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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2012

Safeguards by Design (SBD): Safeguards Guidance for Research Reactors and Critical Assemblies

This document is part of a series of guidance documents developed by the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA’s) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative to assist facility designers and operators in implementing international safeguards by design (SBD). SBD has two main objectives: (1) avoid costly and time-consuming redesign work or retrofits of new nuclear fuel cycle facilities and (2) make the implementation of international safeguards more effective and efficient at such facilities. In the long term, the attainment of these goals would save both industry and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA, or the Agency) time, money, and resources—a mutually beneficial, win-win endeavor. The purpose of the IAEA safeguards system is to provide credible assurance to the international community that nuclear material and other specified items are not diverted from peaceful nuclear uses. The safeguards system consists of the IAEA’s statutory authority to establish safeguards, the safeguards rights and obligations in safeguards agreements and additional protocols, and technical measures implemented pursuant to those agreements. Of foremost importance as a basis for IAEA safeguards is the international safeguards agreement between a country and the IAEA, concluded pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

Energy Planning, Policy, & Economy(29)↗
DOE OSTI2012

Safeguards-by-Design: Guidance for High Temperature Gas Reactors (HTGRs) With Pebble Fuel

The following is a guidance document from a series prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), to assist facility designers and operators in implementing international Safeguards-by-Design (SBD). SBD has two main objectives: (1) to avoid costly and time consuming redesign work or retrofits of new nuclear fuel cycle facilities and (2) to make the implementation of international safeguards more effective and efficient at such facilities. In the long term, the attainment of these goals would save industry and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) time, money, and resources and be mutually beneficial. This particular safeguards guidance document focuses on pebble fuel high temperature gas reactors (HTGR). The purpose of the IAEA safeguards system is to provide credible assurance to the international community that nuclear material and other specified items are not diverted from peaceful nuclear uses. The safeguards system consists of the IAEA’s statutory authority to establish safeguards; safeguards rights and obligations in safeguards agreements and additional protocols; and technical measures implemented pursuant to those agreements. Of foremost importance is the international safeguards agreement between the country and the IAEA, concluded pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). According to a 1992 IAEA Board of Governors decision, countries must: notify the IAEA of a decision to construct a new nuclear facility as soon as such decision is taken; provide design information on such facilities as the designs develop; and provide detailed design information based on construction plans at least 180 days prior to the start of construction, and on "as-built" designs at least 180 days before the first receipt of nuclear material. Ultimately, the design information will be captured in an IAEA Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ), prepared by the facility operator, typically with the support of the facility designer. The IAEA will verify design information over the life of the project. This design information is an important IAEA safeguards tool. Since the main interlocutor with the IAEA in each country is the State Regulatory Authority/SSAC (or Regional Regulatory Authority, e.g. EURATOM), the responsibility for conveying this design information to the IAEA falls to the State Regulatory Authority/SSAC.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2018

Uranium Mining and Milling

The starting point for material accountancy under INFCIRC/153-type comprehensive safeguards agreements (paragraph 34(c)) with an Additional Protocol envisions a shifting toward earlier in the nuclear fuel cycle than current practice. The design of effective and efficient safeguards requires a more detailed process-level understanding of front-end activities, to include conducting a survey of uranium mining, concentration, and purification processes in commercial use to catalog technological options for producing uranium ore concentrate, also known as yellow cake. Based on this survey, a process flow diagram (PFD) illustrating front-end process options will be created to illustrate pre-34(c) material flows and support the identification of material control points.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Implementation of IAEA Safeguards

The historical evolution of safeguards implementation, Four safeguards strengthening measures implemented by the IAEA post-Iraq, The importance of an additional protocol

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2025

Resolving Issues Regarding Disposal of Safeguarded Nuclear Materials: Concepts for Near Surface and Intermediate Depth Disposal sites

This document presents two case studies on nuclear waste disposal to explore the safeguards challenges and potential solutions present under each scenario. Both involve the disposal of nuclear materials, either for waste containing safeguarded nuclear materials or waste where safeguards on the nuclear materials have been previously terminated. The first case study is that of a low-level waste (LLW) repository that is situated near the surface. This facility will accept safeguarded nuclear materials for disposal. Examples of this type of activity are rare, but the potential for more facilities of this type is very possible as States become more comfortable with considering safeguards measures in perpetuity on deep geological repositories. The second study extends this to the case of terminated wastes at an intermediate depth disposal site. In this case, the reasons why terminated nuclear materials could be found in these disposal facilities and how obligations under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and Additional Protocol (AP) are met when the disposed waste items are intermediate level waste (ILW) or high-level waste (HLW).

