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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 37 records · Page 2

FY2017 Updates to the SAS4A/SASSYS-1 Safety Analysis Code

The SAS4A/SASSYS-1 safety analysis software is used to perform deterministic analysis of anticipated events as well as design-basis and beyond-design-basis accidents for advanced fast reactors. It plays a central role in the analysis of U.S. DOE conceptual designs, proposed test and demonstration reactors, and in domestic and international collaborations. This report summarizes the code development activities that have taken place during FY2017. Extensions to the void and cladding reactivity feedback models have been implemented, and Control System capabilities have been improved through a new virtual data acquisition system for plant state variables and an additional Block Signal for a variable lag compensator to represent reactivity feedback for novel shutdown devices. Current code development and maintenance needs are also summarized in three key areas: software quality assurance, modeling improvements, and maintenance of related tools. With ongoing support, SAS4A/SASSYS-1 can continue to fulfill its growing role in fast reactor safety analysis and help solidify DOE’s leadership role in fast reactor safety both domestically and in international collaborations.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Level-3 Probabilistic Safety Analysis VAB-3 as an NPP Safety Enhancement Stage

Questions pertaining to the development of reactors from the standpoint of the evolution of protection and emergency response systems for large radiation accidents, and development of probabilistic safety analysis at different levels are examined. Examples are presented of the calculation of quantitative characteristics of risk in an accident at a model NPP that show the possibility of using VAB-3 to evaluate the scale of countermeasures as a function of the level of intervention, their effectiveness as a function of the time of application and validation of countermeasures for an individual populated point. It is shown that the VAB-3 methodology must be developed in order to increase NPP safety.

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Draft Feasibility Assessment for Use of AI in Preparing Transportation Safety Analysis Reports

Preparing transportation safety analysis reports for microreactors is time and labor intensive, requiring extensive cross referencing to Federal regulations, previously approved documents, and expert review comments across structural, thermal, criticality, shielding, containment, and security. These burdens are magnified by the novelty of microreactor technologies and the evolving regulatory landscape, as well as current workforce constraints. Generative AI and supporting machine learning tools present an opportunity to accelerate drafting timelines, lift generalized writing burdens, and systematically enforce regulatory adherence through retrieval augmented generation and other knowledge retrieval and mapping methods. This draft report presents a preliminary feasibility assessment of the use of AI to expedite the preparation of microreactor transportation safety analysis reports and proposes an initial methodology for doing so.

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Using Qualitative Hazard Analysis to Guide Quantitative Safety Analysis

Quantitative methods can be beneficial in many types of safety investigations. However, there are many difficulties in using quantitative m ethods. Far example, there may be little relevant data available. This paper proposes a framework for using quantitative hazard analysis to prioritize hazard scenarios most suitable for quantitative mziysis. The framework first categorizes hazard scenarios by severity and likelihood. We then propose another metric "modeling difficulty" that desc ribes the complexity in modeling a given hazard scenario quantitatively. The combined metrics of severity, likelihood, and modeling difficu lty help to prioritize hazard scenarios for which quantitative analys is should be applied. We have applied this methodology to proposed concepts of operations for reduced wake separation for airplane operatio ns at closely spaced parallel runways.

Shortle, J. F.↗

Evaluation of AI-Enabled Digital Documented Safety Analysis: A Case Study

Safety basis documentation development and review under U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) authorization have emerged as critical constraint throttling deployment of advanced nuclear reactors, with traditional processes demanding extraordinary resource investment that delays the delivery of these technologies. Traditional Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) processes rely on static documents with limited traceability [U.S. DOE]. The regulatory review and engagement processes are similarly constrained, often requiring significant effort and extensive manual verification. The scale of this challenge is exemplified by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) review of the NuScale application, which required over 250,000 staff hours and the evaluation of approximately two million pages of documentation [Bergman 2021]. The volume and complexity of information within nuclear licensing applications or authorization reviews demands innovative approaches to document generation and data management.

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Applying Qualitative Hazard Analysis to Support Quantitative Safety Analysis for Proposed Reduced Wake Separation Conops

This paper describes a scenario-driven hazard analysis process to identify, eliminate, and control safety-related risks. Within this process, we develop selective criteria to determine the applicability of applying engineering modeling to hypothesized hazard scenarios. This provides a basis for evaluating and prioritizing the scenarios as candidates for further quantitative analysis. We have applied this methodology to proposed concepts of operations for reduced wake separation for closely spaced parallel runways. For arrivals, the process identified 43 core hazard scenarios. Of these, we classified 12 as appropriate for further quantitative modeling, 24 that should be mitigated through controls, recommendations, and / or procedures (that is, scenarios not appropriate for quantitative modeling), and 7 that have the lowest priority for further analysis.

