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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 37 records · Page 2
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1974

Study of application of ERTS-A imagery to fracture-related mine safety hazards in the coal mining industry

The author has identified the following significant results. The mine refuse inventory maps were prepared in response to a need by both the State and the coal industry. The lack of information on the scope of the problem handicapped all people concerned in drafting realistic legislation for a severance tax on coal production to raise funds for restoration of refuse sites. The inventory was conducted rapidly and economically, and demonstrated the benefits which can be derived through remote sensing methods.

Wier, C. E.↗
NASA NTRS1975

Application of EREP imagery to fracture-related mine safety hazards in coal mining and mining-environmental problems in Indiana

The author has identified the following significant results. This investigation evaluated the applicability of a variety of sensor types, formats, and resolution capabilities to the study of both fuel and nonfuel mined lands. The image reinforcement provided by stereo viewing of the EREP images proved useful for identifying lineaments and for mined lands mapping. Skylab S190B color and color infrared transparencies were the most useful EREP imagery. New information on lineament and fracture patterns in the bedrock of Indiana and Illinois extracted from analysis of the Skylab imagery has contributed to furthering the geological understanding of this portion of the Illinois basin.

Wier, C. E.↗
NASA NTRS1979

Safety hazard of aircraft icing

The problem of aircraft icing is reported as well as the type of aircraft affected, the pilots involved, and an identification of the areas where reduction in icing accidents are readily accomplished.

Mclean, J. C., Jr.↗
NASA NTRS1986

Safety hazards associated with the charging of lithium/sulfur dioxide cells

A continuing research program to assess the responses of spirally wound, lithium/sulfur dioxide cells to charging as functions of charging current, temperature, and cell condition prior to charging is described. Partially discharged cells that are charged at currents greater than one ampere explode with the time to explosion inversely proportional to the charging current. Cells charged at currents of less than one ampere may fail in one of several modes. The data allows an empirical prediction of when certain cells will fail given a constant charging current.

Frank, H.↗
NASA NTRS1974

Bibliography on aircraft fire hazards and safety. Volume 1: Hazards. Part 1: Key numbers 1 to 817

Ignition temperatures of n-hexane, n-octane, n-decane, JP-6 jet fuel, and aircraft engine oil MIL-7-7808 (0-60-18) were determined in air using heated Pyrex cylinders and Nichrome wires, rods, or tubes. Ignition temperature varied little with fuel-air ratio, but increased as the size of the heat source was decreased. Expressions are given which define the variation of the hot surface ignition temperatures of these combustibles with the radius and the surface area of the heat source. The expressions are applicable to stagnant or low velocity flow conditions (less than 0.2 in./sec.). In addition, the hot gas ignition temperatures of the combustible vapor-air mixtures were determined with jets of hot air. These ignition temperatures also varied little with fuel-air ratio and increased as the diameter of the heat sources was decreased.

