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DOE OSTI2015

Dosimetric characterization and organ dose assessment in digital breast tomosynthesis: Measurements and Monte Carlo simulations using voxel phantoms

Purpose: Due to its capability to more accurately detect deep lesions inside the breast by removing the effect of overlying anatomy, digital breast tomosynthesis (DBT) has the potential to replace the standard mammography technique in clinical screening exams. However, the European Guidelines for DBT dosimetry are still a work in progress and there are little data available on organ doses other than to the breast. It is, therefore, of great importance to assess the dosimetric performance of DBT with respect to the one obtained with standard digital mammography (DM) systems. The aim of this work is twofold: (i) to study the dosimetric properties of a combined DBT/DM system (MAMMOMAT Inspiration Siemens{sup ®}) for a tungsten/rhodium (W/Rh) anode/filter combination and (ii) to evaluate organs doses during a DBT examination. Methods: For the first task, measurements were performed in manual and automatic exposure control (AEC) modes, using two homogeneous breast phantoms: a PMMA slab phantom and a 4 cm thick breast-shaped rigid phantom, with 50% of glandular tissue in its composition. Monte Carlo (MC) simulations were performed using Monte Carlo N-Particle eXtended v.2.7.0. A MC model was implemented to mimic DM and DBT acquisitions for a wide range of x-ray spectra (24 –34 kV). This was used to calculate mean glandular dose (MGD) and to compute series of backscatter factors (BSFs) that could be inserted into the DBT dosimetric formalism proposed by Dance et al. Regarding the second aim of the study, the implemented MC model of the clinical equipment, together with a female voxel phantom (“Laura”), was used to calculate organ doses considering a typical DBT acquisition. Results were compared with a standard two-view mammography craniocaudal (CC) acquisition. Results: Considering the AEC mode, the acquisition of a single CC view results in a MGD ranging from 0.53 ± 0.07 mGy to 2.41 ± 0.31 mGy in DM mode and from 0.77 ± 0.11 mGy to 2.28 ± 0.32 mGy in DBT mode. Regarding the BSF, the results achieved may lead to a MGD correction of about 6%, contributing to the improvement of the current guidelines used in these applications. Finally, considering the MC results obtained for the organ dose study, the radiation doses found for the tissues of the body other than the breast were in the range of tens of μSv, and are in part comparable to the ones obtained in standard DM. Nevertheless, in a single DBT examination, some organs (such as lung and thyroid) receive higher doses (of about 9% and 21%, respectively) with respect to the CC DM acquisition. Conclusions: Taking into account an average breast with a thickness of 4.5 cm, the MGDs for DM and DBT acquisitions were below the achievable value (2.0 mGy) defined by the European protocol. Additionally, in the case of a fusion imaging study (DM + DBT), the MGD for a 4.5 cm thick breast is of the order of 1.88 ± 0.36 mGy. Finally, organ dose evaluations underline the need to improve awareness concerning dose estimation of DBT exams for some organs, especially when radiation risk is assessed by using the effective dose.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2025

otsdaq

otsdaq is a Ready-to-Use data-acquisition (DAQ) solution aimed at scaling down to test-beam, detector development, and other rapid-deployment scenarios; and scaling up through the development cycle to fullscale production and operation. otsdaq uses the artdaq DAQ framework under-the-hood, providing flexibility and scalability to meet evolving DAQ needs. otsdaq provides a library of supported front-end boards and firmware modules which implement a custom UDP protocol. Additionally, an integrated Run Control GUI and readout software are provided, preconfigured to communicate with otsdaq firmware.

