inspection is currently performed. Presently inspections are performed by teleoperated robotic crawlers which provide low-res video feedback to the structural engineers. Advanced sensors: including Lidar and panospheric hi-res cameras have the potential to provide additional valuable data in future inspections. The primary goal of the sensor suite is to provide an internal 3D map of the HCAEX tunnel. Possible sensors were a stereo camera, a 3D Lidar, or a 2D Lidar that would need to be spun around. The issues with the stereo camera were that it does not have a large field-of-view and that its depth information was not nearly as accurate as even the baseline Lidars. The Hokuyo UTM-30LX-EW shown below provides a 270 deg. FOV with high accuracy and resolution while the largest FOV on a 3D Lidar is 40 deg. This was the reason a 2D Lidar was chosen over the 3D Lidar. Even though the 2D Lidar requires additional components and software to generate a 3D map, its FOV advantage is too great given that the HCAEX tunnel is a relatively confined space. Along with the Lidar, a camera sensor, IMU sensor, pan-tit unit, and on board computer needed to be identified. The two panospheric cameras allow for full 360 deg. FOV. The IMU will give data on the state of the robot inside the tunnel. The computer is used to gather and process data on board and to control the pan-tilt system. Mounts were designed and 3D printed to build the prototype of the sensor suite. It was designed to have the Lidar on top With its full FOV free while having the camera below and as close to together as possible while still leaving much of their FOV visible. The design also managed the cables such that they were unlikely to be damaged if in tension and so that they did not intrude much on the cameras vision. The sensor tree developed for the H-Canyon tunnel inspection project produces a large quantity of camera and Lidar data. a postprocessing pipeline was created to facilitate the analysis of these data. The pipeline follows the following routine: 1) Registration - Salient local features in subsequent scans are identified and used to align the scans With one another. This allows production of a single cohesive map of the tunnel. 2) Sensor Fusion - RGB camera data is 'painted' onto the depth data created by the Lidar. 3) Segmentation - Individual surfaces from within the scene are segmented out separately for individual analysis. 4) Degradation Analysis - Automatic mapping of local deviation from the plane in position or surface normal is performed, as is detection of exposed rebar using Lidar return intensity. 2) Obstacle Detection - Lidar data is also used in real time to detect obstacles in the environment. This could give feedback to the operator to successfully drive in the tunnel. 6) Graphic User Interface - a custom GUI was created to facilitate customer use of the system. The system provides real-time feedback from both the cameras and Lidar. The Lidar point-cloud data is also used for obstacle detection. As the Lidar spins, various algorithms are run to analyze the current 'slice' and obstacles in the environment are determined and registered on a cost-map. A Graphical User Interface (GUI) was developed to allow the user to easily command the crawler to set the rotational speed of the Lidar, perform a scan, and register and save the 3D generated cloud after a scan is done. For the good of the crawler, a critical aspect of the GUI design is to allow the user to cancel a scan any time after it is commanded and before it is saved. The sensor trees depth accuracy was evaluated in comparison to a high end commercial FARO Terrestrial Laser Scanner (TLS) with specifications for millimeter accuracy at distances above 10 m. For the purposes of these tests, the depth measurements produced by the TLS were taken as ground truth. Example test wall panels were scanned with the TLS and postprocessed with its proprietary software, and subsequently scanned with the sensor tree system. The two scans were manually aligned and for each point in the output cloud from the sensor tree, the distance to the nearest ground truth point in the FARO cloud was determined. 98.7% of all produced points were within the specified target range of 6 mm, with an average deviation of 1.75 mm. The test walls used have an overall in-wall depth variation of around 40 mm.

