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Sister Rod Destructive Examinations (FY22) Appendix I: SNF Aerosols Released During Rod Fracture

As a part of the DOE NE High Burnup Spent Fuel Data Project, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is performing destructive examinations (DEs) of high burnup (HBU) (>45 GWd/MTU) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) rods from the North Anna Nuclear Power Station operated by Dominion Energy. The SNF rods, called sister rods or sibling rods, are all HBU and include four different kinds of fuel rod cladding: standard Zircaloy-4 (Zirc-4), low-tin Zirc-4, ZIRLO, and M5. The DEs are being conducted to obtain a baseline of the HBU rods’ condition before dry storage and are focused on understanding overall SNF rod strength and durability. Fuel rods and defueled cladding will be tested to derive material properties. Although the data generated can be used for multiple purposes, one primary goal for obtaining the post-irradiation examination data and the associated measured mechanical properties is to support SNF dry storage licensing and relicensing activities by (1) addressing identified knowledge gaps and (2) enhancing the technical basis for post-storage transportation, handling, and subsequent disposition. This report documents the status of the ORNL Phase 1 DE activities related to the collection of SNF aerosol particles released during fuel rod fracture in 4-point bending in Phase 1 of the sister rod test program.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Sister Rod Destructive Examinations (FY23) Appendix I: SNF Aerosols Released During Rod Fracture

This report documents work performed under the Spent Fuel and Waste Disposition’s Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology program for the US Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (NE). This work was performed to fulfill Level 3 Milestone M3SF-23OR010201026, “FY23 M3 draft report on results from testing in FY23,” within work package SF-23OR01020102 and is an updated to the work reported in M2SF-23OR010201024, M2SF-22OR010201047, M2SF-21OR010201032, M2SF-19ORO010201026, and M2SF-19OR010201028. As a part of the DOE NE High Burnup Spent Fuel Data Project, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is performing destructive examinations (DEs) of high burnup (HBU) (>45 GWd/MTU) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) rods from the North Anna Nuclear Power Station operated by Dominion Energy. The SNF rods, called sister rods or sibling rods, are all HBU and include four different kinds of fuel rod cladding: standard Zircaloy-4 (Zirc-4), low-tin Zirc-4, ZIRLO, and M5. The DEs are being conducted to obtain a baseline of the HBU rods’ condition before dry storage and are focused on understanding overall SNF rod strength and durability. Fuel rods and defueled cladding will be tested to derive material properties. Although the data generated can be used for multiple purposes, one primary goal for obtaining the post-irradiation examination data and the associated measured mechanical properties is to support SNF dry storage licensing and relicensing activities by (1) addressing identified knowledge gaps and (2) enhancing the technical basis for post-storage transportation, handling, and subsequent disposition.This report documents the status of the ORNL Phase 1 DE activities related to the collection of SNF aerosol particles released during fuel rod fracture in 4-point bending in Phase 1 of the sister rod test program.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

New rig for studying SNF vibration integrity

Transportation packages for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) must meet safety requirements under normal and accident conditions as specified by federal regulations. During transportation, SNF experiences unique conditions and challenges to cladding integrity due to the vibrational loading encountered during road or rail shipment. ORNL has been developing testing capabilities that can be used to improve our understanding of the impact of vibration loading on SNF integrity, especially for high burn-up SNF under normal conditions of transport (NCT). Ultimately, this information can be used to meet nuclear industry and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission needs in the area of safety of SNF transportation operations.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Commercial SNF Pickup Queue Under the Standard Contact and Analysis of Hypothetical Alternate Acceptance Strategies

The Standard Contract for Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and/or High-Level Radioactive Waste (Standard Contract) (10 CFR Part 961) establishes the terms and conditions under which the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) will make available nuclear waste disposal services to the owners and generators of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW), as provided in section 302 of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA) as amended, and by which DOE will take title to, transport, and dispose of SNF and/or HLW delivered to DOE by those owners or generators who execute the contract. The Standard Contract establishes the process for allocating the federal government’s finite waste acceptance capacity among those various owners/generators. This acceptance allocation, also known as the acceptance queue, orders acceptance and transportation priority in accordance with the principle of “oldest fuel first” (OFF). Under the OFF methodology, the oldest SNF, as measured from the date of permanent discharge from the reactor, is given the highest priority in the acceptance queue. While the date of discharge of spent fuel forms the basis of allocations, the owner/generator can send an equivalent Metric Tons of Uranium (MTU) of SNF that the owner/generator owns in its place, as long as it meets the “Standard Fuel” specifications in Appendix E of the Standard Contract. This is a technical paper that does not take into account the contractual limitations under the Standard Contract. This paper also does not specify the party or parties responsible for any costs discussed herein. This paper provides analysis of hypothetical strategies for accepting SNF and no inferences should be drawn from this paper regarding future actions by DOE. To the extent that discussions or recommendations in this paper conflict with the provisions of the Standard Contract, the Standard Contract provisions prevail.

