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Post-Closure Report for Closed Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Corrective Action Units, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, For Calendar Year 2021 (Revision 1)

This report serves as the combined annual report for post-closure activities in compliance with the requirements listed in Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Permit Number NEV HW0101 associated with the following closed corrective action units (CAUs): CAU 90, Area 2 Bitcutter Containment; CAU 91, Area 3 U-3fi Injection Well; CAU 92, Area 6 Decon Pond Facility; CAU 110, Area 3 WMD U-3ax/bl Crater; CAU 111, Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits; and CAU 112, Area 23 Hazardous Waste Trenches. This report will address all monitoring requirements noted in the RCRA Permit NEV HW0101, except groundwater monitoring. Groundwater monitoring is documented in the Nevada National Security Site Data Report: Groundwater Monitoring Program Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Post-Closure Inspection and Monitoring Report for Surface Corrective Action Unit 417 at the Central Nevada Test Area, Nevada, Site

This report documents the biennial postclosure site inspections conducted in June 2018 at the surface Corrective Action Unit (CA U) 417 at the Central Nevada Test Area, Nevada, Site. The UC-I, UC-3, and UC-4 sites are inspected every 2 years, in accordance with the Post-Closure Monitoring Plan provided in the CAU 417 Closure Report published in 2001. The requirements for postclosure monitoring have been modified over the years through negotiations with the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP). Modifications were documented through three separate Records of Technical Change to the Closure Report, which were approved by NDEP in 2003, 2011, and 2015. The UC-1, UC-3, and UC-4 sites were all observed as being in good condition during the 2018 inspections. A few minor cracks on the UC-1 Central Mud Pit cover were repaired during the UC- I inspection. A concrete monument at the northeast corner of Mud Pit U3E at the UC-3 site had some damage near the top of the monument, but the damage has not impacted the functionality of the monument or survey pin on top of the monument. No issues were identified at the UC-4 site. No maintenance or additional repair activities are recommended at the UC-1, UC-3, and UC-4 sites.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Underground Test Area (UGTA) Sampling Plan for Corrective Action Units 101 and 102: Central and Western Pahute Mesa, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

The purpose of this groundwater sampling plan (referred to herein as “the Plan”) is to describe the approach for collecting and analyzing groundwater samples to meet the objectives of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management (EM) Nevada Program’s Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity. The Plan is focused on the Central and Western Pahute Mesa corrective action units (CAUs 101 and 102). The remaining UGTA CAUs are in the final stage of the UGTA strategy (Closure Report [CR] stage), and monitoring requirements for these CAUs are described in their respective CRs. The Plan supersedes the Nevada National Security Site Integrated Groundwater Sampling Plan and its ensuing Record of Technical Change (ROTC) (DOE/EMNV, 2019b). The Plan is designed to ensure compliance with the UGTA Quality Assurance Plan (QAP) and its ensuing ROTC (DOE/EMNV, 2018), and the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (1996, as amended). The Plan is implemented by the Environmental Program Services (EPS) contractor. Implementation of the Plan provides data to complete corrective actions prescribed by the FFACO to protect the public from groundwater contaminated by historical underground nuclear testing. The Plan’s scope comprises sample collection and analysis requirements for assessing the extent of groundwater contamination from underground nuclear testing. Sampling wells located in the communities surrounding the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) is performed by other organizations (e.g., management and operating [M&O] contractor) and is therefore not included within the Plan. The results of the community sampling are presented in the annual NNSS environmental reports.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Post-Closure Report for Closed Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Corrective Action Units, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, For Calendar Year 2019, Revision 0

This report serves as the combined annual report for post-closure activities in compliance with the requirements listed in Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Permit Number NEV HW0101 associated with the following closed corrective action units (CAUs): • CAU 90, Area 2 Bitcutter Containment • CAU 91, Area 3 U-3fi Injection Well • CAU 92, Area 6 Decon Pond Facility • CAU 110, Area 3 WMD U-3ax/bl Crater • CAU 111, Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits • CAU 112, Area 23 Hazardous Waste Trenches