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2011

The future of IAEA safeguards: challenges and responses

For nearly two decades, the International Atomic Energy Agency (lAEA) has been transforming its safeguards system to address the challenges posed by undeclared nuclear programs, the associated revelation of an extensive non-State nuclear procurement network and other issues, including past limits to its verification mandate and the burden of noncompliance issues. Implementing the new measures, including those in the Additional Protocol, and integrating new and old safeguards measures, remains a work in progress. Implementation is complicated by factors including the limited teclmological tools that are available to address such issues as safeguarding bulk handling facilities, detection of undeclared facilities/activities, especially related to enrichment, etc. As this process continues, new challenges are arising, including the demands of expanding nuclear power production worldwide, so-called safeguards by design for a new generation of facilities, the possible IAEA role in a fissile material cutoff treaty and other elements of the arms control and disarmament agenda, the possible role in 'rollback' cases, etc. There is no doubt safeguards will need to evolve in the future, as they have over the last decades. In order for the evolutionary path to proceed, there will inter alia be a need to identify technological gaps, especially with respect to undeclared facilities, and ensure they are filled by adapting old safeguards technologies, by developing and introducing new and novel safeguards teclmologies and/or by developing new procedures and protocols. Safeguards will also need to respond to anticipated emerging threats and to future, unanticipated threats. This will require strategic planning and cooperation among Member States and with the Agency. This paper will address challenges to IAEA safeguards and the technological possibilities and R&D strategies needed to meet those challenges in the context of the forty-year evolution of safeguards, including the ongoing transformation of safeguards by the Agency.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2011

Design of an Unattended Environmental Aerosol Sampling and Analysis System for Gaseous Centrifuge Enrichment Plants

The resources of the IAEA continue to be challenged by the rapid, worldwide expansion of nuclear energy production. Gaseous centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) represent an especially formidable dilemma to the application of safeguard measures, as the size and enrichment capacity of GCEPs continue to escalate. During the early part of the 1990's, the IAEA began to lay the foundation to strengthen and make cost-effective its future safeguard regime. Measures under Part II of 'Programme 93+2' specifically sanctioned access to nuclear fuel production facilities and environmental sampling by IAEA inspectors. Today, the Additional Protocol grants inspection and environmental sample collection authority to IAEA inspectors at GCEPs during announced and low frequency unannounced (LFUA) inspections. During inspections, IAEA inspectors collect environmental swipe samples that are then shipped offsite to an analytical laboratory for enrichment assay. This approach has proven to be an effective deterrence to GCEP misuse, but this method has never achieved the timeliness of detection goals set forth by IAEA. Furthermore it is questionable whether the IAEA will have the resources to even maintain pace with the expansive production capacity of the modern GCEP, let alone improve the timeliness in reaching current safeguards conclusions. New safeguards propositions, outside of familiar mainstream safeguard measures, may therefore be required that counteract the changing landscape of nuclear energy fuel production. A new concept is proposed that offers rapid, cost effective GCEP misuse detection, without increasing LFUA inspection access or introducing intrusive access demands on GCEP operations. Our approach is based on continuous onsite aerosol collection and laser enrichment analysis. This approach mitigates many of the constraints imposed by the LFUA protocol, reduces the demand for onsite sample collection and offsite analysis, and overcomes current limitations associated with the in-facility misuse detection devices. Onsite environmental sample collection offers the ability to collect fleeting uranium hexafluoride emissions before they are lost to the ventilation system or before they disperse throughout the facility, to become deposited onto surfaces that are contaminated with background and historical production material. Onsite aerosol sample collection, combined with enrichment analysis, provides the unique ability to quickly detect stepwise enrichment level changes within the facility, leading to a significant strengthening of facility misuse deterence. We report in this paper our study of several GCEP environmental sample release scenarios and simulation results of a newly designed aerosol collection and particle capture system that is fully integrated with the Laser Ablation, Absorbance Ratio Spectrometry (LAARS) uranium particle enrichment analysis instrument that was developed at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2012