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CEBAF Accelerator Tunnel Robot Project

Advancements in the field of robotics allow for the use of remotely controlled robots to perform tasks that have typically required human intervention. Jefferson Lab has explored the possibilities of robots placed in the accelerator tunnel to perform remote inspections that would otherwise require powering down equipment and completing lengthy radiological surveys that impact beam operations. A robotic solution ? driven by a human operator ? could not only reduce accelerator down time but also support the Lab's radiation exposure policy (known as "ALARA" - As Low As Reasonably Acceptable) by handling routine tunnel and beamline investigations in place of a human being. However, operating a remote device in a radioactive, high electronic-noise area is not a trivial task and drop-in solutions are rarely as simple as they seem. We will present the past prototypes that were tested as well follow-on technology developed from the project. We will also briefly survey current applications of robots at accelerator facilities with an eye toward future applications.

McGuckin, Theodore↗

On distant neutron logging (laser methods)

We discuss the concept of remote inspection of the isotopic composition of objects in space by products of nuclear reactions (including the fission of heavy isotopes), initiated by directed accelerated beams of ultracold neutrons. Despite the partial unavailability of quantitative estimates of specific situations, the proposed approach is internally consistent. We emphasise the urgency of development the problem in question and offer directions for further research.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Processing Large Sensor Data Sets for Safeguards: The Knowledge Generation System

Modern nuclear facilities, such as reprocessing plants, present inspectors with significant challenges due in part to the sheer amount of equipment that must be safeguarded. The Sandia-developed and patented Knowledge Generation system was designed to automatically analyze large amounts of safeguards data to identify anomalous events of interest by comparing sensor readings with those expected from a process of interest and operator declarations. This paper describes a demonstration of the Knowledge Generation system using simulated accountability tank sensor data to represent part of a reprocessing plant. The demonstration indicated that Knowledge Generation has the potential to address several problems critical to the future of safeguards. It could be extended to facilitate remote inspections and trigger random inspections. Knowledge Generation could analyze data to establish trust hierarchies, to facilitate safeguards use of operator-owned sensors.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

GMLC Southeast Regional Consortium: Technology Driven Improvements to Power Grid Resiliency

Recognizing that electric grid challenges can differ by geographical regions across the US, the Department of Energy (DOE) created a pioneer regional partnership to provide technical assistance to stakeholders facing grid modernization challenges. The southeast regional teams will transfer technologies developed under DOE auspices to stakeholders for testing, evaluation, and market validation. Regional members will help define critical challenges and pave the way for transition of technologies to the commercial sector. Using the depth and expertise at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Savannah River National Laboratory, University of Tennessee’s CURENT, CAPER and the Clemson 20 MVA Electrical Grid Laboratory—along with critical industry partners, such as Duke Energy, TVA, Southern Company, EPB, and Santee Cooper—the Southeast Regional Consortium team will conduct collaborative research to advance the state of the grid in the Southeast region and improve power system resiliency to enhance responsiveness, enable faster restoration of power, and increase distributed energy resource (DER) concentrations. This report provides details of the technical research and demonstration projects accomplished by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) as part of the Southeast Regional Consortium. Specifically, ORNL analyzed the application of optical current and voltage measurements impedance relays which would enable step distance protection to be deployed on distribution systems. This would improve the precision of determining the geographic location of faults, increase network topology flexibility, and allow bi-directional power flow. Next, ORNL deployed time sensitive networking technology on the EPB fiberoptic data network to study the impact of increased sensor traffic on existing supervisory control and data acquisition data. The deterministic latency and high bandwidth were demonstrated by remotely inspecting a substation using a drone with full HD streaming video operated at the EPB Control Center. Finally, a new application-based communication and control system developed at ORNL call CSEISMIC was tested for future deployment on the EPB Control Center microgrid using a hardware-in-the-loop testbed that was also developed at ORNL. The controller was able to successfully optimize ancillary service when the microgrid is connected to the distribution network. The seamless islanding, resynchronization, and reconnection of the microgrid was also demonstrated through the testing.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

The development and application of the Remotely Monitored Sealing Array (RMSA).

