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Performance Assessment for the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility (Annual Status Report FY 2021)

DOE O 435.1 and DOE M 435.1-1 require that a determination of continued adequacy of the performance assessment (PA) (CP-60089), composite analysis (CA), and disposal authorization statement (DAS) be made on an annual basis, and that the determination must consider the results of data collection and analysis from research, field studies, and monitoring as well as the need to update any Radioactive Waste Management Basis (RWMB) documents. Beginning in 1996, the Environmental Disposal Facility (ERDF) started accepting low-level radioactive, hazardous, and mixed wastes that were generated during cleanup activities at the Hanford Site. ERDF is composed of a series of cells or disposal areas and can accommodate future design expansions as needed. Currently, there are eight cells and two supercells in ERDF. Each supercell is the equivalent of two cells. During this reporting period (fiscal year 2021, extending from October 1, 2020, through September 30, 2021), approximately 9.14E+04 metric tons (1.01E+05 U.S. tons) of waste was disposed at ERDF. From ERDF inception through September 30, 2021, approximately 16.9 million metric tons (18.9 U.S. tons) of waste has been disposed of at ERDF, which equates to consumption of approximately 88.7% of the currently constructed disposal volume. According to the design of ERDF, the facility has the ability to be expanded as needed. As a condition of the DAS, disposal operation within ERDF must be in accordance with the waste acceptance criteria (ERDF-00011) that provide specific radionuclide disposal limits, waste form restrictions, and descriptions of acceptable waste packages in compliance with the requirements of DOE M 435-1.1. The ERDF waste acceptance criteria stipulate that waste destined for disposal at ERDF be controlled based on source, physical form, and contaminant concentration and activity levels. There have been no changes to the physical configuration of ERDF or to the waste forms (source, physical form, etc.). No new unreviewed disposal question screenings or evaluations have been generated in this reporting period. Therefore, there are no noted impacts to the PA, CA, DAS, or RWMB resulting from the evaluations and screenings. Sum-of-fractions analysis shows that the disposed inventory meets both the concentration and inventory threshold requirements. A sum-of-fractions value is computed for ERDF sensitive radionuclides contributing to the all pathways and the air pathway inventory limits. Computed values were 7.63E-03 and 1.49E-03, respectively. The disposed waste inventory remained well under the PA imposed limits, as shown in Table 4 and Table 5 in the main text of this report. Required monitoring was satisfactorily completed during the fiscal year reporting period. Compliance with performance objectives were met as each of the reported values were well below the established limit. Overall, there are no substantive changes to primary PA assumptions or changes to the PA analysis conclusion; therefore, compliance with DOE O 435.1 and the DAS is maintained.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Nuclear Criticality Safety Assessment of Criticality Control Containers without Moderation Control at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) provides for safe, permanent disposal of government-owned transuranic (TRU) and TRU mixed wastes. Receipt and disposal of waste at the WIPP site began in March 1999. The Sandia report, Consideration of Nuclear Criticality When Disposing of Transuranic Waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, addressed potential nuclear criticality safety issues based on the projected inventory characteristics known at the time [1]. As designs for inventory, waste forms, and disposal packages have changed, new analyses have been performed, and updates have been made to address any potential effects to the WIPP safety basis. New analyses performed include Saylor 2017 [2] and Brickner 2019 [3], which address certain waste containers with specified loadings under post-closure conditions. Both examined several hypothetical scenarios and included analyses to bound (from a criticality potential standpoint) credible configurations that could occur at WIPP during the repository regulatory post-closure disposal time period for feature, event, and process (FEP) considerations—10,000 years. During this post-closure period at WIPP, the screening of FEPs is governed by the risk-based standards and implementing regulations of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (i.e., 40 CFR 191 and 40 CFR 194, respectively) [4,5]. An FEP screening can be based on either a