Safeguards-by-Design:Guidance for High Temperature Gas Reactors (HTGRs) With Prismatic Fuel

Introduction and Purpose The following is a guidance document from a series prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), to assist facility designers and operators in implementing international Safeguards-by-Design (SBD). SBD has two main objectives: (1) to avoid costly and time consuming redesign work or retrofits of new nuclear fuel cycle facilities and (2) to make the implementation of international safeguards more effective and efficient at such facilities. In the long term, the attainment of these goals would save industry and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) time, money, and resources and be mutually beneficial. This particular safeguards guidance document focuses on prismatic fuel high temperature gas reactors (HTGR). The purpose of the IAEA safeguards system is to provide credible assurance to the international community that nuclear material and other specified items are not diverted from peaceful nuclear uses. The safeguards system consists of the IAEA’s statutory authority to establish safeguards; safeguards rights and obligations in safeguards agreements and additional protocols; and technical measures implemented pursuant to those agreements. Of foremost importance is the international safeguards agreement between the country and the IAEA, concluded pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). According to a 1992 IAEA Board of Governors decision, countries must: notify the IAEA of a decision to construct a new nuclear facility as soon as such decision is taken; provide design information on such facilities as the designs develop; and provide detailed design information based on construction plans at least 180 days prior to the start of construction, and on "as-built" designs at least 180 days before the first receipt of nuclear material. Ultimately, the design information will be captured in an IAEA Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ), prepared by the facility operator, typically with the support of the facility designer. The IAEA will verify design information over the life of the project. This design information is an important IAEA safeguards tool. Since the main interlocutor with the IAEA in each country is the State Regulatory Authority/SSAC (or Regional Regulatory Authority, e.g. EURATOM), the responsibility for conveying this design information to the IAEA falls to the State Regulatory Authority/SSAC. For the nuclear industry to reap the benefits of SBD (i.e. avoid cost overruns and construction schedule slippages), nuclear facility designers and operators should work closely with the State Regulatory Authority and IAEA as soon as a decision is taken to build a new nuclear facility. Ideally, this interaction should begin during the conceptual design phase and continue throughout construction and start-up of a nuclear facility. Such early coordination and planning could influence decisions on the design of the nuclear material processing flow-sheet, material storage and handling arrangements, and facility layout (including safeguards equipment), etc.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2014

Laboratory and Field Testing of Commercially Available Detectors for the Identification of Chemicals of Interest in the Nuclear Fuel Cycle for the Detection of Undeclared Activities

Traditionally, IAEA inspectors have focused on the detection of nuclear indicators as part of infield inspection activities. The ability to rapidly detect and identify chemical as well as nuclear signatures can increase the ability of IAEA inspectors to detect undeclared activities at a site. Identification of chemical indicators have been limited to use in the analysis of environmental samples. Although IAEA analytical laboratories are highly effective, environmental sample processing does not allow for immediate or real-time results to an IAEA inspector at a facility. During a complementary access inspection, under the Additional Protocol, the use of fieldable technologies that can quickly provide accurate information on chemicals that may be indicative of undeclared activities can increase the ability of IAEA to effectively and efficiently complete their mission. The Complementary Access Working Group (CAWG) is a multi-laboratory team with members from Brookhaven National Laboratory, Idaho National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, and Sandia National Laboratory. The team identified chemicals at each stage of the nuclear fuel cycle that may provide IAEA inspectors with indications that proliferation activities may be occurring. The group eliminated all indicators related to equipment, technology and training, developing a list of by-products/effluents, non-nuclear materials, nuclear materials, and other observables. These proliferation indicators were prioritized based on detectability from a conduct of operations (CONOPS) perspective of a CA inspection (for example, whether an inspector actually can access the S&O or whether it is in process with no physical access), and the IAEA’s interest in the detection technology in conjunction with radiation detectors. The list was consolidated to general categories (nuclear materials from a chemical detection technique, inorganic chemicals, organic chemicals, halogens, and miscellaneous materials). The team then identified commercial off the shelf (COTS) chemical detectors that may detect the chemicals of interest. Three chemical detectors were selected and tested both in laboratory settings and in field operations settings at Idaho National Laboratory. The instruments selected are: Thermo Scientific TruDefender FT (FTIR), Thermo Scientific FirstDefender RM (Raman), and Bruker Tracer III SD (XRF). Functional specifications, operability, and chemical detectability, selectivity, and limits of detection were determined. Results from the laboratory and field tests will be presented. This work is supported by the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, Office of Nonproliferation and International Security, National Nuclear Security Administration.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗
DOE OSTI2017