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

NRAP-Open-IAM: NRAP Open Source Integrated Assessment Model

Note: This is the last version (a2.6.1) of NRAP-Open-IAM released during NRAP Phase II in 2022. The latest version of NRAP-Open-IAM is available here: https://edx.netl.doe.gov/dataset/phase-iii-nrap-open-iam NRAP-Open-IAM is an open-source software product that enables quantification of containment effectiveness and leakage risk at storage sites in the context of system uncertainties and variability. NRAP-Open-IAM represents the next-generation in a line of systems-based computational models developed for quantitative geological carbon storage (GCS) risk assessment. The model comprises a set of reduced-order and analytical models of various components of the GCS system, potential leakage pathways, receptors of concern including impact to groundwater resources and the atmosphere, a framework to support stochastic simulation, time stepping, uncertainty quantification, other analytical functionality for scenario and risk-performance evaluation, and a basic graphical user interface to support scenario development, data input simulation definition, and basic post-processing and results display. As the NRAP Open-IAM functionality continues to evolve, we continue to add to its capability to develop quantitative, probabilistic, and time-dependent profiles of the evolution of risk at a GCS site and evaluate the influence of uncertain parameters on uncertainty in predicted risk. It can be used to quantify the dynamics of reservoir saturation plume and pressure-affected area, for evaluation of the area of potential groundwater impact (i.e., Area of Review) and monitoring requirements to support cost and regulatory analysis, and for consideration of different post-injection site care and closure scenarios. This submission contains the current version of NRAP-Open-IAM available for evaluation and testing. To use the NRAP-Open-IAM, download the source code (https://edx.netl.doe.gov/dataset/08f396c8-bc5f-44ad-a028-6e98a6ea6d70/resource/4c24a3da-3b40-4ffe-9892-c807ae9f8760) then open the NRAP-Open-IAM user's guide (https://edx.netl.doe.gov/dataset/08f396c8-bc5f-44ad-a028-6e98a6ea6d70/resource/8b27335a-343c-4836-b8a3-3ad0bdc9e669) to read more about the tool. Installation instructions for Windows, Mac, and Linux can be found in the "installers" folder of the extracted NRAP-Open-IAM folder and describe setup of environment (e.g., Python libraries) needed for proper work of the tool. Test of installation can be done by running "python openiam_setup_tests.py" in the "setup" folder. The installation test also runs a test suite to see if the NRAP-Open-IAM has been installed correctly. To run the test suite separately, run "python iam_test.py" in the "test" folder. User's guide: https://edx.netl.doe.gov/dataset/08f396c8-bc5f-44ad-a028-6e98a6ea6d70/resource/8b27335a-343c-4836-b8a3-3ad0bdc9e669 Developer's guide: https://edx.netl.doe.gov/dataset/08f396c8-bc5f-44ad-a028-6e98a6ea6d70/resource/3bc6ee7d-609d-4eb6-80ba-fa6130ee0313 Reservoir simulation data used in some examples distributed with NRAP-Open-IAM: - Kimberlina: https://edx.netl.doe.gov/dataset/08f396c8-bc5f-44ad-a028-6e98a6ea6d70/resource/eb62cece-61b2-4037-9b6d-32407dde2ab8 - Kimberlina (compartmentalized): https://edx.netl.doe.gov/dataset/08f396c8-bc5f-44ad-a028-6e98a6ea6d70/resource/366f9530-3b32-4b84-affe-ab2df1d9a8b5 - FutureGen 2.0: https://edx.netl.doe.gov/dataset/futuregen-2-0-1008-simulation-reservoir-lookup-table NRAP-Open-IAM GitLab repository: https://gitlab.com/NRAP/OpenIAM Related