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At least 37 records · Page 2

Role-based access control permissions

Devices, systems, and methods for role-based access control permissions are disclosed. One method includes a policy decision point that receives up-to-date security context information from one or more outside sources to determine whether to grant access for a data client to a portion of the system and creates an access vector including the determination; receiving, via a policy agent, a request by the data client for access to the portion of the computing system by the data client, wherein the policy agent checks to ensure there is a session established with communications and user/application enforcement points; receiving, via communications policy enforcement point, the request from the policy agent, wherein the communications policy enforcement point determines whether the data client is an authorized node, based upon the access vector received from the policy decision point; and receiving, via the user/application policy enforcement point, the request from the communications policy enforcement point.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Role-Based Access Control for Distributed Energy Resources v.1.0

The Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) for Distributed Energy Resources (DER) software is an automated and transparent stack for RBAC administrators to interact with RBAC policy. The package includes demonstrations of centralized and decentralized RBAC implementation. Both include simulated DER entities that are stored automatically in a centralized Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) server. It also includes a REST-API to serve the HTTP requests of the RBAC administrators. A complete front-end is included to serve the users' needs. This software may be used by industry (DER vendors/utilities) as well as the research community to determine if a centralized or decentralized solution fits better the needs of an RBAC model in a DER environment. Additionally, parts of this software may be useful for developing implementations for specific needs. Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525. SAND2021-8292 O

Johnson, Jay↗

Common Badging and Access Control System (CBACS)

The goals of the project are: Achieve high business value through a common badging and access control system that integrates with smart cards. Provide physical (versus logical) deployment of smart cards initially. Provides a common consistent and reliable environment into which to release the smart card. Gives opportunity to develop agency-wide consistent processes, practices and policies. Enables enterprise data capture and management. Promotes data validation prior to SC issuance.

Baldridge, Tim↗

AOI-2, A Novel Access Control Blockchain Paradigm for Cybersecure Sensor Infrastructure in Fossil Power Generation Systems

Fossil power generation systems are increasingly vulnerable to attack from both cybercriminals as well as internal threats. These vulnerabilities demand that emerging technologies such as blockchains be utilized to secure the data involved in the information flows within the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems of the fossil power generation plants. The publicly accessible blockchain protocols, although secure, are visible to everyone. Even private blockchains currently are unable to support different levels of access to different participants, which is a critical requirement for the existing SCADA systems running the power plants. In light of the above, novel blockchain protocols that are specifically adapted to fossil power generation environments need to be developed in order to achieve the goal of cybersecure sensor networks. In this work, we address this question by creating a novel blockchain technology, namely smart private ledger, for cybersecure communication within the fossil power generation systems. A lab-scale sensor network consisting of strain and temperature sensors is constructed to develop the ledger. The technology has hierarchical access control which is compatible with the existing SCADA systems in fossil power plants. The sensor data is used with cryptographic digital signatures and secret sharing protocols within the nodes of the blockchain technology. The research results will lead to cybersecurity for machine-to-machine interactions, infrastructure for secure data logging for sensors, decentralized data storage, and second-layer technologies for high volume machine-to-machine interactions in the power plants. The work aims to largely address the concerns for the security of distributed sensor networks in such systems that can be compromised by insider threats and by cybercriminals. The research has led to the training of the next generation of engineers and scientists in the important areas of sensor engineering and blockchain technology.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗

Guaranteeing synchronous message deadlines with the timed token medium access control protocol