Pelouch, J. J., Jr.↗
NASA NTRS2022

Run Time Assurance for Electric Vertical Takeoff and Landing Aircraft

NASA is conducting research to demonstrate and evaluate the application of Run Time Assurance (RTA) as a means to assure safety in Electric Vertical Takeoff and Landing (eVTOL) aircraft with highly automated or autonomous flight capability supervised by a single onboard pilot. The work described in this report demonstrates an application of RTA and examines the implications for design and analysis of aircraft functions and systems; aircraft safety hazards; safety assurance; development assurance; and pilot tasks and performance. This research effort also seeks to assess the efficacy of the combined application of traditional Functional Hazard Analysis (FHA) and the more modern System Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) techniques to perform hazard analyses on aircraft with complex automated and autonomous systems and an onboard pilot. During the research effort we developed architectural designs of two alternate eVTOL aircraft, generally following the process characterized in the SAE standards ARP4754 and ARP4761. The design has focused on the control architectures of these aircraft, which are identical except that one incorporates RTA techniques to reduce the criticality of some key software components. Artifacts of this process include a taxonomy of aircraft-level functions, aircraft-level architecture diagrams, aircraft-level functional hazard assessments (AFHA), function allocations onto aircraft systems and subsystems, functional block diagrams for a select set of control-related functions, and system-level functional hazard assessments (SFHA) for those functions. This project has highlighted the notion that DAL D is something of a sweet spot for low-confidence controllers in an RTA-based design. Among the many activities described in DO-178C, the activities related to requirement verifiability, algorithmic accuracy, and test coverage can be the most challenging for the kinds of advanced control techniques that may be desirable in novel UAM designs, such as adaptive control, machine-learning, artificial intelligence, numerical search, and Monte Carlo based algorithms. Moreover, the standard requires that development teams demonstrate that errors leading to unacceptable failure conditions have been removed from the software. The RTA architecture, which cordons off the low-confidence function, makes it much easier to show this for these kinds of algorithms. With regard to the use of STPA and FHA as complementary hazard analysis techniques, our research effort led us to the conclusion that STPA should be used to derive requirements for hardware and software systems and/or components. Also, STPA is a natural complement to other processes in ARP4754A involving design studies and iteration.

Run-time assurance↗
NASA NTRS1967

Operational range safety.

Hazards in sounding rocket assembly and launch operations and safety techniques at NASA Wallops station noting storage, explosive control, ground safety, etc

ROCKET FIRING↗
NASA NTRS1971

Lunar mission safety and rescue: Hazards analysis and safety requirements

The results are presented of the hazards analysis which was concerned only with hazards to personnel and not with loss of equipment or property. Hazards characterization includes the definition of a hazard, the hazard levels, and the hazard groups. The analysis methodology is described in detail. The methodology was used to prepare the top level functional flow diagrams, to perform the first level hazards assessment, and to develop a list of conditions and situations requiring individual hazard studies. The 39 individual hazard study results are presented in total.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2014

International Space Station (ISS) Plasma Contactor Unit (PCU) Utilization Plan Assessment Update

The International Space Station (ISS) vehicle undergoes spacecraft charging as it interacts with Earth's ionosphere and magnetic field. The interaction can result in a large potential difference developing between the ISS metal chassis and the local ionosphere plasma environment. If an astronaut conducting extravehicular activities (EVA) is exposed to the potential difference, then a possible electrical shock hazard arises. The control of this hazard was addressed by a number of documents within the ISS Program (ISSP) including Catastrophic Safety Hazard for Astronauts on EVA (ISS-EVA-312-4A_revE). The safety hazard identified the risk for an astronaut to experience an electrical shock in the event an arc was generated on an extravehicular mobility unit (EMU) surface. A catastrophic safety hazard, by the ISS requirements, necessitates mitigation by a two-fault tolerant system of hazard controls. Traditionally, the plasma contactor units (PCUs) on the ISS have been used to limit the charging and serve as a "ground strap" between the ISS structure and the surrounding ionospheric plasma. In 2009, a previous NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) team evaluated the PCU utilization plan (NESC Request #07-054-E) with the objective to assess whether leaving PCUs off during non-EVA time periods presented risk to the ISS through assembly completion. For this study, in situ measurements of ISS charging, covering the installation of three of the four photovoltaic arrays, and laboratory testing results provided key data to underpin the assessment. The conclusion stated, "there appears to be no significant risk of damage to critical equipment nor excessive ISS thermal coating damage as a result of eliminating PCU operations during non- EVA times." In 2013, the ISSP was presented with recommendations from Boeing Space Environments for the "Conditional" Marginalization of Plasma Hazard. These recommendations include a plan that would keep the PCUs off during EVAs when the space environment forecast input to the ISS charging model indicates floating potentials (FP) within specified limits. These recommendations were based on the persistence of conditions in the space environment due to the current low solar cycle and belief in the accuracy and completeness of the ISS charging model. Subsequently, a Noncompliance Report (NCR), ISS-NCR-232G, Lack of Two-fault Tolerance to EVA Crew Shock in the Low Earth Orbit Plasma Environment, was signed in September 2013 specifying new guidelines for the use of shock hazard controls based on a forecast of the space environment from ISS plasma measurements taken prior to the EVA [ISS-EVA-312-AC, 2012]. This NESC assessment re-evaluates EVA charging hazards through a process that is based on over 14 years of ISS operations, charging measurements, laboratory tests, EMU studies and modifications, and safety reports. The assessment seeks an objective review of the plasma charging hazards associated with EVA operations to determine if any of the present hazard controls can safely change the PCU utilization plan to allow more flexibility in ISS operations during EVA preparation and execution.