publications: - Bacon, D., Yonkofski, C., Brown, C., Demirkanli, D. and Whiting, J., 2019. Risk-based post injection site care and monitoring for commercial-scale carbon storage: Reevaluation of the FutureGen 2.0 site using NRAP-Open-IAM and DREAM. International Journal of Greenhouse Gas Control 90: 102784. - Bacon, D. Demirkanli, D., and White, S., 2020. Probabilistic risk-based Area of Review (AoR) determination for a deep-saline carbon storage site. International Journal of Greenhouse Gas Control 102: 103153. - Harp, D., Oldenburg, C., and Pawar, R., 2019. A metric for evaluating conformance robustness during geologic CO2 sequestration operations. International Journal of Greenhouse Gas Control 85: 100-108. - Lackey, G., Vasylkivska, V., Huerta, N., King, S., and Dilmore, R., 2019. Managing well leakage risks at a geologic carbon storage site with many wells, International Journal of Greenhouse Gas Control, 88 :182-194. - Vasylkivska, V., Dilmore, R., Lackey, G., Zhang, Y., King, S., Bacon, D., Chen, B., Mansoor, K., and Harp, D., 2021. NRAP-Open-IAM: A flexible open-source integrated assessment model for geologic carbon storage risk assessment and management, Environmental Modelling & Software, 143: 105114. Presentations: - Chen, B., Harp, D., and Pawar, R., A data assimilation approach (ES-MDA) coupling with NRAP-Open-IAM for quantifying uncertainty reduction in geological CO2 sequestration. AGUFM 2019: T44A-02. - Chen, B., and Harp, D., Improving risk analysis precision for geologic CO2 sequestration by quantifying the uncertainty reduction before and after acquiring monitoring data. 14th Greenhouse Gas Control Technologies Conference, Melbourne, Australia, 2018, pp. 21-26. - Harp, D., National Risk Assessment Partnership Task 2: Containment Assurance. No. LA-UR-19-28654, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States), 2019. - Vasylkivska, V., King, S., Bacon, D., Harp, D., Chen, B., Mansoor, K., Onishi, T., Yang, Y., Zhang, Y., and Keating, E., NRAP-Open-IAM: An open-source integrated assessment model, poster, Mastering the Subsurface Through Technology Innovation, Partnerships and Collaboration: Carbon Storage and Oil and Natural Gas Technologies Review Meeting, Pittsburgh, PA, August 13-16, 2018. - Vasylkivska, V., Lackey, G., King, S., Wentworth, A., Huerta, N., Creason, C., DiGiulio, J., Yang, Y., and Dilmore, R., Long-term risk analysis of a geologic CO2 storage project during the post-injection period, SIAM Conference on Computational Science and Engineering, Spokane, WA, February 25-March 1, 2019. - Vasylkivska, V., Overview of the NRAP-Open-IAM tool for carbon storage (beta release), 2019 Annual NRAP Tool Users Meeting, Pittsburgh, PA, August 27, 2019. - Vasylkivska, V., Bacon, D., Chen, B., Dilmore, R., Harp, D., King, S., Lackey, G., Lindner, E., Liu, G., Mansoor, K. and Zhang, Y., NRAP-Open-IAM: A new, open-source code for integrated assessment of geologic carbon storage containment effectiveness and leakage risk, poster, American Geophysical Union Fall Meeting 2020 (virtual meeting), December 2020. - Vasylkivska, V., NRAP open-source integrated assessment model and relevant application, oral presentation, NRAP workshop "NRAP Tools for Geologic Carbon Storage Risk-Based Decision Making" held in conjunction with Groundwater Protection Council (GWPC) 2021 Annual Forum (virtual meeting), Salt Lake City, UT, September 2021. - Vasylkivska, V., NRAP-Open-IAM: open-source integrated assessment model, digital poster/demonstration, software demonstration session, 2022 Carbon Management Project Review Meeting, August 16, 2022