Advanced sealing technologies are often an integral part of a containment surveillance (CS) approach to detect undeclared diversion of nuclear materials. As adversarial capabilities continue to advance, the sophistication of the seal design must advance as well. The intelligent integration of security concepts into a physical technology used to seal monitored items is a fundamental requirement for secure containment. Seals have a broad range of capabilities. These capabilities must be matched appropriately to the application to establish the greatest effectiveness from the seal. However, many current seal designs and their application fail to provide the high confidence of detection and timely notification that can be appreciated with new technology. Additionally, as monitoring needs rapidly expand, out-pacing budgets, remote monitoring of low-cost autonomous sealing technologies becomes increasingly appealing. The Remotely Monitored Sealing Array (RMSA) utilizes this technology and has implemented cost effective security concepts establishing the high confidence that is expected of active sealing technology today. RMSA is a system of relatively low-cost but secure active loop seals for the monitoring of nuclear material containers. The sealing mechanism is a fiber optic loop that is pulsed using a low-power LED circuit with a coded signal to verify integrity. Battery life is conserved by the use of sophisticated power management techniques, permitting many years of reliable operation without battery replacement or other maintenance. Individual seals communicate by radio using a secure transmission protocol using either of two specially designated communication frequency bands. Signals are encrypted and authenticated by private key, established during the installation procedure, and the seal bodies feature both active and passive tamper indication. Seals broadcast to a central 'translator' from which information is both stored locally and/or transmitted remotely for review. The system is especially appropriate for nuclear material storage facilities, indoor or outdoor, enabling remote inspection of status rather than tedious individual seal verification, and without the need for interconnected cabling. A handheld seal verifier is also available for an inspector to verify any particular individual seal in close proximity. This paper will discuss the development of the RMSA sealing system, its capabilities, its application philosophy, and projected future trends.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Advanced Tele-operation and Shared Autonomy for Nuclearized Robotic Systems - 17333

Remotely-initiated operations have existed for more than 50 years in the nuclear weapons complex, as the environments are far too extreme for humans. We introduce the scope of the nuclear waste cleanup effort and describe some existing applications of robotics technology at specific sites. We offer summaries of both the technology that is currently used, as well as a discussion of the types of problems that the technology is applied to. We contrast this with the current state of practice in other areas where robots are deployed in the real world, such as with military infantry units. We then go on to summarize and discuss the current state of the art in advanced tele-operation research and in shared autonomy, where humans collaborate with closed-loop automation to complete tasks. Our discussion focuses on areas with particular relevance to nuclear waste management, such as remote inspection and manipulation. Armed with this background, we then identify specific technology gaps that must be closed in order to successfully bring advanced tele-operation and shared autonomy technologies to bear on problems in nuclear waste management, such as (1) environmental remediation; (2) sampling, characterization, and disposition of tanks with hazardous and highly radioactive waste and (3) decontamination and decommissioning of facilities with gloveboxes and hot cells. We propose a roadmap for how to transition the current state of the art approaches in advanced robotics and shared autonomy to practice in the nuclear industry and how to close the technology gaps previously identified. This roadmap covers not only the technical advances that need to be made, but also considers the social and societal aspects. Drawing parallels with the adoption of similar technologies in the military and other areas, we offer concrete suggestions for how to deploy these new technologies effectively into the nuclear industry from a human-centered perspective. (authors)

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Advancements in the H-Canyon Exhaust Ventilation System Inspections at the Savannah River Site - 16030

A facility safety envelope requires management of activities to ensure no unacceptable radiological or chemical hazards to the public, site worker and environment occur. While appropriate design and construction methods ensure an initial physical plant configuration, what actions must an operating Facility take to ensure the physical plant continues to meet a safety configuration throughout Facility life? While a physical walk down of the plant is a tried and true method to confirm conditions, what other methods must be used when a walk down is not possible? What inspection methods are used when balancing budget pressures against obtaining inspection data? The periodic inspections of the H-Canyon Exhaust Tunnel are performed remotely. The 2015 remote Tunnel inspection has been the most successful inspection to date. This presentation highlights the continued lessons learned with the most recent 2015 remote Tunnel inspection. These lessons learned are applicable to Facilities considering or performing remote inspections. The Recovery Crawler Project was tasked with determining if the 2014 Inspection Crawler could be retrieved, perform the retrieval if feasible and complete the inspection of the remaining sections of the exhaust tunnel that were not previously performed. The objectives for the project were met, the Inspection Crawler was deemed unusable and left in place and the Recovery Crawler performed the complete 143 meters (470 feet) of tunnel inspection and an additional 55 meters (180 feet) of exhaust tunnel inspection not previously completed. The remote inspection of a 60+ year operating Canyon Exhaust tunnel is a complex endeavor requiring close coordination of multiple organizations, adherence to Conduct of Operations, Radiological Safety, Worker Safety, etc. principles as well as alignment with Facility Safety Basis requirements. This paper discusses the challenges, actions required getting ready for the 2015 recovery and continued inspection and the hazards encountered performing the actual recovery/inspection. (authors)