low-consequence or low-probability rationale. A low-probability rationale includes either (a) a qualitative rationale that the FEP is not credible or (b) a quantitative demonstration that the probability is less than 10-4 in 104 years. In this evaluation, a qualitative lowprobability rationale of not credible is used by demonstrating that bounding configurations of the waste are not critical. The demonstration of subcriticality is through quantitative calculations, but a probability of criticality is not evaluated. Rather, the rationale for this evaluation is that bounding configurations with an effective neutron multiplication factor (keff) well below the upper subcriticality limit (USL) make criticality incredible. Reference [2] documented a nuclear criticality assessment of the WIPP repository for disposal of dilute surplus plutonium materials using the Dilute and Dispose Approach and packaging in criticality control overpacks (CCOs). The CCO is the waste disposal container recently designed to allow for up to 380 fissile gram equivalent (FGE) 239 Pu per drum, which is a higher fissile loading than typical waste containers. The CCO consists of a criticality control container (CCC) positioned by upper and lower plywood spacers within a standard 55 gal drum. The CCC is used to establish a geometry control for fissile materials during transportation and WIPP emplacement operations. The current WIPP waste acceptance criteria for CCO payloads limit beryllium to less than or equal to 1% by weight of the waste contents and require the waste form to be non-machine compacted. Reference [2] considered two scenario progressions—room closure from salt creep, hereafter referred to as the reconfigured dry scenario, and flooding with brine, hereafter referred to as the reconfigured wet scenario. The subsequent drying out of the reconfigured wet scenarios was also considered. For all scenarios, subcriticality was maintained when 50 g of B 4 C (acting as a neutron absorber) per CCC was intermixed within the plutonium disposition waste form. The analysis used a waste form description that limits the amount of moderation that could be present within the waste form (i.e., it limits the amount of water and polyethylene that could be present based on planned processing conditions). This analysis to evaluate increased limits on the amount of moderation that could be present was performed as a companion to Reference [2] to address concerns associated with verifying moisture and/or plastic contents of waste materials following packaging of dilute surplus plutonium in the CCO. To that end, this analysis used the models and methods from Reference [2] to evaluate a more generic base waste form consisting of water and polyethylene that is more similar (and nearly identical) to the generic waste forms utilized in other models/analyses supporting the TRU Package Transporter Model II (TRUPACTII) safety analysis [6] (all are without moderation controls). The waste form in this analysis uses a base mixture of 75% water and 25% polyethylene, the total amount of which is varied to determine the optimum moderation to fissile material (H/Pu) ratio. The fissile loading is maintained at up to 380 FGE 239 Pu (modeled as PuO 2 ) per CCO with an additional 545 g of beryllium (to bound the 1% by weight contents restriction) and 50 g of B 4 C intermixed per CCO. The beryllium content (1% by weight) is based on the total allowed waste weight (this does not include packaging and container weights). Figures ES-1 and ES-2 display summary results, showing that with this model including 50 g of B 4 C per CCO, the system keff remains under 0.85 for all moderator amounts and provides a significant margin against post-closure criticality under postulated bounding conditions for compaction. Figure ES-1 compares an infinite model with a room model at the initial emplacement spacing and under full radial compaction. Full radial compaction places each CCC in direct contact and does not credit any anticipated spacing associated with current post-closure geomechanical modeling of the repository [7]. The effects of variations in the H/Pu ratio were evaluated by varying the amount of the water/polyethylene component of the waste model, with fissile loading maintained at 380 239 Pu FGE. Similarly, Figure ES-2 illustrates how various amounts of B 4 C per CCO influence k eff at different radial compactions, all at the H/Pu ratio of 200 (in the room array model). Therefore, while the results from Saylor 2017 [2] modeled more realistic process limits associated with packaging of dilute surplus plutonium, this analysis demonstrates that limits on moderation (plastic and water content) are not necessary to ensure subcriticality in the WIPP repository, provided the requisite B 4 C absorber is present.