AoR↗

Post-Closure Report for Closed Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Corrective Action Units, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada For Calendar Year 2022

This report serves as the combined annual report for post-closure activities in compliance with the requirements listed in Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Permit Number NEV HW0101 (Rev. 6) associated with the following closed corrective action units (CAUs): CAU 90, Area 2 Bitcutter Containment; CAU 91, Area 3 U-3fi Injection Well; CAU 92, Area 6 Decon Pond Facility; CAU 110, Area 3 WMD U-3ax/bl Crater; CAU 111, Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits; CAU 112, Area 23 Hazardous Waste Trenches. All post-closure inspections and evaluations were performed in accordance with requirements set out in RCRA Permit NEV HW0101, Rev. 6.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Underground Test Area (UGTA) Sampling Plan for Corrective Action Units 101 and 102: Central and Western Pahute Mesa, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 2

The purpose of this groundwater sampling plan (referred to herein as “the Plan”) is to describe the approach for collecting and analyzing groundwater samples to meet the objectives of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management (EM) Nevada Program’s Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity. The Plan is focused on the Central and Western Pahute Mesa corrective action units (CAUs 101 and 102), which are currently in the Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD)/Corrective Action Plan (CAP) stage of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) UGTA Strategy. The remaining UGTA CAUs are in the final stage of the UGTA strategy (Closure Report [CR] stage), and monitoring requirements for these CAUs are described in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order Nevada National Security Site Use Restriction Management Plan (DOE/EMNV, 2024a). The Plan supersedes the Nevada National Security Site Integrated Groundwater Sampling Plan and its ensuing Record of Technical Change (ROTC) (DOE/EMNV, 2019b).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Conformational dynamics linked to domain closure and substrate binding explain the ERAP1 allosteric regulation mechanism

The endoplasmic-reticulum aminopeptidase ERAP1 processes antigenic peptides for loading on MHC-I proteins and recognition by CD8 T cells as they survey the body for infection and malignancy. Crystal structures have revealed ERAP1 in either open or closed conformations, but whether these occur in solution and are involved in catalysis is not clear. Here, we assess ERAP1 conformational states in solution in the presence of substrates, allosteric activators, and inhibitors by small-angle X-ray scattering. We also characterize changes in protein conformation by X-ray crystallography, and we localize alternate C-terminal binding sites by chemical crosslinking. Structural and enzymatic data suggest that the structural reconfigurations of ERAP1 active site are physically linked to domain closure and are promoted by binding of long peptide substrates. These results clarify steps required for ERAP1 catalysis, demonstrate the importance of conformational dynamics within the catalytic cycle, and provide a mechanism for the observed allosteric regulation and Lys/Arg528 polymorphism disease association.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Development of a Conditioned System-Level Groundwater Model to Evaluate Long-Term Groundwater Impacts within a Performance Assessment - 20115

A preliminary performance assessment (PA) of single-shell tank Waste Management Area (WMA) A-AX located at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)'s Hanford Site in southeastern Washington is being conducted to satisfy the requirements of DOE Order 435.1 [1] as it relates to closure of the single-shell radioactive waste tanks in the WMA A-AX tank farms. A PA assesses the fate, transport, and impacts of radionuclides within a low-level radioactive waste disposal facility in its assumed closure configuration and the subsequent potential doses to humans over a 1,000-year compliance period and a 10,000-year performance evaluation period. The WMA A-AX preliminary PA evaluation is structured around the complementary use of process-level and system-level models to calculate the facility performance against established DOE Order 435.1 [1] performance objectives. Process-level models are those that represent a detailed phenomenological representation of processes of concern in the PA. Process models typically only represent one or a few of the components of the PA, such as groundwater flow and transport, and must be integrated with other modeling elements to perform PA calculations. System-level models are those that are abstracted from the process models, retaining the essential features of the process model, while allowing integration of all aspects of the PA in a single modeling framework. System-level models are often characterized by coarser numerical discretization, lower dimensionality, or other similar simplifications compared to the process-level model. Traditionally, a three-dimensional (3-D) process-level model is utilized primarily to evaluate the long-term impact on groundwater and the potential doses to individuals who consume contaminated groundwater. System-level models are also utilized to evaluate the groundwater pathway in PAs. These models typically have reduced dimensionality (1-D) and are conditioned utilizing flow fields (Darcy fluxes) and moisture content distributions that are abstracted from the process level models. The abstraction approach assures that the flow field in both models is consistent for a specific set of input parameters for flow, differing only in the discretization and dimensionality of the two models. The preliminary WMA A-AX PA incorporates a detailed representation of the geological system and hydraulic properties within the 3-D model STOMP{sup C} numerical code so that the effects of relevant features and processes on water flow and radionuclide transport in the subsurface can be evaluated. The complementary system-level model is developed utilizing the GoldSim{sup C} code to implement a simplified, 1-D equivalent model to represent the groundwater pathway. Contaminant transport through the vadose zone and unconfined aquifer for Tc-99 and I-129 were evaluated in each of the models. Adjustments to the saturated portion of the GoldSim{sup C} 1-D model were required to mimic the dispersion effect captured with the 3-D STOMP{sup C} model. Once this conditioning was conducted, highly similar results for the transport of Tc-99 and I-129 were achieved at the point of calculation, located 100 m downgradient from the WMA A-AX fenceline. These radionuclides represent elements that are regarded as primary dose drivers in the PA groundwater pathway analysis. The high degree of conformance between the two models suggests that the use of the equivalent 1-D system model is suitable for evaluating the full suite of radionuclides that will be released from the tank sources within WMA A-AX over the 1,000-year compliance period and over the 10,000-year evaluation period. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Innovative Strategies for Long-Term Monitoring of Complex Groundwater Plumes at DOE’s Legacy Sites (Workshop Report)