Rivera, Ryan [Fermi National Accelerator Laborator↗

DOE OSTI2012

Safeguards by Design (SBD): Safeguards Guidance for Research Reactors and Critical Assemblies

This document is part of a series of guidance documents developed by the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA’s) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative to assist facility designers and operators in implementing international safeguards by design (SBD). SBD has two main objectives: (1) avoid costly and time-consuming redesign work or retrofits of new nuclear fuel cycle facilities and (2) make the implementation of international safeguards more effective and efficient at such facilities. In the long term, the attainment of these goals would save both industry and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA, or the Agency) time, money, and resources—a mutually beneficial, win-win endeavor. The purpose of the IAEA safeguards system is to provide credible assurance to the international community that nuclear material and other specified items are not diverted from peaceful nuclear uses. The safeguards system consists of the IAEA’s statutory authority to establish safeguards, the safeguards rights and obligations in safeguards agreements and additional protocols, and technical measures implemented pursuant to those agreements. Of foremost importance as a basis for IAEA safeguards is the international safeguards agreement between a country and the IAEA, concluded pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

Energy Planning, Policy, & Economy(29)↗

DOE OSTI2012

Safeguards-by-Design: Guidance for High Temperature Gas Reactors (HTGRs) With Pebble Fuel

The following is a guidance document from a series prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), to assist facility designers and operators in implementing international Safeguards-by-Design (SBD). SBD has two main objectives: (1) to avoid costly and time consuming redesign work or retrofits of new nuclear fuel cycle facilities and (2) to make the implementation of international safeguards more effective and efficient at such facilities. In the long term, the attainment of these goals would save industry and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) time, money, and resources and be mutually beneficial. This particular safeguards guidance document focuses on pebble fuel high temperature gas reactors (HTGR). The purpose of the IAEA safeguards system is to provide credible assurance to the international community that nuclear material and other specified items are not diverted from peaceful nuclear uses. The safeguards system consists of the IAEA’s statutory authority to establish safeguards; safeguards rights and obligations in safeguards agreements and additional protocols; and technical measures implemented pursuant to those agreements. Of foremost importance is the international safeguards agreement between the country and the IAEA, concluded pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). According to a 1992 IAEA Board of Governors decision, countries must: notify the IAEA of a decision to construct a new nuclear facility as soon as such decision is taken; provide design information on such facilities as the designs develop; and provide detailed design information based on construction plans at least 180 days prior to the start of construction, and on "as-built" designs at least 180 days before the first receipt of nuclear material. Ultimately, the design information will be captured in an IAEA Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ), prepared by the facility operator, typically with the support of the facility designer. The IAEA will verify design information over the life of the project. This design information is an important IAEA safeguards tool. Since the main interlocutor with the IAEA in each country is the State Regulatory Authority/SSAC (or Regional Regulatory Authority, e.g. EURATOM), the responsibility for conveying this design information to the IAEA falls to the State Regulatory Authority/SSAC.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2018

Uranium Mining and Milling

The starting point for material accountancy under INFCIRC/153-type comprehensive safeguards agreements (paragraph 34(c)) with an Additional Protocol envisions a shifting toward earlier in the nuclear fuel cycle than current practice. The design of effective and efficient safeguards requires a more detailed process-level understanding of front-end activities, to include conducting a survey of uranium mining, concentration, and purification processes in commercial use to catalog technological options for producing uranium ore concentrate, also known as yellow cake. Based on this survey, a process flow diagram (PFD) illustrating front-end process options will be created to illustrate pre-34(c) material flows and support the identification of material control points.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2021

Implementation of IAEA Safeguards

The historical evolution of safeguards implementation, Four safeguards strengthening measures implemented by the IAEA post-Iraq, The importance of an additional protocol

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2025

Resolving Issues Regarding Disposal of Safeguarded Nuclear Materials: Concepts for Near Surface and Intermediate Depth Disposal sites

This document presents two case studies on nuclear waste disposal to explore the safeguards challenges and potential solutions present under each scenario. Both involve the disposal of nuclear materials, either for waste containing safeguarded nuclear materials or waste where safeguards on the nuclear materials have been previously terminated. The first case study is that of a low-level waste (LLW) repository that is situated near the surface. This facility will accept safeguarded nuclear materials for disposal. Examples of this type of activity are rare, but the potential for more facilities of this type is very possible as States become more comfortable with considering safeguards measures in perpetuity on deep geological repositories. The second study extends this to the case of terminated wastes at an intermediate depth disposal site. In this case, the reasons why terminated nuclear materials could be found in these disposal facilities and how obligations under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and Additional Protocol (AP) are met when the disposed waste items are intermediate level waste (ILW) or high-level waste (HLW).