Quantitative Digital Autoradiography for Environmental Swipe Sample Prioritization: System design, Characterization, and Initial Measurements

Environmental sampling and sample analyses by the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL) is a critical technical tool used to detect facility misuse under a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear material activities under an Additional Protocol. Currently all environmental swipe samples (ESS) are screened using gamma spectrometry and x-ray fluorescence to estimate the amount of U and/or Pu in the ESS, to guide further analysis, and to assist in the shipment of ESS to the NWAL. Quantitative Digital Autoradiography for Environmental Samples (QDARES) is being developed to complement existing techniques through the use of a portable, real-time, high-spatial-resolution camera called the Ionizing-radiation Quantum Imaging Detector (iQID). The iQID constructs a spatial map of radionuclides within a sample or surface in real-time as charged particles (betas) and photons (gamma/x-rays) are detected and localized on an event-by-event basis. Knowledge of the location and nature of radioactive hot spots on the ESS could provide information for subsequent laboratory analysis. As a nondestructive technique, QDARES does not compromise the ESS chain of custody or subsequent laboratory analysis. In this paper we will present the system design and construction, characterization measurements with calibration sources, and initial measurements of ESS.

McDonald, Benjamin S.↗
DOE OSTI2017

Field Implementation of Nuclear Safeguards: ENEA' s Capability Projection - 17174

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) for Italy entered into force on May 2, 1975, in the framework of the national political position to deal with the nuclear energy only for civilian medical and industrial uses, being the country included in the NNWS (Non-Nuclear Weapon States). It is recognized that for these scopes nuclear material is produced, used, shipped and disposed, but it is at the same time known that it is not like any other material. The signature of further international treaties like the Additional Protocol to NPT led the Italian Ministry for the Economic Development (MISE) to take advantage of the public Italian Agency for Energy Environment and the Economic Development (ENEA) by means of a three years basis renewable agreement that could support the Ministry in fulfilling the clauses and obligations rising from the treaty itself and then fostering R and D in the field of the safeguards. MISE supported the procurement of a mobile laboratory able to bring sophisticated analysis instruments on the field in case of suspected environmental contamination deriving from the presence of nuclear materials. The description of this mobile laboratory and its capabilities is illustrated in this paper. (authors)

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2019

Microstructural Characterization of Alloy 709 Plate Materials with Additional Heat Treatment Protocol

This report provides the results on microstructural characterization of the first commercial heat of Alloy 709 plate material which has undergone additional heat treatment protocol. The report is a Level 4 deliverable in FY19 (M4AT-19AN020502012), under the Work Package AT19AN0205201, “A709 Development – ANL.” The study involves thermodynamic-kinetic modeling, heat treating of materials, microhardness testing, x-ray diffraction (XRD) study, scanning electron microscopy (SEM), and transmission electron microscopy (TEM) study. Through thermodynamic-kinetic modeling, it is determined that after an 1100°C solutionizing treatment, heat treating of Alloy 709 at 775°C for 10 hours or at 900°C for 10 hours are candidate recipes for promoting desired microstructural features. Both heat treatments were executed on small samples of the AOD-1100°C condition of the commercial heat of Alloy 709. Micro-hardness tests showed that both treatments increases the hardness of the material. XRD showed that both treatments brings out M23C6 and MX phases, though the 775°C/10h-treatment has more profound effect. The TEM study revealed that similar for both conditions, M23C6 precipitated on grain boundaries and within grain interior. In contrast, after the 775°C/10h treatment, the dislocations are decorated with MX nano particles, while after the 900°C/10h treatment, most of the dislocations are free of MX particles. It is thus determined that the 775°C/10h treatment has a better potential to provide enhanced creep properties by pinning the dislocations with nano particles. Following this study, the 775°C/10h treatment was carried out on a large ESR-1100°C plate at Idaho National Laboratory. Hardness testing and microstructural characterization were performed and compared between the two materials being heated treated under the same protocol. The implication on mechanical properties was briefly discussed.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2023

ETF Grout Expansion: Evaluation of MgO Additions and Struvite Precipitation Protocol for Potential Expansion

