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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 37 records · Page 2
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2000

Endpoint Security Using Biometric Authentication for Secure Remote Mission Operations

We propose a flexible security authentication solution for the spacecraft end-user, which will allow the user to interact over Internet with the spacecraft, its instruments, or with the ground segment from anywhere, anytime based on the user's pre-defined set of privileges. This package includes biometrics authentication products, such as face, voice or fingerprint recognition, authentication services and procedures, such as: user registration and verification over the Internet and user database maintenance, with a configurable schema of spacecraft users' privileges. This fast and reliable user authentication mechanism will become an integral part of end-to-end ground-to-space secure Internet communications and migration from current practice to the future. All modules and services of the proposed package are commercially available and built to the NIST BioAPI standard, which facilitates "pluggability" and interoperability.

Donohue, John T.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Payload Performance of Third Generation TDRS and Future Services

NASA has accepted two of the 3rd generation Tracking and Data Relay Satellites, TDRS K, L, and M, designed and built by Boeing Defense, Space & Security (DSS). TDRS K, L, and M provide S-band Multiple Access (MA) service and S-band, Ku-band and Ka-band Single Access (SA) services to near Earth orbiting satellites. The TDRS KLM satellites offer improved services relative to the 1st generation TDRS spacecraft, such as: an enhanced MA service featuring increased EIRPs and G/T; and Ka-band SA capability which provides a 225 and 650 MHz return service (customer-to-TDRS direction) bandwidth and a 50 MHz forward service (TDRS-to-customer direction) bandwidth. MA services are provided through a 15 element forward phased array that forms up to two beams with onboard active beamforming and a 32 element return phased array supported by ground-based beamforming. SA services are provided through two 4.6m tri-band reflector antennas which support program track pointing and autotrack pointing. Prior to NASAs acceptance of the satellites, payload on-orbit testing was performed on each satellite to determine on-orbit compliance with design requirements. Performance parameters evaluated include: EIRP, G/T, antenna gain patterns, SA antenna autotrack performance, and radiometric tracking performance. On-orbit antenna calibration and pointing optimization was also performed on the MA and SA antennas including 24 hour duration tests to characterize and calibrate out diurnal effects. Bit-Error-Rate (BER) tests were performed to evaluate the end-to-end link BER performance of service through a TDRS K and L spacecraft. The TDRS M is planned to be launched in August 2017. This paper summarizes the results of the TDRS KL communications payload on-orbit performance verification and end-to-end service characterization and compares the results with the performance of the 2nd generation TDRS J. The paper also provides a high-level overview of an optical communications application that will augment the data rates supported by the Space Network.

RF↗
NASA NTRS2017

Payload Performance of TDRS KL and Future Services

NASA has accepted two of the 3nd generation Tracking and Data Relay Satellites, TDRS K, L, and M, designed and built by Boeing Defense, Space Security (DSS). TDRS K, L, and M provide S-band Multiple Access (MA) service and S-band, Ku-band and Ka-band Single Access (SA) services to near Earth orbiting satellites. The TDRS KLM satellites offer improved services relative to the 1st generation TDRS spacecraft, such as: an enhanced MA service featuring increased EIRPs and GT; and Ka-band SA capability which provides a 225 and 650 MHz return service (customer-to-TDRS direction) bandwidth and a 50 MHz forward service (TDRS-to-customer direction) bandwidth. MA services are provided through a 15 element forward phased array that forms up to two beams with onboard active beamforming and a 32 element return phased array supported by ground-based beamforming. SA services are provided through two 4.6m tri-band reflector antennas which support program track pointing and autotrack pointing. Prior to NASAs acceptance of the satellites, payload on-orbit testing was performed on each satellite to determine on-orbit compliance with design requirements. Performance parameters evaluated include: EIRP, GT, antenna gain patterns, SA antenna autotrack performance, and radiometric tracking performance. On-orbit antenna calibration and pointing optimization was also performed on the MA and SA antennas including 24 hour duration tests to characterize and calibrate out diurnal effects. Bit-Error-Rate (BER) tests were performed to evaluate the end-to-end link BER performance of service through a TDRS K and L spacecraft. The TDRS M is planned to be launched in August 2017. This paper summarizes the results of the TDRS KL communications payload on-orbit performance verification and end-to-end service characterization and compares the results with the performance of the 2nd generation TDRS J. The paper also provides a high-level overview of an optical communications application that will augment the data rates supported by the Space Network.

