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NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Government Personnel Participation in Suborbital Space Flight

In 2020, NASA issued a Request for Information (RFI) from potential sources for Suborbital Crew (SubC) space transportation services. NASA recognizes the advancement of the commercial suborbital space flight industry and is currently working to develop suborbital transportation for Government personnel that could fly on commercially available suborbital vehicles and determine a systems qualification approach for flight risk acceptance. Prior examples of risk assessment such as the purchase of Soyuz missions serve as a foundation for how the US Government’s best technical experts can partner with a successfully flying industry provider to understand risks. More recently, NASA, the FAA, and industry have successfully demonstrated that a company-owned operation with government oversight can successfully launch Government Astronauts safely. This paper explores the challenges and opportunities presented with the use of suborbital vehicles by Government personnel and how industry might leverage the Government’s efforts to maximize the success of the suborbital space industry.

Risk Management↗
NASA NTRS2020

Ensemble Methodologies for Astronaut Cancer Risk Assessment in the face of Large Uncertainties

A new approach to NASA space radiation risk modeling has successfully extended the current NASA probabilistic cancer risk model to an ensemble framework able to consider sub-model parameter uncertainty (e.g. uncertainty in a radiation quality parameter) as well as model-form uncertainty associated with differing theoretical or empirical formalisms (e.g. combined dose-rate and radiation quality effects). Ensemble methodologies are already widely used in weather prediction, modeling of infectious disease outbreaks, and certain terrestrial radiation protection applications to better understand how uncertainty may influence risk decision-making. Applying ensemble methodologies to space radiation risk projections offers the potential to efficiently incorporate emerging research results, allow for the incorporation of future (including international) models, improve uncertainty quantification for underlying sub-models developed against sparse experimental data, and reduce the impact of subjective bias on risk projections. Moreover, risk forecasting across an ensemble of multiple predictive models can provide stakeholders additional information on risk acceptance if current health/medical standards cannot be met or the level of knowledge doesn’t permit a specific risk or exposure limit to be developed for future space exploration missions. In this work, ensemble risk projections implementing multiple sub-models of radiation quality, dose and dose-rate effectiveness factors, excess risk, and latency as ensemble members are presented. Initial consensus methods for ensemble model weights and correlations to account for individual model bias are discussed. In these analyses, the ensemble forecast compares well to results from NASA's current operational cancer risk projection model used to assess permissible exposure limits and permissible mission durations for astronauts. However, a large range of projected risk values are obtained at the upper 95th confidence level where models must extrapolate beyond available biological data sets; closer agreement is seen at the median + one sigma due to the inherent similarities in available models. Future work, including the addition of new models and methods for statistical correlation between predictive members are discussed to define alternate ways of thinking about risk and ‘acceptable’ uncertainty with respect to NASA’s current permissible exposure limits.

space radiation↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Ensemble Cancer Risk Model for Astronaut Risk Assessment

A new approach to NASA space radiation risk modeling has successfully extended the current NASA probabilistic cancer risk model to an ensemble framework able to consider sub-model parameter uncertainty (e.g. uncertainty in a radiation quality parameter) as well as model-form uncertainty associated with differing theoretical or empirical formalisms (e.g. combined dose-rate and radiation quality effects). Ensemble methodologies are already widely used in weather prediction, modeling of infectious disease outbreaks, and certain terrestrial radiation protection applications to better understand how uncertainty may influence risk decision-making. Applying ensemble methodologies to space radiation risk projections offers the potential to efficiently incorporate emerging research results, allow for the incorporation of future (including international) models, improve uncertainty quantification for underlying sub-models developed against sparse experimental data, and reduce the impact of subjective bias on risk projections. Moreover, risk forecasting across an ensemble of multiple predictive models can provide stakeholders additional information on risk acceptance if current health/medical standards cannot be met or the level of knowledge doesn’t permit a specific risk or exposure limit to be developed for future space exploration missions. In this work, ensemble risk projections implementing multiple sub-models of radiation quality, dose and dose-rate effectiveness factors, excess risk, and latency as ensemble members are presented. Initial consensus methods for ensemble model weights and correlations to account for individual model bias are discussed. In these analyses, the ensemble forecast compares well to results from NASA's current operational cancer risk projection model used to assess permissible exposure limits and permissible mission durations for astronauts. However, a large range of projected risk values are obtained at the upper 95th confidence level where models must extrapolate beyond available biological data sets; closer agreement is seen at the median + one sigma due to the inherent similarities in available models. Future work, including the addition of new models and methods for statistical correlation between predictive members are discussed to define alternate ways of thinking about risk and ‘acceptable’ uncertainty with respect to NASA’s current permissible exposure limits.

