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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2013

Identifying, Visualizing, and Fusing Social Media Data to Support Nonproliferation and Arms Control Treaty Verification: Preliminary Results

While international nonproliferation and arms control verification capabilities have their foundations in physical and chemical sensors, state declarations, and on-site inspections, verification experts are beginning to consider the importance of open source data to complement and support traditional means of verification. One of those new, and increasingly expanding, sources of open source information is social media, which can be ingested and understood through social media analytics (SMA). Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is conducting research to further our ability to identify, visualize, and fuse social media data to support nonproliferation and arms control treaty verification efforts. This paper will describe our preliminary research to examine social media signatures of nonproliferation or arms control proxy events. We will describe the development of our preliminary nonproliferation and arms control proxy events, outline our initial findings, and propose ideas for future work.

social media, arms control, nonproliferation↗
DOE OSTI2015

Report on a Zero-Knowledge Protocol Tabletop Exercise

This report summarizes the discussion and conclusions reached during a table top exercise held at Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque on September 3, 2014 regarding a recently described approach for nuclear warhead verification based on the cryptographic concept of a zero-knowledge protocol (ZKP) presented in a recent paper authored by Glaser, Barak, and Goldston. A panel of Sandia National Laboratories researchers, whose expertise includes radiation instrumentation design and development, cryptography, and arms control verification implementation, jointly reviewed the paper and identified specific challenges to implementing the approach as well as some opportunities. It was noted that ZKP as used in cryptography is a useful model for the arms control verification problem, but the direct analogy to arms control breaks down quickly. The ZKP methodology for warhead verification fits within the general class of template-based verification techniques, where a reference measurement is used to confirm that a given object is like another object that has already been accepted as a warhead by some other means. This can be a powerful verification approach, but requires independent means to trust the authenticity of the reference warhead - a standard that may be difficult to achieve, which the ZKP authors do not directly address. Despite some technical challenges, the concept of last-minute selection of the pre-loads and equipment could be a valuable component of a verification regime.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2013

Information Filters for Safeguards Applications: A Scoping Study

A core concern of the Department of Energy is protecting sensitive information in the face of verification agreements that may make use of increasingly sophisticated and intrusive sensors. The conflict between intrusiveness and information protection is evident in existing treaties, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Additional Protocol (AP), where Congress has seen a need to step in and enact implementing legislation to protect, for example, sensitive information such as certain unique chemical signatures, but in so doing has introduced complexities into U.S. treaty compliance policy. Information barriers or filters (IFs) – broadly defined as physical and/or encryption mechanisms that preclude acquisition of sensitive, quantitative information while allowing the acquisition of treaty-relevant qualitative information by an inspectorate – could play a useful role in avoiding this type of conflict. In order to stimulate new thinking on ways to meet existing and future safeguard challenges, this scoping study investigates how IFs – a technique borrowed from the realm of arms control verification - might contribute to international safeguards activities. Information filters (IFs) have long been recognized as an important tool for the protection of sensitive signals and other data in the verification of bilateral and multilateral arms control treaties. The implementation of NPT safeguards, while differing somewhat in context from arms control verification, involves similar sensitivity concerns. This report examines whether or not IFs can be useful in the world of international safeguards, and provides a survey of methods of barring or filtering information that could be applied. The study finds that while many safeguards activities involve non sensitive data, there are also a number of areas where IFs are already in use and others where IFs could make a useful contribution. Examples include verification of enrichment plants, complementary access inspections, and the Additional Protocol (AP) to Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSAs) under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2014

