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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS2017

Crewed Space Vehicle Battery Safety Requirements Revision D

The Crewed Space Vehicle Battery Safety Requirements document has been prepared for use by designers of battery-powered vehicles, portable equipment, and experiments intended for crewed spaceflight. The purpose of the requirements document is to provide battery designers with information on design provisions to be incorporated in and around the battery and on the verification to be undertaken to demonstrate a safe battery is provided. The term "safe battery" means that the battery is safe for ground personnel and crew members to handle and use; safe to be used in the enclosed environment of a crewed space vehicle; and safe to be mounted or used in unpressurized spaces adjacent to habitable areas. Battery design review, approval, and certification is required before the batteries can be used for ground operations and be certified for flight.

Russell, Samuel↗
NASA NTRS2003

Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report: Volume One

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board's independent investigation into the February 1, 2003, loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia and its seven-member crew lasted nearly seven months. A staff of more than 120, along with some 400 NASA engineers, supported the Board's 13 members. Investigators examined more than 30,000 documents, conducted more than 200 formal interviews, heard testimony from dozens of expert witnesses, and reviewed more than 3,000 inputs from the general public. In addition, more than 25,000 searchers combed vast stretches of the Western United States to retrieve the spacecraft's debris. In the process, Columbia's tragedy was compounded when two debris searchers with the U.S. Forest Service perished in a helicopter accident. This report discusses the attributes of an organization that could more safely and reliably operate the inherently risky Space Shuttle, but does not provide a detailed organizational prescription. Among those attributes are: a robust and independent program technical authority that has complete control over specifications and requirements, and waivers to them; an independent safety assurance organization with line authority over all levels of safety oversight; and an organizational culture that reflects the best characteristics of a learning organization. This report concludes with recommendations, some of which are specifically identified and prefaced as "before return to flight." These recommendations are largely related to the physical cause of the accident, and include preventing the loss of foam, improved imaging of the Space Shuttle stack from liftoff through separation of the External Tank, and on-orbit inspection and repair of the Thermal Protection System. The remaining recommendations, for the most part, stem from the Board's findings on organizational cause factors. While they are not "before return to flight" recommendations, they can be viewed as "continuing to fly" recommendations, as they capture the Board's thinking on what changes are necessary to operate the Shuttle and future spacecraft safely in the mid- to long-term.

CAIB↗
NASA NTRS2018

Simplified Aid for Extra-Vehicular Activity Rescue (SAFER) Battery Assessment

In 2013, the Boeing Company model 787-8 Dreamliner commercial aircraft experienced three catastrophic lithium (Li) battery failures. The cause of each failure resulted in a single-cell thermal runaway (TR) condition, which propagated to adjacent battery cells. Two of the failures involved rechargeable lithium-ion (Li-Ion) batteries, and the third event involved a nonrechargeable lithium-manganese dioxide (Li-MnO2) battery. In response to these Li battery failures, the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) approved a technical assessment of the International Space Station Simplified Aid for Extra-Vehicular Activity Rescue (SAFER) Li non-rechargeable battery. This assessment was conducted to evaluate the SAFER Li nonrechargeable battery safety design features against Boeing 787 Dreamliner Li battery failure lessons learned. Specifically, this investigation focused on assessing the severity of a SAFER battery TR hazard conditions.

Iannello, Christopher J.↗
NASA NTRS2007

NASA Engineering Safety Center NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Systems Working Group 2007 Proactive Task Status

In 2007, the NASA Engineering Safety Center (NESC) chartered the NASA Aerospace Flight Battery Systems Working Group to bring forth and address critical battery-related performance/manufacturing issues for NASA and the aerospace community. A suite of tasks identifying and addressing issues related to Ni-H2 and Li-ion battery chemistries was submitted and selected for implementation. The current NESC funded are: (1) Wet Life of Ni-H2 Batteries (2) Binding Procurement (3) NASA Lithium-Ion Battery Guidelines (3a) Li-Ion Performance Assessment (3b) Li-Ion Guidelines Document (3b-i) Assessment of Applicability of Pouch Cells for Aerospace Missions (3b-ii) High Voltage Risk Assessment (3b-iii) Safe Charge Rates for Li-Ion Cells (4) Availability of Source Material for Li-Ion Cells (5) NASA Aerospace Battery Workshop This presentation provides a brief overview of the tasks in the 2007 plan and serves as an introduction to more detailed discussions on each of the specific tasks.

