Using Past Experience to Inform Management of Waste from Advanced Reactors and Advanced Fuels.
Abstract not provided.
Price, Laura↗
SEARCH · Search NASA
Results for “advanced reactor”
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
A Framework to Assess Advanced Reactor Spent Fuel Management Facility Deployment
Advanced nuclear reactors offer various operational advantages over existing light water reactors but could produce types of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) with a wide variety of forms and characteristics depending on how many different concepts are deployed. Each advanced reactor SNF type potentially poses unique management challenges. New planning efforts will be necessary to anticipate how the management requirements of advanced reactor SNF will affect the deployment of an integrated waste management system. This paper applies a framework of high-level facility deployment milestones to a generic SNF management system, reviewing them together with the advanced reactor SNF characteristics and management requirements. This allows for the investigation of factors that influence facility and system deployment, and ultimately, the identification of challenges facing the deployment of different kinds of SNF management facilities. Here, the back end of the once-through fuel cycle is examined for four advanced reactor system technology types: sodium-cooled fast reactors, high-temperature gas-cooled reactors, liquid-fuel molten salt reactors, and lead-cooled fast reactors. It is observed that milestones earlier in the facility deployment process (e.g., siting and facility design) are more impacted by the uniqueness of advanced reactor SNF characteristics than others (e.g., construction and testing). Ultimately, none of the differences are seen as fundamentally disqualifying in a technical sense; however, they should be considered early, potentially as part of reactor design, to avoid issues in the future.
11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
SAM Two-Phase Flow Model Development and Applications for Operational Transients in Advanced Reactors
As advanced nuclear technologies continue to develop, the need for the flexible operation and generation of these advanced reactors becomes necessary to maximize economic potential. As large-scale experiments are not always feasible, modeling and simulations of advanced reactors play a crucial role in design optimization and analysis. The SAM (System Analysis Module) code developed at Argonne National Laboratory is a state-of-the-art system-level thermal-hydraulic code aimed at simulating advanced reactor systems. Recent code developments have implemented two-phase flow modeling using the homogeneous equilibrium model, and a new steam generator component has been developed to utilize the two-phase flow implementation. In addition to verification tests, a load-following simulation was performed to model a realistic load-following transient in a proposed integrated system consisting of a conceptual advanced reactor known as the Advanced Burner Test Reactor (ABTR) and thermal energy storage (TES) tanks. The integrated system model uses two large TES tanks designed for sodium and a model helical coil steam generator to simulate the operational load-following transient. The flow rates of the feedwater and secondary loops are regulated to meet a prescribed steam generator load consistent with the electricity demand over a 24-h period. In conclusion, the results found the ABTR system was able to maintain stable reactor conditions and primary- and secondary-side characteristics over the course of the load-following transient.
Advanced Burner Test Reactor (ABTR)↗
The Deimos Experiment: Advanced Reactor Testbed
Advanced reactor initiatives are growing significantly through programs nationwide. This research area includes small modular reactors, microreactors, and space reactors. Many of the reactors being designed are untested concepts. They include unique moderators, varying fuel types, high temperatures, and compact configurations. The shift in fuel type, from highly enriched uranium (HEU) to high assay, low enriched uranium (HALEU), is particularly important as it has driven many of the other changes. For example, lower enrichment requires advanced moderators, which in turn require different reflectors to make the systems compact. The change in materials including the transition from HEU to HALEU affects the temperature feedback of the systems. Additionally, these advanced reactor concepts generally have a thermal neutron spectrum in contrast to earlier fast spectrum advanced reactor. With the extensive changes from previous reactor designs, validation experiments are needed. The National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) is uniquely equipped to perform such experiments. The Deimos experiment, designed for execution at NCERC, will serve as a testbed for advanced reactor concepts. It will use HALEU fuel in a graphite matrix, provide the ability to use advanced moderators, and allow measurements of temperature reactivity coefficients (TRCs).
