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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 37 records · Page 2
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2000

Establishing Hazardous Gas Launch Commit Criteria for the Space Shuttle External Tank Intertank Compartment

Until recently, the simultaneous detection and evaluation of multiple Space Transportation System (STS) element compartments for propellant leakage was not possible during the External Tank (ET) pre-pressurization (pre-press) phase of propellant loading; late in the loading sequence (T-3 min to T-0). There exist launch commit criteria (LCCS) designed to protect against leaks resulting in flammable mixtures in the intertank during the functional life of the ET; start of propellant loading through ET-Orbiter separation. However thus far, leak protection had relied on the premise that if a propellant supply system leak were to exist, it would be a leak of fixed area present at the start of propellant loading (dumb leak mode) and such a leak could be detected earlier in the loading sequence than the pre-press phase. No measures had ever been implemented which would protect against leaks potentially developing late in the loading sequence (smart leak mode), The STS community had baselined this situation as an accepted risk their decision supported by exhaustive hardware acceptance criteria and a history of many successful launches. With the recent development of improvements to the hazardous gas detection system (HGDS), an opportunity arose to monitor the intertank compartment for hazardous gas concentrations beyond the T-3 minute mark. In this timeframe the propellant supply system is pressurized for flight and protection was sought against potential leaks generated by this pressurization process. The challenge at hand was to develop LCCs in this timeframe that were not too conservative to unnecessarily prohibit a launch, yet not too liberal to endanger crew safety and mission success. Since essentially no measurement history existed in this timeframe, the LCCs would have to rely on analysis alone. At NASA's direction, Lockheed Martin Michoud Space Systems (LMMSS) developed requirements that would protect against a smart leak during pre-press. A smart leak protection strategy is noteworthy from an STS main propulsion system (NWS) community perspective. This paper presents the resultant requirements as well as the technical and program issues involved with establishing hazardous gas LCCs for the ET intertank compartment.

Baran, Adam J.↗
NASA NTRS2004

Overview and Status of the Bioastronautics Critical Path Roadmap (BCPR)

Viewgraphs on the status and overview of the Bioastronautics Critical Path Roadmap (BCPR) are presented. The topics include: 1) BCPR Objectives; 2) BCPR and OBPR Program Management; 3) BCPR Disciplines & Cross-Cutting Areas; 4) Characteristics of BCPR Reference Missions; 5) Bioastronautics Timetable (notional); 6) BCPR Processes Risk Identification, Assessment, and Management; 7) Types of BCPR Risks; 8) Enabling Questions Categories; 9) Risk Mitigation Status; 10) Defining Levels of Accepted Risk; 11) BCPR Integration; 12) BCPR Implementation, Integration, and Validation; 13) BCPR Refinement Schedule; 14) Academy Review; 15) Rating Bioastronautics Risks; 16) Risk Rating Exercises; 17) Human Health Risk Assessment Criteria (examples); 18) A Recent Risk Rating Exercise; 19) Consensus Workshop Background; 20) Consensus Workshop Rating Analysis; 21) Consensus Workshop Selected Preliminary Recommendations; and 22) Access to BCPR Content.

Charles, John↗
NASA NTRS2019

A Risk Informed Approach to Reliability Requirements Tailoring

Every institution has their “recipe” for success. Cell phones and personal computers seem like they are designed to be obsolete in 2-3 years. Automobiles seem like they are designed to have a power train failure within 1000 miles of the extended warranty expiration; at least that’s been my experience. The Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) is not any different. JPL has a tried and proven recipe for success because in space things can’t fail. Or else. However, in today’s competitive environment and funding limitations, that recipe for success is being challenged and the resultant increased risk accepted. This paper will describe JPL’s Risk Informed Decision Making (RIDM) approach to tailoring reliability requirements based on mission classification and other project characteristics.