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On the effectiveness in implementing a waste-management-plan method in construction

The increasing awareness of waste management concerns from construction and demolition waste has led to the development of waste management as an important function of construction project management. The Hong Kong government started employing the implementation of a waste-management-plan (WMP) method for all construction projects in 2003. During the trial period, the government received different version of feedback from the industry. It also came out that detailed descriptions of waste management procedures in the WMP method largely affect the productivity of companies. This paper investigates the effectiveness of the existing implementation of the WMP method in the Hong Kong construction industry. A questionnaire survey and structured interviews were conducted. The result showed that 'Propose methods for on-site reuse of materials' and 'Propose methods for reducing waste' are the main benefits gained from the implementation of the WMP method. However, 'Low financial incentive' and 'Increase in overhead cost' are considered as the major difficulties in the implementation. From that, 'Use of prefabricated building components' is considered as the major effective measure to encourage the implementation of the WMP method.

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A step-by-step development of radioactive waste management strategy

Fennovoima is Finland's third nuclear power company founded in 2007. Fennovoima will build a new nuclear power plant, Hanhikivi 1, in Pyhajoki municipality located in Northern Finland. Currently Fennovoima is evaluating bids from reactor suppliers. Originally two suppliers, AREVA and Toshiba Heavy Industries were invited to bid for the plant but later also a bid from Rosatom were invited. The plant supplier will be selected in 2013. Platom is a Finnish company with extensive experience in radioactive waste management. In the beginning of 2008, Platom was assigned by Fennovoima as radioactive waste management consultant and to develop radioactive waste management strategy and to support Fennovoima in negotiations with plant suppliers in waste management aspects. Since Fennovoima has started, there have been some changes to the regulatory requirements which had to be taken into account while developing the strategy. One important change is due to the Government Degree 27.11.2008/736 which establishes a new waste category of very low-level waste following international development and the 'new' IAEA waste classification. Other important change was introduced by the change 342/2008 to the Nuclear Energy Act allowing some nuclear waste to be delivered to another country for treatment. These and many more requirements had to be considered when developing the strategy. Early work by Platom was mostly done to support development of application for Decision-in-Principle. This was the first important licensing step for Fennovoima. Work started with studies and plans which were used by Fennovoima to gather the know-how required to draw up the application. Descriptions of waste streams and waste management technologies were developed as well as preliminary waste inventories and studies for final disposal, including preliminary dimensioning of the repository facilities. Based on these plans nuclear regulator's preliminary safety assessment was performed. The work was successfully completed as in 2010 the Government of Finland granted Fennovoima a permit to build a new nuclear power plant. The work continued in 2012 when bids were received for EPR and ABWR type reactors. Plans developed earlier were elaborated into a detailed strategy and the proposed waste management solutions were evaluated. This allowed feedback from the bids into the strategy and to the bid specification and they both were developed. Also waste inventories were elaborated which allowed development of reactor design specific disposal strategies. The main objective of work has been to establish basis for safe and efficient radioactive waste management which meets all the relevant national and international recommendations, requirements and regulations, takes advantage of best available and state-of-art technologies and offers fit-for-purpose solutions. All the work was performed to accommodate requirement based management system. (authors)

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Review Guidelines for Biosphere Safety Assessment of Low-Level Waste Disposal Repository in Taiwan - 19606

Conducting reviews of radiological dose assessments is a crucial step toward the approval of long-term radiological safety requirements for low-level radioactive waste (LLW) disposal facilities. However, the concentration of radionuclides released from the near field into the biosphere and the radiation exposure levels to an individual can influence the performance acceptability of the LLW disposal facility and safety of the disposal environment. Therefore, all LLW must be managed and disposed of such that it minimizes risk to individuals and the environment. A dose of 0.25 mSv/year is the limit for individuals expected to receive the highest level of exposure to residual radioactivity. In Taiwan, a review for license applications has been proposed for LLW disposal facilities. These review guidelines are based on the Standard Review Plan (NUREG-1200) and are amended according to the environmental conditions in Taiwan. These guidelines can help reviewers to perform safety assessment reviews of applications for the construction and operation of LLW disposal facilities. The review guidelines for biosphere safety assessment include radiological dose assessment, description of waste characteristics, radionuclide transport characteristics, radiation dose under normal and unusual conditions, radionuclide release into the biosphere, and interpretation of evaluation results in various transfer mechanisms. These guidelines can also serve as references for regulatory departments conducting safety assessments of radiological doses in LLW disposal facilities in Taiwan. (authors)