Hernandez-Pellerano, Amri↗
NASA NTRS2011

L-Band Digital Aeronautical Communications System Engineering - Initial Safety and Security Risk Assessment and Mitigation

This document is being provided as part of ITT's NASA Glenn Research Center Aerospace Communication Systems Technical Support (ACSTS) contract NNC05CA85C, Task 7: "New ATM Requirements--Future Communications, C-Band and L-Band Communications Standard Development." ITT has completed a safety hazard analysis providing a preliminary safety assessment for the proposed L-band (960 to 1164 MHz) terrestrial en route communications system. The assessment was performed following the guidelines outlined in the Federal Aviation Administration Safety Risk Management Guidance for System Acquisitions document. The safety analysis did not identify any hazards with an unacceptable risk, though a number of hazards with a medium risk were documented. This effort represents a preliminary safety hazard analysis and notes the triggers for risk reassessment. A detailed safety hazards analysis is recommended as a follow-on activity to assess particular components of the L-band communication system after the technology is chosen and system rollout timing is determined. The security risk analysis resulted in identifying main security threats to the proposed system as well as noting additional threats recommended for a future security analysis conducted at a later stage in the system development process. The document discusses various security controls, including those suggested in the COCR Version 2.0.

Zelkin, Natalie↗
NASA NTRS2011

C-Band Airport Surface Communications System Engineering-Initial High-Level Safety Risk Assessment and Mitigation

This document is being provided as part of ITT's NASA Glenn Research Center Aerospace Communication Systems Technical Support (ACSTS) contract: "New ATM Requirements--Future Communications, C-Band and L-Band Communications Standard Development." ITT has completed a safety hazard analysis providing a preliminary safety assessment for the proposed C-band (5091- to 5150-MHz) airport surface communication system. The assessment was performed following the guidelines outlined in the Federal Aviation Administration Safety Risk Management Guidance for System Acquisitions document. The safety analysis did not identify any hazards with an unacceptable risk, though a number of hazards with a medium risk were documented. This effort represents an initial high-level safety hazard analysis and notes the triggers for risk reassessment. A detailed safety hazards analysis is recommended as a follow-on activity to assess particular components of the C-band communication system after the profile is finalized and system rollout timing is determined. A security risk assessment has been performed by NASA as a parallel activity. While safety analysis is concerned with a prevention of accidental errors and failures, the security threat analysis focuses on deliberate attacks. Both processes identify the events that affect operation of the system; and from a safety perspective the security threats may present safety risks.

Zelkin, Natalie↗
NASA NTRS2016

Preliminary Assessment of Operational Hazards and Safety Requirements for Airborne Trajectory Management (ABTM) Roadmap Applications

A set of five developmental steps building from the NASA TASAR (Traffic Aware Strategic Aircrew Requests) concept are described, each providing incrementally more efficiency and capacity benefits to airspace system users and service providers, culminating in a Full Airborne Trajectory Management capability. For each of these steps, the incremental Operational Hazards and Safety Requirements are identified for later use in future formal safety assessments intended to lead to certification and operational approval of the equipment and the associated procedures. Two established safety assessment methodologies that are compliant with the FAA's Safety Management System were used leading to Failure Effects Classifications (FEC) for each of the steps. The most likely FEC for the first three steps, Basic TASAR, Digital TASAR, and 4D TASAR, is "No effect". For step four, Strategic Airborne Trajectory Management, the likely FEC is "Minor". For Full Airborne Trajectory Management (Step 5), the most likely FEC is "Major".

