Results for “Verification and Validation (V&V)” — Page 2

NASA NTRS2022

How to Build a Rover: An Overview of the Mars 2020 Mission’s Vehicle System Testbed

While NASA’s Mars rover Perseverance continues to make groundbreaking achievements on the Red Planet, its twin is hard at work here on Earth. The Operational Perseverance Twin for the Integration of Mechanisms and Instruments Sent to Mars, or OPTIMISM, is the Mars 2020 Vehicle System Testbed (VSTB) rover operated by NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) in Pasadena, California. OPTIMISM’s home is the JPL Mars Yard; an outdoor field with red soil that simulates the terrain encountered by Perseverance. The VSTB is a full-scale engineering model of the flight rover, serving a number of functions to ensure mission operations can continue smoothly and on schedule. The VSTB possesses instrumentation, computers, mechanisms, cameras, and a Mobility subsystem that are nearly identical to its extraterrestrial twin. Its high fidelity allows the rover to be a highly effective tool to fully test system functionality and performance prior to commanding the flight rover. The early stages of building OPTIMISM began a few months prior to Perseverance departing JPL for Cape Canaveral, FL in early 2020. Electrical integration of the flight system avionics, and compatibility checkouts of the electrical ground support equipment ensured that the foundation of the electrical system was operational and in place. Next, the internal harnessing was installed and compatibility checks of the rover instrumentation and mechanisms were performed to confirm the system was prepared for full buildup. Finally, mechanical assembly of the rover chassis with its external components completed the integration of the system before it was moved to the Mars Yard for its initial phase of testing to perform verification & validation (V&V) of the Mobility subsystem requirements. By the time Perseverance landed at Jezero Crater in February 2021, the first phase of VSTB operations was underway. Surface guidance, navigation, and control (SGNC) testing for the Mobility subsystem ensured functionality and performance requirements were met for various capabilities such as visual odometry (VO), mapping, and automatic navigation (AutoNav). Subsequent integration of the robotic arm (RA) onto the VSTB enabled the V&V campaign for surface sampling operations (SSO) to commence. As the mission’s engineering operations (EO) have gotten underway, the VSTB has been utilized for an array of purposes including troubleshooting software anomalies, and performing dry-runs for first time activities (FTAs) prior to sending the commands to Perseverance. OPTIMISM will continue to serve mission critical functions as long as Perseverance is roving the Red Planet.

Rojas, Jose Trujillo↗

NASA NTRS2023

Adaptive Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Reduces Risk of Software Impacting Safety in Artemis Missions

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is asking more of its human spaceflight programs than ever before through the collective Artemis Missions. The NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Program contributes to NASA’s human spaceflight goals by providing IV&V services for NASA’s critical spacecraft and ground software. The IV&V Program is tasked with providing assurance from both individual and integrated mission software perspectives. The Artemis IV&V organization is actively supporting six distinct development efforts: Orion, the Space Launch System (SLS), Exploration Ground Systems (EGS), Mission Control Center (MCC), the Lunar Gateway, and the Human Landing System (HLS), representing a wide diversity of developer organizations, management structures, and development approaches. With much of this extremely complex flight and ground software being essential to human safety both on the ground and in space, Artemis IV&V is likewise challenged to provide more value-added assurance to future Artemis missions within a constrained budget. To meet this challenge, Artemis IV&V employs a variety of novel and evolving “Adaptive IV&V” approaches for planning and executing IV&V analysis to increase both the efficiency and effectiveness of the IV&V Program’s assurance activities, and to address the difficulties imposed by assuring software for a large, highly integrated, multi-mission enterprise managed and executed by physically and organizationally distinct programs. Instilling agile principles like iterative planning cycles, self-organizing teams, and regular retrospectives, into IV&V planning and execution has led to a more rapid turnaround of a minimum viable assurance product and allowed for increased alignment of assurance activities with development progress. Adopting an assurance case methodology has led to greater consistency and clearer communication of assurance design and provided a foundation for long-term maintenance of assurance plans, products, and results across missions. The IV&V-developed Assurance / Safety Case Analytical Network (A-SCAN) framework and tool has enabled the quantification and tracking of system/software risk and confidence. These confidence measures provide a means to repeatedly express the impact of planned and completed assurance work and the remaining residual risk. Applied as part of a “Follow-the-Risk” organizational ethos, this allows consistent rightsizing of analysis rigor and intensity commensurate with the perceived risk of defects, as well as appropriate targeting of the highest risk areas of the software to find safety issues before they can manifest. Finally, the development of the IV&V Advanced Risk Reduction Integrated Software Test and Operations Tri-program Lightweight Environment (ARRISTOTLE), an integrated software-only simulation of Orion, SLS, and EGS systems, has made it possible to independently test integrated pad and flight scenarios and inject faults to observe how the Artemis multi-program, mission software behaves in degraded modes and in response to hazards. These adaptive IV&V investments have enabled Artemis IV&V to become more efficient and effective in IV&V planning and execution and respond more readily to changes in the risk landscape, increasing the breadth and depth of risk reduction possible within the available resources. Residual risk tracking allows IV&V to communicate more effectively with stakeholders, both internal and external at all levels, and inform key decision-making personnel. This evolving assurance design approach provides IV&V surety that work is performed in the highest risk, most value-added areas of the software, to keep our astronauts and ground crews safe and ensure mission success.