Lisa C Simonsen↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Government Astronaut Participation In Suborbital Spaceflight

In 2020, NASA issued a Request for Information (RFI) from potential sources for Suborbital Crew (SubC) Space Transportation Services. NASA recognizes the advancement of the commercial suborbital spaceflight industry and is currently working to develop suborbital transportation for Government personnel, that could fly on commercially available suborbital vehicles and determine a systems qualification approach for flight risk acceptance.

Suborbital↗
NASA NTRS2004

Human Health Risk Assessment Simulations in a Distributed Environment for Shuttle Launch

During the launch of a rocket under prevailing weather conditions, commanders at Cape Canaveral Air Force station evaluate the possibility of whether wind blown toxic emissions might reach civilian and military personnel in the near by area. In our model, we focused mainly on Hydrogen chloride (HCL), Nitrogen oxides (NOx) and Nitric acid (HNO3), which are non-carcinogenic chemicals as per United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) classification. We have used the hazard quotient model to estimate the number of people at risk. It is based on the number of people with exposure above a reference exposure level that is unlikely to cause adverse health effects. The risk to the exposed population is calculated by multiplying the individual risk and the number in exposed population. The risk values are compared against the acceptable risk values and GO or NO-go situation is decided based on risk values for the Shuttle launch. The entire model is simulated over the web and different scenaria can be generated which allows management to choose an optimum decision.

Thirumalainambi, Rajkumar↗
NASA NTRS2000

Establishing Hazardous Gas Launch Commit Criteria for the Space Shuttle External Tank Intertank Compartment

Until recently, the simultaneous detection and evaluation of multiple Space Transportation System (STS) element compartments for propellant leakage was not possible during the External Tank (ET) pre-pressurization (pre-press) phase of propellant loading; late in the loading sequence (T-3 min to T-0). There exist launch commit criteria (LCCS) designed to protect against leaks resulting in flammable mixtures in the intertank during the functional life of the ET; start of propellant loading through ET-Orbiter separation. However thus far, leak protection had relied on the premise that if a propellant supply system leak were to exist, it would be a leak of fixed area present at the start of propellant loading (dumb leak mode) and such a leak could be detected earlier in the loading sequence than the pre-press phase. No measures had ever been implemented which would protect against leaks potentially developing late in the loading sequence (smart leak mode), The STS community had baselined this situation as an accepted risk their decision supported by exhaustive hardware acceptance criteria and a history of many successful launches. With the recent development of improvements to the hazardous gas detection system (HGDS), an opportunity arose to monitor the intertank compartment for hazardous gas concentrations beyond the T-3 minute mark. In this timeframe the propellant supply system is pressurized for flight and protection was sought against potential leaks generated by this pressurization process. The challenge at hand was to develop LCCs in this timeframe that were not too conservative to unnecessarily prohibit a launch, yet not too liberal to endanger crew safety and mission success. Since essentially no measurement history existed in this timeframe, the LCCs would have to rely on analysis alone. At NASA's direction, Lockheed Martin Michoud Space Systems (LMMSS) developed requirements that would protect against a smart leak during pre-press. A smart leak protection strategy is noteworthy from an STS main propulsion system (NWS) community perspective. This paper presents the resultant requirements as well as the technical and program issues involved with establishing hazardous gas LCCs for the ET intertank compartment.

