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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2012

Achievable Performance and Effective Interrogator Design for SAW RFID Sensor Tags

For many NASA missions, remote sensing is a critical application that supports activities such as environmental monitoring, planetary science, structural shape and health monitoring, non-destructive evaluation, etc. The utility of the remote sensing devices themselves is greatly increased if they are passive V that is, they do not require any on-board power supply such as batteries V and if they can be identified uniquely during the sensor interrogation process. Additional passive sensor characteristics that enable greater utilization in space applications are small size and weight, long read ranges with low interrogator power, ruggedness, and operability in extreme environments (vacuum, extreme high/low temperature, high radiation, etc.) In this paper, we consider one very promising passive sensor technology, called surface acoustic wave (SAW) radio-frequency identification (RFID), that satisfies all of these criteria. In general, RFID is a method of identifying items using radio waves to interrogate tags encoded with a unique identifier that are affixed to the items of interest. In the case of passive tags, only the interrogator, which transmits power to the tags in the form of radio-frequency electromagnetic radiation, requires access to a power supply. Passive RFID technologies are used today in many applications, including asset tracking and management, security and access control, and remote sensing. To date, most of the development and application in RFID technology has focused on either asset/inventory tracking and control or security and access control because these are the largest commercial application areas. Recently however, there has been growing interest in using passive RFID technology for remote sensing applications, and SAW devices are at the forefront of RFID sensing technology development. Although SAW RFID tags have great potential for use in numerous space-based remote sensing applications, the limited collision resolution capability of current generation tags limits the performance in a cluttered sensing environment. That is, as more SAW-based sensors are added to the environment, numerous tag responses are superimposed at the receiver and decoding all or even a subset of the telemetry becomes increasingly difficult. Background clutter generated by reflectors other than the sensors themselves is also a problem, as is multipath interference and signal distortion, but the limiting factor in many remote sensing applications can be expected to be tag mutual interference. This problem may be greatly mitigated by proper design of the SAW tag waveform, but that remains an open research problem, and in the meantime, several other related questions remain to be answered including: (1) What are the fundamental relationships between tag parameters such as bit-rate, time-bandwidth-product, SNR, and achievable collision resolution? (2) What are the differences in optimal or near-optimal interrogator designs between noise-limited environments and interference-limited environments? (3) What are the performance characteristics of different interrogator designs in term of parameters such as transmitter power level, range, and number of interfering tags? In this paper, we will present the results of a research effort aimed at providing at least partial answers to all of these questions.

Barton Richard J.↗
NASA NTRS2007

Digital Multicasting of Multiple Audio Streams

The Mission Control Center Voice Over Internet Protocol (MCC VOIP) system (see figure) comprises hardware and software that effect simultaneous, nearly real-time transmission of as many as 14 different audio streams to authorized listeners via the MCC intranet and/or the Internet. The original version of the MCC VOIP system was conceived to enable flight-support personnel located in offices outside a spacecraft mission control center to monitor audio loops within the mission control center. Different versions of the MCC VOIP system could be used for a variety of public and commercial purposes - for example, to enable members of the general public to monitor one or more NASA audio streams through their home computers, to enable air-traffic supervisors to monitor communication between airline pilots and air-traffic controllers in training, and to monitor conferences among brokers in a stock exchange. At the transmitting end, the audio-distribution process begins with feeding the audio signals to analog-to-digital converters. The resulting digital streams are sent through the MCC intranet, using a user datagram protocol (UDP), to a server that converts them to encrypted data packets. The encrypted data packets are then routed to the personal computers of authorized users by use of multicasting techniques. The total data-processing load on the portion of the system upstream of and including the encryption server is the total load imposed by all of the audio streams being encoded, regardless of the number of the listeners or the number of streams being monitored concurrently by the listeners. The personal computer of a user authorized to listen is equipped with special- purpose MCC audio-player software. When the user launches the program, the user is prompted to provide identification and a password. In one of two access- control provisions, the program is hard-coded to validate the user s identity and password against a list maintained on a domain-controller computer at the MCC. In the other access-control provision, the program verifies that the user is authorized to have access to the audio streams. Once both access-control checks are completed, the audio software presents a graphical display that includes audiostream-selection buttons and volume-control sliders. The user can select all or any subset of the available audio streams and can adjust the volume of each stream independently of that of the other streams. The audio-player program spawns a "read" process for the selected stream(s). The spawned process sends, to the router(s), a "multicast-join" request for the selected streams. The router(s) responds to the request by sending the encrypted multicast packets to the spawned process. The spawned process receives the encrypted multicast packets and sends a decryption packet to audio-driver software. As the volume or muting features are changed by the user, interrupts are sent to the spawned process to change the corresponding attributes sent to the audio-driver software. The total latency of this system - that is, the total time from the origination of the audio signals to generation of sound at a listener s computer - lies between four and six seconds.

