Space station safety study - Crew safety guidelines, volume 2
Space station safety study - crew safety guidelines - Vol. 2
SEARCH · Search NASA
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
Space station safety study - crew safety guidelines - Vol. 2
Space station safety study - supporting analysis
Space station safety study - subsystem analysis
Volume IV is devoted to examining the medical and associated organizational measures used to maintain the health of space crews and to support their performance before, during, and after space flight. These measures, collectively known as the medical flight support system, are important contributors to the safety and success of space flight. The contributions of space hardware and the spacecraft environment to flight safety and mission success are covered in previous volumes of the Space Biology and Medicine series. In Volume IV, we address means of improving the reliability of people who are required to function in the unfamiliar environment of space flight as well as the importance of those who support the crew. Please note that the extensive collaboration between Russian and American teams for this volume of work resulted in a timeframe of publication longer than originally anticipated. Therefore, new research or insights may have emerged since the authors composed their chapters and references. This volume includes a list of authors' names and addresses should readers seek specifics on new information. At least three groups of factors act to perturb human physiological homeostasis during space flight. All have significant influence on health, psychological, and emotional status, tolerance, and work capacity. The first and most important of these factors is weightlessness, the most specific and radical change in the ambient environment; it causes a variety of functional and structural changes in human physiology. The second group of factors precludes the constraints associated with living in the sealed, confined environment of spacecraft. Although these factors are not unique to space flight, the limitations they entail in terms of an uncomfortable environment can diminish the well-being and performance of crewmembers in space. The third group of factors includes the occupational and social factors associated with the difficult, critical nature of the crewmembers' work: the risks involved in space flight, changes in circadian rhythms, and intragroup interactions. The physical and emotional stress and fatigue that develop under these conditions also can disturb human health and performance. In addition to these factors, the risk also exists that crewmembers will develop various illnesses during flight. The risk of illness is no less during space flight than on Earth, and may actually be greater for some classes of diseases.
An analysis of the nuclear safety aspects (design and operational considerations) in the transport of nuclear payloads to and from earth orbit by the space shuttle is presented. Three representative nuclear payloads used in the study were: (1) the zirconium hydride reactor Brayton power module, (2) the large isotope Brayton power system and (3) small isotopic heat sources which can be a part of an upper stage or part of a logistics module. Reference data on the space shuttle and nuclear payloads are presented in an appendix. Safety oriented design and operational requirements were identified to integrate the nuclear payloads in the shuttle mission. Contingency situations were discussed and operations and design features were recommended to minimize the nuclear hazards. The study indicates the safety, design and operational advantages in the use of a nuclear payload transfer module. The transfer module can provide many of the safety related support functions (blast and fragmentation protection, environmental control, payload ejection) minimizing the direct impact on the shuttle.
Large numbers of individuals are required to work in space to assemble and operate a Solar Power Satellite. The physiological and behavioral consequences for large groups of men and women who perform complex tasks in the vehicular or extravehicular environments over long periods of orbital stay time were considered. The most disturbing consequences of exposure to the null gravity environment found relate to: (1) a generalized cardiovascular deconditioning along with loss of a significant amount of body fluid volume; (2) loss of bone minerals and muscle mass; and (3) degraded performance of neutral mechanisms which govern equilibrium and spatial orientation.
Space station safety study - fault tree analyses
A qualitative identification of the steps required to assure the incorporation of radiological system safety principles and objectives into all phases of a manned space base program are presented. Specific areas of emphasis include: (1) radiological program management, (2) nuclear system safety plan implementation, (3) impact on program, and (4) summary of the key operation and design guidelines and requirements. The plan clearly indicates the necessity of considering and implementing radiological system safety recommendations as early as possible in the development cycle to assure maximum safety and minimize the impact on design and mission plans.