Laser↗
NASA NTRS2016

Science and Technology (S and T) Roadmap Collaboration between SMC, NASA, and Government Partners

National Security Space (NSS) presents multi-faceted S and T challenges. We must continually innovate enterprise and information management; provide decision support; develop advanced materials; enhance sensor technology; transform communication technology; develop advanced propulsion and resilient space architectures and capabilities; and enhance multiple additional S and T domains. These challenges are best met by leveraging advanced S and T research and technology development from a number of DoD agencies and civil agencies such as NASA. The authors of this paper have engaged in these activities since 2006 and over the past decade developed multiple strategic S and T relationships. This paper highlights the Office of the Space Missile Systems Center (SMC) Chief Scientist (SMC/ST) collaboration with the NASA Office of Chief Technologist (NASA OCT), which has multiple S and T activities that are relevant to NSS. In particular we discuss the development of the Technology Roadmaps that benefit both Civil Space and NSS. Our collaboration with NASA OCT has been of mutual benefit to multiple participants. Some of the other DoD components include the Defense Advanced Research Projects agency (DARPA), Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), Naval Research Laboratory (NRL), The USAF Office of Chief Scientist, the USAF Science Advisory Board (SAB), Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR), and a number of other services and agencies. In addition, the human talent is a key enabler of advanced S and T activities; it is absolutely critical to have a strong supply of talent in the fields of Science Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM). Consequently, we continually collaborate with the USAF Institute of Technology (AFIT), other service academies and graduate schools, and other universities and colleges. This paper highlights the benefits that result from such strategic S and T partnerships and recommends a way forward that will continually build upon these achievements into the future.

Science Technology Collaboration↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Beyond Gravity Single Launch Payload Accommodations Shock Testing

The Vulcan Centaur launch vehicle is purpose-built to meet all the U.S. government’s National Security Space Launch (NSSL) needs. A shock test for the Centaur V’s payload accommodations (PLA), single launch (SL) configuration was successfully conducted at NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) in Huntsville, Alabama, in May 2021. This test was a joint effort between MSFC, Beyond Gravity and United Launch Alliance. The primary purpose of the shock test was to characterize the shock environment induced by the separation event on components attached to the PLA and its interfaces. Additional test requirements included: (1) verifying the payload fairing (PLF) did not contact the flight hardware during the mechanical separation of the PLF horizontal separation system (HSS) and (2) evaluating the performance of the HSS spring packages during jettison. The data acquired during the PLF SL shock test will be used to validate the shock predictions from pre-test analysis of the launch vehicle and the PLF separation analysis. This paper provides an overview of the PLA SL shock test planning and execution as well as the required catch system, instrumentation and results.

separation↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Beyond Gravity Single Launch Payload Accommodations Shock Testing

The Vulcan Centaur launch vehicle is purpose-built to meet all the U.S. government’s National Security Space Launch (NSSL) needs. A shock test for the Centaur V’s payload accommodations (PLA), single launch (SL) configuration was successfully conducted at NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) in Huntsville, Alabama, in May 2021. This test was a joint effort between MSFC, Beyond Gravity and United Launch Alliance. The primary purpose of the shock test was to characterize the shock environment induced by the separation event on components attached to the PLA and its interfaces. Additional test requirements included: (1) verifying the payload fairing (PLF) did not contact the flight hardware during the mechanical separation of the PLF horizontal separation system (HSS) and (2) evaluating the performance of the HSS spring packages during jettison. The data acquired during the PLF SL shock test will be used to validate the shock predictions from pre-test analysis of the launch vehicle and the PLF separation analysis. This paper provides an overview of the PLA SL shock test planning and execution as well as the required catch system, instrumentation and results.