We study the problem of guaranteeing synchronous message deadlines in token ring networks where the timed token medium access control protocol is employed. Synchronous capacity, defined as the maximum time for which a node can transmit its synchronous messages every time it receives the token, is a key parameter in the control of synchronous message transmission. To ensure the transmission of synchronous messages before their deadlines, synchronous capacities must be properly allocated to individual nodes. We address the issue of appropriate allocation of the synchronous capacities. Several synchronous capacity allocation schemes are analyzed in terms of their ability to satisfy deadline constraints of synchronous messages. We show that an inappropriate allocation of the synchronous capacities could cause message deadlines to be missed even if the synchronous traffic is extremely low. We propose a scheme called the normalized proportional allocation scheme which can guarantee the synchronous message deadlines for synchronous traffic of up to 33 percent of available utilization. To date, no other synchronous capacity allocation scheme has been reported to achieve such substantial performance. Another major contribution of this paper is an extension to the previous work on the bounded token rotation time. We prove that the time elapsed between any consecutive visits to a particular node is bounded by upsilon TTRT, where TTRT is the target token rotation time set up at system initialization time. The previous result by Johnson and Sevcik is a special case where upsilon = 2. We use this result in the analysis of various synchronous allocation schemes. It can also be applied in other similar studies.

Agrawal, Gopal↗

RCT Module 2.10 Access Control and Work Area Setup [Slides]

Terminal Objective: Given the need to perform duties as an RCT, recognize the requirements for access controls and work setup in radiological areas in accordance with RP-PROG-TP-200, Radiation Protection Manual and P-121, Radiation Protection .

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

RCT: Module 2.10, Access Control and Work Area Setup, Course 8776

This course presents information on radiological work permits (RWPs), various types of postings used in radiological areas, radiological area setups, access controls, and releases of material from radiological areas. All of these are fundamental duties of RCTs. This course will prepare the student with the skills necessary for radiological control technician (RCT) qualification by passing quizzes, tests, and the RCT Comprehensive Phase 1, Unit 2 Examination (TEST 27566) and providing in-thefield skills.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Cardea: Dynamic Access Control in Distributed Systems

Modern authorization systems span domains of administration, rely on many different authentication sources, and manage complex attributes as part of the authorization process. This . paper presents Cardea, a distributed system that facilitates dynamic access control, as a valuable piece of an inter-operable authorization framework. First, the authorization model employed in Cardea and its functionality goals are examined. Next, critical features of the system architecture and its handling of the authorization process are then examined. Then the S A M L and XACML standards, as incorporated into the system, are analyzed. Finally, the future directions of this project are outlined and connection points with general components of an authorization system are highlighted.

Lepro, Rebekah↗

First Experiences Using XACML for Access Control in Distributed Systems

Authorization systems today are increasingly complex. They span domains of administration, rely on many different authentication sources, and manage permissions that can be as complex as the system itself. Worse still, while there are many standards that define authentication mechanisms, the standards that address authorization are less well defined and tend to work only within homogeneous systems. This paper presents XACML, a standard access control language, as one component of a distributed and inter-operable authorization framework. Several emerging systems which incorporate XACML are discussed. These discussions illustrate how authorization can be deployed in distributed, decentralized systems. Finally, some new and future topics are presented to show where this work is heading and how it will help connect the general components of an authorization system.

Lorch, Marcus↗

Autonomous Information Unit for Fine-Grain Data Access Control and Information Protection in a Net-Centric System

As communication and networking technologies advance, networks will become highly complex and heterogeneous, interconnecting different network domains. There is a need to provide user authentication and data protection in order to further facilitate critical mission operations, especially in the tactical and mission-critical net-centric networking environment. The Autonomous Information Unit (AIU) technology was designed to provide the fine-grain data access and user control in a net-centric system-testing environment to meet these objectives. The AIU is a fundamental capability designed to enable fine-grain data access and user control in the cross-domain networking environments, where an AIU is composed of the mission data, metadata, and policy. An AIU provides a mechanism to establish trust among deployed AIUs based on recombining shared secrets, authentication and verify users with a username, X.509 certificate, enclave information, and classification level. AIU achieves data protection through (1) splitting data into multiple information pieces using the Shamir's secret sharing algorithm, (2) encrypting each individual information piece using military-grade AES-256 encryption, and (3) randomizing the position of the encrypted data based on the unbiased and memory efficient in-place Fisher-Yates shuffle method. Therefore, it becomes virtually impossible for attackers to compromise data since attackers need to obtain all distributed information as well as the encryption key and the random seeds to properly arrange the data. In addition, since policy can be associated with data in the AIU, different user access and data control strategies can be included. The AIU technology can greatly enhance information assurance and security management in the bandwidth-limited and ad hoc net-centric environments. In addition, AIU technology can be applicable to general complex network domains and applications where distributed user authentication and data protection are necessary. AIU achieves fine-grain data access and user control, reducing the security risk significantly, simplifying the complexity of various security operations, and providing the high information assurance across different network domains.