Baran, Adam J.↗
NASA NTRS2004

Overview and Status of the Bioastronautics Critical Path Roadmap (BCPR)

Viewgraphs on the status and overview of the Bioastronautics Critical Path Roadmap (BCPR) are presented. The topics include: 1) BCPR Objectives; 2) BCPR and OBPR Program Management; 3) BCPR Disciplines & Cross-Cutting Areas; 4) Characteristics of BCPR Reference Missions; 5) Bioastronautics Timetable (notional); 6) BCPR Processes Risk Identification, Assessment, and Management; 7) Types of BCPR Risks; 8) Enabling Questions Categories; 9) Risk Mitigation Status; 10) Defining Levels of Accepted Risk; 11) BCPR Integration; 12) BCPR Implementation, Integration, and Validation; 13) BCPR Refinement Schedule; 14) Academy Review; 15) Rating Bioastronautics Risks; 16) Risk Rating Exercises; 17) Human Health Risk Assessment Criteria (examples); 18) A Recent Risk Rating Exercise; 19) Consensus Workshop Background; 20) Consensus Workshop Rating Analysis; 21) Consensus Workshop Selected Preliminary Recommendations; and 22) Access to BCPR Content.

Charles, John↗
NASA NTRS2019

A Risk Informed Approach to Reliability Requirements Tailoring

Every institution has their “recipe” for success. Cell phones and personal computers seem like they are designed to be obsolete in 2-3 years. Automobiles seem like they are designed to have a power train failure within 1000 miles of the extended warranty expiration; at least that’s been my experience. The Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) is not any different. JPL has a tried and proven recipe for success because in space things can’t fail. Or else. However, in today’s competitive environment and funding limitations, that recipe for success is being challenged and the resultant increased risk accepted. This paper will describe JPL’s Risk Informed Decision Making (RIDM) approach to tailoring reliability requirements based on mission classification and other project characteristics.

Klohoker, John↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Application of Objectives-Driven Assurance Cases to System Development in an Evolving Acquisition Model

System properties such as “safety” and “dependability” cannot, in practice, be proven, and must be argued in an “assurance case” aimed at supporting risk-acceptance decisions that have to be made by system acquirers and/or regulatory authorities. The paper is concerned with applications of the “assurance case” idea early in design and development of new systems, when (apart from dedicated testing) the only available operating experience information derives from previous (non-identical) systems. Much of the discussion is based on an evolving acquisition model at the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration; previously, most major systems were developed in-house, but some major systems will now be developed by and acquired from commercial providers. Key points discussed include the following. (1) By promoting a particular kind of focused discussion between acquirers and providers, the use of assurance cases should be particularly valuable under the new acquisition model. (2) In principle, objectives-driven (sometimes called “performance-based”) approaches to assurance of performance have significant advantages in cases where they are applicable. (3) For truly novel systems, completeness of the safety analysis is a significant issue; it is important for the assurance case to include a commitment by the provider (or applicant) to seriously pursue analysis of operating experience, so that previously unrecognized hazards can be identified and addressed. (4) Inquiries into major accidents often point to deficiencies in management oversight in all parts of the life cycle; management processes need to be addressed in the formulation and the implementation of an assurance case. Under the new acquisition model, these considerations imply a serious reconsideration of the way in which the development process is managed by both providers and acquirers.

Objectives-driven↗
NASA NTRS2008

Risks Associated with Long-Term Spaceflight

Requirements driving the HHC work and deliverables are derived from the Human Research Program requirements, as well as Agency standards regarding the maintenance of human health and performance and a programmatic review of the existing evidence to support identified risks. Agency human health and performance standards define acceptable risk for each type and duration of exploration mission. It is critical to have the best available scientific and clinical evidence in setting and validating these standards. In addition, it is imperative that the best available evidence on preventing and mitigating human health and performance risks is incorporated into exploration mission and vehicle designs.

Francisco, David↗
NASA NTRS2016

Electrical, Electronic and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts in the New Space Paradigm: When is Better the Enemy of Good Enough?

As the space business rapidly evolves to accommodate a lower cost model of development and operation via concepts such as commercial space and small spacecraft (aka, CubeSats), traditional EEE parts screening and qualification methods are being scrutinized under a risk-reward trade space. In this presentation, two basic concepts will be the overarching theme: 1) The movement from complete risk aversion EEE parts methods to managing and/or accepting risk via alternate approaches; and, 2) A discussion of over-design focusing on both electrical design performance and bounding margins.

Small spacecraft↗
NASA NTRS2017

Electrical, Electronic and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts in the New Space Paradigm: When is Better the Enemy of Good Enough?