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Gas centrifuge enrichment plants inspection frequency and remote monitoring issues for advanced safeguards implementation

Current safeguards approaches used by the IAEA at gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) need enhancement in order to verify declared low enriched uranium (LEU) production, detect undeclared LEU production and detect high enriched uranium (BEU) production with adequate probability using non destructive assay (NDA) techniques. At present inspectors use attended systems, systems needing the presence of an inspector for operation, during inspections to verify the mass and {sup 235}U enrichment of declared cylinders of uranium hexafluoride that are used in the process of enrichment at GCEPs. This paper contains an analysis of how possible improvements in unattended and attended NDA systems including process monitoring and possible on-site destructive analysis (DA) of samples could reduce the uncertainty of the inspector's measurements providing more effective and efficient IAEA GCEPs safeguards. We have also studied a few advanced safeguards systems that could be assembled for unattended operation and the level of performance needed from these systems to provide more effective safeguards. The analysis also considers how short notice random inspections, unannounced inspections (UIs), and the concept of information-driven inspections can affect probability of detection of the diversion of nuclear material when coupled to new GCEPs safeguards regimes augmented with unattended systems. We also explore the effects of system failures and operator tampering on meeting safeguards goals for quantity and timeliness and the measures needed to recover from such failures and anomalies.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOESC Remote Canister Closure System UT Inspection Couplant Solutions

The DOE Standard Canister (DOESC) Remote Canister Closure System is a remotely operated welding and inspection mechanism designed for the packaging of DOE-managed spent nuclear fuel into canisters. The ultrasonic testing (UT) inspection, included in the system, requires the use of water tanks that are opened to act as a couplant between the canister and the sensors. With the couplant, the UT inspection can guarantee accurate results determining imperfections in the weld.

12 - MGMT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE WASTE↗

Final Technical Report (FTR) - DE-EE0009084: Prefabricated Construction: Guidance, Technical Assistance, and Virtual Inspections

This final technical report summarizes research, case studies, and resources developed from 2020–2025 on prefabricated construction and remote virtual inspections. It documents key findings on benefits, challenges, and best practices, highlights examples from multiple states, and provides guidance to support wider adoption of these innovations in the construction sector.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

H-CANYON AIR EXHAUST TUNNEL INSPECTION VEHICLE DEVELOPMENT

The H-Canyon at Savannah River Site is a large concrete structure designed for chemical separation processes of radioactive material. The facility requires a large ventilation system to maintain negative pressure in process areas for radioactive contamination control and personnel protection. The ventilation exhaust is directed through a concrete tunnel under the facility which is approximately five feet wide and 8 feet tall that leads to a sand filter and stack. Acidic vapors in the exhaust have had a degrading effect on the surface of the concrete tunnels. Some areas have been inspected; however, the condition of other areas is unknown. Experience from historical inspections with remote controlled vehicles will be discussed along with the current challenge of inspecting levels below available access points. The area of interest in the exhaust tunnel must be accessed through a 14 X 14 inch concrete plug in the floor of the hot gang valve corridor. The purpose for the inspection is to determine the condition of the inside of the air tunnel and establish if there are any structural concerns. Various landmarks, pipe hangers and exposed rebar are used as reference points for the structural engineers when evaluating the current integrity of the air tunnel.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Systems and Tools to Facilitate Aging Management Inspections of Used Nuclear Fuel Dry Storage Systems - 18382