Gerek A Whitman↗

NASA NTRS2023

Adaptive Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Reduces Risk of Software Impacting Safety in Artemis Missions

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is asking more of its human spaceflight programs than ever before through the collective Artemis Missions. The NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Program contributes to NASA’s human spaceflight goals by providing IV&V services for NASA’s critical spacecraft and ground software. The IV&V Program is tasked with providing assurance from both individual and integrated mission software perspectives. The Artemis IV&V organization is actively supporting six distinct development efforts: Orion, the Space Launch System (SLS), Exploration Ground Systems (EGS), Mission Control Center (MCC), the Lunar Gateway, and the Human Landing System (HLS), representing a wide diversity of developer organizations, management structures, and development approaches. With much of this extremely complex flight and ground software being essential to human safety both on the ground and in space, Artemis IV&V is likewise challenged to provide more value-added assurance to future Artemis missions within a constrained budget. To meet this challenge, Artemis IV&V employs a variety of novel and evolving “Adaptive IV&V” approaches for planning and executing IV&V analysis to increase both the efficiency and effectiveness of the IV&V Program’s assurance activities, and to address the difficulties imposed by assuring software for a large, highly integrated, multi-mission enterprise managed and executed by physically and organizationally distinct programs. Instilling agile principles like iterative planning cycles, self-organizing teams, and regular retrospectives, into IV&V planning and execution has led to a more rapid turnaround of a minimum viable assurance product and allowed for increased alignment of assurance activities with development progress. Adopting an assurance case methodology has led to greater consistency and clearer communication of assurance design and provided a foundation for long-term maintenance of assurance plans, products, and results across missions. The IV&V-developed Assurance / Safety Case Analytical Network (A-SCAN) framework and tool has enabled the quantification and tracking of system/software risk and confidence. These confidence measures provide a means to repeatedly express the impact of planned and completed assurance work and the remaining residual risk. Applied as part of a “Follow-the-Risk” organizational ethos, this allows consistent rightsizing of analysis rigor and intensity commensurate with the perceived risk of defects, as well as appropriate targeting of the highest risk areas of the software to find safety issues before they can manifest. Finally, the development of the IV&V Advanced Risk Reduction Integrated Software Test and Operations Tri-program Lightweight Environment (ARRISTOTLE), an integrated software-only simulation of Orion, SLS, and EGS systems, has made it possible to independently test integrated pad and flight scenarios and inject faults to observe how the Artemis multi-program, mission software behaves in degraded modes and in response to hazards. These adaptive IV&V investments have enabled Artemis IV&V to become more efficient and effective in IV&V planning and execution and respond more readily to changes in the risk landscape, increasing the breadth and depth of risk reduction possible within the available resources. Residual risk tracking allows IV&V to communicate more effectively with stakeholders, both internal and external at all levels, and inform key decision-making personnel. This evolving assurance design approach provides IV&V surety that work is performed in the highest risk, most value-added areas of the software, to keep our astronauts and ground crews safe and ensure mission success.

Gerek Whitman↗

NASA NTRS1997

NASA software independent verification and validation (IV and V): An upfront approach to mission success

Software independent verification and validation (IV and V) implementation methods, specific approaches and accomplishments in the application of IV and V to NASA programs are discussed. Because software is mission critical, software assurance is a critical aspect of NASA's safety and mission assurance program. An overview of NASA's software IV and V facility is given.