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

NASA NTRS2005

A WOUND CARE AND INTRAVENOUS ACCESS SUMMIT FOR ON-ORBIT CARE

Wound care issues and the ability to establish intravenous (IV) access among injured or ill crew members are a source of concern for NASA flight surgeons. Indeed, the microgravity environment and the remote nature of the International Space Station (ISS) pose unique challenges in diagnosing and treating an injured astronaut. Therefore, it is necessary to identify and adapt the best evidence based terrestrial practices regarding wound care, hemostasis, and IV access for use on the ISS. Methods: A panel of consultants was convened to evaluate the adequacy of the current ISS in-flight medical system for diagnosis and treatment of wounds and establishing IV access by a nonclinician crew medical officer. Participants were acknowledged experts in terrestrial wound care and/or operational medicine. Prior to the meeting, each panelist was encouraged to participate in a pre-summit online forum. Results: Eight external experts participated in a face-to-face meeting held at NASA-Johnson Space Center. Recommendations were made to augment the space station pharmacopoeia, as well as current wound care diagnostic, therapeutic, and deorbit criteria protocols. Additionally, suggestions were offered regarding IV access techniques and devices for use in the microgravity environment. Discussion: The results of the expert panel provide an evidence-based approach to the diagnosis and care of wounds in an injured astronaut on aboard the ISS. The results of the panel underscored the need for further research in wound therapy and IV access devices.

Scheuring, R.↗

NASA NTRS2006

Space-based Networking Technology Developments in the Interplanetary Network Directorate Information Technology Program

Described recent development of communications protocols, services, and associated tools targeted to reduce risk, reduce cost and increase efficiency of IND infrastructure and supported mission operations. Space-based networking technologies developed were: a) Provide differentiated quality of service (QoS) that will give precedence to traffic that users have selected as having the greatest importance and/or time-criticality; b) Improve the total value of information to users through the use of QoS prioritization techniques; c) Increase operational flexibility and improve command-response turnaround; d) Enable new class of networked and collaborative science missions; e) Simplify applications interfaces to communications services; and f) Reduce risk and cost from a common object model and automated scheduling and communications protocols. Technologies are described in three general areas: communications scheduling, middleware, and protocols. Additionally developed simulation environment, which provides comprehensive, quantitative understanding of the technologies performance within overall, evolving architecture, as well as ability to refine & optimize specific components.

scheduling↗

NASA NTRS2015

Statistical Analysis of Large Simulated Yield Datasets for Studying Climate Effects

Many studies have been carried out during the last decade to study the effect of climate change on crop yields and other key crop characteristics. In these studies, one or several crop models were used to simulate crop growth and development for different climate scenarios that correspond to different projections of atmospheric CO2 concentration, temperature, and rainfall changes (Semenov et al., 1996; Tubiello and Ewert, 2002; White et al., 2011). The Agricultural Model Intercomparison and Improvement Project (AgMIP; Rosenzweig et al., 2013) builds on these studies with the goal of using an ensemble of multiple crop models in order to assess effects of climate change scenarios for several crops in contrasting environments. These studies generate large datasets, including thousands of simulated crop yield data. They include series of yield values obtained by combining several crop models with different climate scenarios that are defined by several climatic variables (temperature, CO2, rainfall, etc.). Such datasets potentially provide useful information on the possible effects of different climate change scenarios on crop yields. However, it is sometimes difficult to analyze these datasets and to summarize them in a useful way due to their structural complexity; simulated yield data can differ among contrasting climate scenarios, sites, and crop models. Another issue is that it is not straightforward to extrapolate the results obtained for the scenarios to alternative climate change scenarios not initially included in the simulation protocols. Additional dynamic crop model simulations for new climate change scenarios are an option but this approach is costly, especially when a large number of crop models are used to generate the simulated data, as in AgMIP. Statistical models have been used to analyze responses of measured yield data to climate variables in past studies (Lobell et al., 2011), but the use of a statistical model to analyze yields simulated by complex process-based crop models is a rather new idea. We demonstrate herewith that statistical methods can play an important role in analyzing simulated yield data sets obtained from the ensembles of process-based crop models. Formal statistical analysis is helpful to estimate the effects of different climatic variables on yield, and to describe the between-model variability of these effects.