Manzo, Michelle A.↗
NASA NTRS2006

20V, 40 Ah Lithium Ion Polymer Battery for the Spacesuit

Objective: Consider a new battery design for EMU. Results: a) Electrovaya s aerospace cell production line is improving, but must further improve to achieve acceptable reliability; b) Completed functional, vibration, and thermal cycling of LIB; c) So far, electrical safety tests have produced good results; d) Completed functional, vibration, thermal cycling, power quality and EMI of LIB Charger; e) Completed CDR on 9/23/04; and f) Manufacturing Readiness Review for flight cell/battery production scheduled for Dec 04.

Darcy, Eric↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Spacecraft Fire Safety Predictions using Verified Saffire Model

A model developed using Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) that aimed to determine the effect of a fire in a spacecraft was validated by data collected during the Saffire campaign. The model used inlet and outlet temperatures and CO 2 concentrations of the Saffire payload where fire spread was taking place to determine the amount of heat and combustion products that made it into Northrop Grumman’s Cygnus vehicle. The model was then validated using six remote sensors in various places in the vehicle, as well as a far field device (FFD) in the open zenith section that was representative of average vehicle values. The current work focuses on using the model to predict fire safety scenarios. One simulation aimed to determine the fate of HCl, which sticks to surfaces. The model prediction showed that the HCl was removed from the atmosphere rapidly. This compared well against the FFD data in the Saffire VI campaign event where a bottle of 5% HCl was released into the vehicle. An additional simulation where the Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS) was shut off once the FFD reached 5 ppm of HCl showed that HCl stayed in the atmosphere considerably longer. Continuing the simulation with the ECLSS activated and after temperatures returned to their initial conditions, resulted in a rapid removal of HCL similar to that observed in the original HCl release scenario model. Finally, a simulation that used the heat release rate from a lithium-ion battery test to determine the effect it would have on a spacecraft was performed. This simulation used a heat addition rate that is considerably higher than what was determined from the burning of solid fuels in the Saffire campaign and hence produced a non-trivial temperature increase in more locations within the vehicle.

Fire Safety↗
NASA NTRS1984

Nickel-iron battery system safety

The generated flow rates of gaseous hydrogen and gaseous oxygen from an electrical vehicle nickel-iron battery system were determined and used to evaluate the flame quenching capabilities of several candidate devices to prevent flame propagation within batteries having central watering/venting systems. The battery generated hydrogen and oxygen gases were measured for a complete charge and discharge cycle. The data correlates well with accepted theory during strong overcharge conditions indicating that the measurements are valid for other portions of the cycle. Tests confirm that the gas mixture in the cells is always flammable regardless of the battery status. The literature indicated that a conventional flame arrestor would not be effective over the broad spectrum of gassing conditions presented by a nickel-iron battery. Four different types of protective devices were evaluated. A foam-metal arrestor design was successful in quenching gaseous hydrogen and gaseous oxygen flames, however; the application of this flame arrestor to individual cell or module protection in a battery is problematic. A possible rearrangement of the watering/venting system to accept the partial protection of simple one-way valves is presented which, in combination with the successful foam-metal arrestor as main vent protection, could result in a significant improvement in battery protection.

Saltat, R. C.↗
NASA NTRS1991

NASA. Johnson Space Center primary battery applications

The role of the Power Branch/EP5 of JSC in primary battery applications is to support those JSC organizations having direct application responsibility with trade studies, battery selection recommendations, and with development, qualification, and provisioning of primary batteries. Battery subsystem management is provided. Payload hazard report preparation is supported, as is the review and comment of such reports for the JSC Payload Safety Panel, who approves the flight safety for all Orbiter payloads. JSC battery users are provided with safety analysis and test support to achieve safety approval. Finally, it is the responsibility of the Power Branch to define and maintain battery safety requirement documentation for JSC.