Joseph III, Robby↗

A Safety Case Approach for Deep Geologic Disposal of DOE HLW and DOE SNF in Bedded Salt - 13350

The primary objective of this study is to investigate the feasibility and utility of developing a defensible safety case for disposal of United States Department of Energy (U.S. DOE) high-level waste (HLW) and DOE spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in a conceptual deep geologic repository that is assumed to be located in a bedded salt formation of the Delaware Basin [1]. A safety case is a formal compilation of evidence, analyses, and arguments that substantiate and demonstrate the safety of a proposed or conceptual repository. We conclude that a strong initial safety case for potential licensing can be readily compiled by capitalizing on the extensive technical basis that exists from prior work on the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), other U.S. repository development programs, and the work published through international efforts in salt repository programs such as in Germany. The potential benefits of developing a safety case include leveraging previous investments in WIPP to reduce future new repository costs, enhancing the ability to effectively plan for a repository and its licensing, and possibly expediting a schedule for a repository. A safety case will provide the necessary structure for organizing and synthesizing existing salt repository science and identifying any issues and gaps pertaining to safe disposal of DOE HLW and DOE SNF in bedded salt. The safety case synthesis will help DOE to plan its future R and D activities for investigating salt disposal using a risk-informed approach that prioritizes test activities that include laboratory, field, and underground investigations. It should be emphasized that the DOE has not made any decisions regarding the disposition of DOE HLW and DOE SNF. Furthermore, the safety case discussed herein is not intended to either site a repository in the Delaware Basin or preclude siting in other media at other locations. Rather, this study simply presents an approach for accelerated development of a safety case for a potential DOE HLW and DOE SNF repository using the currently available technical basis for bedded salt. This approach includes a summary of the regulatory environment relevant to disposal of DOE HLW and DOE SNF in a deep geologic repository, the key elements of a safety case, the evolution of the safety case through the successive phases of repository development and licensing, and the existing technical basis that could be used to substantiate the safety of a geologic repository if it were to be sited in the Delaware Basin. We also discuss the potential role of an underground research laboratory (URL). (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

First Road / River Barge Security Transport of SNF under the New German Transport Security Guidelines - 19102