climate↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Firmware Architecture of the ARMADAS Bolting Robot

The Automated Reconfigurable Mission Adaptive Digital Assembly Systems (ARMADAS) project, under development at NASA Ames Research Center, has demonstrated on-ground autonomous robotic assembly of extensive digital structures, and it is now moving forward towards in-space demonstration. The ARMADAS system comprises of the operation software, the operation user interface (opsUI), and a swarm of robots. The robotic system consists of a multitude of collaborative agents specifically designed to transport, place and bolt the building blocks, called voxels (volumetric pixels). This paper focuses on the bolting robot, referred to as Mobile Metamaterial Internal Co-Integrator (MMIC-I). MMIC-I is a battery-powered crawling robot. It navigates the structure through extension, contraction and gripping. Two distinct controller boards operate the robot's two symmetric modules, referred to as module A and B. Board A is the master board: it coordinates motion planning and motion primitives execution, hosts the WiFi client, performs periodic self-assessment and system idle check and triggers faults if anomalies are detected. Board B periodically sends a heartbeat to board A, through a wired communication channel that uses the Serial protocol. Additionally, board A's WiFi client receives heartbeat packet requests or motion/bolting commands from a dedicated server board, and acknowledges reception sending back a response heartbeat packet containing information about the overall robot status, e. g. electrical current and voltage values, target and actual angles, operating mode, fault status. Whenever a motion command is sent, the motion planning section of the firmware determines the current robot configuration, using Inertial Measurement Unit readings and the motors Pulse Width Modulation values. Afterwards, it calculates the list of primitives needed to reach the target state, and controls their execution in the proper order. MMIC-I can receive and execute motion and bolting commands only when it is in operational mode. MMIC-I has three operating modes: standby, operational and safed. Standby mode is automatically entered upon startup. While in standby mode, all motors are powered off, and the only accepted commands are the ones relative to a change of mode and heartbeat packet request. Fault detection causes the robot to automatically enter safed or standby mode. Whenever the detected fault occurs within a motion and requires immediate intervention, e. g. an over-current situation, the robot enters safed mode. Safed mode powers off all motors except for the locomotion module, thus preventing the robot from collapsing. Conversely, when the detected fault doesn't require immediate intervention (low battery warning, for instance), the robot enters standby mode after completing the ongoing motion. This paper provides a detailed discussion of MMIC-I's firmware architecture. It accurately describes the implementation approach for each module: sensor data reading, motor control and actuation, WiFi server-client communication, intra-boards Serial communication, operating modes and autonomous fault detection, motion planning, coordination and execution, etc. Moreover, in support of the software description, this paper includes a thorough characterization of MMIC-I's hardware and avionics.