Most remaining Department of Energy (DOE) sites will require extended periods of institutional control, especially at complex groundwater sites where attenuation-based strategies have been implemented to facilitate closure. The current practice of monitoring—obtaining and analyzing contaminant concentration in groundwater samples at numerous wells—will account for a large portion of the projected life-cycle at these DOE sites unless a new approach is adopted. State-of-the-art technologies are being developed, including in situ sensors, geophysics, radiation mapping, numerical modeling and AI/ML. These technologies can optimize monitoring strategies in space and time, provide spatially extensive information at vulnerable regions and/or provide more continuous monitoring at lower cost. As part of DOE’s Office of Environmental Management (DOE-EM’s) efforts to advance long-term monitoring systems, an in-person/virtual hybrid workshop was hosted by Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) on January 24 and 25, 2023, in Augusta, Georgia. Because DOE-EM’s complex sites will eventually be transferred to DOE’s Office of Legacy Management (DOE-LM), representatives of DOE-LM were important participants in the workshop. The purpose of the workshop was to identify challenges and opportunities for deploying advanced technologies for long-term monitoring at DOE sites. The key questions during the workshop were: 1) the regulatory acceptance of replacing a process that traditionally has used laboratory sampling and analysis of groundwater samples, and 2) the application of this strategy to the southwestern arid sites that include many of the remaining DOE-EM and DOE-LM complex groundwater plumes. Characteristics common to most arid sites present both limitations and opportunities for advanced technologies. DOE-EM has funded a National Laboratory team from SRNL, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL), and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) to establish the overarching framework of long-term monitoring by systematically combining advanced hardware and software technologies. This project is titled “Advanced Long-Term Environmental Monitoring Systems (ALTEMIS)” and is sponsored by the DOE-EM Technology Development Program. The multi-laboratory team is currently developing and testing innovative monitoring strategies, including the use of in situ groundwater sensors, geophysics, drone/satellite-based remote sensing, reactive transport modeling, and artificial intelligence/machine learning (AI/ML). The project’s demonstration testbed is at the Savannah River Site (SRS) F-Area Seepage Basins, where a well-characterized complex groundwater plume composed of uranium and other radionuclides is in the latter stages of remediation. The workshop included more than 70 participants, presentations, a field visit to F-Area, breakout working groups, and large group discussion. Participants developed recommendations on five topics: in situ sensors, spatially integrative tools, challenges to regulatory acceptance, AI/ML strategies, and transitioning sites to DOE-LM.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Contaminant Migration Modeling to Support the In Situ Decommissioning of Hardened Nuclear Facilities - 20215