Shortle, John F.↗

SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT FOR PACKAGING SHIELDING & NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY COURSES DEVELOPED AND CONDUCTED BY OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY

The US Department of Energy (DOE) Packaging Certification Program, Office of Packaging and Transportation, is offering Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) Shielding and Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) courses for SARP generalists and analysts. The SARP generalist course is designed for project managers, supervisors, NCS/shielding subject matter experts (SME), and SMEs in non-NCS/shielding technical areas (e.g., structural, thermal, package design) who need to improve their understanding of how NCS/shielding analyses fit into the broader spectrum of SARP documentation. The generalist course provides an overview of the regulations and guidelines for the criticality and shielding analyses included in a SARP, and it illustrates how the NCS/shielding chapters integrate with the other parts of the SARP. After course material is presented, students in the generalist course will review an actual SARP document to examine key elements of the shielding and criticality analyses. The analyst course provides detailed instructions on the radioactive material package shielding analyses and NCS evaluation fundamentals needed by analysts/practitioners, including safety analysts and/or technical reviewers, to prepare and/or review technical analyses for SARP documentation. The analyst course also provides an overview of regulations and guidelines, in addition to detailed in-class exercises associated with package shielding and NCS analyses. Analysis teams will be faced with staged SARP examples in which several important decision processes in the generation of a SARP will be demonstrated and discussed. Both courses are offered at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and for interested students, the analyst course is offered for one hour of graduate credit (course ME-690) from the University of Nevada at Reno. An overview of the course will be provided to ensure that the NCS community is aware of the course and its intent to support the shielding and NCS aspects of packaging and transportation analyses for SARP activities.

Bowen, Douglas G.↗

Safety Analysis for the Versatile Test Reactor Conceptual Design

Safety analysis simulations have been carried out using the SAS4A/SASSYS-1 safety analysis code system to update the baseline set of results for the Versatile Test Reactor conceptual design. Results from a previous revision of this work provided input for the Conceptual Safety Design Report summarizing the overall safety basis for the VTR. This work will also support future analyses that will be required for Chapter 13, “Accident Analysis,” of a preliminary safety analysis report. A number of transients have been evaluated based on categories of postulated accident sequences suggested for consideration in NUREG-1537. Ultimately, the full spectrum of event initiators and subsequent accident sequences will be defined through a probabilistic risk assessment of the plant design following the implementation of the Licensing Modernization Project guidelines as described in the VTR Safety Design Strategy. Since that process is ongoing, the present analysis addresses several transients that are expected to be bounding accident scenarios that represent the three key ways to perturb a reactor: through changes to the core inlet temperature, mass flow rate, or reactivity. These correspond to a loss of heat sink (LOHS), loss of flow (LOF) or station blackout (SBO), and transient overpower (TOP), respectively. Both Protected and Unprotected versions of these transients have been evaluated, along with additional transients that include transient overpower with one stuck rod, pump coast-down failures, seismic events, and overcooling events. At the current stage of design, transient simulation results for the Versatile Test Reactor indicate that large safety margins exist for many event initiators. However, several “enabling” assumptions have been made, in terms of both design features and design limits, in order to perform the analyses; and these assumptions will need to be revised as the design matures. In addition, a larger spectrum of events needs to be evaluated as part of the on-going probabilistic risk assessment process.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Preliminary Results Obtained in Integrated Safety Analysis of NASA Aviation Safety Program Technologies

This is a listing of recent unclassified RTO technical publications processed by the NASA Center for AeroSpace Information from January 1, 2001 through March 31, 2001 available on the NASA Aeronautics and Space Database. Contents include 1) Cognitive Task Analysis; 2) RTO Educational Notes; 3) The Capability of Virtual Reality to Meet Military Requirements; 4) Aging Engines, Avionics, Subsystems and Helicopters; 5) RTO Meeting Proceedings; 6) RTO Technical Reports; 7) Low Grazing Angle Clutter...; 8) Verification and Validation Data for Computational Unsteady Aerodynamics; 9) Space Observation Technology; 10) The Human Factor in System Reliability...; 11) Flight Control Design...; 12) Commercial Off-the-Shelf Products in Defense Applications.