Klohoker, John↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Application of Objectives-Driven Assurance Cases to System Development in an Evolving Acquisition Model

System properties such as “safety” and “dependability” cannot, in practice, be proven, and must be argued in an “assurance case” aimed at supporting risk-acceptance decisions that have to be made by system acquirers and/or regulatory authorities. The paper is concerned with applications of the “assurance case” idea early in design and development of new systems, when (apart from dedicated testing) the only available operating experience information derives from previous (non-identical) systems. Much of the discussion is based on an evolving acquisition model at the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration; previously, most major systems were developed in-house, but some major systems will now be developed by and acquired from commercial providers. Key points discussed include the following. (1) By promoting a particular kind of focused discussion between acquirers and providers, the use of assurance cases should be particularly valuable under the new acquisition model. (2) In principle, objectives-driven (sometimes called “performance-based”) approaches to assurance of performance have significant advantages in cases where they are applicable. (3) For truly novel systems, completeness of the safety analysis is a significant issue; it is important for the assurance case to include a commitment by the provider (or applicant) to seriously pursue analysis of operating experience, so that previously unrecognized hazards can be identified and addressed. (4) Inquiries into major accidents often point to deficiencies in management oversight in all parts of the life cycle; management processes need to be addressed in the formulation and the implementation of an assurance case. Under the new acquisition model, these considerations imply a serious reconsideration of the way in which the development process is managed by both providers and acquirers.

Objectives-driven↗
NASA NTRS2008

Risks Associated with Long-Term Spaceflight

Requirements driving the HHC work and deliverables are derived from the Human Research Program requirements, as well as Agency standards regarding the maintenance of human health and performance and a programmatic review of the existing evidence to support identified risks. Agency human health and performance standards define acceptable risk for each type and duration of exploration mission. It is critical to have the best available scientific and clinical evidence in setting and validating these standards. In addition, it is imperative that the best available evidence on preventing and mitigating human health and performance risks is incorporated into exploration mission and vehicle designs.

Francisco, David↗
NASA NTRS2016

Electrical, Electronic and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts in the New Space Paradigm: When is Better the Enemy of Good Enough?

As the space business rapidly evolves to accommodate a lower cost model of development and operation via concepts such as commercial space and small spacecraft (aka, CubeSats), traditional EEE parts screening and qualification methods are being scrutinized under a risk-reward trade space. In this presentation, two basic concepts will be the overarching theme: 1) The movement from complete risk aversion EEE parts methods to managing and/or accepting risk via alternate approaches; and, 2) A discussion of over-design focusing on both electrical design performance and bounding margins.

Small spacecraft↗
NASA NTRS2017

Electrical, Electronic and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts in the New Space Paradigm: When is Better the Enemy of Good Enough?

As the space business rapidly evolves to accommodate a lower cost model of development and operation via concepts such as commercial space and small spacecraft (aka, CubeSats and swarms), traditional EEE parts screening and qualification methods are being scrutinized under a risk-reward trade space. In this presentation, two basic concepts will be discussed: (1) The movement from complete risk aversion EEE parts methods to managing and/or accepting risk via alternate approaches; and, (2) A discussion of emerging assurance methods to reduce overdesign as well emerging model based mission assurance (MBMA) concepts. center dot Example scenarios will be described as well as consideration for trading traditional versus alternate methods.

LaBel, Kenneth A.↗
NASA NTRS2018

Electrical, Electronic and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts in the New Space Paradigm: When is Better the Enemy of Good Enough?

As the space business rapidly evolves to accommodate a lower cost model of development and operation via concepts such as commercial space and small spacecraft (aka, CubeSats), traditional EEE parts screening and qualification methods are being scrutinized under a risk-reward trade space. In this presentation, two basic concepts will be the overarching theme: 1) The movement from complete risk aversion EEE parts methods to managing andor accepting risk via alternate approaches; and, 2) A discussion of over-design focusing on both electrical design performance and bounding margins.

Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE↗
NASA NTRS2016

Electrical, Electronic and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts in the New Space Paradigm: When is Better the Enemy of Good Enough?

As the space business rapidly evolves to accommodate a lower cost model of development and operation via concepts such as commercial space and small spacecraft (aka, CubeSats), traditional EEE parts screening and qualification methods are being scrutinized under a risk-reward trade space. In this presentation, two basic concepts will be the overarching theme: 1) The movement from complete risk aversion EEE parts methods to managing and or accepting risk via alternate approaches; and, 2) A discussion of over-design focusing on both electrical design performance and bounding margins.