The Used Nuclear Fuel (UNF) dry storage systems (DSSs) are currently used at almost all the nuclear plants in the USA for the storage of their UNF as the spent fuel pools are running out of capacity to store any additional discharged fuel. Even though these DSSs are supposed to be at the reactor site for a short amount of time, they are expected to be at the reactor sites for an extended duration due to the unavailability of Interim Storage Facilities (ISF) or a permanent disposal sites like Yucca Mountain. Maintaining the integrity of the DSS canisters and storage overpacks so they can safely protect the fuel and maintain the integrity of UNF is of utmost importance during storage at reactor site ISFSI or at the ISF. Comprehensive and robust Aging Management Program (AMP) is an important aspect for DSSs to satisfy these requirements. In order to address this industry need, TN Americas have developed an enhanced NUHOMS{sup R} DSS licensed by NRC under 10 CFR Part 72 regulations and a comprehensive AMP development which includes prevention, inspection, monitoring and mitigation of any corrosion or degradation of DSS components. For DSC and HSM inspection, two remotely operating delivery systems have been developed using non-destructive examination (NDE) methods including robotic crawler and inspection ring system. This paper describes details of these developments and status of their deployment for implementation at various utility ISFSI sites. TN Americas completed the detailed design of the DSC inspection system and conducted functional tests of the inspection system on a DSC mockup and the system is ready for deployment at any NUHOMS{sup R} ISFSI site. TN Americas is committed to offer the most robust and comprehensive AMP systems, tools and services to the industry to assure the safety of the deployed DSS at the utility sites. (authors)

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Double-Shell Tank Visual Inspection Changes Resulting from the Tank 241-AY-102 Primary Tank Leak

As part of the Double-Shell Tank (DST) Integrity Program, remote visual inspections are utilized to perform qualitative in-service inspections of the DSTs in order to provide a general overview of the condition of the tanks. During routine visual inspections of tank 241-AY-102 (AY-102) in August 2012, anomalies were identified on the annulus floor which resulted in further evaluations. In October 2012, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC determined that the primary tank of AY-102 was leaking. Following identification of the tank AY-102 probable leak cause, evaluations considered the adequacy of the existing annulus inspection frequency with respect to the circumstances of the tank AY-102 1eak and the advancing age of the DST structures. The evaluations concluded that the interval between annulus inspections should be shortened for all DSTs, and each annulus inspection should cover > 95 percent of annulus floor area, and the portion of the primary tank (i.e., dome, sidewall, lower knuckle, and insulating refractory) that is visible from the annulus inspection risers. In March 2013, enhanced visual inspections were performed for the six oldest tanks: 241-AY-101, 241-AZ-101,241-AZ-102, 241-SY-101, 241-SY-102, and 241-SY-103, and no evidence of leakage from the primary tank were observed. Prior to October 2012, the approach for conducting visual examinations of DSTs was to perform a video examination of each tank's interior and annulus regions approximately every five years (not to exceed seven years between inspections). Also, the annulus inspection only covered about 42 percent of the annulus floor.

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Evaluation of H-Canyon Ventilation Exhaust Tunnel Inspection at the Savannah River Site - 20052