The ETF ammonia tolerant grout waste form was developed by the Vitreous State Laboratory (VSL) to stabilize ammonium and thereby prevent emission of ammonia vapor during solidification of an ammonium-rich, concentrated sulfate aqueous waste stream generated at the Hanford Effluent Treatment Facility (ETF). VSL did not observe expansion in samples prepared during the waste form development work. However, Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) personnel did encounter expansion, in some cases up to 20+ volume percent expansion in ETF grout samples while preforming work scope to evaluate compositional ranges for ETF brine and of the precipitation and solidification reagent. The work requests can be found in Washington River Protection Services (WRPS) Statement of Work (SOW), Requisitions #: 339922 Revisions 0 and 1, March 11, 2021, and November 2021. Additional evaluation was requested by WRPS SOW Requisitions #: 356730, Revision 1, February 1, 2022, to determine whether differences in the slags or differences in sample preparation protocols used by VSL and SRNL were the cause of the expansion observed in the SRNL samples. G. Chen, WRPS, arranged a materials exchange between VSL and SRNL and coordinated the VSL protocol for grouting and curing 1L of Base Case ETF simulant. Materials were exchanged between VSL and SRNL and both laboratories performed the VSL struvite precipitation-solidification protocol and cured samples for at least 28 days. VSL and SRNL encountered expansion, at varying degrees, in all samples prepared under the material exchange and grouting protocol. Additional material exchange testing between VSL and SRNL and alternative materials evaluation to further investigate the causes of grout expansion and differentiate the effects of various dry materials, grouting procedures, and curing containers was requested by WRPS SOW Requisitions #: 356730, Revision 2, January 10, 2023. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) assembled and distributed materials to both laboratories for testing. Observations from this study indicated variations in MgO additions, water-to-dry mix (dm) ratios and curing containers did not correlate to ETF ammonia grout expansion. In comparison to previous work, SRNL observed the addition rate of NaOH to be a potential factor for the final pH in the struvite precipitation step. In the current testing NaOH was added in bulk (5-10 mL at one time) during the precipitation step. The resulting pH was 7.57-9.15 which is slightly higher than pH observed at a slower addition rate. Additional testing is needed to identify the presence and/or struvite stability in high-pH struvite precipitant ETF ammonia grout samples. Therefore, based on current data, it is unknown if NaOH addition rate is the fundamental cause of grout expansion.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2019

Left ventricular ejection fraction determined with the simulation of a very low-dose CZT-SPECT protocol and an additional count-calibration on planar radionuclide angiographic data