Chow, Edward T.↗

Controlling accesses to a branch prediction unit for sequences of fetch groups

An electronic device is described that handles control transfer instructions (CTIs) when executing instructions in program code. The electronic device has a processor that includes a branch prediction functional block and a sequential fetch logic functional block. The sequential fetch logic functional block determines, based on a record associated with a CTI, that a specified number of fetch groups of instructions that were previously determined to include no CTIs are to be fetched for execution in sequence following the CTI. When each of the specified number of fetch groups is fetched and prepared for execution, the sequential fetch logic prevents corresponding accesses of the branch prediction functional block for acquiring branch prediction information for instructions in that fetch group.

Yalavarti, Adithya↗

High-Level Considerations for Access and Access Controls by Design

Nuclear power plants must be, by design and construction, robust structures and difficult to penetrate. Limiting access with difficult-to-penetrate physical barriers is going to be key for staffing reduction. Ideally, for security, the reactors would be sited underground, beneath a massive solid block, too thick to be penetrated by tools or explosives with all communications and power transfer lines also underground and fortified. Having the minimal possible number of access points and methods to completely block access from these points if a threat is detected will greatly help us justify staffing reduction.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Controlling accesses to a branch prediction unit for sequences of fetch groups

An electronic device handles accesses of a branch prediction functional block when executing instructions in program code. The electronic device includes a processor having the branch prediction functional block that provides branch prediction information for control transfer instructions (CTIs) in the program code and a minimum predictor use (MPU) functional block. The MPU functional block determines, based on a record associated with a given fetch group of instructions, that a specified number of subsequent fetch groups of instructions that were previously determined to include no CTIs or conditional CTIs that were not taken are to be fetched for execution in sequence following the given fetch group. The MPU functional block then, when each of the specified number of the subsequent fetch groups is fetched and prepared for execution, prevents corresponding accesses of the branch prediction functional block for acquiring branch prediction information for instructions in that subsequent fetch group.

Agrawal, Varun↗

Advance Reservation Access Control Using Software-Defined Networking and Tokens

Advance reservation systems allow users to reserve dedicated bandwidth connection resources from an advanced high-speed network. A common use case for such systems is data transfers in distributed science environments in which a user wants exclusive access to the reservation. However, current advance network reservation methods cannot ensure exclusive access of a network reservation to the specific flow for which the user made the reservation. We present here a novel network architecture that addresses this limitation and ensures that a reservation is used only by the intended flow. We achieve this by leveraging software-defined networking (SDN) and token-based authorization. We use SDN to orchestrate and automate the reservation of networking resources, end-to-end and across multiple administrativedomains, and tokens to create a strong binding between the user or application that requested the reservation and the flows provisioned by SDN.

Kettimuthu, R.↗

High-Level Considerations for Access and Access Controls by Design

Nuclear power plants must be, by design and construction, robust structures and difficult to penetrate. Ideally, for security, the reactors would be sited underground, beneath a massive solid block, too thick to be penetrated by tools or explosives with all communications and power transfer lines also underground and fortified. Limiting access with difficult-to-penetrate physical barriers is going to be key for determining response and staffing requirements.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

High-Level Considerations for Access and Access Controls by Design

The design and construction of a nuclear power plant must include robust structures and a security boundary that is difficult to penetrate. For security considerations, the reactors would ideally be sited underground, beneath a massive solid block, which would be too thick to be penetrated by tools or explosives. Additionally, all communications and power transfer lines would also be located underground and would be fortified against any possible design basis threats. Limiting access with difficult-to-penetrate physical barriers is a key aspect for determining response and staffing requirements. Considerations considered in a graded approach to physical protection are described.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