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Low-Activity Waste Melter Process (LMP) System Design Description (Rev. 4)

This system design description (SDD) defines the technical, functional, and performance requirements of the low-activity waste (LAW) melter process system (LMP). This document details the waste treatment requirements, environmental compliance requirements, and authorization basis requirements of the LMP system as they are currently known and understood. This SDD describes the process and functional design requirements of the LMP, including the following: 1) Services and utility requirements, operating materials and supplies, and other external interfaces; 2) Operations limits and design bases; 3) Other criteria and requirements pertinent to the design of the LMP system; 4) Boundaries, system interfaces, and functional description of the LMP system. The LMP system is composed of two LAW melters of the same design with the contingency to add the third. Also included in the LMP system are the pour spouts, which are positioned under the melter discharge chambers of each melter, and the container level detectors. The boundaries, system interfaces, and functional description of the LMP system are provided in Section 2.

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Preliminary waste management plan of European spallation

The European Spallation Source (ESS) is the European common effort in designing and building a next generation large-scale user facility for studies of the structure and dynamics of materials. The proposed schematic layout of the ESS facility is based on a linear driver (linac) directing the proton beam (5 MW of 2.5 GeV) of 2.8 ms long pulses with a 20 Hz on a tungsten target where neutrons are produced via spallation reactions. Further the neutrons will be moderated to thermal and sub-thermal energies in a couple of moderators placed around the target. The moderators feed 22 beamlines guiding the neutrons to the scattering instruments, mainly for neutron scattering research, as has been previously mentioned. The objective of this work is to develop a waste management plan for ESS facility. In this respect two important aspects are analyzed. First the present status of the problem is outlined as follow. Estimate types and quantities of waste that the ESS project will generate at different stages: commission, operation, decommissioning were derived using: i) precise Monte Carlo calculations ii) scaling the activity from the operation experience of the existing spallation source installations for waste such it is difficult to predict level of activation or for components of the facility in stage of the preconceptual model. Associated waste treatment/conditioning options and final disposal route were further analyzed in order to define the waste type and packet descriptions in agreement with Swedish regulations and policy. It was found that the compilation of completely new waste type descriptions for qualification of the ESS waste for disposal will be necessary. Particular attention was devoted to 'problematic waste' as Beryllium reflector, C-14 from graphite used as core zone of the beam-dump and collimators or waste arising from the purification systems of both Helium and water cooling circuits. Management of waste on ESS site: collection/segregation systems, characterization system, storage options, is also described. In the second step, the acquired information is used for planning and implementing actions involving all participants (ESS, treatment facility operator, disposal operator, regulatory body and other authorized authorities). (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Disposal Activities and the Unique Waste Streams at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS)

This slide show documents waste disposal at the Nevada National Security Site. Topics covered include: radionuclide requirements for waste disposal; approved performance assessment (PA) for depleted uranium disposal; requirements; program approval; the Waste Acceptance Review Panel (WARP); description of the Radioactive Waste Acceptance Program (RWAP); facility evaluation; recent program accomplishments, nuclear facility safety changes; higher-activity waste stream disposal; and, large volume bulk waste streams.

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Characterization of radioactive wastes with respect to harmful materials