separation↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Beyond Gravity Single Launch Payload Accommodations Shock Testing

The Vulcan Centaur launch vehicle is purpose-built to meet all the U.S. government’s National Security Space Launch (NSSL) needs. A shock test for the Centaur V’s payload accommodations (PLA), single launch (SL) configuration was successfully conducted at NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) in Huntsville, Alabama, in May 2021. This test was a joint effort between MSFC, Beyond Gravity and United Launch Alliance. The primary purpose of the shock test was to characterize the shock environment induced by the separation event on components attached to the PLA and its interfaces. Additional test requirements included: (1) verifying the payload fairing (PLF) did not contact the flight hardware during the mechanical separation of the PLF horizontal separation system (HSS) and (2) evaluating the performance of the HSS spring packages during jettison. The data acquired during the PLF SL shock test will be used to validate the shock predictions from pre-test analysis of the launch vehicle and the PLF separation analysis. This paper provides an overview of the PLA SL shock test planning and execution as well as the required catch system, instrumentation and results.

separation↗
NASA NTRS1997

Monitor and Control of the Deep-Space network via Secure Web

(view graph) NASA lead center for robotic space exploration. Operating division of Caltech/Jet Propulsion Laboratory. Current missions, Voyagers, Galileo, Pathfinder, Global Surveyor. Upcoming missions, Cassini, Mars and New Millennium.

Deep-Space Network communications NCP Data Managem↗
NASA NTRS1995

Security for Multimedia Space Data Distribution over the Internet

Distribution of interactive multimedia to remote investigators will be required for high quality science on the International Space Station (ISS). The Internet with the World Wide Web (WWW) and the JAVA environment are a good match for distribution of data, video and voice to remote science centers. Utilizing the "open" Internet in a secure manner is the major hurdle in making use of this cost effective, off-the-shelf, universal resource. This paper examines the major security threats to an Internet distribution system for payload data and the mitigation of these threats. A proposed security environment for the Space Station Biological Research Facility (SSBRP) is presented with a short description of the tools that have been implemented or planned. Formulating and implementing a security policy, firewalls, host hardware and software security are also discussed in this paper. Security is a vast topic and this paper can only give an overview of important issues. This paper postulates that a structured approach is required and stresses that security must be built into a network from the start. Ignoring security issues or putting them off until late in the development cycle can be disastrous.

Stone, Thom↗
NASA NTRS1988

System security in the space flight operations center

The Space Flight Operations Center is a networked system of workstation-class computers that will provide ground support for NASA's next generation of deep-space missions. The author recounts the development of the SFOC system security policy and discusses the various management and technology issues involved. Particular attention is given to risk assessment, security plan development, security implications of design requirements, automatic safeguards, and procedural safeguards.

Wagner, David A.↗
NASA NTRS2019

Flexible Modem Interface (FMI) in Space - Extending Standardized Commercial Satellite Communications Services to Space Users

Recent innovations are producing a multitude of advanced commercial satellite communications (COMSATCOM) systems that could deliver massive amounts of SATCOM capacity at a fraction of current cost while also offering reliability and availability that is critical to achieving mission success for orbiting assets. Recognizing the alignment of commercial capabilities with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) diverse mission requirements, the agency is proactively engaging industry to formulate strategies leading towards a NASA communications architecture that includes advanced commercial capabilities. To fully leverage the expanded space resources, NASA must also address the integration of commercial waveforms into its space terminals. In pursuit of similar goals, the United States Department of Defense (DoD) is leading the standardization of the flexible modem interface (FMI) to address service integration for their tactical terminals in pursuit of a DoD Wideband SATCOM Enterprise.This paper describes how NASA is adapting this FMI standard to work with the Space Telecommunications Radio System (STRS) software-defined radio (SDR) framework to address the challenging size, weight, and power resource requirements for terminals in space. A full adaptation would include waveform compatibility with modular baseband processing, frequency compatibility with a wideband front end, and radiated beam control with an electronically steerable antenna to enable multi-provider commercial service capability in a feasible package for space terminals. Security is also a key aspect to be addressed for this integration since data will flow through commercial networks, commercial service providers have their own security mechanisms, and space terminals must be able to securely load proprietary software and firmware needed to access the commercial networks on demand. Success of this effort means commercial partners will be able to allow network-compliant implementations to be hosted on STRS-compliant SDRs in space for reliable and capable network access.