Macha, Mitchell↗
DOE OSTI2024

The Design and Evaluation of Zero Trust Architecture for Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure: EVs @ Scale Series on EV Charging Station Cybersecurity

Implementing a zero trust architecture can significantly bolster the security of electric vehicle (EV) charging infrastructure. EV charging infrastructure includes numerous networked interfaces, each of which can present potential vulnerabilities. When these vulnerabilities are exploited, they can compromise the entire system, leading to severe operational and security risks. Zero trust is a security model that operates on the principle of "never trust, always verify," which helps manage the attack surface and limit the scope of any potential compromises. Fundamentally, this model ensures that no entity, whether inside or outside the network, is trusted by default. The design principles of zero trust include continuous verification, strict deny-by-default access controls, and micro-segmentation. Continuous verification ensures that every request is thoroughly checked, regardless of its origin. Strict access controls enforce the principle of least privilege, allowing users and devices only the minimum necessary access to perform their functions. Micro-segmentation involves dividing the network into smaller, isolated segments to prevent lateral movement in case of a breach. In the context of EV charging infrastructure, zero trust can be implemented through various strategies. For example, multi-factor authentication (MFA) can be required for engineers to access the management interfaces and control systems of charging stations. Real-time monitoring and analysis of network traffic can help detect and respond to anomalies. Systems that do not need to communicate with each other can be micro-segmented to enhance security. All communications should adhere to predefined policies to be permitted. Additionally, encrypting communications can protect sensitive information exchanged between chargers and management systems. This paper presents a zero trust architecture specifically designed for EV charging infrastructure. Implementing zero trust not only mitigates risks but also builds a resilient infrastructure capable of withstanding and quickly recovering from cyber threats. The architecture addresses six defined security objectives. A comprehensive test plan is developed to assess the architecture against these objectives, and the results of the evaluation are reported. This approach is essential for maintaining the reliability and integrity of EV charging services in an increasingly interconnected and vulnerable digital landscape. This is the first in a planned series of papers exploring the implementation of zero trust in EV charging infrastructure. Each paper will delve into different aspects and applications of zero trust, highlighting how various work processes and requirements can lead to distinct architectural designs. These architectures will be tailored to address specific security challenges and operational needs within the EV charging ecosystem, ensuring a robust and adaptable security framework.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗
NASA NTRS1989

UNIX security in a supercomputing environment

The author critiques some security mechanisms in most versions of the Unix operating system and suggests more effective tools that either have working prototypes or have been implemented, for example in secure Unix systems. Although no computer (not even a secure one) is impenetrable, breaking into systems with these alternate mechanisms will cost more, require more skill, and be more easily detected than penetrations of systems without these mechanisms. The mechanisms described fall into four classes (with considerable overlap). User authentication at the local host affirms the identity of the person using the computer. The principle of least privilege dictates that properly authenticated users should have rights precisely sufficient to perform their tasks, and system administration functions should be compartmentalized; to this end, access control lists or capabilities should either replace or augment the default Unix protection system, and mandatory access controls implementing multilevel security models and integrity mechanisms should be available. Since most users access supercomputing environments using networks, the third class of mechanisms augments authentication (where feasible). As no security is perfect, the fourth class of mechanism logs events that may indicate possible security violations; this will allow the reconstruction of a successful penetration (if discovered), or possibly the detection of an attempted penetration.