In addendum 4 to the license of the German KONRAD repository, which considers mainly radiological aspects, a water law permit was issued in order to prevent the pollution of the near-surface groundwater. The water law permit stipulates limitations for 10 radionuclides and 2 groups of radionuclides as well as mass limitations for 94 substances and materials relevant for water protection issues. Two collateral clauses, i.e. additional requirements imposed by the licensing authority, include demands on the monitoring, registering and balancing of non-radioactive harmful substances and materials /1/. In order to fulfill the requirements of the water law permit the German Federal Office for Radiation Protection (BfS) being the operator of the KONRAD repository has developed a concept, which ensures the compliance with all requirements of the water law permit and which provides standardized easy manageable guidance for the waste producers to describe their wastes. On 15 March 2011 the competent water authority, the 'Niedersaechsischer Landesbetrieb fuer Wasserwirtschaft, Kuesten- und Naturschutz' (NLWKN) issued the approval for this concept. Being the most essential part of this concept the procedural method and the developed description of nonradioactive waste package constituents by use of standardized lists of materials and containers is addressed and presented in this paper. The waste producer has to describe his waste package in a standardized way on the base of the lists of materials and containers. For each material in the list a comprehensive description is given comprising the composition, scope of application, quality control measures, thresholds and other data. Each entry in the list has to be approved by NLWKN. The scope of the lists is defined by the waste producers' needs. Using some particular materials as examples, the approval procedure for including materials in the list is described. The procedure of describing the material composition has to be considered in the KONRAD waste acceptance requirements. The respective part of these requirements will be introduced. In order to clarify the procedure of describing waste packages by use of the standardized lists of materials and containers some examples of typical waste package descriptions will be presented. (authors)

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Economic Feasibility of Electrochemical Caustic Recycling at the Hanford Site

This report contains a review of potential cost benefits of NaSICON Ceramic membranes for the separation of sodium from Hanford tank waste. The primary application is for caustic recycle to the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) pretreatment leaching operation. The report includes a description of the waste, the benefits and costs for a caustic-recycle facility, and Monte Carlo results obtained from a model of these costs and benefits. The use of existing cost information has been limited to publicly available sources. This study is intended to be an initial evaluation of the economic feasibility of a caustic recycle facility based on NaSICON technology. The current pretreatment flowsheet indicates that approximately 6,500 metric tons (MT) of Na will be added to the tank waste, primarily for removing Al from the high-level waste (HLW) sludge (Kirkbride et al. 2007). An assessment (Alexander et al. 2004) of the pretreatment flowsheet, equilibrium chemistry, and laboratory results indicates that the quantity of Na required for sludge leaching will increase by 6,000 to 12,000 MT in order to dissolve sufficient Al from the tank-waste sludge material to maintain the number of HLW canisters produced at 9,400 canisters as defined in the Office of River Protection (ORP) System Plan (Certa 2003). This additional Na will significantly increase the volume of LAW glass and extend the processing time of the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP). Future estimates on sodium requirements for caustic leaching are expected to significantly exceed the 12,000-MT value and approach 40,000-MT of total sodium addition for leaching (Gilbert, 2007). The cost benefit for caustic recycling is assumed to consist of four major contributions: 1) the cost savings realized by not producing additional immobilized low-activity waste (ILAW) glass, 2) caustic recycle capital investment, 3) caustic recycle operating and maintenance costs, and 4) research and technology costs needed to deploy the technology. In estimating costs for each of these components, several parameters are used as inputs. Due to uncertainty in assuming a singular value for each of these parameters, a range of possible values is assumed. A Monte Carlo simulation is then performed where the range of these parameters is exercised, and the resulting range of cost benefits is determined.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Preliminary Evaluation of Removing Used Nuclear Fuel from Shutdown Sites