Cotton, William B.↗
NASA NTRS1985

Space station crew safety: Human factors interaction model

A model of the various human factors issues and interactions that might affect crew safety is developed. The first step addressed systematically the central question: How is this space station different from all other spacecraft? A wide range of possible issue was identified and researched. Five major topics of human factors issues that interacted with crew safety resulted: Protocols, Critical Habitability, Work Related Issues, Crew Incapacitation and Personal Choice. Second, an interaction model was developed that would show some degree of cause and effect between objective environmental or operational conditions and the creation of potential safety hazards. The intermediary steps between these two extremes of causality were the effects on human performance and the results of degraded performance. The model contains three milestones: stressor, human performance (degraded) and safety hazard threshold. Between these milestones are two countermeasure intervention points. The first opportunity for intervention is the countermeasure against stress. If this countermeasure fails, performance degrades. The second opportunity for intervention is the countermeasure against error. If this second countermeasure fails, the threshold of a potential safety hazard may be crossed.

Cohen, M. M.↗
NASA NTRS1984

Space Station crew safety - Human factors model

A model of the various human factors issues and interactions that might affect crew safety is developed. The first step addressed systematically the central question: How is this Space Station different from all other spacecraft? A wide range of possible issue was identified and researched. Five major topics of human factors issues that interacted with crew safety resulted: Protocols, Critical Habitability, Work Related Issues, Crew Incapacitation and Personal Choice. Second, an interaction model was developed that would show some degree of cause and effect between objective environmental or operational conditions and the creation of potential safety hazards. The intermediary steps between these two extremes of causality were the effects on human performance and the results of degraded performance. The model contains three milestones: stressor, human performance (degraded) and safety hazard threshold. Between these milestones are two countermeasure intervention points. The first opportunity for intervention is the countermeasure against stress. If this countermeasure fails, performance degrades. The second opportunity for intervention is the countermeasure against error. If this second countermeasure fails, the threshold of a potential safety hazard may be crossed.

Cohen, M. M.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Resilient Autonomy in the Face of Adversity

The NASA Resilient Autonomy Project developed a software framework that implemented a Run Time Assurance (RTA) architecture that leveraged ASTM International’s F3269 Industry Standard for safely bounding complex behavior in aircraft. This framework was called the Expandable Variable Autonomy Architecture, or EVAA. EVAA was developed during the height of the Covid-19 lockdown that caused the Resilient Autonomy team to pivot from flight test to distributed simulator testing. EVAA was developed to be platform and mission agnostic where platform specifics were behind a hardware abstraction layer that EVAA called a Coupler. EVAA was able to host multiple safety monitors that could resolve individual safety hazards. EVAA was able to resolve priority conflicts when multiple safety hazards needed to be resolved simultaneously and was able to resolve highly complex situations in a safe manner that could exceed human capabilities.

Ethan Williams↗
NASA NTRS1977

Rocket propulsion hazard summary: Safety classification, handling experience and application to space shuttle payload

The DOT classification for transportation, the military classification for quantity distance, and hazard compatibility grouping used to regulate the transportation and storage of explosives are presented along with a discussion of tests used in determining sensitivity of propellants to an impact/shock environment in the absence of a large explosive donor. The safety procedures and requirements of a Scout launch vehicle, Western and Eastern Test Range, and the Minuteman, Delta, and Poseidon programs are reviewed and summarized. Requirements of the space transportation system safety program include safety reviews from the subsystem level to the completed payload. The Scout safety procedures will satisfy a portion of these requirements but additional procedures need to be implemented to comply with the safety requirements for Shuttle operation from the Eastern Test Range.

Pennington, D. F.↗