Results for “Stainless steel weldment” — Page 2

DOE OSTI2024

Stress Relaxation Cracking of Alloys at Temperatures Higher Than 540°C

Type 347H stainless steel (347H SS), used in commercial concentrating solar power (CSP) thermal energy storage to store solar-salt at a temperature of 565°C, has been reported in the literature to be susceptible to stress-relaxation cracking (SRC). The welded heat-affected zone (HAZ) and fusion zone (FZ) of 347H SS, particularly in thick sections, are known to be susceptible to failure during post-weld heat treatment (reheat cracking). SRC could also occur after months or years under an elevated-temperature service environment. Two conditions must be present for failure to occur in the HAZ and/or FZ: 1) a modified or sensitized microstructure and 2) sufficiently high tensile residual stresses present at the elevated service temperature. The overarching goal of this project is to recommend SRC mitigation protocols to avoid susceptibility to fail through SRC at temperatures relevant for CSP. Post weld heat treatment conditions and alternative alloys are investigated as potential mitigation solutions to SRC. We used Gleeble thermomechanical simulation tests and finite element (FE) models to understand the susceptibility of 347H SS to SRC as a function of temperature, stress, and microstructure. We started with a literature review of weldability issues with 347H SS and techniques to mitigate SRC in 347H SS weldments. Next, we used Gleeble experiments to determine reheat cracking susceptibility in the simulated HAZ of 347SS weldments and an alternative alloy, 316L SS (NUCL 167 SPH) with boron added. We also performed Gleeble experiments to compare the reheat cracking susceptibility of 347H cross welded with two different fillers: E347, which is used in some commercial CSP TES tanks, and E16.8.2. We validated the experimental results with FE models of the residual stresses. We found that although the 316L (NUCL 167 SPH) is less susceptible to reheat cracking, it is slightly weaker than 347H and ASME BP&V codes limit its use to a service condition of 565°C. We also found that welds using E16.8.2 as the weld filler are less susceptible to failure than those using E347, likely due to the higher creep ductility of E16.8.2, and that it may be used as an alternative filler for repair welding of 347H welds or as the primary choice of filler for newly developed weld joints. We also found that post weld heat treatment could be a viable solution for mitigating stress in E347-347H SS thick, constrained welds, like those found in CSP tanks, and propose several options for mitigating SRC in existing and future TES tanks.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

DOE OSTI2021

Microstructure, Hardness, and Residual Stress of the Dissimilar Metal Weldments of SA508-309L/308L-304L

A dissimilar metal weldment consisting of SA508-309L-308L-304L is widely used in light-water nuclear reactors. These weldments demonstrate dissimilar susceptibility to stress corrosion cracking that are related to the microstructure, properties, and residual stress. In this work, microstructures, hardness, and the residual stress distribution of the dissimilar metal weldments were investigated, with the correlation of increased hardness in the heat-affected zone (HAZ) to the microstructure. 304L HAZ demonstrated similar grain morphology as the base material, and the increase in hardness was primarily attributed to the increased dislocation density. SA508 HAZ demonstrated a change of grain morphology resulting from the different peak temperatures and cooling rates. The increased hardness in the SA508 HAZ was attributed to the refined grain morphology, higher dislocation density, and higher number density of precipitates. A ~ 20–30-μm-wide martensitic zone formed at the fusion boundary of SA508-309L, where Cr-rich carbide precipitates were observed, with the average size and the number density of 44.1 ± 16.9 nm and 1.5 × 10 21 m ₋3 , respectively. In conclusion, residual stress results demonstrated the largest tensile stress at 309L butter, indicating its high cracking susceptibility.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

DOE OSTI2020

Drop Analysis of the Advanced Test Reactor Fresh Fuel Shipping Container with Heavier Low-Enriched Uranium Fuel Contents