In-space assembly↗

NASA NTRS2024

Updates to NASA’s Break-in-Prebreathe Rules Due to Type II Decompression Sickness Risk Considerations

INTRODUCTION. Investigation of a central neurological decompression sickness (DCS) case during ground testing at Johnson Space Center identified a break-in-prebreathe (BIP) 13 minutes prior to depressurization as the leading credible cause despite applicable prebreathe payback rules being followed. Applicable NASA rules, for ground and flight, directed 2:1 payback of breaks up to 10 mins in duration, regardless of when a break occurs relative to depress. Full restart of prebreathe is directed following breaks > 10 min. The adequacy of NASA’s BIP rules was evaluated prior to resuming hypobaric ground testing or ISS extravehicular activities. METHODS. The following information sources were reviewed prior to formulating recommendations: i) Type II DCS case report and investigation findings; ii) documented rationale for existing flight rules, iii) consultations with subject matter experts involved in definition of existing flight rules (several of whom had since left NASA), iv) relevant published literature, v) model estimates of tissue on-gassing and off-gassing, and vi) NASA’s operational experience with late breaks in prebreathe. RESULTS. NASA’s nominal prebreathe protocols are validated via extensive ground testing to ensure DCS risk is reduced to within acceptable limits. Conversely, there exists a paucity of data, no validated models, and limited documentation regarding BIP risk for NASA prebreathe protocols. Flight rules implemented for shuttle and later ISS are based primarily on expert opinion and an assumption of symmetric on-gassing and off-gassing, which would make 2:1 payback a conservative mitigation for a BIP. Assumption of exponential gas kinetics makes late breaks higher risk, or require greater payback, than earlier breaks. Two BIPs have occurred using the current ISS prebreathe protocol, each of which was followed by greater than 2:1 payback and at least 59 minutes of 100% O2 pre-depress. No DCS cases have been reported during shuttle or ISS EVA operations. DISCUSSION. Interim changes were implemented to protect against late breaks during ground and flight prebreathes by ensuring negligible difference in conservatively modeled ppN2 pre-depress compared to nominal validated protocols. Additional documentation and literature review as well as chamber test planning are ongoing with the objective of further ground and flight rule updates and validation of a BIP risk model.

Prebreathe↗

NASA NTRS2024

Updates to NASA’s Break-in-Prebreathe Rules Due to Type II Decompression Sickness Risk Considerations

Prebreathe↗

DOE OSTI2011

The future of IAEA safeguards: challenges and responses

For nearly two decades, the International Atomic Energy Agency (lAEA) has been transforming its safeguards system to address the challenges posed by undeclared nuclear programs, the associated revelation of an extensive non-State nuclear procurement network and other issues, including past limits to its verification mandate and the burden of noncompliance issues. Implementing the new measures, including those in the Additional Protocol, and integrating new and old safeguards measures, remains a work in progress. Implementation is complicated by factors including the limited teclmological tools that are available to address such issues as safeguarding bulk handling facilities, detection of undeclared facilities/activities, especially related to enrichment, etc. As this process continues, new challenges are arising, including the demands of expanding nuclear power production worldwide, so-called safeguards by design for a new generation of facilities, the possible IAEA role in a fissile material cutoff treaty and other elements of the arms control and disarmament agenda, the possible role in 'rollback' cases, etc. There is no doubt safeguards will need to evolve in the future, as they have over the last decades. In order for the evolutionary path to proceed, there will inter alia be a need to identify technological gaps, especially with respect to undeclared facilities, and ensure they are filled by adapting old safeguards technologies, by developing and introducing new and novel safeguards teclmologies and/or by developing new procedures and protocols. Safeguards will also need to respond to anticipated emerging threats and to future, unanticipated threats. This will require strategic planning and cooperation among Member States and with the Agency. This paper will address challenges to IAEA safeguards and the technological possibilities and R&D strategies needed to meet those challenges in the context of the forty-year evolution of safeguards, including the ongoing transformation of safeguards by the Agency.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2011

Design of an Unattended Environmental Aerosol Sampling and Analysis System for Gaseous Centrifuge Enrichment Plants