COMSATCOM↗
NASA NTRS1983

Guidelines for developing NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) ADP security risk management plans

This report presents guidance to NASA Computer security officials for developing ADP security risk management plans. The six components of the risk management process are identified and discussed. Guidance is presented on how to manage security risks that have been identified during a risk analysis performed at a data processing facility or during the security evaluation of an application system.

Tompkins, F. G.↗
NASA NTRS1983

Guidelines for development of NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) computer security training programs

The report presents guidance for the NASA Computer Security Program Manager and the NASA Center Computer Security Officials as they develop training requirements and implement computer security training programs. NASA audiences are categorized based on the computer security knowledge required to accomplish identified job functions. Training requirements, in terms of training subject areas, are presented for both computer security program management personnel and computer resource providers and users. Sources of computer security training are identified.

Tompkins, F. G.↗
NASA NTRS1984

Guidelines for contingency planning NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) ADP security risk reduction decision studies

Guidance is presented to NASA Computer Security Officials for determining the acceptability or unacceptability of ADP security risks based on the technical, operational and economic feasibility of potential safeguards. The risk management process is reviewed as a specialized application of the systems approach to problem solving and information systems analysis and design. Reporting the results of the risk reduction analysis to management is considered. Report formats for the risk reduction study are provided.

Tompkins, F. G.↗
NASA NTRS1993

Report to the President on the US Space Program

The National Space Council is responsible for advising the President on national space policy and strategy, and coordinating the implementation of the President's policies. It was authorized by an act of Congress in 1988 and was established as an agency of the federal government by President Bush on April 20, 1989. The Space Council is chaired by Vice President Dan Quayle, who serves as the President's principal advisor on national space policy and strategy. Content of this report includes: status of the US Space Program - Space Transportation, National Security, Civil Space, and Space Commerce and Trade; and Planning for the Future.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1983

NASA's future directions in space exploration

The Presidential policy statement of July 4, 1982 has outlined basic U.S. goals for activities in space which include strengthening security, maintaining space leadership, obtaining economic and scientific benefits, expanding private sector investment and involvement in space-related activities, promoting international cooperative activities, and cooperating with other nations in maintaining freedom of space for activities enhancing the security and welfare of mankind. NASA's priorities include: operational status for a four-Orbiter Shuttle fleet, demonstration of the Shuttle's ability to recover and repair the Solar Maximum Mission Satellite, the first launch of Spacelab, and the 1986 launch of the Space Telescope. Future projects include the Venus Radar Mapper, the Advanced Communications Technology Satellite, and the establishment of large permanent space facilities. It is stated that the United States must take the necessary steps now to achieve an understanding of the potential benefits of continued manned operations in space.

Odonnell, W. J.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Finalizing the CCSDS Space-Data Link Layer Security Protocol: Setup and Execution of the Interoperability Testing

The protection of data transmitted over the space-link is an issue of growing importance also for civilian space missions. Through the Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems (CCSDS), space agencies have reacted to this need by specifying the Space Data-Link Layer Security (SDLS) protocol which provides confidentiality and integrity services for the CCSDS Telemetry (TM), Telecommand (TC) and Advanced Orbiting Services (AOS) space data-link protocols. This paper describes the approach of the CCSDS SDLS working group to specify and execute the necessary interoperability tests. It first details the individual SDLS implementations that have been produced by ESA, NASA, and CNES and then the overall architecture that allows the interoperability tests between them. The paper reports on the results of the interoperability tests and identifies relevant aspects for the evolution of the test environment.

Fischer, Daniel↗