A transfer of 342 spent fuel assemblies from NPP Obrigheim to NPP Neckarwestheim, both located alongside the river Neckar in the south of Germany, is required to promote the decommissioning process of NPP Obrigheim, which started in 2008 after the NPP had been shut down three years before. The spent fuel storage facility in Neckarwestheim offers sufficient storage space to accept the 342 SNF assemblies, stored in fifteen dry casks type CASTOR{sup R} 440/84 mvK. After several transport feasibility studies had been conducted, Daher Nuclear Technologies GmbH was awarded the commission to plan, prepare and conduct the SNF transport. Since the combined road / river barge transport promised to be the most suitable mode of transportation Daher Nuclear Technologies started to prepare its security concept, a prerequisite to apply for and attain the transport license mandatory for transporting spent nuclear fuel in Germany. In March 2014 the company applied for the transport license, which, after more than three years and numerous amendments to the security concept, was finally granted to Daher Nuclear Technologies on May 16, 2017 by the German Federal Office for the Safety of Nuclear Waste Management (successor organization of the BfS). Simultaneously to the license application phase the transport equipment - amongst others the heavy-duty trucks and trailers, the pusher tugs, the river barge and transport frames - had to be provided and modified to meet the intensified requirements of the New German Transport Security Guidelines Road / Rail as well as several other legal regulations referring to the transport of dangerous goods by road and inland waterways (e.g. ADR - European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road and ADN - European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Inland Waterways). The planning process involved various meetings with representatives of different authorities and administrative bodies incl. accredited experts as well as subcontractors. Tremendous training efforts had to be undertaken to train more than 100 transport participants regarding security measures, health, safety and environmental measures, as well as the proper handling of radioactive material. This also included the training of the security staff, that had to be qualified in compliance with the new Transport Security Guidelines Road and Rail. Finally, in June 2017, when all preparations where complete, all requirements met, and all permits obtained, the first ever security SNF transport on a German river was performed. Three laden CASTOR{sup R} 440/84 mvK transport and storage casks were transported in one batch via heavy-duty truck-trailer from the NPP Obrigheim to the NPP's own harbor, to be rolled on to the river barge, that would carry the three casks upstream the river Neckar to the approx. fifty kilometer distant NPP Neckarwestheim. The journey on the river took about eleven hours, in which several bridges and locks had to be passed. The entire transport was escorted by qualified security staff and auxiliary police forces on waterways and alongside on roads. It attracted nationwide public attention, due to its pioneer status and the fact, that there hadn't been any SNF or HLW shipments in Germany since 2011. After the convoy safely arrived at NPP Neckarwestheim's pier the three laden CASTOR{sup R} 440/84 mvK casks were rolled off the river barge via heavy-duty truck-trailers to be stored in the on-site interim storage facility. This first transport was a success and was followed by four additionally successful security transports in September, October, November and December 2017. The public attention receded significantly during the transport campaign, which ended on December 19, 2017 with the transfer of the last three of fifteen casks to the on-site interim storage facility in Neckarwestheim. With the last cask safely transferred to the interim storage facility Daher Nuclear Technologies successfully completed the transport campaign on schedule, meeting one of EnBW's fundamental objectives to finish the transfer of the 342 SNF assemblies by the end of 2017. (authors)

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Impurity gas detection for SNF canisters using probabilistic deep learning and acoustic sensing *

Abstract Monitoring impurity gases in spent nuclear fuel (SNF) canisters is a novel structural health monitoring approach for SNF in dry storage. The SNF canisters are sealed containers that do not facilitate visual access to the inside. Acoustic sensing can be deployed by taking advantage of the pathways unobstructed by internal hardware. Although the ultrasonic time-of-flight measurement can provide valuable information, it is limited in its ability to discern the concentration of only one impurity gas. As such, deep learning algorithms, particularly convolutional neural networks (CNNs), offer a promising solution. In this study, CNN-based probabilistic deep learning models were implemented to detect and quantify multiple impurity gases in helium. An experimental platform was established to simulate canister conditions, and ultrasonic test data were collected. The presence of argon and air in helium at concentrations ranging from 0% to 1.2% at increments of 0.05% was considered. The multi-layer perceptron, decision tree, and logistic regression classifiers achieved high accuracies when distinguishing pure helium from helium with impurities. CNN with dropout layers and CNN using maximum likelihood estimation showed a similar performance, indicating their ability to capture uncertainties. The ensemble CNN model exhibited improved predictions and the ability to balance individual gas concentration by integrating 1D- and 2D-CNN models. These findings contribute probabilistic deep learning solutions for impurity gas detection and analysis within SNF canisters, thus ensuring safe storage and management of SNFs.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

PRELIMINARY EVALUATION OF REMOVING SNF FROM SHUTDOWN SITES – 2016 UPDATE

An updated evaluation of removing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from 13 shutdown nuclear power reactor sites was conducted during 2016. At these shutdown sites the nuclear power reactors have been permanently shut down and the sites have been decommissioned or are undergoing decommissioning. The shutdown sites included in the evaluation were Maine Yankee, Yankee Rowe, Connecticut Yankee, Humboldt Bay, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Trojan, La Crosse, Zion, Crystal River, Kewaunee, San Onofre, and Vermont Yankee. This paper provides summary information on the 13 shutdown sites as well detailed information gathered from site visits to San Onofre and Vermont Yankee. The evaluation was divided into four components: (1) characterization of the SNF and greater-than-Class C low-level radioactive waste (GTCC waste) inventory, (2) a description of the on-site infrastructure, (3) an evaluation of the near-site transportation infrastructure and transportation experience, and (4) an evaluation of the actions necessary to prepare for and remove SNF and GTCC waste. Updates to the evaluation since 2015 include incorporating SNF data from the GC-859 database; updating of Google Earth imagery; incorporating revisions to transportation certificates of compliance; adding information obtained from site visits to the Pacific Sun Railroad and Camp Pendleton, California; adding rail assessments for Kewaunee, Crystal River, and San Onofre to the evaluation; and adding information obtained from the site visit to Vermont Yankee. As additional sites such as Fort Calhoun, Palisades, Clinton, Quad Cities, Pilgrim, Oyster Creek, and Diablo Canyon shut down, these sites will be included in updates to the evaluation.