Source record↗

Safety analysis report for packaging shielding and nuclear criticality safety courses developed and conducted by Oak Ridge National Laboratory

The US Department of Energy (DOE) Packaging Certification Program, Office of Packaging and Transportation, is offering Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) Shielding and Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) courses for SARP generalists and analysts. The SARP generalist course is designed for project managers, supervisors, NCS/shielding subject matter experts (SME), and SMEs in non-NCS/shielding technical areas (e.g., structural, thermal, package design) who need to better understand how NCS/shielding analyses fit into the broader body of SARP documentation. The generalist course provides an overview of the regulations and guidelines for the criticality and shielding analyses for a SARP and illustrates how the NCS/shielding chapters integrate with the other parts of the SARP. After course material is presented, students in the generalist course will review an actual SARP document to examine key elements of the shielding and criticality analyses. The analyst course provides detailed instructions on the radioactive material package shielding analyses and NCS evaluation fundamentals needed by analysts/practitioners (i.e., safety analysts and/or technical reviewers) to prepare and/or review technical analyses for the SARP documentation. The analyst course also provides an overview of regulations and guidelines, in addition to detailed in-class exercises associated with package shielding and NCS analyses. Analysis teams will be faced with staged SARP examples in which several important decision processes in the generation of a SARP will be demonstrated and discussed. The courses are offered at Oak Ridge National Laboratory's National Transportation Research Center. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Preliminary Results Obtained in Integrated Safety Analysis of NASA Aviation Safety Program Technologies

This is a listing of recent unclassified RTO technical publications for January 1, 2005 through March 31, 2005 processed by the NASA Center for AeroSpace Center available on the NASA Aeronautics and Space Database. Contents include 1) Electronic Information Management; 2) Decision Support to Combined Joint Task Force and Component Commanders; 3) RTO Technical Publications : A Quarterly Listing (December 2004); 4) The Role of Humans in Intelligent and Automated Systems.

Source record↗

Preliminary Safety Analysis of the Gorleben Site: Safety Concept and Application to Scenario Development Based on a Site-Specific Features, Events and Processes (FEP) Database - 13304

Based upon the German safety criteria, released in 2010 by the Federal Ministry of the Environment (BMU), a safety concept and a safety assessment concept for the disposal of heat-generating high-level waste have both been developed in the framework of the preliminary safety case for the Gorleben site (Project VSG). The main objective of the disposal is to contain the radioactive waste inside a defined rock zone, which is called containment-providing rock zone. The radionuclides shall remain essentially at the emplacement site, and at the most, a small defined quantity of material shall be able to leave this rock zone. This shall be accomplished by the geological barrier and a technical barrier system, which is required to seal the inevitable penetration of the geological barrier by the construction of the mine. The safe containment has to be demonstrated for probable and less probable evolutions of the site, while evolutions with very low probability (less than 1 % over the demonstration period of 1 million years) need not to be considered. Owing to the uncertainty in predicting the real evolution of the site, plausible scenarios have been derived in a systematic manner. Therefore, a comprehensive site-specific features, events and processes (FEP) data base for the Gorleben site has been developed. The safety concept was directly taken into account, e.g. by identification of FEP with direct influence on the barriers that provide the containment. No effort was spared to identify the interactions of the FEP, their probabilities of occurrence, and their characteristics (values). The information stored in the data base provided the basis for the development of scenarios. The scenario development methodology is based on FEP related to an impairment of the functionality of a subset of barriers, called initial barriers. By taking these FEP into account in their probable characteristics the reference scenario is derived. Thus, the reference scenario describes a comprehensive set of probable future evolutions of the repository site. By stepwise consideration of less probable FEP or less probable characteristics of FEP within this process, alternative scenarios are also developed, which are characterized by a lower probability of occurrence. An important methodological aspect is that some assumptions had to be made for the scenario development. They allow, on the one hand, to deal systematically with incomplete knowledge regarding the geological situation below ground owing to restricted site investigations, and, on the other hand, to structure the scenario development process. The consideration of alternative assumptions may result in additional alternative scenarios. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Defining and Reasoning about Model-based Safety Analysis: A Review