As the space business rapidly evolves to accommodate a lower cost model of development and operation via concepts such as commercial space and small spacecraft (aka, CubeSats and swarms), traditional EEE parts screening and qualification methods are being scrutinized under a risk-reward trade space. In this presentation, two basic concepts will be discussed: (1) The movement from complete risk aversion EEE parts methods to managing and/or accepting risk via alternate approaches; and, (2) A discussion of emerging assurance methods to reduce overdesign as well emerging model based mission assurance (MBMA) concepts. center dot Example scenarios will be described as well as consideration for trading traditional versus alternate methods.

LaBel, Kenneth A.↗
NASA NTRS2018

Electrical, Electronic and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts in the New Space Paradigm: When is Better the Enemy of Good Enough?

As the space business rapidly evolves to accommodate a lower cost model of development and operation via concepts such as commercial space and small spacecraft (aka, CubeSats), traditional EEE parts screening and qualification methods are being scrutinized under a risk-reward trade space. In this presentation, two basic concepts will be the overarching theme: 1) The movement from complete risk aversion EEE parts methods to managing andor accepting risk via alternate approaches; and, 2) A discussion of over-design focusing on both electrical design performance and bounding margins.

Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE↗
DOE OSTI2021

Miscalculation, Misperception and Risk Reduction

In the current security environment, the most likely wars for which the US and its allies must be prepared are wars against nuclear-armed states. Such wars bring unique risks of both vertical and horizontal escalation. Some are “accepted risks;” for example, the US may choose to escalate a conflict to clarify its commitment to an issue and defend its interest. Other are “unacceptable risks;” especially, the risk of miscalculation by the U.S. or an adversary. The focus here is on this latter category. Miscalculation is an error of judgment—the failure to accurately assess a situation. Miscalculation can result from hidden, incomplete, or ambiguous information, or from inaccurate processing of available information because of bias, overconfidence, denial, delusion, etc. Miscalculation is related to misperception. For some, they are synonymous. This paper characterizes the risks of miscalculation and introduces a discussion of a risk mitigation strategy.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
NASA NTRS2016

Electrical, Electronic and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts in the New Space Paradigm: When is Better the Enemy of Good Enough?

As the space business rapidly evolves to accommodate a lower cost model of development and operation via concepts such as commercial space and small spacecraft (aka, CubeSats), traditional EEE parts screening and qualification methods are being scrutinized under a risk-reward trade space. In this presentation, two basic concepts will be the overarching theme: 1) The movement from complete risk aversion EEE parts methods to managing and or accepting risk via alternate approaches; and, 2) A discussion of over-design focusing on both electrical design performance and bounding margins.

Electrical↗
NASA NTRS2011

Orbiter Window Hypervelocity Impact Strength Evaluation

When the Space Shuttle Orbiter incurs damage on its windowpane during flight from particles traveling at hypervelocity speeds, it produces a distinctive damage that reduces the overall strength of the pane. This damage has the potential to increase the risk associated with a safe return to Earth. Engineers at Boeing and NASA/JSC are called to Mission Control to evaluate the damage and provide an assessment on the risk to the crew. Historically, damages like these were categorized as "accepted risk" associated with manned spaceflight, and as long as the glass was intact, engineers gave a "go ahead" for entry for the Orbiter. Since the Columbia accident, managers have given more scrutiny to these assessments, and this has caused the Orbiter window engineers to capitalize on new methods of assessments for these damages. This presentation will describe the original methodology that was used to asses the damages, and introduce a philosophy new to the Shuttle program for assessing structural damage, reliability/risk-based engineering. The presentation will also present a new, recently adopted method for assessing the damage and providing management with a reasonable assessment on the realities of the risk to the crew and vehicle for return.

Estes, Lynda R.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Risk Management of Jettisoned Objects in LEO