11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
A Regulatory Approach to Accelerated Deployment for New Material or Applications in Advanced Reactors
New advanced reactor developers may embark on deploying materials in novel and unique environments where a material’s long-term performance may be in question or unknown. In many cases, sufficient test data may not exist for the material in the desired application, or that no prescript or applicable regulatory testing requirements are available to demonstrate the safety of the application explicitly. This study endeavors to develop the framework for a regulatory and technical approach for safe and predictable accelerated materials use in advanced reactors guided by 10 CFR Part 50.43(e)(1), Advanced Reactor Design Criteria contained in Regulatory Guide 1.232, and Reliability Integrity Management Program (RIM) principles.
99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
Decay heat analysis for advanced reactor spent fuel transportation and storage applications
Accurate characterization of nuclide inventories and decay heat in spent nuclear fuel is critical for ensuring its safe handling, storage, transportation, and disposal. Although extensive research has been conducted on light-water reactor fuel, advanced reactors present unique challenges due to their diverse core configurations, fuel characteristics, neutron energy spectra, and burnup levels. Building upon previous efforts that developed representative reactor core models for various advanced reactor types and fuels, this study evaluates reactor-specific decay heat characteristics. The results highlight significant variations across advanced reactor types as well as across reactor designs within the same reactor type, and they provide comparison to typical commercial light-water reactor fuel. For example, thermal-spectrum reactor fuels were observed to have an approximately 100-fold decrease in decay heat over the first decade of cooling, whereas the reduction was 10-fold for fast-spectrum reactor fuels. Mass-specific decay heat at discharge can differ by three orders of magnitude among the fast and thermal reactor systems considered. Overall, for the analyzed advanced reactor fuel, fewer than 17 nuclides account for over 99% of total decay heat at 0.5 years, and that number drops to fewer than 7 nuclides at 100 years of cooling. By quantifying reactor-specific decay heat trends and nuclide contributions, this work provides a technical basis to support the development of spent fuel management strategies for advanced reactor fuels as well as safety evaluations for storage, transportation, and long-term waste disposal.
Advanced reactors↗
Advanced Reactor Designs Security Analysis, Risk, and Recommendations: Risks, Consequences, and Possible by-Design Mitigation Approaches Associated with Select Advanced Reactors
Next-generation advanced reactors (ARs) incorporate enhanced safety systems, have smaller source terms, and feature compact modular designs, which should lessen their collective risk profiles. However, to fully evaluate risk, security needs to be a part of the equation. Without taking security into consideration, safety systems and components in the new ARs may be vulnerable to sabotage. These base attributes, coupled with enhanced security features specific to AR design through sound engineering and security-by-design (SeBD), should provide developers and operators with lower inherent security risk profiles. Building security early into the AR design may remove or passively secure potential critical targets from an adversary’s reach , thereby increasing overall safety and security. An integrated approach and diverse design team that includes engineering, operations, and security experts are fundamental to building security into the design without sacrificing fundamental operational efficiencies and principles. The objective of this project was to evaluate the security and safety interfaces for five classes of reactors, identify potential security vulnerabilities of structures, systems, and components (SSC), and underscore the need to consider security alongside safety in the design o f these concepts. The five reactor classes evaluated in this project and presented in this report are molten-salt reactors (MSR), high temperature gas reactors (HTGR), sodium-fast reactors (SFR), advanced light-water reactors (ALWR), and microreactors. These designs were selected because they reflect the concepts that are closest to market deployment and have received significant resource investments from the public and private sector. This project assesses the inherent security risks posed by common classes of ARs, provides a methodology and framework to assess security along with safety, and offers an analysis of potential mitigation strategies that could be incorporated. For each AR technology, the SSCs that relate to radionuclide source safety functions are discussed to understand the SSC contribution to safety and relative importance in the protective strategy for the design. The assumptions that went into evaluating each reactor concept originated from generic publicly available nonproprietary information and should not directly be used to qualify an absolute risk profile nor to rank specific AR designs. Instead, the purpose of the analysis is to understand and compare the generic inherent security risks of different AR technologies.