Bishop, Matt↗
NASA NTRS1975

Facility and test support equipment for the manned thermal vacuum tests of the Apollo Soyuz docking module

In order to accommodate manned thermal-vacuum testing of the Apollo-Soyuz docking module (ASDM), modifications to the facility, cleanliness and access control, and special test equipment were required. Facility modifications discussed briefly include: the addition of an oxygen supply system; the modification of manlock (ML) piping for cleaning and access controls; the addition of a nitrogen diluent system; the removal of manlock internal lights and the addition of external lights as well as fusing all power circuits over 10 watts; the removal/containment of flammable materials; the upgrading of a ML fire suppression system; and the addition of a garment donning station for cleanliness control. Special test equipment discussed include: an access tunnel for crew ingress/egress; a support device for the docking module (DM) and simulators; a command module thermal simulator; a DM infrared (IR) simulator; a docking system IR simulator; a metabolic heat load simulator; and a television camera simulator.

Pearson, O. L.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Router Agent Technology for Policy-Based Network Management

This innovation can be run as a standalone network application on any computer in a networked environment. This design can be configured to control one or more routers (one instance per router), and can also be configured to listen to a policy server over the network to receive new policies based on the policy- based network management technology. The Router Agent Technology transforms the received policies into suitable Access Control List syntax for the routers it is configured to control. It commits the newly generated access control lists to the routers and provides feedback regarding any errors that were faced. The innovation also automatically generates a time-stamped log file regarding all updates to the router it is configured to control. This technology, once installed on a local network computer and started, is autonomous because it has the capability to keep listening to new policies from the policy server, transforming those policies to router-compliant access lists, and committing those access lists to a specified interface on the specified router on the network with any error feedback regarding commitment process. The stand-alone application is named RouterAgent and is currently realized as a fully functional (version 1) implementation for the Windows operating system and for CISCO routers.

Chow, Edward T.↗
NASA NTRS2001

The Paperless Solution

REI Systems, Inc. developed a software solution that uses the Internet to eliminate the paperwork typically required to document and manage complex business processes. The data management solution, called Electronic Handbooks (EHBs), is presently used for the entire SBIR program processes at NASA. The EHB-based system is ideal for programs and projects whose users are geographically distributed and are involved in complex management processes and procedures. EHBs provide flexible access control and increased communications while maintaining security for systems of all sizes. Through Internet Protocol- based access, user authentication and user-based access restrictions, role-based access control, and encryption/decryption, EHBs provide the level of security required for confidential data transfer. EHBs contain electronic forms and menus, which can be used in real time to execute the described processes. EHBs use standard word processors that generate ASCII HTML code to set up electronic forms that are viewed within a web browser. EHBs require no end-user software distribution, significantly reducing operating costs. Each interactive handbook simulates a hard-copy version containing chapters with descriptions of participants' roles in the online process.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1987

Security for safety critical space borne systems

The Space Station contains safety critical computer software components in systems that can affect life and vital property. These components require a multilevel secure system that provides dynamic access control of the data and processes involved. A study is under way to define requirements for a security model providing access control through level B3 of the Orange Book. The model will be prototyped at NASA-Johnson Space Center.