gtcc waste, unf, used nuclear fuel, transportation↗

Aluminum Clad Spent Nuclear Fuel Task 4: Performance of Aluminum SNF in Dry Storage Experiment Test Plan

This document presents the activities to be performed in support of understanding the performance of aluminum spent nuclear fuel (ASNF) in dry storage. These activities will visually examine and acquire baseline samples of as-irradiated ATR fuel assembly components to determine fuel condition and the morphology of the aluminum oxyhydroxides present on the fuel external surfaces. Because the boehmite phase of oxyhydroxide is projected to be a significant contributor to radiolytic hydrogen production and general corrosion, being able to quantify its presence is of major importance to long term storage of aluminum spent nuclear fuel. Baseline samples will be taken from irradiated end adapters, removed from ATR SNF elements, stored in the ATR Canal. These will be transferred to Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) to perform non-destructive and destructive testing to determine the degree of hydration of the wet-stored aluminum components prior to drying and air storage. Examination of the dry stored SNF at Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC) in CPP-603 Irradiated Fuel Storage Facility (IFSF) will allow the opportunity to identify gross degradation and as conditions permit, sample the surface oxide on fueled and un-fueled portions of the stored assemblies. The information resulting from analysis of the ATR Canal samples will be used to support validation of surrogate samples prepared under Task 6, sample surrogate preparation, and used in Task 1, oxyhydroxide layer behavior and chemistry, Task 2, oxide layer radiolytic gas generation, and Task 5, oxide layer response to drying. Surface oxide samples collected from SNF in IFSF dry storage will SNF dry storage prediction modeling from Task 3, sealed and vented system episodic breathing and gas generation prediction.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Initial DOE SNF Standardized Canister Storage Configuration Alternatives Study

This study looks at storage configuration alternatives for United States Department of Energy (DOE) Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Standardized Canisters loaded with DOE-owned SNF. The focus of the study is for the DOE SNF Standardized Canisters that would be packaged in the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC) area at Idaho National Laboratory (INL), but its general findings are useful across the DOE Complex. The study considered storage in existing facilities, modified existing facilities, new facilities, and new modular systems. The existing INTEC facilities considered in the study include the CPP-603 Irradiated Fuel Storage Facility (IFSF), the CPP-749 Underground Fuel Storage Facility (UFSF), the CPP-666 SNF Wet Storage Basin Facility, CPP-1774 Three Mile Island (TMI) Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facility (ISFSF), and the CPP-2707 Cask Pad Facility. The new facilities considered in the study include the Foster Wheeler designed Idaho Spent Fuel (ISF) Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) and some conceptual designs. The new modular systems considered in the study include Holtec International’s HI-STAR/HI-STORM, NAC International’s MAGNASTOR/UMS/MPC and Orano TN’s MATRIX/NUHOMS. Based on considerations of various factors, including but not limited to capacity, impact to facility operations, capital costs, expenditure rate, licensing issues, agreements with the State of Idaho, and road ready conditions, new modular storage systems from commercial vendors may have clear advantages over other storage alternatives. This is further supported by recent experience with West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) storage project for High Level Waste Glass canisters.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Computational and Experimental Investigation of Thermal-Mechanical- Chemical Mechanisms of High-burnup Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Processes at Elevated Temperatures and Degradation Behavior in Geologic Repositories