Electrical↗
NASA NTRS2011

Orbiter Window Hypervelocity Impact Strength Evaluation

When the Space Shuttle Orbiter incurs damage on its windowpane during flight from particles traveling at hypervelocity speeds, it produces a distinctive damage that reduces the overall strength of the pane. This damage has the potential to increase the risk associated with a safe return to Earth. Engineers at Boeing and NASA/JSC are called to Mission Control to evaluate the damage and provide an assessment on the risk to the crew. Historically, damages like these were categorized as "accepted risk" associated with manned spaceflight, and as long as the glass was intact, engineers gave a "go ahead" for entry for the Orbiter. Since the Columbia accident, managers have given more scrutiny to these assessments, and this has caused the Orbiter window engineers to capitalize on new methods of assessments for these damages. This presentation will describe the original methodology that was used to asses the damages, and introduce a philosophy new to the Shuttle program for assessing structural damage, reliability/risk-based engineering. The presentation will also present a new, recently adopted method for assessing the damage and providing management with a reasonable assessment on the realities of the risk to the crew and vehicle for return.

Estes, Lynda R.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Risk Management of Jettisoned Objects in LEO

The construction and maintenance of the International Space Station (ISS) has led to the release of many objects into its orbital plane, usually during the course of an extra-vehicular activity (EVA). Such releases are often unintentional, but in a growing number of cases, the jettison has been intentional, conducted after a careful assessment of the net risk to the partnership and to other objects in space. Since its launch in 1998 the ISS has contributed on average at least one additional debris object that is simultaneously in orbit with the station, although the number varies widely from zero to eight at any one moment. All of these objects present potential risks to other objects in orbit. Whether it comes from known and tracked orbiting objects or from unknown or untrackable objects, collision with orbital debris can have disastrous consequences. Objects greater than 10cm are generally well documented and tracked, allowing orbiting spacecraft or satellites opportunities to perform evasive maneuvers (commonly known as Debris Avoidance Maneuvers, or DAMs) in the event that imminent collision is predicted. The issue with smaller debris; however, is that it is too numerous to be tracked effectively and yet still poses disastrous consequences if it intercepts a larger object. Due to the immense kinetic energy of any item in orbit, collision with debris as small as 1cm can have catastrophic consequences for many orbiting satellites or spacecraft. Faced with the growing orbital debris threat and the potentially catastrophic consequences of a collision-generated debris shower originating in an orbit crossing the ISS altitude band, in 2007 the ISS program manger asked program specialists to coordinate a multilateral jettison policy amongst the ISS partners. This policy would define the acceptable risk trade rationale for intentional release of a debris object, and other mandatory constraints on such jettisons to minimize the residual risks whenever a jettison was accepted. Although ISS-related debris often presents untenable risks to the EVA crew, IVA crew, or to a departing cargo vehicle for a controlled disposal, such released objects also present a ballistic nuisance to the visiting vehicle traffic, and a potential fragmentation threat to the hundreds of other functional and debris objects whose perigees lie below the ISS orbital altitude. Thus, every such jettison decision is a conscious risk trade.