Model-based safety analysis (MBSA) has been around for over two decades. The benefits of MBSA have been well-documented in the literature, such as tackling complexity, introducing Formal Methods to eliminate the ambiguity in the traditional safety analysis, using automation to replace the error-prone manual safety modeling process, and ensuring consistency between the design model and the safety model. However, there is still a lack of consensus on what MBSA even is. This paper provides an approach towards developing such a consensus

model-based↗

Digital Safety Analysis for Small Modular Nuclear Reactors (SMRs)

A Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) is a Department of Energy (DOE) construct that defines the extent to which a nuclear facility can be operated safely. It includes a description of hazards, safe boundaries, and hazard controls. The authors assert that a Digital Safety Analysis (DgSA) is far superior to a legacy DSA for several reasons: • The underling database is structured such that it is possible to perform a comprehensive design review and safety analysis by iterating systematically across a hierarchy of linked objects versus a redundant and spotty review by entities of various abilities under unknown resource and schedule constraints. • The analysis of a new design can discover elements that are similar to elements in previous designs. The discovery of similarities is made possible by using the same structure for the underlying database for each new DgSA. The “prior learning” from previous designs is then applied automatically to new designs. • Outputs from the DgSA are from a single source to ensure consistency among various views of the same information. After the DgSA is released, the continued use of a single source implements a configuration management program to ensure consistency between the design basis, the design, the built system, and system procedures. • The development of the DgSA is agile in that any change in a linked object triggers an analysis of impacts on other linked objects and updates of linked objects are made accordingly. After the DgSA is released, the continued maintenance of these links and objects automates the “unreviewed safety question” process.

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Documented Safety Analysis for the B695 Segment

This Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) was prepared for the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Building 695 (B695) Segment of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF). The report provides comprehensive information on design and operations, including safety programs and safety structures, systems and components to address the potential process-related hazards, natural phenomena, and external hazards that can affect the public, facility workers, and the environment. Consideration is given to all modes of operation, including the potential for both equipment failure and human error. The facilities known collectively as the DWTF are used by LLNL's Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) Division to store and treat regulated wastes generated at LLNL. RHWM generally processes low-level radioactive waste with no, or extremely low, concentrations of transuranics (e.g., much less than 100 nCi/g). Wastes processed often contain only depleted uranium and beta- and gamma-emitting nuclides, e.g., {sup 90}Sr, {sup 137}Cs, or {sup 3}H. The mission of the B695 Segment centers on container storage, lab-packing, repacking, overpacking, bulking, sampling, waste transfer, and waste treatment. The B695 Segment is used for storage of radioactive waste (including transuranic and low-level), hazardous, nonhazardous, mixed, and other waste. Storage of hazardous and mixed waste in B695 Segment facilities is in compliance with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). LLNL is operated by the Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC, for the Department of Energy (DOE). The B695 Segment is operated by the RHWM Division of LLNL. Many operations in the B695 Segment are performed under a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) operation plan, similar to commercial treatment operations with best demonstrated available technologies. The buildings of the B695 Segment were designed and built considering such operations, using proven building systems, and keeping them as simple as possible while complying with industry standards and institutional requirements. No operations to be performed in the B695 Segment or building system are considered to be complex. No anticipated future change in the facility mission is expected to impact the extent of safety analysis documented in this DSA.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

ANTARES: a new IRSN computational chain for safety analysis

Since some years, the IRSN has developed a new project to simulate accurately the interaction between neutronic and thermal hydraulic phenomena. This project called ANTARES (Advanced Neutronics and Thermal-hydraulic for the Analysis of Reactor Safety) couples the thermal hydraulic code CATHARE-3 with the 3D neutronic nodal code PARCS. The purpose of this project is to take the advantage of the complementary of these 2 codes, by the knowledge of the 3D core power distribution in CATHARE-3 (computed by PARCS) and improving the thermal hydraulic boundaries conditions in PARCS. In this way, the IRSN diversifies and enlarges its available tools to perform safety analysis with improved accuracy. The current technique usually adopted in France for the safety demonstrations for Reactivity Insertion Accident (RIA) is the so-called 'conservative' approach, which consists of reducing all the feedback (Doppler and moderator effects) and in modifying some physical quantities in such a way to increase a power peak. For this reason, these facilities ('penalties') have been implemented in ANTARES. In this paper we will give two examples of accidental transients that can be simulated with ANTARES: a Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) and an inadvertent boron dilution event. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