This report presents a preliminary evaluation of removing used nuclear fuel (UNF) from 12 shutdown nuclear power plant sites. At these shutdown sites the nuclear power reactors have been permanently shut down and the sites have been decommissioned or are undergoing decommissioning. The shutdown sites are Maine Yankee, Yankee Rowe, Connecticut Yankee, Humboldt Bay, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Trojan, La Crosse, Zion, Crystal River, Kewaunee, and San Onofre. The evaluation was divided into four components: characterization of the UNF and greater-than-Class C low-level radioactive waste (GTCC waste) inventory; a description of the on-site infrastructure and conditions relevant to transportation of UNF and GTCC waste; an evaluation of the near-site transportation infrastructure and experience relevant to shipping transportation casks containing UNF and GTCC waste, including identification of gaps in information; and, an evaluation of the actions necessary to prepare for and remove UNF and GTCC waste. The primary sources for the inventory of UNF and GTCC waste are the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) RW-859 used nuclear fuel inventory database, industry sources such as StoreFUEL and SpentFUEL, and government sources such as the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The primary sources for information on the conditions of site and near-site transportation infrastructure and experience included observations and information collected during visits to the Maine Yankee, Yankee Rowe, Connecticut Yankee, Humboldt Bay, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Trojan, La Crosse, and Zion sites; information provided by managers at the shutdown sites; Facility Interface Data Sheets compiled for DOE in 2005; Services Planning Documents prepared for DOE in 1993 and 1994; industry publications such as Radwaste Solutions; and Google Earth. State and Regional Group representatives, a Tribal representative, and a Federal Railroad Administration representative participated in six of the shutdown site visits. Every site was found to have at least one off-site transportation mode option for removing its UNF and GTCC waste; some have multiple options. Experience removing large components during reactor decommissioning provided an important source of information used to identify the transportation mode options for the sites. Especially important in conducting the evaluation were site visits, through which information was obtained that would not have been available otherwise. Extensive photographs taken during the site visits proved to be particularly useful in documenting the current conditions at or near the sites. Additional conclusions from this evaluation include: The 12 shutdown sites use designs from 4 different suppliers involving 9 different (horizontal and vertical) dry storage systems that would require the use of 8 different transportation cask designs to remove the UNF and GTCC waste from the shutdown sites; Although there are common aspects, each site has some unique features and/or conditions; Although some regulatory actions will be required, all UNF at the initial 9 shutdown sites (Maine Yankee, Yankee Rowe, Connecticut Yankee, Humboldt Bay, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Trojan, La Crosse, and Zion) is in licensed systems that can be transported, including a small amount of high-burnup fuel; Each site indicated that 2-3 years of advance time would be required for its preparations before shipments could begin; Most sites have more than one transportation option, e.g., rail, barge, or heavy haul truck, as well as constraints and preferences. It is expected that additional site visits will be conducted to add to the information presented in the evaluation.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities March 2010

This Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) for the Waste Storage Facilities was developed in accordance with 10 CFR 830, Subpart B, 'Safety Basis Requirements,' and utilizes the methodology outlined in DOE-STD-3009-94, Change Notice 3. The Waste Storage Facilities consist of Area 625 (A625) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area portion of the DWTF complex. These two areas are combined into a single DSA, as their functions as storage for radioactive and hazardous waste are essentially identical. The B695 Segment of DWTF is addressed under a separate DSA. This DSA provides a description of the Waste Storage Facilities and the operations conducted therein; identification of hazards; analyses of the hazards, including inventories, bounding releases, consequences, and conclusions; and programmatic elements that describe the current capacity for safe operations. The mission of the Waste Storage Facilities is to safely handle, store, and treat hazardous waste, transuranic (TRU) waste, low-level waste (LLW), mixed waste, combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL (as well as small amounts from other DOE facilities).

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Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities

This documented safety analysis (DSA) for the Waste Storage Facilities was developed in accordance with 10 CFR 830, Subpart B, 'Safety Basis Requirements', and utilizes the methodology outlined in DOE-STD-3009-94, Change Notice 3. The Waste Storage Facilities consist of Area 625 (A625) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area portion of the DWTF complex. These two areas are combined into a single DSA, as their functions as storage for radioactive and hazardous waste are essentially identical. The B695 Segment of DWTF is addressed under a separate DSA. This DSA provides a description of the Waste Storage Facilities and the operations conducted therein; identification of hazards; analyses of the hazards, including inventories, bounding releases, consequences, and conclusions; and programmatic elements that describe the current capacity for safe operations. The mission of the Waste Storage Facilities is to safely handle, store, and treat hazardous waste, transuranic (TRU) waste, low-level waste (LLW), mixed waste, combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL (as well as small amounts from other DOE facilities).

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Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Overview

An overview of WIPP including a description of its history, waste characterization, and disposal activities.