The decommissioning of hardened nuclear facilities provides a unique challenge in balancing current worker dose with exposure to future receptors and media. In situ decommissioning (ISD) is a cost-effective and safe option for the closure of such facilities but requires a detailed understanding of the threat that radioactive and hazardous constituents remaining in the facilities pose to groundwater and surrounding surface water. The Savannah River Site (SRS) extensively employs contaminant migration models within the decommissioning process to develop site-specific removal, grouting, and monitoring strategies in support of safe and effective final end states of nuclear facilities. This work discusses the use of contaminant migration modeling in the ISD process at SRS, including specific examples from the closure of P-Reactor and R-Reactor, Building 235-F, F-Canyon and F/H Laboratory Complex. Migration models developed during the closure of P-Reactor and R-Reactor were divided into four source areas: the reactor vessel, the process area, the disassembly basin, and the purification wing. Each source area was assigned a specific inventory and migration pathway and was then subject to varying hypothetical removal, capping, and grouting schemes. Modeling indicated that groundwater Maximum Concentration Limits (MCLs) might be exceeded if no action was taken for eleven and ten constituents of concern (COCs) at P-Reactor and R-Reactor, respectively. These exceedances could occur in as few as 200 to 500 years. Alternatively, the migration modeling demonstrated that the selected ISD actions reduced contaminant mobility which allowed for significant radioactive decay and resulted in fewer predicted exceedances of groundwater MCLs (five COCs for P-Reactor; eight COCs for R-Reactor). In response to the modeling results for P-Reactor and R-Reactor, effectiveness monitoring programs were developed to target contaminants, specific to each reactor, that may migrate to groundwater. Contaminant migration modeling also revealed that roof collapse was a large factor in the release of COCs to the environment, giving rise to roof improvements, and an inspection and vegetation control program to ensure roof stability over time. Contaminant migration modeling is also aiding in the closure planning for hardened facilities in F Area. Building 235-F housed the Actinide Billet Line, which produced Np-237 billets for irradiation in SRS reactors, and the Plutonium Fuel Form (PuFF) facility that produced Pu-238 heat sources for the space program. As a result of these missions, areas within Building 235-F contain considerable residual amounts of both Pu-238 and Np-237. Contaminant migration modeling of Building 235-F was originally performed in 2012 to identify the feasibility of ISD and the amount of radioactive material removal required to prevent the exceedance of groundwater MCLs. The original model indicated that a 60% reduction in the PuFF facility Pu-238 inventory could keep groundwater concentrations below standards, while Np-237 did not pose a threat to groundwater. However, updates to the model with an emphasis on source impact pathways revealed that, due to the orientation of the source areas relative to groundwater flow, no amount of reasonable removal of Pu-238 would keep groundwater concentrations below MCLs and that Np-237 could be a large contributor to localized MCL exceedances. With this insight, the refined 2019 model is being used to assist in the development of grouting plans specific to each facility source area, where bentonite may be utilized to slow the migration of Pu-238 and its daughter products from the PuFF facility and a reducing grout may decrease Np-237 transport by ensuring the nuclide remains in the less mobile +IV oxidation state. The beginning phases of contaminant migration modeling are underway for F-Canyon and associated facilities using lessons learned from the Reactors and Building 235-F. A contaminant migration pathway, similar to the pathway used for the reactor vessels, is being developed for the hot and warm canyons. The F-Canyon inventories are being spatially refined to identify specific and localized source zones, comparable to Building 235-F, that may impact groundwater. Contaminant migration modeling provides vital input within the ISD process, from facility investigation to post closure effectiveness monitoring, making it a valuable tool in the development of safe and effective end states for hardened nuclear facilities at SRS. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Hybrid Transportation System Integrated Trajectory Design and Optimization for Mars Landing Site Accessibility

NASA’s Mars Study Capability Team continues the agency’s efforts to study and refine the nation’s plan to field a sustainable human Mars campaign. One of the primary open issues left unanswered during previous analysis cycles was the uncertainty of the impact to the vehicle performance requirement to deliver crew and cargo to the same landing site across multiple mission opportunities. The Mars Study Capability Team has recently developed an integrated trajectory optimization and system closure model to solve the complex interplanetary trajectory optimization using both low-thrust and high-thrust maneuvers. This paper demonstrates the capability of this new integrated trajectory design and optimization method as it applies to the landing site accessibility problem for the Hybrid transportation architecture. The results showed that the current vehicle is capable of reaching up to +20 degree latitude and down to -20 degree latitude in every mission opportunity from 2033 to 2052. However, reaching latitudes beyond +/- 20 required more propellant than the spacecraft is currently designed to carry for many of the mission opportunities.