Steve Poulos, Space Shuttle Orbiter Projects Office Manager, and John Chapman, Space Shuttle External Tank Project Manager is shown in this STS-121 Space Shuttle Discovery safety improvements briefing. A graphic presentation of the gap filler installation is shown. The graphics include: 1) Protruding gap fillers during STS-114 mission; 2) STS-114 gap fillers removed on orbiter; 3) Gap filler installation prior to STS-114; 4) Post-STS-114 installation techniques; 5) Gap filler installation post STS-114; 6) Gap filler priority areas; 7) Discovery gap filler installation table and status for STS-121; 8) Damaged blanket on STS-114; 9) On-orbit photography and post-landing photography on STS-114; and 10) STS-114 insulation tiles. Poulos presents imagery that was obtained on STS-114. The imagery includes: 1) The Enhanced Launch Vehicle Imaging System (ELVIS); 2) Liquid oxygen external tank view; 3) Hand-held imagery of the external tank falling into the ocean; 4) ELVIS on STS-121, short, medium and long range camera configurations; 5) Radar capability on the ground at Kennedy Space Center, and 6) STS-121 aft external tank door tiles. Poulos says that STS-121 will have even more imagery than STS-114. John Chapman presents video animation of the external tank where modifications were made along with the ice frost ramps with extensions. Chapman explains these areas using an external tank model. Questions are then answered from the media.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) continues to push the boundary of manned flight. Current mission profiles include flights to the moon and mars. Many of these missions require advance manufacturing and planned off planet resource utilization. As NASA continues to develop highly advance materials and manufacturing techniques to meet these mission profiles, inspection of these increasingly complex parts has had to evolve as well. Additive manufacturing is coming to the forefront as a primary manufacturing technique but offers unique challenges when inspection and certification are required. NASA has been working diligently to be a leader in developing and utilizing inspection techniques capable of inspecting these highly advanced parts. Additionally additive manufacturing techniques can also be used to build parts in space and provides a vehicle for in-situ resource utilization for off world missions. As NASA and its commercial crew partners move forward inspection techniques will need to continue to advance to ensure safe manned space flight. In this talk NASA will highlight many of the advanced nondestructive evaluation efforts going on across the agency. As well as highlights for points of infusion for helping NASA meet it’s future missions.
While traveling to deep space is difficult for many reasons, food is a crucial one. Round-trip Mars mission scenarios last 3 years, demanding food with a shelf-life of 5 years; this means that feeding human crew sustainably for long-duration missions beyond low Earth orbit (LEO) will ultimately lead to a paradigm shift away from the current Earth-based food production system, which depends upon storing and transporting prepackaged foods, and toward bio-regenerative production of food in space. Pharmaceuticals and nutritional supplements face similar challenges. Moreover, the methods we currently use to detect dangerous microbes in food require sample return to Earth, a situation not viable for deep-space missions. While the science behind generating foods and bioproducts is covered by other white papers, in this paper we discuss a crucial gap uniting all of them: how to ensure that such products are free of unwanted microbial contamination and safe for crew to consume. Because Earth-based food safety systems cannot be directly applied in space, safety assurance is currently a critical bottleneck in the space production of food and other bioproducts. Future sustainable deep-space missions will require NASA to devote more resources in the coming decade to understanding the biological and physical science principles underlying microbial food safety in space, and to developing efficient, reliable methods in this area.
The Space Station contains safety critical computer software components in systems that can affect life and vital property. These components require a multilevel secure system that provides dynamic access control of the data and processes involved. A study is under way to define requirements for a security model providing access control through level B3 of the Orange Book. The model will be prototyped at NASA-Johnson Space Center.
Summary of space station safety study
The design and operations guidelines and requirements developed in the study of space base nuclear system safety are presented. Guidelines and requirements are presented for the space base subsystems, nuclear hardware (reactor, isotope sources, dynamic generator equipment), experiments, interfacing vehicles, ground support systems, range safety and facilities. Cross indices and references are provided which relate guidelines to each other, and to substantiating data in other volumes. The guidelines are intended for the implementation of nuclear safety related design and operational considerations in future space programs.
Presentation covers: (1) Safety Certification Process at NASA (2) Safety Testing for Lithium-ion Batteries (3) Limitations Observed with Li-ion Batteries in High Voltage and High Capacity Configurations.
A rocket engine safety system was designed to initiate control procedures to minimize damage to the engine or vehicle or test stand in the event of an engine failure. The features and the implementation issues associated with rocket engine safety systems are discussed, as well as the specific concerns of safety systems applied to a space-based engine and long duration space missions. Examples of safety system features and architectures are given, based on recent safety monitoring investigations conducted for the Space Shuttle Main Engine and for future liquid rocket engines. Also, the general design and implementation process for rocket engine safety systems is presented.