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Food waste and the food-energy-water nexus: A review of food waste management alternatives

Highlights: • Little is known about FEW impacts of managing food waste after it has been disposed. • Food waste management options have variable FEW impacts and opportunities. • Preventable and unpreventable food waste have different mechanisms of FEW impact. • A “food-waste-FEW systems” approach may maximize benefits across FEW sectors. • Characterizing FEW nexus impacts of wasted food is a priority for future work. - Abstract: Throughout the world, much food produced is wasted. The resource impact of producing wasted food is substantial; however, little is known about the energy and water consumed in managing food waste after it has been disposed. Herein, we characterize food waste within the Food-Energy-Water (FEW) nexus and parse the differential FEW effects of producing uneaten food and managing food loss and waste. We find that various food waste management options, such as waste prevention, landfilling, composting, anaerobic digestion, and incineration, present variable pathways for FEW impacts and opportunities. Furthermore, comprehensive sustainable management of food waste will involve varied mechanisms and actors at multiple levels of governance and at the level of individual consumers. To address the complex food waste problem, we therefore propose a “food-waste-systems” approach to optimize resources within the FEW nexus. Such a framework may be applied to devise strategies that, for instance, minimize the amount of edible food that is wasted, foster efficient use of energy and water in the food production process, and simultaneously reduce pollution externalities and create opportunities from recycled energy and nutrients. Characterization of FEW nexus impacts of wasted food, including descriptions of dynamic feedback behaviors, presents a significant research gap and a priority for future work. Large-scale decision making requires more complete understanding of food waste and its management within the FEW nexus, particularly regarding post-disposal impacts related to water.

09 BIOMASS FUELS↗

An overview of the sustainability of solid waste management at military installations

Sustainable municipal solid waste management at military solutions necessitates a combined approach that includes waste reduction, alternative disposal techniques, and increased recycling. Military installations are unique because they often represent large employers in the region in which they are located, thereby making any practices they employ impact overall waste management strategies of the region. Solutions for waste sustainability will be dependent on operational directives and base location, availability of resources such as water and energy, and size of population. Presented in this paper are descriptions of available waste strategies that can be used to support sustainable waste management. Results presented indicate source reduction and recycling to be the most sustainable solutions. However, new waste-to-energy plants and composting have potential to improve on these well proven techniques and allow military installations to achieve sustainable waste management.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Preliminary Evaluation of Removing Spent Nuclear Fuel from Shutdown Nuclear Power Plant Sites - 2018 - 19101

This is a technical paper that does not take into account the contractual limitations under the Standard Contract for Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and/or High-Level Radioactive Waste (Standard Contract) (10 CFR Part 961). Under the provisions of the Standard Contract, DOE does not consider spent nuclear fuel in multi-assembly canisters to be an acceptable waste form, absent a mutually agreed to contract amendment. To the extent discussions or recommendations in this paper conflict with the provisions of the Standard Contract, the Standard Contract provisions prevail. The U.S. Department of Energy Office of Integrated Waste Management (DOE-IWM) continues to conduct evaluations of removing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from shutdown nuclear power plant sites. The 14 shutdown sites included in the evaluation to date have nuclear power reactors that have been permanently shut down and the sites have been decommissioned or are undergoing decommissioning. The 14 shutdown sites are Maine Yankee, Yankee Rowe, Connecticut Yankee, Humboldt Bay, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Trojan, La Crosse, Zion, Crystal River, Kewaunee, San Onofre, Vermont Yankee, and Fort Calhoun. The Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station ceased operations in September 2018 and will be included in future evaluations. The evaluations of the shutdown sites contain four components: - A characterization of the SNF and greater-than-Class C low-level radioactive waste (GTCC waste) inventory; - A description of the on-site infrastructure at the shutdown sites; - An evaluation of the near-site transportation infrastructure and experience at the shutdown sites - An evaluation of the actions necessary to prepare for and remove SNF and GTCC waste. The primary sources for the inventory of SNF were the DOE GC-859 and RW-859 spent nuclear fuel inventory databases. This inventory has been augmented with data obtained from the shutdown sites for SNF discharges that occurred after June 2013. The primary sources for information on the conditions of site and near-site transportation infrastructure and experience included field observations and information collected during visits to the 14 shutdown sites, information provided by managers and staff at the shutdown sites, and Google Earth imagery. Extensive photographs taken during the shutdown site visits have proven to be particularly useful in documenting the current conditions at and near the shutdown sites. Tribal and state representatives, State and Regional Group representatives, and Federal Railroad Administration representatives have participated in 11 of the shutdown site visits. In addition to visiting the shutdown site, site visits often include activities such as meeting with local railroads to discuss the near-site railroad infrastructure and meeting with community engagement panels. Oyster Creek permanently ceased power operations on September 17, 2018 and fuel was removed from the reactor vessel on September 25, 2018. Planning for the Oyster Creek site visit has begun and is conducted in three stages. In the first stage, data and documents that are applicable to Oyster Creek are collected. In the second stage, questions are developed based on the data and documents collected during the first stage. These questions are submitted to the Oyster Creek site approximately one month before the site visit. The third stage involves establishing specific schedules and participants. Participants will likely include tribal and state representatives, the Council of State Governments - Eastern Regional Conference, and the Federal Railroad Administration. State participation will likely include a representative of the State Rail Safety Participation Program, the New Jersey Department of Transportation, and the New Jersey Bureau of Nuclear Engineering. The site visit is tentatively expected to occur in April or May of 2019. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Preliminary Evaluation of Removing Used Nuclear Fuel from Shutdown Sites