98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗
Editorial: Benchmark experiments, development and needs in support of advanced reactor design
Advanced nuclear reactor designs will for the most part be a departure from low enrichment light water reactor (LWR) designs currently operated around the world. Such advanced designs include but are not limited to new TRISO-fueled high temperature gas reactors, heat-pipe cooled micro-reactors, fluoride salt cooled high-temperature reactors, molten salt reactors, lead cooled fast reactors, nuclear thermal propulsion concepts, and include LWR designs with advanced fuel and clad types. Modeling and simulation methods for advanced reactors is necessary for regulators to approve license requests. However, regulators also require that modeling approaches be validated against experimental measurements. Hence, there is a crucial need for data for advanced reactor systems that will support validation of analysis methods. To this end, this Research Topic includes eleven papers organized into topical seven categories relevant for advanced reactor design.
22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
Development of a nearly autonomous management and control system for advanced reactors
This presentation discusses the development of a Nearly Autonomous Management and Control (NAMAC) system for advanced reactors. This presentation first introduces the NAMAC-enabled plant control. Next, this presentation introduces major technologies of implementing NAMAC, including operational workflow, digital twin, and advanced machine learning algorithms. To demonstrate the capability of the NAMAC system, NAMAC is connected with a simulator of the Experimental Breeder Reactor II, where NAMAC is activated to provide recommendations during a single loss of flow accident.
22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
Dynamic responses of submerged components in advanced reactors: experimental and numerical studies
The seismic design of an advanced nuclear reactor must consider the interaction of vessel internal components with the surrounding coolant: fluid–structure interaction (FSI). Available analytical solutions for FSI of submerged components do not accommodate multiple-component, intense seismic inputs and complex reactor and internal geometries. Physical testing of reactor vessels and internals to inform seismic design is impractical and cost-prohibitive, leaving the use of verified and validated, robust numerical models as the only plausible option for analysis and design. Physical data that could be used for validating such numerical models for multi-component shaking are not available. This article describes an experimental program performed on a 6-degree-of-freedom earthquake simulator to generate data that could support validation of seismic FSI numerical models for submerged components in commercial finite element codes. A scaled model of a base-supported reactor vessel with simplified representations of submerged internals was tested to generate submerged-component response histories for a range of seismic inputs. The generated data were used to validate numerical models in the finite element code LS-DYNA. Numerical models were validated for calculation of hydrodynamic pressure responses on internals, in-water frequencies of internals, and acceleration responses of internals. The generated data and the analysis recommendations could aid engineering analysts designing submerged components and systems for seismic effects.
Engineering↗
ORNL Peer Review Summary and Recommendations for: Advanced Reactor Designs Security Analysis, Risk, and Recommendations: Risks, Consequences, and Possible Design Mitigation Approaches Associated with Select Advanced Reactors Study
The purpose of this document is to provide a summary of the peer review conducted for the "Advanced Reactor Designs Security Analysis, Risk, and Recommendations: Risks, Consequences, and Possible Design Mitigation Approaches Associated with Select Advanced Reactors" study prepared by researchers at Idaho National Laboratory (INL), Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) International Nuclear Security (INS) program team requested that ORNL perform a peer review of the study report prior to publication as a final peer check before distributing the report to a broader audience.