Gregory, Frederick D.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Independent Verification and Validation (IV and V) - Adding Mission Assurance to NASA Flight Software

The NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Facility objective is to identify potential defects in flight software using independent analysis techniques. This paper describes the tailored IV&V techniques that have been developed in support of critical interactions on the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) project, scheduled to launch in November, 2011. The IV&V techniques for interface analysis use independently developed sequence diagrams of critical scenarios. The results from these analyses have had a positive impact on the requirements flow down, consistency amongst MSL requirements and identification of missing requirements. The results of these analyses and the positive impact to the MSL project are provided.

performance evaluation↗

NASA NTRS2019

NASA's Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Program and Gateway IV&V Project

No abstract available

Stanton, Bill↗

NASA NTRS2015

Fault Management Architectures and the Challenges of Providing Software Assurance

Fault Management (FM) is focused on safety, the preservation of assets, and maintaining the desired functionality of the system. How FM is implemented varies among missions. Common to most missions is system complexity due to a need to establish a multi-dimensional structure across hardware, software and spacecraft operations. FM is necessary to identify and respond to system faults, mitigate technical risks and ensure operational continuity. Generally, FM architecture, implementation, and software assurance efforts increase with mission complexity. Because FM is a systems engineering discipline with a distributed implementation, providing efficient and effective verification and validation (V&V) is challenging. A breakout session at the 2012 NASA Independent Verification & Validation (IV&V) Annual Workshop titled "V&V of Fault Management: Challenges and Successes" exposed this issue in terms of V&V for a representative set of architectures. NASA's Software Assurance Research Program (SARP) has provided funds to NASA IV&V to extend the work performed at the Workshop session in partnership with NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL). NASA IV&V will extract FM architectures across the IV&V portfolio and evaluate the data set, assess visibility for validation and test, and define software assurance methods that could be applied to the various architectures and designs. This SARP initiative focuses efforts on FM architectures from critical and complex projects within NASA. The identification of particular FM architectures and associated V&V/IV&V techniques provides a data set that can enable improved assurance that a system will adequately detect and respond to adverse conditions. Ultimately, results from this activity will be incorporated into the NASA Fault Management Handbook providing dissemination across NASA, other agencies and the space community. This paper discusses the approach taken to perform the evaluations and preliminary findings from the research.

Fault Management↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Verification and Validation of Safety-Critical Aircraft Systems Operating under Off-Nominal, Contingency, and Emergency Conditions

Verification and validation (V&V) of safety-critical technologies developed for loss of control (LOC) prevention and recovery and other aviation safety concerns pose significant challenges. Aircraft LOC can result from a wide spectrum of hazards, often occurring in combination, which cannot be fully replicated during evaluation. Technologies developed for LOC prevention and recovery must therefore be effective under a wide variety of hazardous and uncertain conditions, and the verification and validation of these technologies must provide some measure of assurance that the new vehicle safety technologies do no harm (i.e., that they themselves do not introduce new safety risks). V&V technologies must also enable the identification of system limitations and constraints, as well as enable the identification of safe and unsafe operating conditions (and their boundaries). Additionally, the V&V of complex, increasingly autonomous systems is a fundamental concern. Scalable, reproducible and cost-effective techniques for the assurance of safety critical systems during their design and operation is a key barrier to fielding new systems or updating current systems. Moreover, these techniques need to provide artifacts that enable a comprehensive evidence-based approach to certification. This briefing summarizes research performed under NASA’s Aviation Safety Program and follow-on research for the V&V of safety-critical aircraft system technologies developed for LOC prevention and recovery and increasingly autonomous systems, and for a broad assurance capability in both current and emerging aviation applications. Note that, in this briefing, the term “validation” refers to a confirmation that the system implementation (e.g., algorithms etc.) is performing the intended function(s), as well as an affirmation of effectiveness in these functions. “Verification” refers to a confirmation that the system implementation in the software and hardware meets its (hopefully validated) specifications (e.g., correctly executes algorithms as designed).