Purpose: To determine whether the left ventricular ejection fractions (EFs), measured on a high-sensitivity CZT single photon emission computed tomography (SPECT)-camera with a 70% reduction in recording times and a prevention of EF overestimation through an additional count-calibration, are concordant with reference EF from planar radionuclide angiography (2D-RNA). Methods: An additional 10-minute CZT-SPECT recording was performed in patients referred to 2D-RNA for cardiomyopathy (n = 23) or chemotherapy monitoring (n = 50) with an in vivo red blood cell labeling with 850 MBq {sup 99m}TcO{sub 4}{sup −}. The EF, obtained from CZT-SPECT with 100% (SPECT100) or 30% (SPECT30) projection times and with a SPECT-count calibration on the 2D-RNA counts of corresponding cavity volumes, were compared to EF from 2D-RNA. Results: Strong and equivalent relationships were documented between the EF from 2D-RNA and the calibrated EF from SPECT100 (y = 0.89x + 6.62; R{sup 2} = 0.87) and SPECT30 (y = 0.87x + 8.40; R{sup 2} = 0.85), and the mean EF from SPECT100 (54% ± 15%) and SPECT30 (53% ± 16%) were close to that from 2D-RNA (55% ± 15%). However, upward shifts in these mean values were documented in the absence of count calibration for both SPECT100 (60% ± 18%) and SPECT30 (60% ± 18%). Conclusion: Left ventricular EF may be determined on a high-sensitivity CZT-camera, a 70% reduction in injected activities, and an additional count-calibration for further enhancing the concordance with 2D-RNA values. [French] French Abstract: Objectif: Déterminer si les fractions d'éjection ventriculaire gauche (EF) mesurées sur une caméra CZT SPECT à haute sensibilité avec une réduction de 70% des temps d'enregistrement et une prévention de la surestimation de l'EF grâce à un étalonnage supplémentaire des coups concordent avec les EF de référence obtenues par angiographie scintigraphique planaire (2D-RNA). Méthodes: Un enregistrement CZT-SPECT supplémentaire de 10 minutes a été réalisé chez les patients référés pour évaluation de cardiomyopathie (n=23) ou suivi de chimiothérapie (n = 50) par angiographie scintigraphique planaire (2D-RNA) au globules rouges marqués avec 850 MBq 99mTcO4-. Les EF, obtenues au moyen d’une caméra CZT-SPECT avec 100% (SPECT100) ou 30% (SPECT30) de temps d’acquisition et avec étalonnage des coups SPECT sur les images 2D-RNA des volumes de cavité correspondants ont été comparés aux EF à partir de 2D-RNA. Résultats: une corrélation significative existe entre les EF obtenues par 2D-RNA et les EF étalonnées obtenues par SPECT100 (y = 0,89x + 6,62; R2 = 0,87) et SPECT30 (y = 0,87x + 8,40; R2 = 0,85). Les EF moyennes de SPECT100 (54 ± 15%) et SPECT30 (53 ± 16%) sont similaires à celles obtenues par 2D-RNA (55 ± 15%). En l'absence d'étalonnage de comptage des études SPECT100 (60 ± 18%) et SPECT30 (60 ± 18%), ces valeurs moyennes d’EF sont généralement plus élevées. Conclusion: La fonction ventriculaire gauche peut être déterminée avec une caméra CZT à haute sensibilité, une réduction des activités injectées et un étalonnage supplémentaire des coups pour améliorer la concordance avec les valeurs obtenues par 2D-RNA. [Spanish] Spanish Abstract: Propósito: Determinar si la fracción de eyección del ventrículo izquierdo, medida con la cámara CZT-SPECT con una reducción del 70% en tiempo de grabación y con la prevención de la sobreestimación mediante una calibración de cuentas adicional, que sea concordante con el valor referencia de fracción de eyección mediante radiografía planar de radionucleidos. (2D-RNA). Métodos: Una grabación adicional de 10 minutos con CZT-SPECT se realizo en pacientes referidos a radiografía planar de radionucleidos (2D-RNA) por miocardiopatías. (n = 23) o para monitorizar las quimioterapias (n = 50) con marcaje de glóbulos rojos con 850 MBq 99m TcO4. La fracción de eyección obtenida por CZT-SPECT con 100% (SPECT100) o 30% (SPECT30) de tiempo de proyección, y con SPECT con calibración de cuentas con el 2D-RNA, los volúmenes de cavidades fueron comparados con fracción de eyección . Relaciones fuertes y equivalentes fueron documentados entre fracción de eyección del 2D-RNA, y la forma calibrada de la fracción de eyección SPECT100 (y = 0.89x + 6.62; R2 = 0.87) y SPECT30 y = 0.87x + 8.40; R2 = 0.85), y la media de fracción de eyección de SPECT100 (54 ± 15%) and SPECT30 (53 ± 16%) fueron cercanos a la de el 2D-RNA (55 ± 15%). Aunque, aumentos en estas medias se documentaron en la ausencia de la calibración de cuentas para SPECT100 (60 ± 18%) y SPECT30 (60 ± 18%). Conclusión: La fracción de eyección del ventrículo izquierdo puede ser determinada con una cámara CZT de alta sensibilidad, una reducción del 70% en actividades inyectadas y la calibración de cuentas adicional para realzar la concordancia con los valores de 2D-RNA. [Chinese] Chinese Abstract: 目的: 以平面放射性核素血管造影 (2D-RNA) 测定左心室射血分数 (EF) 作为参考标准,为确定利用高灵敏度 CZT SPECT 相机在减少 70% 的记录时间, 并结合计数校准防止高估情况下测量的 EF值, 是否与 2D-RNA 测得的 EF 值一致。 方法: 对心肌病 (n = 23) 或化疗监测 (n = 50) 的患者采用体内标记法注射 850 MBq {sup 99m}TcO{sub 4} 标记的红细胞进行 2D-RNA ,随后再采集 10 分钟 CZT-SPECT。 对 CZT-SPECT 100% 投影时间 (SPECT100) 或 30% 投影时间 (SPECT30) 获得的图像进行重建, 并进行计数校准 (对相应容积获得的 2D-RNA 计数通过 SPECT 校准)获得 EF 值, 与 2D-RNA 测定的 EF 的进行比较。 结果: 2D-RNA 测定的 EF 值与 SPECT100 校准后测定的 EF 值 (y = 0.89x + 6.62; R{sup 2} = 0.87) 及 SPECT30 (y = 0.87x + 8.40; R{sup 2} = 0.85) 校准后 EF 值具有高度相关性, 并且 SPECT100 (54 ± 15%) 和 SPECT30 (53 ± 16%) 测定的 EF 平均值与 2D-RNA 测定的 EF 平均值 (55 ± 15%) 非常接近。 但是, 在没有计数校准的情况下, SPECT100 (60 ± 18%) 和 SPECT30 (60 ± 18%) 测定的 EF 平均值会被高估。 结论: 高灵敏度 CZT 相机可在减少 70% 的注射剂量情况下测定左心室 EF 值, 结合计数校准可进一步提高与 2D-RNA测得的 EF 值的一致性。 关键词: 放射性核素血管造影; 血池 SPECT; CZT 相机; 左心室射血分数; 校准曲线。.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗
DOE OSTI2020