Legrand, Sue↗
NASA NTRS2006

TRMM On-Orbit Performance Re-Accessed After Control Change

The Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission (TRMM) spacecraft, a joint mission between the U.S. and Japan, launched onboard an HI1 rocket on November 27,1997 and transitioned in August, 2001 from an average operating altitude of 350 kilometers to 402.5 kilometers. Due to problems using the Earth Sensor Assembly (ESA) at the higher altitude, TRMM switched to a backup attitude control mode. Prior to the orbit boost TRMM controlled pitch and roll to the local vertical using ESA measurements while using gyro data to propagate yaw attitude between yaw updates from the Sun sensors. After the orbit boost, a Kalman filter used 3-axis gyro data with Sun sensor and magnetometers to estimate onboard attitude. While originally intended to meet a degraded attitude accuracy of 0.7 degrees, the new control mode met the original 0.2 degree attitude accuracy requirement after improving onboard ephemeris prediction and adjusting the magnetometer calibration onboard. Independent roll attitude checks using a science instrument, the Precipitation Radar (PR) which was built in Japan, provided a novel insight into the pointing performance. The PR data helped identify the pointing errors after the orbit boost, track the performance improvements, and show subtle effects from ephemeris errors and gyro bias errors. It also helped identify average bias trends throughout the mission. Roll errors tracked by the PR from sample orbits pre-boost and post-boost are shown in Figure 1. Prior to the orbit boost the largest attitude errors were due to occasional interference in the ESA. These errors were sometime larger than 0.2 degrees in pitch and roll, but usually less, as estimated from a comprehensive review of the attitude excursions using gyro data. Sudden jumps in the onboard roll show up as spikes in the reported attitude since the control responds within tens of seconds to null the pointing error. The PR estimated roll tracks well with an estimate of the roll history propagated using gyro data. After the orbit boost, the attitude errors shown by the PR roll have a smooth sine-wave type signal because of the way that attitude errors propagate with the use of gyro data. Yaw errors couple at orbit period to roll with '/4 orbit lag. By tracking the amplitude, phase, and bias of the sinusoidal PR roll error signal, it was shown that the average pitch rotation axis tends to be offset from orbit normal in a direction perpendicular to the Sun direction, as shown in Figure 2 for a 200 day period following the orbit boost. This is a result of the higher accuracy and stability of the Sun sensor measurements relative to the magnetometer measurements used in the Kalman filter. In November, 2001 a magnetometer calibration adjustment was uploaded which improved the pointing performance, keeping the roll and yaw amplitudes within about 0.1 degrees. After the boost, onboard ephemeris errors had a direct effect on the pitch pointing, being used to compute the Earth pointing reference frame. Improvements after the orbit boost have kept the the onboard ephemeris errors generally below 20 kilometers. Ephemeris errors have secondary effects on roll and yaw, especially during high beta angle when pitch effects can couple into roll and yaw. This is illustrated in figure 3. The onboard roll bias trends as measured by PR data show correlations with the Kalman filter's gyro bias error. This particularly shows up after yaw turns (every 2 to 4 weeks) as shown in Figure 3, when a slight roll bias is observed while the onboard computed gyro biases settle to new values. As for longer term trends, the PR data shows that the roll bias was influenced by Earth horizon radiance effects prior to the boost, changing values at yaw turns, and indicated a long term drift as shown in Figure 4. After the boost, the bias variations were smaller and showed some possible correlation with solar beta angle, probably due to sun sensor misalignment effects.

Bilanow, Steve↗
NASA NTRS2003

Increasing software testability with standard access and control interfaces

Testing is the most common method of determining whether a software system satisfies its requirements. Traditionally, testing starts with the detailed examination of individual functions or methods, progresses through the integration of functions or methods into subsystems, and ends with testing the functionality and behavior of the completely integrated system. At each stage of testing, the amount of functionality and behavior of the artifact being tested is increasingly limited. One reason for this is that it becomes impossible to test all paths through the system within a reasonable amount of time. However, another reason for this progressive decrease of test coverage has to do with increasingly limited control of and visibility into the state of the artifact being tested. During unit test, it is rather simple to control the inputs of individual functions or methods or view their internal state - modem development environments provide adequate facilities for doing so. However, these facilities do not scale up to the testing of partially or completely integrated systems. Control of and visibility into the system's state is then limited to the input and output facilities provided by the software itself as well as the hardware on which the software is hosted during the test. These facilities are usually insufficient to precisely control the state of individual components or sets of components of the system; they are also inadequate to the task of displaying on demand the state of specific components. We describe an approach to improving the testability of complex software systems with software constructs modeled after the hardware JTAG bus, used to provide visibility and controllability in testing digital circuits.