Validation↗

NASA NTRS2006

An Overview of NASA's IM&S Verification and Validation Process Plan and Specification for Space Exploration

NASA's Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD) is implementing a management approach for modeling and simulation (M&S) that will provide decision-makers information on the model's fidelity, credibility, and quality. This information will allow the decision-maker to understand the risks involved in using a model's results in the decision-making process. This presentation will discuss NASA's approach for verification and validation (V&V) of its models or simulations supporting space exploration. This presentation will describe NASA's V&V process and the associated M&S verification and validation (V&V) activities required to support the decision-making process. The M&S V&V Plan and V&V Report templates for ESMD will also be illustrated.

Gravitz, Robert M.↗

NASA NTRS2003

Optimizing IV and V for Mature Organizations

NASA is intending for its future software development agencies to have at least a Level 3 rating in the Carnegie Mellon University Capability Maturity Model (CMM). The CMM has built-in Verification and Validation (V&V) processes that support higher software quality. Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) of software developed by mature agencies can be therefore more effective than for software developed by less mature organizations. How is Independent V&V different with respect to the maturity of an organization? Knowing a priori the maturity of an organization's processes, how can IV&V planners better identify areas of need choose IV&V activities, etc? The objective of this research is to provide a complementary set of guidelines and criteria to assist the planning of IV&V activities on a project using a priori knowledge of the measurable levels of maturity of the organization developing the software.

Fuhman, Christopher↗

NASA NTRS2015

Assuring NASA's Safety and Mission Critical Software

What is IV&V? Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) is an objective examination of safety and mission critical software processes and products. Independence: 3 Key parameters: Technical Independence; Managerial Independence; Financial Independence. NASA IV&V perspectives: Will the system's software: Do what it is supposed to do?; Not do what it is not supposed to do?; Respond as expected under adverse conditions?. Systems Engineering: Determines if the right system has been built and that it has been built correctly. IV&V Technical Approaches: Aligned with IEEE 1012; Captured in a Catalog of Methods; Spans the full project lifecycle. IV&V Assurance Strategy: The IV&V Project's strategy for providing mission assurance; Assurance Strategy is driven by the specific needs of an individual project; Implemented via an Assurance Design; Communicated via Assurance Statements.

Validation↗

NASA NTRS2004

An Approach to V&V of Embedded Adaptive Systems

Rigorous Verification and Validation (V&V) techniques are essential for high assurance systems. Lately, the performance of some of these systems is enhanced by embedded adaptive components in order to cope with environmental changes. Although the ability of adapting is appealing, it actually poses a problem in terms of V&V. Since uncertainties induced by environmental changes have a significant impact on system behavior, the applicability of conventional V&V techniques is limited. In safety-critical applications such as flight control system, the mechanisms of change must be observed, diagnosed, accommodated and well understood prior to deployment. In this paper, we propose a non-conventional V&V approach suitable for online adaptive systems. We apply our approach to an intelligent flight control system that employs a particular type of Neural Networks (NN) as the adaptive learning paradigm. Presented methodology consists of a novelty detection technique and online stability monitoring tools. The novelty detection technique is based on Support Vector Data Description that detects novel (abnormal) data patterns. The Online Stability Monitoring tools based on Lyapunov's Stability Theory detect unstable learning behavior in neural networks. Cases studies based on a high fidelity simulator of NASA's Intelligent Flight Control System demonstrate a successful application of the presented V&V methodology. ,

Liu, Yan↗

NASA NTRS1987

Approaches to the verification of rule-based expert systems

Expert systems are a highly useful spinoff of artificial intelligence research. One major stumbling block to extended use of expert systems is the lack of well-defined verification and validation (V and V) methodologies. Since expert systems are computer programs, the definitions of verification and validation from conventional software are applicable. The primary difficulty with expert systems is the use of development methodologies which do not support effective V and V. If proper techniques are used to document requirements, V and V of rule-based expert systems is possible, and may be easier than with conventional code. For NASA applications, the flight technique panels used in previous programs should provide an excellent way to verify the rules used in expert systems. There are, however, some inherent differences in expert systems that will affect V and V considerations.

Culbert, Chris↗

NASA NTRS1998

Executive Summary: Special Section on Credible Computational Fluid Dynamics Simulations

This summary presents the motivation for the Special Section on the credibility of computational fluid dynamics (CFD) simulations, its objective, its background and context, its content, and its major conclusions. Verification and validation (V&V) are the processes for establishing the credibility of CFD simulations. Validation assesses whether correct things are performed and verification assesses whether they are performed correctly. Various aspects of V&V are discussed. Progress is made in verification of simulation models. Considerable effort is still needed for developing a systematic validation method that can assess the credibility of simulated reality.