Bragg, Bob J.↗
NASA NTRS1992

Automated Resupply of Consumables: Enhancement of Space Commercialization Opportunities

This paper addresses work performed at Rockwell International's Space Systems Division to investigate the feasibility of, and develop concepts for, automated and/or robotic resupply of consumables on orbit. The work focuses on the resupply of satellites and is described in five sections. First, the various problems relating the resupply on orbit are discussed: for example, economic concerns, fuel handling problems, and safety issues. Next major methods of effecting fuel transfer on orbit are summarized, together with their advantages and disadvantages. Direct fuel exchange is emphasized as the most feasible technique. Third, guidelines are developed for automated/robotic refueling mechanisms to accomplish on-orbit consumable resupply. For example, the guidelines cover safety, reliability, maintainability, alignment, induced loads, thermal protection, leaks, extravehicular activity (EVA) interface, and so on. The fourth part of the paper covers the development of design concepts for satellite resupply robotic interfaces that comply with the guidelines. Concepts include servicer fluid transfer system and satellite propulsion system, and a combined docking/umbilical device. Last, future technical development in these areas are discussed.

Davoud Manouchehri↗
NASA NTRS2026

Thermal Cycle and Capacitance Testing of Mezzo Industries Phase Changer Material Heat Capacitor

Effective Thermal management is essential for the safety and performance of human spacecraft, especially during long-duration missions with fluctuating heat loads. Phase Change Material (PCM) heat exchangers offer a compact, efficient solution by storing and releasing thermal energy through latent heat during phase transitions. This allows PCM systems to buffer transient thermal loads without immediate heat rejection, reducing the need for oversized radiators – particularly critical during ascent and re-entry when radiators are stowed. By maintaining stable temperatures in crew cabins and equipment bays, PCM technology enhances crew comfort, protects sensitive systems, and supports long-term mission sustainability with minimal mass and volume impact. A phase change material heat capacitor prototype, designed and built under a NASA Small Business Innovation Research grant by Mezzo Technologies, utilizes a laser welding microtube manufacturing process that promises increased reliability and performance over current manufacturing methods like brazing. This heat exchanger was tested through coolant thermal cycling within the expected flow rates and temperature range of the Orion spacecraft, the crewed spacecraft taking NASA astronauts to the moon under the Artemis Program. The useful heat storage capacitance was measured and compared to Orion spacecraft requirements.

Active Thermal Control Systems↗
NASA NTRS2026

Hydrofluoroether (HFE) Cleaning Fluid Replacement and Qualification

This NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) Technical Assessment Report addresses the urgent need to identify, test, and qualify replacement cleaning solvents and technologies following 3M’s decision to discontinue production of hydrofluoroether (HFE) products, including Novec HFE-7100, by the end of 2025. HFE-7100 is widely used across NASA for precision cleaning of ground and flight hardware, especially in oxygen system components, and as a heat transfer fluid in high-power-density thermal control systems. The assessment evaluates commercially available replacement solvents, alternative cleaning technologies, and their compatibility with NASA’s operational requirements. Key findings include the identification of viable solvent replacements, their performance in contaminant removal, materials compatibility, and oxygen system safety. The report also explores novel cleaning approaches, including aqueous, supercritical CO₂, cryogenic aerosol, plasma, UV-ozone, magnetically optimized fluids, and induced charge active filtration, highlighting their merits, limitations, and readiness for NASA adoption. The NESC provides recommendations for solvent selection, facility adaptation, and continued technology maturation to ensure mission continuity and regulatory compliance.