Tamir, Yuval↗
NASA NTRS1990

Computer access security code system

A security code system for controlling access to computer and computer-controlled entry situations comprises a plurality of subsets of alpha-numeric characters disposed in random order in matrices of at least two dimensions forming theoretical rectangles, cubes, etc., such that when access is desired, at least one pair of previously unused character subsets not found in the same row or column of the matrix is chosen at random and transmitted by the computer. The proper response to gain access is transmittal of subsets which complete the rectangle, and/or a parallelepiped whose opposite corners were defined by first groups of code. Once used, subsets are not used again to absolutely defeat unauthorized access by eavesdropping, and the like.

Collins, Earl R., Jr.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Autonomous Information Unit: Why Making Data Smart Can also Make Data Secured?

In this paper, we introduce a new fine-grain distributed information protection mechanism which can self-protect, self-discover, self-organize, and self-manage. In our approach, we decompose data into smaller pieces and provide individualized protection. We also provide a policy control mechanism to allow 'smart' access control and context based re-assembly of the decomposed data. By combining smart policy with individually protected data, we are able to provide better protection of sensitive information and achieve more flexible access during emergency conditions. As a result, this new fine-grain protection mechanism can enable us to achieve better solutions for problems such as distributed information protection and identity theft.

data security↗
NASA NTRS2014

Securing Ground Data System Applications for Space Operations

The increasing prevalence and sophistication of cyber attacks has prompted the Multimission Ground Systems and Services (MGSS) Program Office at Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) to initiate the Common Access Manager (CAM) effort to protect software applications used in Ground Data Systems (GDSs) at JPL and other NASA Centers. The CAM software provides centralized services and software components used by GDS subsystems to meet access control requirements and ensure data integrity, confidentiality, and availability. In this paper we describe the CAM software; examples of its integration with spacecraft commanding software applications and an information management service; and measurements of its performance and reliability.

Security↗
NASA NTRS1990

Computer-Access-Code Matrices

Authorized users respond to changing challenges with changing passwords. Scheme for controlling access to computers defeats eavesdroppers and "hackers". Based on password system of challenge and password or sign, challenge, and countersign correlated with random alphanumeric codes in matrices of two or more dimensions. Codes stored on floppy disk or plug-in card and changed frequently. For even higher security, matrices of four or more dimensions used, just as cubes compounded into hypercubes in concurrent processing.

Collins, Earl R., Jr.↗
NASA NTRS2014

Virtualization - A Key Cost Saver in NASA Multi-Mission Ground System Architecture

With science team budgets being slashed, and a lack of adequate facilities for science payload teams to operate their instruments, there is a strong need for innovative new ground systems that are able to provide necessary levels of capability processing power, system availability and redundancy while maintaining a small footprint in terms of physical space, power utilization and cooling.The ground system architecture being presented is based off of heritage from several other projects currently in development or operations at Goddard, but was designed and built specifically to meet the needs of the Science and Planetary Operations Control Center (SPOCC) as a low-cost payload command, control, planning and analysis operations center. However, this SPOCC architecture was designed to be generic enough to be re-used partially or in whole by other labs and missions (since its inception that has already happened in several cases!)The SPOCC architecture leverages a highly available VMware-based virtualization cluster with shared SAS Direct-Attached Storage (DAS) to provide an extremely high-performing, low-power-utilization and small-footprint compute environment that provides Virtual Machine resources shared among the various tenant missions in the SPOCC. The storage is also expandable, allowing future missions to chain up to 7 additional 2U chassis of storage at an extremely competitive cost if they require additional archive or virtual machine storage space.The software architecture provides a fully-redundant GMSEC-based message bus architecture based on the ActiveMQ middleware to track all health and safety status within the SPOCC ground system. All virtual machines utilize the GMSEC system agents to report system host health over the GMSEC bus, and spacecraft payload health is monitored using the Hammers Integrated Test and Operations System (ITOS) Galaxy Telemetry and Command (TC) system, which performs near-real-time limit checking and data processing on the downlinked data stream and injects messages into the GMSEC bus that are monitored to automatically page the on-call operator or Systems Administrator (SA) when an off-nominal condition is detected. This architecture, like the LTSP thin clients, are shared across all tenant missions.Other required IT security controls are implemented at the ground system level, including physical access controls, logical system-level authentication authorization management, auditing and reporting, network management and a NIST 800-53 FISMA-Moderate IT Security plan Risk Assessment Contingency Plan, helping multiple missions share the cost of compliance with agency-mandated directives.The SPOCC architecture provides science payload control centers and backup mission operations centers with a cost-effective, standardized approach to virtualizing and monitoring resources that were traditionally multiple racks full of physical machines. The increased agility in deploying new virtual systems and thin client workstations can provide significant savings in personnel costs for maintaining the ground system. The cost savings in procurement, power, rack footprint and cooling as well as the shared multi-mission design greatly reduces upfront cost for missions moving into the facility. Overall, the authors hope that this architecture will become a model for how future NASA operations centers are constructed!