The Advanced Test Reactor Fresh Fuel Shipping Container (ATR FFSC) is a rectangular stainless steel container used for shipping radioactive material. The container is described in the ATR FFSC Safety Analysis Report (SAR). Per the ATR FFSC SAR, the ATR FFSC is designated a Type AF-96 packaging per the definition of 10 CFR §71.4, and was originally designed to transport high enriched uranium (HEU) reactor fuel elements for the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), the Advanced Test Reactor Critical (ATRC) facility, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Reactor (MITR), and the University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR). The Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA), Office of Material Management and Minimization (M3) is working with the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to develop and qualify new low enriched uranium (LEU) fuels and technologies for use in the ATR, ATRC, MITR, and MURR reactors. The LEU fuel elements will weigh significantly more than the current HEU designs and, combined with their associated Fuel Handling Enclosures for packaging, some configurations will exceed the 50 lbf used in the ATR FFSC qualifying drop tests. There are LEU versions of MITR, MURR, and ATR fuel elements. However, for this evaluation, drop analysis of the ATR FFSC with only the heavier ATR Low Enrichment (LOWE) fuel element is considered in this evaluation because the LOWE fuel element is the heaviest of the considered LEU fuel elements. The ATR HEU fuel element and the ATR LOWE fuel element are identical in every design aspect except for the fuel meat inside the 19 fuel plates. The LEU fuel meats are made using a U-10Mo high-density foil rather than uranium dispersed in aluminum in the HEU fuel elements. The high density of the uranium in the LEU fuel meat increases the LOWE fuel element weight to just under 44 lbf (versus the 22.1 lbf weight of the tested ATR HEU fuel element). ATR fuel elements are placed in a thin-gauge aluminum weldment called a "Fuel Handling Enclosure" during packaging. The Fuel Handling Enclosure is used to cover and protect the element during loading and unloading operations. The ATR Fuel Handling Enclosure weighs about 15 lbf per the drawings in the ATR FFSC SAR and the weight is accounted for in this evaluation. Transporting the heavier LEU fuel elements require evaluation of two issues. The first is the effect of the increased mass of the LEU fuel elements on the survivability of the ATR FFSC package following the requisite drop qualifications. The second is the effect of the increased mass of the fuel plates on the fuel element during the same drops. The ATR FFSC containing an ATR HEU fuel element in an ATR Fuel Handling Enclosure was physically dropped multiple times to qualify the container as a Type AF-96 package. The ATR FFSC SAR describes the drop tests performed with an actual ATR HEU fuel element weighing 22.1 lbf contained in a 14.3 lbf Fuel Handling Enclosure for a total payload of 36.4 lbf. Those drop tests showed that the ATR FFSC maintained containment of the ATR HEU fuel element and the fuel element was not significantly damaged. (Containment herein is not defined as a leak tight but is retention of the radioactive contents.) The purpose of the evaluation is to analytically show that, for a similar set of tests, the ATR FFSC maintains containment of the heavier ATR LOWE fuel element and to assess the damage to the fuel element during the drops. The approach was to create finite element analysis (FEA) models that produce the same results as the physical drops. Those models were then used as the benchmarks for the follow-on analyses using the heavier contents. FEA models of the drops of ATR FFSC using up to a 115 lbf fuel element were run and evaluated. Likewise, drops of a LOWE fuel element weighing 44 lbf in the ATR FFSC were run and evaluated. It is important to note that this report was done at the quality level necessary to be included in a nuclear facility safety basis. However, it is not the intent of this report to conclude the suitability of the ATR FFSC for transporting the heavier payloads. This report only describes the results of the FEA as related to the required drop scenarios. Incorporation of the FEA into the safety basis will be evaluated by the ATR FFSC design authority. The physical drop tests of the HEU fuel element and FEA drop analysis for the LOWE fuel element showed noteworthy damage to the fuel plates. An aluminum protective block was conceived to mitigate the damage. The concept requires the blocks to be placed in the fuel element between the end boxes and fuel plates. Additional FEA drop analyses were performed using the protective block. The addition of the blocks is primarily intended to mitigate the damage to the LOWE fuel element fuel plates. However, FEA drop analyses of the ATR HEU fuel element with the blocks were also performed and included for information.

42 ENGINEERING↗