Chai, Patrick R.↗

Performance Assessment for the E-Area Low Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility at the Savannah River Site: Chapter 1

This report documents the revised Performance Assessment (PA) analysis for the E-Area Low-Level Waste Facility (ELLWF) at the United States (U.S.) Department of Energy (DOE) Savannah River Site (SRS). A PA analysis is required for DOE-operated facilities that dispose of low-level radioactive waste. PA analyses simulate (1) the release of radionuclides from the disposal site after facility closure, (2) transport of those contaminants through the environment, and (3) exposure/impacts to potential receptors. The purpose of the PA analysis is to demonstrate that the facility is operated in a manner that ensures long-term environmental protection after facility closure, thereby providing for the protection of public health and safety in limiting doses to a hypothetical member of the public (MOP) or an inadvertent human intruder (IHI). DOE Manual (M) 435.1-1, Chg. 3, Radioactive Waste Management (U.S. DOE, 2021b) establishes quantitative post-closure environmental impact limits and requires a facility-specific PA analysis to demonstrate compliance with these limits for DOE low-level waste (LLW) disposed of after September 26, 1988. These limits are defined in terms of human health (e.g., dose limits) with respect to radioactive constituents in the waste.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Opportunities and Strategies for Testing and Infusion of ISRU in the Evolvable Mars Campaign

HE Evolvable Mars Campaign (EMC) is developing the plans and systems needed for a robust, evolutionary strategy to explore cis-lunar space, the Mars sphere of influence (including the moons of Mars), and the surface of Mars. Recently, the emphasis of NASA's plans has changed to focus on the prolonged pioneering of space, rather than focusing on a single crewed mission as the ultimate goal. A sustainable, pioneering vision of space would include in-situ resource utilization (ISRU) in multiple forms and at multiple destinations: atmospheric capture of Mars CO2 and/or volatiles for consumables and propellants, regolith for bulk and refined materials, and in-situ manufacturing at the Moon, Mars, and other bodies. These resources would enable a reduction in the logistical needs from Earth for future missions, thus preparing the way for a sustained presence on Mars. Although the EMC initially relies only on propellant production for the Mars ascent vehicle via ISRU, one of its primary objectives is to prospect at every EMC destination to understand the potential for ISRU; this will permit true pioneering to be enabled after the first crew arrives at Mars. Recent and ongoing analysis has considered the possible prospecting measurements that can be performed at the asteroid returned to cis-lunar space by the Asteroid Robotic Redirect Mission (ARRM), at the lunar surface, at Phobos and Deimos, and on the surface of Mars to identify available resources for future use. These opportunities will be available on missions currently in the Evolvable Mars Campaign construct, and will also facilitate the testing and demonstration of resource acquisition, processing, storage, and useage technologies that can play a role in later missions. This analysis has also led to the identification of several objectives that should be targeted during the missions building up to and including the initial crewed missions. These objectives are mapped to strategies for incorporating ISRU to support resource cycle closure and reduce mass requirements from Earth. This analysis has yielded engineering constraints, based on ISRU, that impact the evaluation of landing sites for missions to the surface of Mars. The terrain of a particular site must be sufficiently flat to permit ISRU systems, as well as ancillary systems such as power and propellant storage tanks, to be landed, moved into position, set up, and operated. Water must be accessible in a form that can be acquired via ISRU, in quantities that align with demands. The chosen method of acquiring and processing water should align with the available resources at a particular site, and that site must have sufficient quantities to meet the requirements (based on crew consumables and propellant demands). Lower altitude landing sites are preferred, as the increase in density can facilitate carbon dioxide acquisition from the atmosphere. Another preference is for sites with a greater ability to move regolith for civil engineering purposes; for example, this would be conducive to both bulk regolith uses (such as the manufacture of berms), and processed regolith uses (such as microwave sintering).