22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
Identify and Assess Technical Challenges in Safeguards Measurements of Spent Advanced Reactor Fuels
Advanced reactor (AR) designs use various nuclear fuel types that can be significantly different than conventional light-water reactor (LWR) fuels, including differences in sizes, compositions, and chemical forms (e.g., oxide, carbide, metal). Nearly all the proposed AR fuels use high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU), which will have higher enrichments (5–20 wt% 235 U) than LWR fuels (currently limited to <5 wt% 235 U). In advance of the wide use of these new fuel types around the world, international safeguards organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA]) are working with some of the AR vendors to formulate safeguards approaches for these AR fuel cycles. As part of the overall safeguards approach, it is important to identify the potential technical challenges in performing safeguards verification measurements of these AR fuels (both fresh and spent fuels) in advance of the widespread adoption of these new fuel types, because new safeguards technologies can take several years to develop, test, and approve for use. This report documents work performed in fiscal year 2024 based on modeling and simulation to assess the performance of the existing safeguards measurement technologies for irradiated or spent AR fuel elements or items. This work is a continuation of the work performed in fiscal year 2023 that focused on fresh AR fuels. Spent AR fuels have a distinct difference from their LWR counterparts: unlike the spent LWR fuels typically stored in a water-filled pool, some spent AR fuels—such as tristructural-isotropic (TRISO)-based fuels—will most likely be stored in air-filled hot cells. Because most safeguards measurements on spent fuel performed to date have been conducted under water, the air-filled hot cell environment could present unique challenges to safeguards measurements. Fork detector (FDET) and Cerenkov viewing device (CVD) systems have been the two primary instruments used by the IAEA for several decades to measure spent LWR fuel assemblies stored in pools for safeguards verification purposes. Because the lower refractive index of air causes Cerenkov light to be of lower intensity in air than in water, existing CVDs are likely unable to perform safeguards verification measurements for spent fuel stored in an air-filled hot cell, as is the case for the TRISO-based spent fuel elements (e.g., pebbles, graphite fuel blocks). Unlike FDET measurements, CVD measurements do not require fuel be moved, so they are a simpler and faster to take than FDET measurements. The inability to perform CVD measurements on the TRISO-based AR fuel types presents a major technical challenge in the effort to use existing technology to perform safeguards measurements on spent AR fuels. This study was mainly conducted through the modeling and simulation of an FDET or an FDET-like system on five spent AR fuel types, including one metallic fuel type and four TRISO-based fuel types in both pebble and graphite block forms in their respective storage configurations and environments. Because the various AR fuel types have significantly different dimensions, FDET systems must be adapted to accommodate them. Partial defect tests were also simulated in this study to assess the FDET’s ability to detect potential fuel diversions. The FDET measures the fuel’s total passive neutron and gamma emissions. The simulated FDET results from spent AR fuel items are compared against results from a typical spent pressurized water reactor (PWR) assembly. High-purity germanium (HPGe) gamma detector measurements were also simulated for the spent AR fuel types and the PWR assembly because the signature photopeaks have been used in LWR safeguards verifications, although HPGe is usually not used to detect diversions because of the fuel’s self-attenuation effects on those photopeaks. The results indicate that these detectors have significant challenges in performing safeguards measurements of the spent AR fuel items, including incompatibilities between AR fuel items and existing FDETs, lower neutron count rates, lower sensitivities to fuel diversions in certain AR fuel items, and significantly higher interference from a neighboring fuel item when the measurement is performed in air. These results suggest that an alternative technology or significant and timely technology development is needed to perform adequate safeguards measurements of some of these AR fuel items.
11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
Development of Predictive Models for Advanced Reactor Autonomous Control
Advanced reactor designs including microreactors and small modular reactors will contribute to the clean production of cheap energy, and autonomous control for advanced reactors is an appealing option for reducing cost. However, there is a lack of industry experience applying autonomous control for advanced nuclear reactors. To accelerate the development and industry acceptance of autonomous control software for nuclear reactors, we aim to demonstrate autonomous control of the Purdue University research reactor (PUR-1) using INL-developed model predictive control (MPC) methods. To prepare for this demonstration, data-driven predictive models based on process data collected from PUR-1 have been developed and integrated with MPC and used to control a physics-based model of PUR-1. A data-driven dynamics model and a gated recurrent unit (GRU) network were both trained on process data from PUR-1. The dynamics model was shown to effectively control the reactor model with MPC when provided reactivity as a control variable but failed to control the model through the control rod positions. The GRU network produced more accurate predictions than the dynamics model when evaluated on operational data, and future work will include the evaluation of the GRU network in the controller.