The resources of the IAEA continue to be challenged by the rapid, worldwide expansion of nuclear energy production. Gaseous centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) represent an especially formidable dilemma to the application of safeguard measures, as the size and enrichment capacity of GCEPs continue to escalate. During the early part of the 1990's, the IAEA began to lay the foundation to strengthen and make cost-effective its future safeguard regime. Measures under Part II of 'Programme 93+2' specifically sanctioned access to nuclear fuel production facilities and environmental sampling by IAEA inspectors. Today, the Additional Protocol grants inspection and environmental sample collection authority to IAEA inspectors at GCEPs during announced and low frequency unannounced (LFUA) inspections. During inspections, IAEA inspectors collect environmental swipe samples that are then shipped offsite to an analytical laboratory for enrichment assay. This approach has proven to be an effective deterrence to GCEP misuse, but this method has never achieved the timeliness of detection goals set forth by IAEA. Furthermore it is questionable whether the IAEA will have the resources to even maintain pace with the expansive production capacity of the modern GCEP, let alone improve the timeliness in reaching current safeguards conclusions. New safeguards propositions, outside of familiar mainstream safeguard measures, may therefore be required that counteract the changing landscape of nuclear energy fuel production. A new concept is proposed that offers rapid, cost effective GCEP misuse detection, without increasing LFUA inspection access or introducing intrusive access demands on GCEP operations. Our approach is based on continuous onsite aerosol collection and laser enrichment analysis. This approach mitigates many of the constraints imposed by the LFUA protocol, reduces the demand for onsite sample collection and offsite analysis, and overcomes current limitations associated with the in-facility misuse detection devices. Onsite environmental sample collection offers the ability to collect fleeting uranium hexafluoride emissions before they are lost to the ventilation system or before they disperse throughout the facility, to become deposited onto surfaces that are contaminated with background and historical production material. Onsite aerosol sample collection, combined with enrichment analysis, provides the unique ability to quickly detect stepwise enrichment level changes within the facility, leading to a significant strengthening of facility misuse deterence. We report in this paper our study of several GCEP environmental sample release scenarios and simulation results of a newly designed aerosol collection and particle capture system that is fully integrated with the Laser Ablation, Absorbance Ratio Spectrometry (LAARS) uranium particle enrichment analysis instrument that was developed at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2012

Safeguards-by-Design:Guidance for High Temperature Gas Reactors (HTGRs) With Prismatic Fuel

Introduction and Purpose The following is a guidance document from a series prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), to assist facility designers and operators in implementing international Safeguards-by-Design (SBD). SBD has two main objectives: (1) to avoid costly and time consuming redesign work or retrofits of new nuclear fuel cycle facilities and (2) to make the implementation of international safeguards more effective and efficient at such facilities. In the long term, the attainment of these goals would save industry and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) time, money, and resources and be mutually beneficial. This particular safeguards guidance document focuses on prismatic fuel high temperature gas reactors (HTGR). The purpose of the IAEA safeguards system is to provide credible assurance to the international community that nuclear material and other specified items are not diverted from peaceful nuclear uses. The safeguards system consists of the IAEA’s statutory authority to establish safeguards; safeguards rights and obligations in safeguards agreements and additional protocols; and technical measures implemented pursuant to those agreements. Of foremost importance is the international safeguards agreement between the country and the IAEA, concluded pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). According to a 1992 IAEA Board of Governors decision, countries must: notify the IAEA of a decision to construct a new nuclear facility as soon as such decision is taken; provide design information on such facilities as the designs develop; and provide detailed design information based on construction plans at least 180 days prior to the start of construction, and on "as-built" designs at least 180 days before the first receipt of nuclear material. Ultimately, the design information will be captured in an IAEA Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ), prepared by the facility operator, typically with the support of the facility designer. The IAEA will verify design information over the life of the project. This design information is an important IAEA safeguards tool. Since the main interlocutor with the IAEA in each country is the State Regulatory Authority/SSAC (or Regional Regulatory Authority, e.g. EURATOM), the responsibility for conveying this design information to the IAEA falls to the State Regulatory Authority/SSAC. For the nuclear industry to reap the benefits of SBD (i.e. avoid cost overruns and construction schedule slippages), nuclear facility designers and operators should work closely with the State Regulatory Authority and IAEA as soon as a decision is taken to build a new nuclear facility. Ideally, this interaction should begin during the conceptual design phase and continue throughout construction and start-up of a nuclear facility. Such early coordination and planning could influence decisions on the design of the nuclear material processing flow-sheet, material storage and handling arrangements, and facility layout (including safeguards equipment), etc.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2014