The overarching goal of the combined computational and experimental R&D activities proposed in this project is to enhance understanding of the mechanisms and thermal-mechanical-chemical (TMC) parameters controlling the instant release fraction (IRF) and matrix dissolution of high-burnup (HB; burnup) spent nuclear fuels (SNFs) and the subsequent formation, stability, and phase transformations of SNF alteration products under long-term storage and geological disposal conditions. Uranium dioxide may undergo oxidative corrosion/alteration, and the IRF may be increased for HB SNF, both of which may affect environmental systems associated with SNF long-term storage and disposal. The oxidative matrix dissolution may form various complex uranyl-based phases, including a rich variety of oxides, silicates, carbonates and other secondary minerals in varied geological environments (e.g., studtite, metastudtite, amorphous uranyl peroxide, uranium trioxide, triuranium octoxide, schoepite, dehydrated schoepite, metaschoepite, becquerelite, soddyite, rutherfordine,...). These uranyl phases generally have higher mobility UO 2 +2 species than less soluble U 4+ phases. However, limited information on the thermodynamic properties and formation kinetics of these uranyl-bearing phases is available to predict explicitly paragenesis under the conditions relevant to long-term storage or disposal. The proposed project draws on complementary expertise and research backgrounds from the team members: (i) to apply a combined ab initio modeling (UNLV/UTEP and SNL) and experimental (UNLV) strategy investigating the high-temperature TMC mechanisms of alteration of SNF under α-radiolysis conditions; (ii) to investigate the mechanistic of phase transformations in UNF degradation products under various conditions expected in long-term storage systems (e.g. (UO 2 )O 2 (H 2 O) 4 → (UO 2 )O 2 (H 2 O) 2 → U 2 O 7 → UO 3 → U 3 O 8 ); (iii) to determine high-accuracy TMC parameters for complex uranyl-based phases formed in storage or geological disposal environments (e.g. UO 3 (H 2 O) 2 , Ca[(UO 2 ) 6 O 4 (OH) 8 ] 8 H 2 O, (UO 2 ) 2 (SiO 4 ) 3 2H 2 O,…). The unforeseen COVID-19 pandemic led to the laboratory/campus closure since March 2020, that resulted in a significant delay in reaching milestones in a satisfactory manner, due to (i) the statewide recommendation from stop-working to later limited work in the lab and work-from-home (WFH), (ii) no in-person interactions, and (iii) a hiring freeze at UNLV. Therefore, a no cost extension (10/01/2021- 9/30/2022) was requested to help make up the time we lost during the global pandemic in 2020-2021, leading to paradigm shifts in the focus of the project in the following three main tasks: Task 1 (Computational), Task 2 (Experimental), and Task 3 (Final report, due on 12/29/2022).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Developments in the Regulatory Framework of Interim Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) in Germany - 18137

According to article 6 of the German Atomic Energy Act, storage of nuclear fuel requires a license granted by the competent authority in this field, which is the Federal Office for Safety of Nuclear Waste Management (BfE). In 1995, a license for storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and vitrified high level waste (HAW) was granted for the interim storage facility in Gorleben. Dry Interim storage at the NPP sites in its current form started in 2002 in the interim storage facility next to the nuclear power plant NPP Lingen. Since this time twelve NPPs erected their own storage facilities additionally to the three central storage facilities (Ahaus, Gorleben and Rubenow). In all of these facilities the concept of dry storage in metallic dual purpose casks (DPCs) is implemented. The actual storage licenses for SNF and the HAW (which is stored in Gorleben and Rubenow) are limited to 40 years after closing the transport and storage cask. The first license to expire will be the storage license for the interim storage facility in Gorleben in the year 2034. In Germany the decision about a repository site will be taken in the year 2031. To enable the utilities to hand over the SNF and HAW to the repository regime while the current licenses are still valid would require a very fast process licensing and construction of the required facilities at this location. As a delay cannot be excluded, necessary preparations have to be taken on the side of the regulator. In the German Atomic Energy Act precautions have already been taken and consulting the German parliament (Bundestag) is mandatory if inevitable events would require an extension of the currently licensed interim storage period. The new structure with the Federal Office BfE, and two companies for final disposal 'Bundesgesellschaft fuer Endlagerung' (BGE mbH) and interim storage 'Bundesgesellschaft fuer Zwischenlagerung' (BGZmbH) was established in 2017. The Federal Office for Safety of Nuclear Waste Management (BfE) is responsible for regulation in the field of nuclear disposal since 30.07.2016. So the package design approval for DPCs and the storage licenses for SNF will be granted by this office. Furthermore, it is the regulator for the repository and will finally grant a license for the German deep geological repository. Site selection and construction and operation of the repository will be the responsibility of BGE. On January 1, 2018, the BGZ will take over all remaining interim storage facilities operating under a license due to article six of the Atomic Energy Act. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Aluminum Clad SNF: Technical Considerations and Challenges for Extended (>50 years) Dry Storage - 1900y