Ground System Architecture↗
NASA NTRS2008

Problem Reporting System

The Problem Reporting System (PRS) is a Web application, running on two Web servers (load-balanced) and two database servers (RAID-5), which establishes a system for submission, editing, and sharing of reports to manage risk assessment of anomalies identified in NASA's flight projects. PRS consolidates diverse anomaly-reporting systems, maintains a rich database set, and incorporates a robust engine, which allows tracking of any hardware, software, or paper process by configuring an appropriate life cycle. Global and specific project administration and setup tools allow lifecycle tailoring, along with customizable controls for user, e-mail, notifications, and more. PRS is accessible via the World Wide Web for authorized user at most any location. Upon successful log-in, the user receives a customizable window, which displays time-critical 'To Do' items (anomalies requiring the user s input before the system moves the anomaly to the next phase of the lifecycle), anomalies originated by the user, anomalies the user has addressed, and custom queries that can be saved for future use. Access controls exist depending on a user's role as system administrator, project administrator, user, or developer, and then, further by association with user, project, subsystem, company, or item with provisions for business-to-business exclusions, limitations on access according to the covert or overt nature of a given project, all with multiple layers of filtration, as needed. Reporting of metrics is built in. There is a provision for proxy access (in which the user may choose to grant one or more other users to view screens and perform actions as though they were the user, during any part of a tracking life cycle - especially useful during tight build schedules and vacations to keep things moving). The system also provides users the ability to have an anomaly link to or notify other systems, including QA Inspection Reports, Safety, GIDEP (Government-Industry Data Exchange Program) Alert, Corrective Actions, and Lessons Learned. The PRS tracking engine was designed as a very extensible and scalable system, able to support additional applications, with future development possibilities already discussed, including Incident Surprise Anomalies (for anomalies occurring during Operations phases of NASA Flight projects), GIDEP and NASA Alerts, and others.

Potter, Don↗
NASA NTRS2015

Scalable Lunar Surface Networks and Adaptive Orbit Access

Teranovi Technologies, Inc., has developed innovative network architecture, protocols, and algorithms for both lunar surface and orbit access networks. A key component of the overall architecture is a medium access control (MAC) protocol that includes a novel mechanism of overlaying time division multiple access (TDMA) and carrier sense multiple access with collision avoidance (CSMA/CA), ensuring scalable throughput and quality of service. The new MAC protocol is compatible with legacy Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.11 networks. Advanced features include efficiency power management, adaptive channel width adjustment, and error control capability. A hybrid routing protocol combines the advantages of ad hoc on-demand distance vector (AODV) routing and disruption/delay-tolerant network (DTN) routing. Performance is significantly better than AODV or DTN and will be particularly effective for wireless networks with intermittent links, such as lunar and planetary surface networks and orbit access networks.

Wang, Xudong↗