A preliminary evaluation of removing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from 13 shutdown nuclear power plant sites was performed. At these shutdown sites the nuclear power reactors have been permanently shut down and the sites have been decommissioned or are undergoing decommissioning. The shutdown sites were Maine Yankee, Yankee Rowe, Connecticut Yankee, Humboldt Bay, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Trojan, La Crosse, Zion, Crystal River, Kewaunee, San Onofre, and Vermont Yankee. The evaluation was divided into four components: Characterization of the SNF and greater-than-Class C low-level radioactive waste (GTCC waste) inventory A description of the on-site infrastructure at the shutdown sites An evaluation of the near-site transportation infrastructure and transportation experience at the shutdown sites An evaluation of the actions necessary to prepare for and remove SNF and GTCC waste. The primary sources for the inventory of SNF and GTCC waste were the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) spent nuclear fuel inventory database, industry publications such as StoreFUEL, and government sources such as the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The primary sources for information on the conditions of on-site infrastructure and near-site transportation infrastructure and experience included information collected during site visits, information provided by managers at the shutdown sites, Facility Interface Data Sheets compiled for DOE in 2005, Services Planning Documents prepared for DOE in 1993 and 1994, industry publications such as Radwaste Solutions, and Google Earth. State staff, State Regional Group representatives, a Tribal representative, and a Federal Railroad Administration representative have participated in nine of the shutdown site visits. Every shutdown site was found to have at least one off-site transportation mode option for removing its SNF and GTCC waste; some have multiple options. Experience removing large components during reactor decommissioning provided an important source of information used to identify the transportation mode options for the sites. Especially important in conducting the evaluation were site visits, through which information was obtained that would not have been available otherwise. Extensive photographs taken during the site visits proved to be particularly useful in documenting the current conditions at or near the sites. Additional conclusions from this evaluation include: The 13 shutdown sites use designs from 4 different suppliers involving 11 different (horizontal and vertical) dry storage systems that would require the use of 9 different transportation cask designs to remove the SNF and GTCC waste from the shutdown sites. Although some changes to transportation certificates of compliance will be required, the SNF at the initial 9 shutdown sites (Maine Yankee, Yankee Rowe, Connecticut Yankee, Humboldt Bay, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Trojan, La Crosse, and Zion) is in dual purpose dry storage canisters that can be transported, including a small amount of high-burnup fuel. Most sites indicated that 2-3 years of advance time would be required for its preparations before shipments could begin. Some sites could be ready in less time. As additional sites such as Fort Calhoun, Clinton, Quad Cities, Pilgrim, Oyster Creek, and Diablo Canyon shut down, these sites will be included in updates to the evaluation.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