Bacon, John B.↗
NASA NTRS2012

Fast Paced, Low Cost Projects at MSFC

What does an orbiting microsatellite, a robotic lander and a ruggedized camera and telescope have in common? They are all fast paced, low cost projects managed by Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) teamed with successful industry partners. MSFC has long been synonymous with human space flight large propulsion programs, engineering acumen and risk intolerance. However, there is a growing portfolio/product line within MSFC that focuses on these smaller, fast paced projects. While launching anything into space is expensive, using a managed risk posture, holding to schedule and keeping costs low by stopping at egood enough f were key elements to their success. Risk is defined as the possibility of loss or failure per Merriam Webster. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) defines risk using procedural requirement 8705.4 and establishes eclasses f to discern the acceptable risk per a project. It states a Class D risk has a medium to significant risk of not achieving mission success. MSFC, along with industry partners, has created a niche in Class D efforts. How did the big, cautious MSFC succeed on these projects that embodied the antithesis of its heritage in human space flight? A key factor toward these successful projects was innovative industry partners such as Dynetics Corporation, University of Alabama in Huntsville (UAHuntsville), Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU APL), Teledyne Brown Engineering (TBE), Von Braun Center for Science and Innovation (VCSI), SAIC, and Jacobs. Fast Affordable Satellite Technology (FastSat HSV01) is a low earth orbit microsatellite that houses six instruments with the primary scientific objective of earth observation and technology demonstration. The team was comprised of Dynetics, UAHuntsvile, SAIC, Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) and VCSI with the United States Air Force Space Test Program as the customer. The team completed design, development, manufacturing, environmental test and integration in one year. FastSat HSV01 also deployed a Poly Picosatellite Orbital Deployer (PPOD) for a separate nano ]satellite class spacecraft (Cubesat: Nano Sail Demonstration) in partnership with Ames Research Center. The Robotic lunar lander is a MSFC JHU APL partnership that led to the development of a flexible architecture for landers to support robotic missions to a wide range of lunar and asteroid destinations. The team started with the goal of meeting NASA agency directives that led to the creation of a test bed focusing on GN&C and software to demonstrate the descent and landing on any airless body for the final 30 to 60 meters. The team created a complex technology demonstration as well as Guidance Control and Navigation (GN&C) algorithms providing autonomous control of the lander. The team uses a green propellant of 90% hydrogen peroxide and has completed 18 successful test flights. The International Space Station (ISS) SERVIR Environmental Research and Visualization System (ISERV) is a technology demonstration payload to assist the SERVIR project with environmental monitoring for disaster relief and humanitarian efforts. The ISERV project was a partnership with TBE. The ISERV payload consists of a commercial off the shelf camera, telescope, and MSFC developed power distribution box and interfaces on ISS with the Window Observational Research Facility in the US Lab. MSFC has identified three key areas that enabled the low cost mission success to include culture, partnering, and cost/schedule control. This paper will briefly discuss these three Class D efforts, FastSat HSV-01, the Robotic Lunar Lander and the ISERV camera system, the lessons learned, their successes and challenges.

Watson-Morgan, Lisa↗
NASA NTRS2017

Failure Mechanisms of Ni-H2 and Li-Ion Batteries Under Hypervelocity Impacts

Lithium-Ion (Li-Ion) batteries have yielded significant performance advantages for many industries, including the aerospace industry, and have been selected to replace nickel hydrogen (Ni-H2) batteries for the International Space Station (ISS) program to meet the energy storage demands. As the ISS uses its vast solar arrays to generate its power, the solar ar-rays meet their sunlit power demands and supply excess power to battery packs for power de-livery on the sun obscured phase of the approximate 90 minute low Earth orbit. These large battery packs are located on the exterior of the ISS, and as such, the battery packs are ex-posed to external environment threats like naturally occurring meteoroids and artificial orbital debris (MMOD). While the risks from these solid particle environments has been known and addressed to an acceptable risk of failure through shield design, it is not possible to completely eliminate the risk of loss of these assets on orbit due to MMOD, and as such, failure consequences to the ISS have been considered.

Miller, J. E.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Failure Mechanisms of Ni-H2 and Li-Ion Batteries Under Hypervelocity Impacts

Lithium-Ion (Li-Ion) batteries have yielded significant performance advantages for many industries, including the aerospace industry, and have been selected to replace nickel hydrogen (Ni-H2) batteries for the International Space Station (ISS) program to meet the energy storage demands. As the ISS uses its vast solar arrays to generate its power, the solar arrays meet their sunlit power demands and supply excess power to battery packs for power delivery on the sun obscured phase of the approximate 90 minute low Earth orbit. These large battery packs are located on the exterior of the ISS, and as such, the battery packs are exposed to external environment threats like naturally occurring meteoroids and artificial orbital debris (MMOD). While the risks from these solid particle environments has been known and addressed to an acceptable risk of failure through shield design, it is not possible to completely eliminate the risk of loss of these assets on orbit due to MMOD, and as such, failure consequences to the ISS have been considered.