A Quick Overview of the Extended Feynman Project

The low natural background rates and the penetrating nature of neutron radiation makes neutron detection a good method for quantifying and accounting for large amounts of special nuclear material capable of neutron induced fission and fission chains. Fission is one of the few natural processes that produces time-correlated neutrons, the others are spallation-type processes (e.g. (n,Xn), cosmic induced background, etc) which have low but measurable rates in common terrestrial material. The high rates of most transuranic spontaneous fission sources of even a gram or less usually swamp any cosmic induced background rate but even Kilogram quantities of natural uranium produce neutrons only on the same order as that of the cosmic generated background flux. However the primary characteristic of special nuclear material is its ability to fission and to support fission chains through neutron induced fission. This means that neutrons produced from fission are not produced randomly singly but rather in time-correlated bursts. Almost from the beginning of the atomic age, the measurement of time-correlated neutrons has been used to detect and quantify fission and fission processes. Feynman himself proposed a method, the grandfather of what is used today, to compare correlation rates of neutron flux in a fixed time to that which would be expected of a random neutron source. The larger variance (broader distribution) as compared to a random distribution is a tell-tale sign of correlated production and commonly used as signature of fission and more importantly fission chains, the broader the distribution (and its departure from a random distribution) the higher the multiplication. Feynman’s original method was used to determine the criticality of the first reactor and other critical or near critical systems. We at LLNL have been developing this concept over the past decade and a half and have employed it for the detection and assessment of nuclear materials. Our method for doing this involved generating a theoretical prediction of what we might expect to see, given a neutron source (spontaneous fission with a nubar, or alpha-n) and a possibly multiplying material (Plutonium or Uranium) and comparing it to a measured result and deducing from this what it is we are measuring. We first developed these methods for portable (low efficiency) thermal neutron detectors that were used predominantly for emergency response situations and we have applied some of these techniques with thermal neutron detectors to arms control verification and authentication, for example verifying that there are multiplying quantities of plutonium in an unknown object. In recent years we have been exploring the use of fast neutrons using liquid scintillator cells with Pulse Shape Discrimination (PSD) and in this project we developing both the theory of fast particle production from fission and fission chains and the use of fast particle detection methods primarily for arms control verification and authentication, but for other uses. We have found that fast detection has many advantages, primarily because the speed of the detection (nanoseconds) preserves the original time scale of the particles produced by fission (and more importantly from induced fission) but also because the fast time scales allow for considering much shorter measurement times (binning) that greatly reduce the pollution of random correlations.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗
DOE OSTI2020

Verification of Arms Control Treaties with Resonance Phenomena

Nuclear disarmament treaties remain insufficient to neutralize the existential threat of the nuclear weapons. Technologies are necessary for verifying the authenticity of the nuclear warheads undergoing dismantlement before counting them toward a treaty partner’s obligation. Here we present a review of concepts involving isotope-specific resonance processes, Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence (NRF) [1] and Neutron Resonance Transmission Analysis (NRTA) [2, 3], used to authenticate a warhead’s fissile components by comparing them to a previously authenticated template. All information is encrypted in the physical domain by the addition of an encrypting filter to the target, leading to measurements with an outcome similar to an equation with two unknowns. Using Monte Carlo simulations and experiments we show that the measurements readily detect hoaxing attempt, while no vital isotopic or geometric information about the weapon is released. These nuclear techniques can be used to dramatically increase the reach and trustworthiness of future nuclear disarmament treaties.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2025

Optimizing a detection system for fissile material in nuclear disarmament verification

In arms control treaties, verification plays a crucial role in detecting non-compliance, deterring future violations, and building trust between state parties. Neutron interrogation that induces fission reactions in fissile isotopes and measures the resulting fission neutrons, could be employed for this purpose. This study aims to develop a system which can determine the presence of fissile material while intrinsically protecting information. In this paper, we focus on optimizing the system for discriminating between an enriched uranium block from a depleted uranium (DU) block. The system was built and we report on benchmark measurements with DU and 16% enriched uranium blocks. Furthermore, the Excalibur (Experiment for Calibration with Uranium) neutron source, a neutron spectrometer (redBubble Technology Industries (BTI) N-Probe), and superheated droplet detectors were used for these measurements. MCNP simulations provided insights into detector responses to fissile materials with varying isotopic compositions, confirming that the system functioned as designed.

Active neutron interrogation↗
DOE OSTI2013

Verification Challenges at Low Numbers

Many papers have dealt with the political difficulties and ramifications of deep nuclear arms reductions, and the issues of “Going to Zero”. Political issues include extended deterrence, conventional weapons, ballistic missile defense, and regional and geo-political security issues. At each step on the road to low numbers, the verification required to ensure compliance of all parties will increase significantly. Looking post New START, the next step will likely include warhead limits in the neighborhood of 1000 . Further reductions will include stepping stones at1000 warheads, 100’s of warheads, and then 10’s of warheads before final elimination could be considered of the last few remaining warheads and weapons. This paper will focus on these three threshold reduction levels, 1000, 100’s, 10’s. For each, the issues and challenges will be discussed, potential solutions will be identified, and the verification technologies and chain of custody measures that address these solutions will be surveyed. It is important to note that many of the issues that need to be addressed have no current solution. In these cases, the paper will explore new or novel technologies that could be applied. These technologies will draw from the research and development that is ongoing throughout the national laboratory complex, and will look at technologies utilized in other areas of industry for their application to arms control verification.