The construction and maintenance of the International Space Station (ISS) has led to the release of many objects into its orbital plane, usually during the course of an extra-vehicular activity (EVA). Such releases are often unintentional, but in a growing number of cases, the jettison has been intentional, conducted after a careful assessment of the net risk to the partnership and to other objects in space. Since its launch in 1998 the ISS has contributed on average at least one additional debris object that is simultaneously in orbit with the station, although the number varies widely from zero to eight at any one moment. All of these objects present potential risks to other objects in orbit. Whether it comes from known and tracked orbiting objects or from unknown or untrackable objects, collision with orbital debris can have disastrous consequences. Objects greater than 10cm are generally well documented and tracked, allowing orbiting spacecraft or satellites opportunities to perform evasive maneuvers (commonly known as Debris Avoidance Maneuvers, or DAMs) in the event that imminent collision is predicted. The issue with smaller debris; however, is that it is too numerous to be tracked effectively and yet still poses disastrous consequences if it intercepts a larger object. Due to the immense kinetic energy of any item in orbit, collision with debris as small as 1cm can have catastrophic consequences for many orbiting satellites or spacecraft. Faced with the growing orbital debris threat and the potentially catastrophic consequences of a collision-generated debris shower originating in an orbit crossing the ISS altitude band, in 2007 the ISS program manger asked program specialists to coordinate a multilateral jettison policy amongst the ISS partners. This policy would define the acceptable risk trade rationale for intentional release of a debris object, and other mandatory constraints on such jettisons to minimize the residual risks whenever a jettison was accepted. Although ISS-related debris often presents untenable risks to the EVA crew, IVA crew, or to a departing cargo vehicle for a controlled disposal, such released objects also present a ballistic nuisance to the visiting vehicle traffic, and a potential fragmentation threat to the hundreds of other functional and debris objects whose perigees lie below the ISS orbital altitude. Thus, every such jettison decision is a conscious risk trade.

Bacon, John B.↗
NASA NTRS2012

Fast Paced, Low Cost Projects at MSFC

What does an orbiting microsatellite, a robotic lander and a ruggedized camera and telescope have in common? They are all fast paced, low cost projects managed by Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) teamed with successful industry partners. MSFC has long been synonymous with human space flight large propulsion programs, engineering acumen and risk intolerance. However, there is a growing portfolio/product line within MSFC that focuses on these smaller, fast paced projects. While launching anything into space is expensive, using a managed risk posture, holding to schedule and keeping costs low by stopping at egood enough f were key elements to their success. Risk is defined as the possibility of loss or failure per Merriam Webster. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) defines risk using procedural requirement 8705.4 and establishes eclasses f to discern the acceptable risk per a project. It states a Class D risk has a medium to significant risk of not achieving mission success. MSFC, along with industry partners, has created a niche in Class D efforts. How did the big, cautious MSFC succeed on these projects that embodied the antithesis of its heritage in human space flight? A key factor toward these successful projects was innovative industry partners such as Dynetics Corporation, University of Alabama in Huntsville (UAHuntsville), Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU APL), Teledyne Brown Engineering (TBE), Von Braun Center for Science and Innovation (VCSI), SAIC, and Jacobs. Fast Affordable Satellite Technology (FastSat HSV01) is a low earth orbit microsatellite that houses six instruments with the primary scientific objective of earth observation and technology demonstration. The team was comprised of Dynetics, UAHuntsvile, SAIC, Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) and VCSI with the United States Air Force Space Test Program as the customer. The team completed design, development, manufacturing, environmental test and integration in one year. FastSat HSV01 also deployed a Poly Picosatellite Orbital Deployer (PPOD) for a separate nano ]satellite class spacecraft (Cubesat: Nano Sail Demonstration) in partnership with Ames Research Center. The Robotic lunar lander is a MSFC JHU APL partnership that led to the development of a flexible architecture for landers to support robotic missions to a wide range of lunar and asteroid destinations. The team started with the goal of meeting NASA agency directives that led to the creation of a test bed focusing on GN&C and software to demonstrate the descent and landing on any airless body for the final 30 to 60 meters. The team created a complex technology demonstration as well as Guidance Control and Navigation (GN&C) algorithms providing autonomous control of the lander. The team uses a green propellant of 90% hydrogen peroxide and has completed 18 successful test flights. The International Space Station (ISS) SERVIR Environmental Research and Visualization System (ISERV) is a technology demonstration payload to assist the SERVIR project with environmental monitoring for disaster relief and humanitarian efforts. The ISERV project was a partnership with TBE. The ISERV payload consists of a commercial off the shelf camera, telescope, and MSFC developed power distribution box and interfaces on ISS with the Window Observational Research Facility in the US Lab. MSFC has identified three key areas that enabled the low cost mission success to include culture, partnering, and cost/schedule control. This paper will briefly discuss these three Class D efforts, FastSat HSV-01, the Robotic Lunar Lander and the ISERV camera system, the lessons learned, their successes and challenges.

Watson-Morgan, Lisa↗