Miller, J. E.↗
NASA NTRS2003

Radiation Risk Projections for Space Travel

Space travelers are exposed to solar and galactic cosmic rays comprised of protons and heavy ions moving with velocities close to the speed of light. Cosmic ray heavy ions are known to produce more severe types of biomolecular damage in comparison to terrestrial forms of radiation, however the relationship between such damage and disease has not been fully elucidated. On Earth, we are protected from cosmic rays by atmospheric and magnetic shielding, and only the remnants of cosmic rays in the form of ground level muons and other secondary radiations are present. Because human epidemiology data is lacking for cosmic rays, risk projection must rely on theoretical understanding and data from experimental models exposed to space radiation using charged particle accelerators to simulate space radiation. Although the risks of cancer and other late effects from cosmic rays are currently believed to present a severe challenge to space travel, this challenge is centered on our lack of confidence in risk projections methodologies. We review biophysics and radiobiology data on the effects of the cosmic ray heavy ions, and the current methods used to project radiation risks . Cancer risk projections are described as a product of many biological and physical factors, each of which has a differential range of uncertainty due to lack of data and knowledge. Risk projections for space travel are described using Monte-Carlo sampling from subjective error di stributions that represent the lack of knowledge in each factor that contributes to the projection model in order to quantify the overall uncertainty in risk projections. This analysis is applied to space mi ssion scenarios including lunar colony, deep space outpost, and a Mars mission. Results suggest that the number of days in space where cancer mortality risks can be assured at a 95% confidence level to be below the maximum acceptable risk for radi ation workers on Earth or the International Space Station is only on the order of 100-200 days. Approaches to reduce these unceI1ainties and mitigate risks are described.

Cucinotta, Francis↗
NASA NTRS2013

Commercial Space with Technology Maturation

To provide affordable space transportation we must be capable of using common fixed assets and the infrastructure for multiple purposes simultaneously. The Space Shuttle was operated for thirty years, but was not able to establish an effective continuous improvement program because of the high risk to the crew on every mission. An unmanned capability is needed to provide an acceptable risk to the primary mission. This paper is intended to present a case where a commercial space venture could share the large fixed cost of operating the infrastructure with the government while the government provides new advanced technology that is focused on reduced operating cost to the common launch transportation system. A conceivable commercial space venture could provide educational entertainment for the country's youth that would stimulate their interest in the science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) through access at entertainment parks or the existing Space Visitor Centers. The paper uses this example to demonstrate how growing public-private space market demand will re-orient space transportation industry priorities in flight and ground system design and technology development, and how the infrastructure is used and shared.

McCleskey, Carey M.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Internal NASA Study: NASAs Protoflight Research Initiative

The NASA Protoflight Research Initiative is an internal NASA study conducted within the Office of the Chief Engineer to better understand the use of Protoflight within NASA. Extensive literature reviews and interviews with key NASA members with experience in both robotic and human spaceflight missions has resulted in three main conclusions and two observations. The first conclusion is that NASA's Protoflight method is not considered to be "prescriptive." The current policies and guidance allows each Program/Project to tailor the Protoflight approach to better meet their needs, goals and objectives. Second, Risk Management plays a key role in implementation of the Protoflight approach. Any deviations from full qualification will be based on the level of acceptable risk with guidance found in NPR 8705.4. Finally, over the past decade (2004 - 2014) only 6% of NASA's Protoflight missions and 6% of NASA's Full qualification missions experienced a publicly disclosed mission failure. In other words, the data indicates that the Protoflight approach, in and of it itself, does not increase the mission risk of in-flight failure. The first observation is that it would be beneficial to document the decision making process on the implementation and use of Protoflight. The second observation is that If a Project/Program chooses to use the Protoflight approach with relevant heritage, it is extremely important that the Program/Project Manager ensures that the current project's requirements falls within the heritage design, component, instrument and/or subsystem's requirements for both the planned and operational use, and that the documentation of the relevant heritage is comprehensive, sufficient and the decision well documented. To further benefit/inform this study, a recommendation to perform a deep dive into 30 missions with accessible data on their testing/verification methodology and decision process to research the differences between Protoflight and Full Qualification missions' Design Requirements and Verification & Validation (V&V) (without any impact or special request directly to the project).

Protoflight↗
NASA NTRS2017

Radiation Hardness Assurance (RHA): Challenges and New Considerations

Radiation Hardness Assurance (RHA) challenges associated with the use of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) components and emerging technologies are cause for risk acceptance in space flight missions. The RHA flow includes environment definition, hazard evaluation, requirements definition, evaluation of design, and design trades to accommodate the risk a project or program takes. The varied missions profiles and environments don't necessarily benefit from the same risk reduction efforts or cost reduction attempts. The level of effort within the RHA flow can be tailored to minimize risk based on the environment or design criticality.

Space Technology↗