Laboratory and Field Testing of Commercially Available Detectors for the Identification of Chemicals of Interest in the Nuclear Fuel Cycle for the Detection of Undeclared Activities

Traditionally, IAEA inspectors have focused on the detection of nuclear indicators as part of infield inspection activities. The ability to rapidly detect and identify chemical as well as nuclear signatures can increase the ability of IAEA inspectors to detect undeclared activities at a site. Identification of chemical indicators have been limited to use in the analysis of environmental samples. Although IAEA analytical laboratories are highly effective, environmental sample processing does not allow for immediate or real-time results to an IAEA inspector at a facility. During a complementary access inspection, under the Additional Protocol, the use of fieldable technologies that can quickly provide accurate information on chemicals that may be indicative of undeclared activities can increase the ability of IAEA to effectively and efficiently complete their mission. The Complementary Access Working Group (CAWG) is a multi-laboratory team with members from Brookhaven National Laboratory, Idaho National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, and Sandia National Laboratory. The team identified chemicals at each stage of the nuclear fuel cycle that may provide IAEA inspectors with indications that proliferation activities may be occurring. The group eliminated all indicators related to equipment, technology and training, developing a list of by-products/effluents, non-nuclear materials, nuclear materials, and other observables. These proliferation indicators were prioritized based on detectability from a conduct of operations (CONOPS) perspective of a CA inspection (for example, whether an inspector actually can access the S&O or whether it is in process with no physical access), and the IAEA’s interest in the detection technology in conjunction with radiation detectors. The list was consolidated to general categories (nuclear materials from a chemical detection technique, inorganic chemicals, organic chemicals, halogens, and miscellaneous materials). The team then identified commercial off the shelf (COTS) chemical detectors that may detect the chemicals of interest. Three chemical detectors were selected and tested both in laboratory settings and in field operations settings at Idaho National Laboratory. The instruments selected are: Thermo Scientific TruDefender FT (FTIR), Thermo Scientific FirstDefender RM (Raman), and Bruker Tracer III SD (XRF). Functional specifications, operability, and chemical detectability, selectivity, and limits of detection were determined. Results from the laboratory and field tests will be presented. This work is supported by the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, Office of Nonproliferation and International Security, National Nuclear Security Administration.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

DOE OSTI2017

Quantitative Digital Autoradiography for Environmental Swipe Sample Prioritization: System design, Characterization, and Initial Measurements

Environmental sampling and sample analyses by the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL) is a critical technical tool used to detect facility misuse under a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear material activities under an Additional Protocol. Currently all environmental swipe samples (ESS) are screened using gamma spectrometry and x-ray fluorescence to estimate the amount of U and/or Pu in the ESS, to guide further analysis, and to assist in the shipment of ESS to the NWAL. Quantitative Digital Autoradiography for Environmental Samples (QDARES) is being developed to complement existing techniques through the use of a portable, real-time, high-spatial-resolution camera called the Ionizing-radiation Quantum Imaging Detector (iQID). The iQID constructs a spatial map of radionuclides within a sample or surface in real-time as charged particles (betas) and photons (gamma/x-rays) are detected and localized on an event-by-event basis. Knowledge of the location and nature of radioactive hot spots on the ESS could provide information for subsequent laboratory analysis. As a nondestructive technique, QDARES does not compromise the ESS chain of custody or subsequent laboratory analysis. In this paper we will present the system design and construction, characterization measurements with calibration sources, and initial measurements of ESS.

McDonald, Benjamin S.↗