Systems and methods for monitoring a power-generation module assembly after a power-generation module shutdown event

Embodiments are directed to providing a user interface (UI) that streamlines and simplifies the process of monitoring critical power-generation module (PGM) parameters after a PGM assembly is shutdown. The UI displays, in real-time, indicators corresponding to one or more post-shutdown PGM parameters. The UI provides indications of whether the post-shutdown PGM parameters meet post-shutdown criteria of the PGM assembly. When a post-shutdown PGM parameter does not meet the post-shutdown criteria, a user alert is provided to the user. A protocol may additionally be provided to the user. In some embodiments, the protocol may enable the user to return the PGM assembly to a condition that satisfies the post-shutdown criteria. The protocol may be a safety protocol and/or an asset protection protocol.

Buenaventura, Don↗
DOE OSTI2022

Systems and methods for monitoring a power-generation module assembly after a power-generation module shutdown event

Embodiments are directed to providing a user interface (UI) that streamlines and simplifies the process of monitoring critical power-generation module (PGM) parameters after a PGM assembly is shutdown. The UI displays, in real-time, indicators corresponding to one or more post-shutdown PGM parameters. The UI provides indications of whether the post-shutdown PGM parameters meet post-shutdown criteria of the PGM assembly. When a post-shutdown PGM parameter does not meet the post-shutdown criteria, a user alert is provided to the user. A protocol may additionally be provided to the user. In some embodiments, the protocol may enable the user to return the PGM assembly to a condition that satisfies the post-shutdown criteria. The protocol may be a safety protocol and/or an asset protection protocol.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2011

Adoption of a SAML-XACML profile for authorization interoperability across grid middleware in OSG and EGEE

The Authorization Interoperability activity was initiated in 2006 to foster interoperability between middleware and authorization infrastructures deployed in the Open Science Grid (OSG) and the Enabling Grids for E-sciencE (EGEE) projects. This activity delivered a common authorization protocol and a set of libraries that implement that protocol. In addition, a set of the most common Grid gateways, or Policy Enforcement Points (Globus Toolkit v4 Gatekeeper, GridFTP, dCache, etc.) and site authorization services, or Policy Decision Points (LCAS/LCMAPS, SCAS, GUMS, etc.) have been integrated with these libraries. At this time, various software providers, including the Globus Toolkit v5, BeStMan, and the Site AuthoriZation service (SAZ), are integrating the authorization interoperability protocol with their products. In addition, as more and more software supports the same protocol, the community is converging on LCMAPS as a common module for identity attribute parsing and authorization call-out. This paper presents this effort, discusses the status of adoption of the common protocol and projects the community work on authorization in the near future.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2011

Relativistic quantum cryptography

A new protocol of quantum key distribution is proposed to transmit keys through free space. Along with quantum-mechanical restrictions on the discernibility of nonorthogonal quantum states, the protocol uses additional restrictions imposed by special relativity theory. Unlike all existing quantum key distribution protocols, this protocol ensures key secrecy for a not strictly one-photon source of quantum states and an arbitrary length of a quantum communication channel.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