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) manages a significant inventory (>13 MTHM) of aluminum clad spent nuclear fuel (ASNF) using a combination of wet and dry storage at three primary sites; Hanford, Idaho National Laboratory (INL), and Savannah River Site (SRS). The majority of this ASNF is generated from U.S. and international research test reactors (RTR), examples include Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) at INL and High-Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). The Obama Administration suspension of the Yucca Mountain repository, issuance of the January 2013 DOE 'Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste,' delays in implementing the 'regionalization' SNF approach recommended in the 1995 'Department of Energy Programmatic Spent Nuclear Fuel Management and Idaho National Engineering Laboratory Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Programs Final Environmental Impact Statement,' and limited ASNF processing capability at SRS H-Canyon means that interim storage has become the de-facto strategy for managing ASNF. The 1995 Idaho Settlement Agreement requires the DOE to transfer all SNF stored at INL to interim dry storage prior to December 31, 2023 and wet storage capacity at the SRS is nearing capacity. This situation was recognized by the DOE Spent Nuclear Fuel Working Group (SNFWG) and at its June 2016 meeting formed a ASNF sub-working group comprised subject matter experts to evaluate this area and provide a report of findings. The ASNF sub-working group met many times over several month period to review the engineering and technical basis of existing and planned DOE ASNF dry storage facilities and additional studies on the behavior of ASNF under different conditions, including during reactor service. The ASNF sub-working group focused its review on RTR SNF. Based on these reviews, the ASNF sub-working group identified five knowledge gaps and technical data needs that should be addressed to ensure viability and safety of extended, greater than 50 years, sealed or vented interim dry storage of ASNF. These five areas include; behavior/chemistry of aluminum oxyhydroxide layer in dry storage, radiolytic gas generation properties of aluminum oxyhydroxide layers, effect of episodic breathing and radiolytic generation of corrosive gases during storage, performance of ASNF in existing dry storage systems, and effects of high temperature (>1000 C) drying on chemistry and behavior of aluminum oxyhydroxide layers. The ASNF sub-working group also recommended development of an action plan to identify technical and engineering activities needed to address the knowledge gaps and technical data needs. Results of the ASNF sub-working group are documented in 2017 report 'Aluminum Clad Spent Nuclear Fuel: Technical Considerations and Challenges for Extended (>50 years) Dry Storage,' DOE-ID/RPT-1575. The INL assembled a team comprised of twenty INL and Savannah River National Laboratory SNF management and subject matter experts to develop this action plan. Over the course of 2 months the team worked to develop the action plan. The plan identified and recommended six technical and engineering tasks needed to address the previously identified knowledge gaps and technical data needs. DOE Environmental Management Office of Technology Development is providing funding to the INL to execute these tasks. This paper will present and discuss the results of the ASNF sub-working group, tasks identified in the action plan, and experimental activities underway at INL and SRNL to address the action plan. (authors)

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DOE SNF Packaging Demonstration Project: Worktable and Canister Loading Sleeve Design [Slides]

This presentation is a briefing for summer interns and others outside the project, to give them a summary of ongoing design activities. The DOE SNF Packaging Demonstration Project is an effort to develop and demonstrate the designs, technology, processes, and regulatory framework for packaging DOE-managed spent nuclear fuel (SNF) for road ready dry storage (RRDS). The project is to remotely load and seal two types of DOE-managed SNF from the CPP-603 facility into DOE Standard Canisters, place the sealed DOE Standard Canisters into commercial vendor over-canisters (equivalent to commercial MPCs), seal and place the over-canisters into commercial vendor storage overpacks, and place the storage system (over-canister and storage overpack) onto the CPP-2707 cask pad.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Using NDA Techniques to Improve Safeguards Metrics on Burnup Quantification and Plutonium Content in LWR SNF