The Department of Energy (DOE) H-Canyon Facility at the Savannah River Site (SRS) is operated by Savannah River Nuclear Solutions (SRNS). The Facility Structural Integrity Program [1] provides a process to inspect, evaluate, and document the conditions of passive safety related structural systems and components, their degradation mechanisms and their impact on the safety envelope. The Structural Integrity Program performs periodic visual inspections to confirm the systems and components can perform their safety function and recommend corrective actions before the function is compromised. The H-Canyon Exhaust Tunnel is part of the H-Canyon Ventilation System and is periodically inspected under the Structural Integrity Program. The Tunnel performs a Safety Class passive design feature function that is available 100% of the time. The underground reinforced concrete Tunnel directs Canyon process air from the Canyon to the Sand Filter System. The radiological and chemical airborne activity coupled with the physical configuration of the tunnel precludes a manned entry into the tunnel to perform the inspection. Unlike active systems that can be subjected to physical testing to confirm capability, qualification calculations, including modeling, is performed to assess passive design feature capabilities relative to operational, accident and natural phenomena hazards events. Input for these calculations come from knowledge of field conditions, design drawings and conservative assumptions. The knowledge of field conditions comes from concrete and soil testing activities as well as inspection data. The use of cameras on crawlers to obtain inspection data and how that data is used in qualification calculations is the focus of this discussion. Remote Tunnel inspections have been performed using cameras on a stick, referred to as pole cameras, prior to Calendar Year 2003 (CY2003). Since CY2003, six camera equipped crawlers have been used. Crawlers have evolved and improved by incorporating lessons learned from the previous inspections. The latest 2019 crawler successfully traveled the entire length of the tunnel between the Canyon and Sand Filter System and captured images that were previously unseen, thus providing key visual data for the Structural Integrity Program report [2]. The inspection data serves as 1) input to qualification calculations, 2) validates current conditions remain bounded by qualification calculations, and 3) documents a record of change over time. This data is vital for the effective evaluation of the tunnel structure and aids with predicting the life cycle service life safety envelope to protect the public, environment, and facility worker. The goal of the 2019 deployment was to use a more robust vehicle to ensure travel over obstacles, perform the inspection with higher resolution cameras, and have the ability to elevate the cameras to view surfaces previously obscured by abandon-in-place ducts in the tunnel. The inspection information will serve to strengthen the input basis for qualification calculations, versus using excessive conservative calculation assumptions. This 2019 inspection was compared with previous crawler visual evidence to identify change over time to project remaining service life and confirm field conditions remain bounded by qualification calculations. The results of the 2019 Exhaust Tunnel inspection continue to improve and provide a firm basis to make sound engineering judgements regarding tunnel capability and approaches in projecting remaining service life with an aging system and component. (authors)

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Savannah River Site H-Canyon Process Exhaust Tunnel Inspection Crawler Development - 20036

This paper covers development of a remote crawler used to inspect a subterranean radiochemical process ventilation tunnel located at the Savannah River Site near Aiken, SC. The purpose of the inspection was to ascertain the apparent structural condition of the tunnel with video footage. Manned entry is prohibited due to the hazardous environment requiring a fully-remote approach. The inspection system used high-definition cameras to archive over 1000 linear feet in the tunnel. While previous inspections had been undertaken, this crawler was developed to overcome obstacles that had put tunnel regions out of reach of prior inspection platforms. (authors)

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NDE Technology Development Program for Non-Visual Volumetric Inspection Technology: Technology Screening Report

The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) located in Richland, Washington, hosted and administered a Technology Screening test that allowed four different participants to demonstrate the NDE volumetric inspection technologies that were proposed in response to the WRPS EOI. This document provides a Technology Screening test report for the initial part of Phase I of a three-phase NDE Technology Development Program designed to identify and mature a system or set of non-visual volumetric NDE technologies for Hanford DST primary liner bottom inspection. Phase I of the program will baseline the performance of current or emerging non-visual volumetric NDE technologies for their ability to detect and characterize primary liner bottom flaws, and identify candidate technologies for adaptation and maturation for Phase II of the program.

42 ENGINEERING↗

NDE Technology Development Program for Non-Visual Volumetric Inspection Technology; Sensor Effectiveness Testing Report

The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) located in Richland, Washington, hosted and administered Sensor Effectiveness Testing that allowed four different participants to demonstrate the NDE volumetric inspection technologies that were previously demonstrated during the Technology Screening session. This document provides a Sensor Effectiveness Testing report for the final part of Phase I of a three-phase NDE Technology Development Program designed to identify and mature a system or set of non-visual volumetric NDE technologies for Hanford DST primary liner bottom inspection. Phase I of the program will baseline the performance of current or emerging non-visual volumetric NDE technologies for their ability to detect and characterize primary liner bottom flaws, and identify candidate technologies for adaptation and maturation for Phase II of the program.

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