Alternative Cleaning Technologies↗
NASA NTRS2014

Crewed Space Vehicle Battery Safety Requirements

This requirements document is applicable to all batteries on crewed spacecraft, including vehicle, payload, and crew equipment batteries. It defines the specific provisions required to design a battery that is safe for ground personnel and crew members to handle and/or operate during all applicable phases of crewed missions, safe for use in the enclosed environment of a crewed space vehicle, and safe for use in launch vehicles, as well as in unpressurized spaces adjacent to the habitable portion of a space vehicle. The required provisions encompass hazard controls, design evaluation, and verification. The extent of the hazard controls and verification required depends on the applicability and credibility of the hazard to the specific battery design and applicable missions under review. Evaluation of the design and verification program results shall be completed prior to certification for flight and ground operations. This requirements document is geared toward the designers of battery systems to be used in crewed vehicles, crew equipment, crew suits, or batteries to be used in crewed vehicle systems and payloads (or experiments). This requirements document also applies to ground handling and testing of flight batteries. Specific design and verification requirements for a battery are dependent upon the battery chemistry, capacity, complexity, charging, environment, and application. The variety of battery chemistries available, combined with the variety of battery-powered applications, results in each battery application having specific, unique requirements pertinent to the specific battery application. However, there are basic requirements for all battery designs and applications, which are listed in section 4. Section 5 includes a description of hazards and controls and also includes requirements.

Jeevarajan, Judith A.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Revisiting the Soyuz-1 Parachute Failure in the Context of Safety in the Modern Era

The Soyuz‑1 accident remains one of the most consequential parachute related failures in human spaceflight history and provides enduring lessons for modern Entry, Descent, and Landing (EDL) system design. Occurring during the height of the Cold War and the Space Race, the mission unfolded under extraordinary political and schedule pressure as the Soviet Union sought to maintain its early leadership in space achievements following the death of chief designer Sergei Korolev. Despite unresolved propulsion, electrical, and parachute system deficiencies, Soyuz‑1 proceeded to launch and immediately encountered critical inflight anomalies, including a failed solar panel deployment, attitude control issues, and communication dropouts. Upon reentry, a malfunction in the parachute system, driven by a primary main canopy that failed to deploy, and subsequent entanglement of the reserve main canopy with the primary drogue parachute, resulted in insufficient deceleration and the fatal crash of cosmonaut Vladimir Komarov. Subsequent investigations revealed deep rooted cultural and organizational issues within the Soviet space program, including inadequate testing, suppression of dissent, undocumented last minute design changes, and the absence of integrated parachute system verification. More than 200 design flaws were identified after the accident, and firsthand accounts, including those from Yuri Gagarin, highlighted widespread concern prior to launch. Over time, the Soviet program implemented substantial reforms: systematic design corrections, rigorous process documentation, and an extensive series of drop tests that ultimately transformed the Soyuz system into one of the world’s most reliable human-rated return vehicles. This paper examines the technical architecture of the Soyuz‑1 parachute system, reconstructs the likely deployment sequence and failure mechanism, and analyzes the cultural contributors that shaped the accident. The study draws parallels to modern spacecraft parachute development, emphasizing the critical importance of integrated system testing, transparent engineering culture, and continuous hardware surveillance. These lessons remain directly relevant to today’s NASA and Commercial Crew Programs (CCP), where the Government continues to refine its understanding of aggregate risk and strengthen overall astronaut safety in the face of increasingly complex parachute systems.

Aaron L Morris↗
NASA NTRS1983

The Galileo probe Li/SO2 battery: The safest battery on Jupiter

The unique power requirement of NASA's Galileo Jupiter Probe are most readily met by a Li/SO2 battery; however, because this battery system is not space flight proven, extensive effort was required to qualify this device from the stand point of performance and safety. Due to the rather checkered safety record of the Li/SO2 system, safety has been foremost among the design considerations and has been addressed at the cell, battery and system level. The mission requirements which led to the choice of the Li/SO2 battery and the safety engineering which went into the battery and power system design are described.