Nuclear Weapons↗
DOE OSTI2014

Optimal Imaging for Treaty Verification

Future arms control treaty verification regimes may use radiation imaging measurements to confirm and track nuclear warheads or other treaty accountable items (TAIs). This project leverages advanced inference methods developed for medical and adaptive imaging to improve task performance in arms control applications. Additionally, we seek a method to acquire and analyze imaging data of declared TAIs without creating an image of those objects or otherwise storing or revealing any classified information. Such a method would avoid the use of classified-information barriers (IB).

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2016

Linear models to perform treaty verification tasks for enhanced information security

Linear mathematical models were applied to binary-discrimination tasks relevant to arms control verification measurements in which a host party wishes to convince a monitoring party that an item is or is not treaty accountable. These models process data in list-mode format and can compensate for the presence of variability in the source, such as uncertain object orientation and location. The Hotelling observer applies an optimal set of weights to binned detector data, yielding a test statistic that is thresholded to make a decision. The channelized Hotelling observer applies a channelizing matrix to the vectorized data, resulting in a lower dimensional vector available to the monitor to make decisions. We demonstrate how incorporating additional terms in this channelizing-matrix optimization offers benefits for treaty verification. We present two methods to increase shared information and trust between the host and monitor. The first method penalizes individual channel performance in order to maximize the information available to the monitor while maintaining optimal performance. Second, we present a method that penalizes predefined sensitive information while maintaining the capability to discriminate between binary choices. Data used in this study was generated using Monte Carlo simulations for fission neutrons, accomplished with the GEANT4 toolkit. Custom models for plutonium inspection objects were measured in simulation by a radiation imaging system. Model performance was evaluated and presented using the area under the receiver operating characteristic curve.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2013

Beyond Arms-Control Monitoring

Expanded monitoring of the environment, everywhere and at all times, can advance arms control around the world, enhancing transparency among nations. In particular, improved characterization of the atmosphere now offers powerful opportunities for global monitoring, with multiple societal benefits. It may be useful to think of environmental monitoring as a long-term objective of arms-control verification.

arms-control monitoring↗
DOE OSTI2019

Deferred Verification: The Role of New Verification Technologies and Approaches

Researchers at UNIDIR have recently proposed a fundamentally new approach to nuclear arms control verification, dubbed "deferred verification." The concept forgoes inspections at sensitive nuclear sites and inspections of nuclear materials or components in classified form. To implement this concept, a state first divides its territory into a closed segment and an open segment. The total fissile material inventory in the closed segment, which includes the weapon complex, is known and declared with very high accuracy. Essentially no inspections take place in the closed segment. Yet, inspectors have access to the open segment, which includes in particular the civilian nuclear sector. The fissile material inventory in the open segment is known with less accuracy, but uncertainties can be reduced over time using methods of nuclear archaeology. Deferred verification relies primarily on established safeguards techniques and avoids many unresolved verification challenges, including for example the need for information barriers for warhead confirmation measurements. At the same time, deferred verification faces some unique challenges. In this work, we explore some of these challenges and offer possible solutions while maintaining the strengths of the concept; to do so, we examine possible noncompliance strategies in which a state would seek to withhold a higher-than-declared inventory.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

Technical Cooperation on Verification and its role in Trust Building [Slides]

Technical cooperation is a low-cost way to initiate movement in the arms control sphere and offers an operational path forward for the reestablishment of working relationships built on trust not freely given, but gained through experience, and a shared vision of the future; Political will alone, though necessary for cooperation to take place, is insufficient in the face of structural obstacles. For effective cooperation to have a future, countries must have both political will and complementary and conducive institutional structures; Cooperation at the intergovernmental level seems unlikely at this time. However, if relationships with international partners continue to be strained as development of new offensive technologies continues, it is very possible that future movement in technical arms control cooperation could again be initiated in the nongovernmental sphere; As the stewards of the majority of the world’s nuclear stockpile, the United States and the Russian Federation have a unique role to play in shaping global norms on arms control verification and cooperation; it is in their mutual interest now to begin to find technical solutions to the question of verification as other countries ramp up production.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