Globally, there exists a long history in reprocessing in evaluation of the shipper/receiver difference (SRD) on spent nuclear fuel (SNF) received and processed. Typically, the declared shipper s values for uranium and plutonium in SNF (based on calculations involving the initial manufacturer s data and reactor operating history) are used as the input quantities to the head-end process of the facility. Problems have been encountered when comparing these values with measured results of the input accountability tank contents. A typical comparison yields a systematic bias indicated as a loss of 5 7 percent of the plutonium (Pu) and approximately 1 percent for the uranium (U). Studies suggest that such deviation can be attributed to the non-linear nature of the axial burnup values of the SNF. Oak Ridge National Laboratory and Texas A&M University are co-investigating the development of a new method, via Nondestructive Assay (NDA) techniques, to improve the accuracy in burnup and Pu content quantification. Two major components have been identified to achieve this objective. The first component calculates a measurement-based burnup profile along the axis of a fuel rod. Gamma-ray data is collected at numerous locations along the axis of the fuel rod using a High Purity Germanium (HPGe) detector designed for a wide range of gamma-ray energies. Using two fission products, 137Cs and 134Cs, the burnup is calculated at each measurement location and a profile created along the axis of the rod based on the individual measurement locations. The second component measures the U/Pu ratio using an HPGe detector configured for relatively low-energy gamma-rays including x-rays. Fluorescence x-rays from U and Pu are measured and compared to the U/Pu ratio determined from a destructive analysis of the sample. This will be used to establish a relationship between the measured and actual values. This relationship will be combined with the burnup analysis results to establish a relationship between fission product activity and Pu content. It is anticipated that this new method will allow receiving facilities to make a limited number of NDA, gamma-ray, measurements to confirm the shipper declared values for burnup and Pu content thereby improving the SRD.

Burnup↗

One-dimensional SnF{sub 2} single crystals in the inner channels of single-wall carbon nanotubes: I. Preparation and basic characterization

One-dimensional (1D) SnF{sub 2} single crystals have been obtained by crystallization from melt in the inner channels of single-wall carbon nanotubes (SWCNTs). SWCNTs with an inner diameter of 1.02-1.4 nm, synthesized by electric-arc discharge and chemically purified, were used for incorporation. The synthesized 1D SnF{sub 2} single crystal-SWCNT composites are basically characterized by X-ray diffraction, energy-dispersive analysis, electron microscopy, and chemical analysis. The characteristic motifs of tin cation distribution in the SWCNT inner channel confirm the formation of SnF{sub 2} single crystals.

75 CONDENSED MATTER PHYSICS, SUPERCONDUCTIVITY AND↗

DOE-Managed HLW and SNF Research: FY15 EBS and Thermal Analysis Work Package Status.

This report examines the technical elements necessary to evaluate EBS concepts and perform thermal analysis of DOE-Managed SNF and HLW in the disposal settings of primary interest – argillite, crystalline, salt, and deep borehole. As the disposal design concept is composed of waste inventory, geologic setting, and engineered concept of operation, the engineered barrier system (EBS) falls into the last component of engineered concept of operation. The waste inventory for DOE-Managed HLW and SNF is closely examined, with specific attention to the number of waste packages, the size of waste packages, and the thermal output per package. As expected, the DOE-Managed HLW and SNF inventory has a much smaller volume, and hence smaller number of canisters, as well a lower thermal output, relative to a waste inventory that would include commercial spent nuclear fuel (CSNF). A survey of available data and methods from previous studies of thermal analysis indicates that, in some cases, thermo-hydrologic modeling will be necessary to appropriately address the problem. This report also outlines scope for FY16 work -- a key challenge identified is developing a methodology to effectively and efficiently evaluate EBS performance in each disposal setting on the basis of thermal analyses results.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Test Plan for Investigation of Hydrogen Generation in SNF Canisters

This report presents a test plan to investigate radiolytic hydrogen generation in spent nuclear fuel (SNF) canisters containing Zr-based cladding materials. The initial primary contributor to the generation of radiolytic hydrogen is estimated to be the residual physisorbed water on the ZrO 2 film, post-dry out. Over the longer term the primary hydrogen source is associated with the aluminum hydroxides and water vapor. The proposed testing to be conducted in FY22 would consist of lab-scale testing on non-radioactive surrogates of oxidized ZIRLO tubing and unalloyed zirconium using a miniature steel canister (“mini-canister") designed to allow intermittent, in-situ sampling of the canister gas during irradiation. The mini-canister approach for irradiation with in-situ monitoring system was used in a recent and on-going study [McNamara and Verst, 2020a & 2020b; Verst et al., 2021] to measure radiolytic hydrogen generation from aluminum SNF cladding surrogate materials. This proposed testing will form part of the overall materials performance evaluation of the commercial SNF-in-canister system and is part of the technical bases for their continued safe dry storage

08 HYDROGEN↗