Mehta, Unmeel B.↗

DOE OSTI2020

Involute Working Group – Validation of CFD Turbulence Models for Steady-State Safety Analysis

There are three research reactors in the world having fuel plates curved as circle-involute (a spiral generated around a circle): The Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) located in Tennessee, U.S.A. [ORNL, 2018]; The Laue-Langevin Institute (ILL) High Flux Reactor (RHF) located in Grenoble, France [ILL, 2018]; and, The Technical University of Munich (TUM) Research Neutron Source Heinz Maier-Leibnitz (FRM II) located in Garching, Germany [TUM, 2018]. All three reactors are currently using Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU, 235U/U ≥ 20 wt. %) as fuel and all three are actively engaged in activities to convert to Low Enriched Uranium (LEU, 235U/U < 20 wt. %) fuel. More information on these reactors can be found in Section two. For various reasons, these reactors have expressed interest in using Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) tools to perform their Steady-State Thermal-Hydraulic (SSTH) safety calculations. Using CFD tools for SSTH analysis represents generally a significant departure from traditional methods and requires thorough verification and validation (V&V) to be accepted by regulators. This is why Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) and the involute reactors formed an informal group to help each other in this endeavor. This so-called Involute Working Group (IWG) aims at supporting the qualification of CFD tools for SSTH safety calculations. Activities include benchmarking, code-to-code comparison, Verification and Validation (V&V) as well as technical support. More information on the IWG and the reasons why involute-plate reactors are interested in CFD can be found in Section three. The present study aims at testing three turbulence models commonly implemented in commercial software (namely K-Epsilon, K-Omega and Reynolds-Stress) and assessing their relevance for involute-plate reactor application. An experiment performed by Gambill and Bundy in 1961 was performed to measure heat transfer coefficients in conditions prototypic of the HFIR reactor [Gambill, 1961]. More details on this experiment are provided in Section four. Based on the information available, CFD models of this experiment have been created and the experimental results have been compared to the ones obtained with these CFD models. CFD models and the results of this comparison are provided in Section five.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

NASA NTRS1996

The Application of V&V within Reuse-Based Software Engineering

Verification and Validation (V&V) is performed during application development for many systems, especially safety-critical and mission-critical systems. The V&V process is intended to discover errors as early as possible during the development process. Early discovery is important in order to minimize the cost and other impacts of correcting these errors. In reuse-based software engineering, decisions on the requirements, design and even implementation of domain assets can can be made prior to beginning development of a specific system. in order to bring the effectiveness of V&V to bear within reuse-based software engineering. V&V must be incorporated within the domain engineering process.

Addy, Edward↗

NASA NTRS1996

A Framework for Performing V&V within Reuse-Based Software Engineering

Verification and validation (V&V) is performed during application development for many systems, especially safety-critical and mission-critical systems. The V&V process is intended to discover errors, especially errors related to critical processing, as early as possible during the development process. Early discovery is important in order to minimize the cost and other impacts of correcting these errors. In order to provide early detection of errors, V&V is conducted in parallel with system development, often beginning with the concept phase. In reuse-based software engineering, however, decisions on the requirements, design and even implementation of domain assets can be made prior to beginning development of a specific system. In this case, V&V must be performed during domain engineering in order to have an impact on system development. This paper describes a framework for performing V&V within architecture-centric, reuse-based software engineering. This framework includes the activities of traditional application-level V&V, and extends these activities into domain engineering and into the transition between domain engineering and application engineering. The framework includes descriptions of the types of activities to be performed during each of the life-cycle phases, and provides motivation for the activities.

Addy, Edward A.↗

NASA NTRS1996

V&V Within Reuse-Based Software Engineering

Verification and Validation (V&V) is used to increase the level of assurance of critical software, particularly that of safety-critical and mission-critical software. V&V is a systems engineering discipline that evaluates the software in a systems context, and is currently applied during the development of a specific application system. In order to bring the effectiveness of V&V to bear within reuse-based software engineering, V&V must be incorporated within the domain engineering process.

Addy, Edward A.↗