Evolvable Mars Campaign↗

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 116: Area 25 Test Cell C Facility, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada with ROTC-1

CR loaded to this OSTI record. Just adding new file which includes CR plus new ROTC 1 and update the metadata to the following: This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 116, Area 25 Test Cell C Facility. This CR complies with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management; the U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management (FFACO, 1996 [as amended March 2010]). CAU 116 consists of the following two Corrective Action Sites (CASs), located in Area 25 of the Nevada National Security Site: (1) CAS 25-23-20, Nuclear Furnace Piping and (2) CAS 25-41-05, Test Cell C Facility. CAS 25-41-05 consisted of Building 3210 and the attached concrete shield wall. CAS 25-23-20 consisted of the nuclear furnace piping and tanks. Closure activities began in January 2007 and were completed in August 2011. Activities were conducted according to Revision 1 of the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Plan for CAU 116 (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office [NNSA/NSO], 2008). This CR provides documentation supporting the completed corrective actions and provides data confirming that closure objectives for CAU 116 were met. Site characterization data and process knowledge indicated that surface areas were radiologically contaminated above release limits and that regulated and/or hazardous wastes were present in the facility. The Record of Technical Change 1 updated the use restriction information.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Corrective Action Unit 98: Frenchman Flat Five-Year Evaluation Nevada National Security Site, Nevada (Revision 1)

The Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 98, Frenchman Flat (FF) Closure Report (CR) (NNSA/NFO, 2016) and its ensuing Records of Technical Change (ROTCs) (compiled in DOE/EMNV, 2019) required the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management (EM) Nevada Program’s Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity to collect data for five years to establish triggers for the monitoring network and analyze the monitoring points for viability in long-term monitoring. This document provides the results of the five-year evaluation and presents recommendations for future monitoring of CAU 98.

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Performance Assessment Maintenance Plan for the Active Low-Level Burial Ground Trenches 31, 34, and 94 at the Hanford Site

This report documents the maintenance plan for the Hanford Site 200 West Area Active Low-Level Burial Ground Trenches 31 and 34 and 200 East Area Active Trench 94 performance assessment (PA). The PA maintenance plan is one of several supporting documents that are compendiums to the active trenches (Trenches 31, 34, and 94) PA as required in DOE O 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management . The PA is documented in DOE/RL-2021-26, Performance Assessment of Active Trenches in 200 East and West Low-Level Burial Grounds at the Hanford Site . This plan follows the requirements and outline specified in the applicable U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) standard used for developing documents supporting DOE-STD-5002-2017, Disposal Authorization Statement and Tank Closure Documentation . This maintenance plan summarizes the following major activities DOE plans to conduct to maintain the Trenches 31, 34, and 94 PA: Monitoring; Research and development; Planned reviews and analyses; Revisions of Trenches 31, 34, and 94 PA. The planned research and development activities relate to evaluating the key assumptions, including evaluating conceptual model assumptions and parameter value assumptions used in the PA. The planned research and development activities include those that are designed to track the release mechanisms for Category 1, Category 3, and uranium billet waste sources, as well as continued characterization and related modeling of the natural environment in the Central Plateau of the Hanford Site. In addition, the planned research and development activities include focused testing and evaluation of engineered and natural materials to reduce the uncertainty in the conceptual models and parameter values used in the PA. All key and secondary issues identified during the review of the PA by the Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility Federal Review Group have been resolved prior to finalization of the PA. There are no outstanding issues.

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Non-Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Corrective Action Unit (CAU) Post-Closure Inspection Report, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada For Calendar Year 2025

This report includes visual inspection results, descriptions of maintenance and repair activities, and recommendations for CY 2025 for use restrictions (URs) at corrective action sites (CASs) located on the Nevada National Security Site and on the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR) that are accessed through the NNSS Main Gate. This document is arranged by project activity (i.e., Industrial Sites, Soils, and Defense Threat Reduction Agency [DTRA]); then by corrective action unit (CAU); and then by CAS. Post-closure UR inspections are performed on an annual basis, unless as noted in text. Post-closure UR inspections verify the condition of physical controls required by each UR, which may include the following activities: • Visual verification of the legibility of signs • Visual inspection of fencing, signs, monuments, and/or markers for indications of wear • Visual inspection of soil covers for indications of subsidence, erosion, or unauthorized use Deficiencies in UR requirements that were identified during CY 2024 inspections and not addressed in the CY 2024 report are addressed in this CY 2025 report.

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