Marcoux, L. S.↗
NASA NTRS1992

Deployment and retrieval mechanism redesigned for Spartan spacecraft on the STS

The Spartan Release Engage Mechanism (REM) is a system designed to restrain the Spartan spacecraft during Space Transportation System (STS) launch and landing. The mechanism is designed to allow deployment and retrieval of the Spartan free flyer spacecraft from the shuttle payload bay. Because current Spartan spacecraft payloads are much heavier than payloads intended for the original REM, an extensive redesign, analysis, and test program was necessary. Also, increased emphasis on safety in the post-Challenger era prompted a reevaluation of possible failures. Much of the design effort focused on improving the latch mechanism gearbox. Key concerns were effective gear lubrication, thermal gradients at the gearbox mounts, operation at thermal extremes, and gear-train failure contingencies. Increased concern for reliability led to the design of an Extra Vehicular Activity (EVA) backup latch system.

Greg Galloway↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Thermal-Fluid Analysis of a Liquid-Cooled Battery Module for Electrified Aircraft

The development of safe, energy-dense batteries is critical to advancing hybrid electric and fully electrified aircraft propulsion. Achieving this capability requires a thermal management system that can maintain battery performance and safety under demanding operational conditions. The objective of this project is to support the maturation of next-generation lithium-ion batteries for electrified aircraft by conducting performance testing on integrated battery modules, specifically a 2-cell series configuration module housed within an aluminum enclosure. Designed to operate at a nominal 7.2 V with discharge rates up to 2.5C, the module will eventually be used to power an electric motor and DC-DC converter, generating substantial thermal loads that must be effectively managed to increase the usable energy and power density of electrified aircraft. To address these thermal challenges, this study presents the development and thermal-fluid analysis of a liquid-cooled thermal management system. While the full aircraft architecture utilizes an eight-string configuration, the present work evaluates a representative single-string water coolant loop to characterize baseline performance. The active cooling loop circulates water through a reservoir, pump, the battery module, and a variable area flow meter. Key performance metrics including component-level temperatures, mass flow rates, and pressure drops are quantified across the loop. Across discharge rates ranging from 0.5C to 2.5C, the active thermal loop consistently and effectively removed heat from the module, validating the design approach and confirming readiness for further development. The validated thermal performance indicates a path toward scalable battery modules that could enable energy and power dense systems for hybrid electric aircraft.

Electrified Aircraft↗
NASA NTRS2016

NASA Alternative Orion Small Cell Battery Design Support

The NASA Orion Crew Module Reference Design was produced to address large scale thermal runaway (TR) hazard with specific safety controls for the Orion Spacecraft. The design presented provides the description of a full scale battery design reference for implementation as a drop in replacement to meet all spacecraft energy requirements with compatible 120 Vdc electrical and mechanical interface using small cell technology (18650) packaging. The 32V SuperBrick incorporates unique support features and an electrical bus bar arrangement that allows cells negative can insertion into heat sink that is compressively coupled to the battery enclosure to promote good thermal management. The housing design also provides an internal flame suppression "filter tray" and positive venting path internal to the enclosure to allow hot effluent ejecta to escape in the event of single cell TR. Virtual cells (14P Banks) that are supported to provide cell spacing with interstitial materials to prevent side can failures that can produce cell to cell TR propagation. These features were successfully test in four separate TR run with the full scale DTA1 test article in February 2016. Successfully Completed Test Objectives - Four separate TR test runs with Full-Scale DTA1 housing with Two SuperBricks, Two SuperBrick Emulators All Tests resulted in "clean" gas with less than 6 C rise at Battery vent All Tests resulted in less than 2 C temperature rise on cold-plate outlet All Tests resulted in less than 6 psi pressure rise in the battery housing Test Run 1 -One neighbor cell TR, highest remaining neighbor 139 C. Ejecta shorted to bus caused prolonged additional heating, One shorted cell did experience TR after 12 minutes, remaining cells had adequate thermal margin Test Run 2 - No cell to cell propagation, highest neighbor cell 112 C; Test Run 3 - No cell to cell propagation, highest neighbor cell 96 C; Test Run 4 - No cell to cell propagation, highest neighbor cell 101 C; Primary TR testing and analysis were completed and reviewed for endorsement by NASA Engineering and Safety Center team members. All Key Test Objectives were met and the small cell design alternative was demonstrated and selected to be a feasible drop in replacement for the MPCV Orion CM Battery for EM2 mission.

Haynes, Chuck↗