22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
Preliminary Benchmark Uncertainties for Deimos, a HALEU-Fueled and Graphite-Moderated Advanced Reactor Testbed
Many advanced reactor concepts will make use of various uranium fuels with levels of enrichment higher than previously seen in current light water reactors. In particular, High-Assay Low Enriched Uranium (HALEU), that is uranium enriched to 235 U ≈ 20 w/o%, is planned to be used in over ten new reactor concepts. HALEU is attractive for advanced reactors as it enables longer intervals between refueling. Unfortunately, little to no experience with HALEU is available in experimental literature raising concerns for not only licensing advanced re actors but also fabrication and transportation of HALEU fuels. This is where Deimos, a Los Alamos National Laboratory internal project, comes in. Deimos is a new critical experiment scheduled for FY24 at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC). Deimos is a graphite moderated, graphite and beryllium reflected critical experiment making use of HALEU TRi-structural ISOtropic (TRISO) fuel from the Compact Nuclear Power System (CNPS). This transaction entails a brief description of efforts to benchmark Deimos for inclusion into the International Criticality Safety
21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
Environmental Degradation in Advanced Reactor Environments
The Advanced Materials and Manufacturing Technologies (AMMT) program operating under the Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy is accelerating the qualification and deployment of additively manufactured materials in advanced reactor environments. Laser powder bed fusion (LPBF) has emerged as a promising additive manufacturing technique to fabricate complex components with the potential of tailored material properties. In the nuclear industry, metal additive manufacturing can offer numerous advantages, such as reduced lead times, streamlined quality assurance, and cost-effective low-volume production of new and replacement components with conventional or novel materials and geometries. The rapid and effective qualification of the effect of processing variability on the performance and degradation of additively manufactured materials is essential for the deployment of these components into advanced reactor environments. This talk presents an overview of the Environmental Effects area activities within AMMT. AMMT is performing irradiation and corrosion testing of several materials built by LPBF, including 316L and 316H stainless steels. Our irradiation efforts encompass neutron irradiation testing and ion irradiation testing to provide a robust technical basis for understanding the effect of process variability on materials degradation. We develop focused irradiation test plans that align well with risk-informed and technologically inclusive approaches to licensing. We will also discuss our plans and specific concerns for corrosion testing additively manufactured material, with a primary focus on molten salt and liquid sodium environments.
11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
Comparing Legacy Waste Management to Advanced Reactor Waste Management
The Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) and Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) are organizing an international workshop on the implementation of radioactive waste management and decommissioning strategies in small modular reactors (SMRs) and advance reactor technologies. The event will take place in Ottawa, Canada on 7-10 November 2022. The workshop will convene participants from various fields of expertise in the areas of radioactive waste management, decommissioning, nuclear science and development, transportation, as well as young professionals, communication experts and researchers. The goal of the workshop is to devise a guideline document that will serve implementers in understanding key issues in decommissioning and waste management of new reactors from the design perspective, aiding in the licensing process and in future decommissioning and waste management activities. DOE has invested considerably in the innovation of advanced reactors. Interaction in this workshop allows INL and DOE to articulate the importance of looking at the back-end of the fuel cycle for advanced reactors. The back-end of the fuel cycle is important to the success of advanced reactors, and DOE may need to manage this material in the future after it is discharged from reactors. I have been asked to present at the track titled "Operational and Design Optimization Consideration Related to Decommissioning and Radioactive Waste Management for SMRs/Advanced Reactors".
11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
Relevant Advanced Reactor Benchmarks for Nuclear Data Assessment
Advanced reactor concepts currently being developed throughout the industry are significantly different from light water reactor (LWR) designs with respect to geometry, materials, and operating conditions, and consequently, with respect to their reactor physics behavior. Given the limited operating experience with non-LWRs, the accurate simulation of reactor physics and the quantification of associated uncertainties are critical for ensuring that advanced reactor concepts operate within the appropriate safety margins. Nuclear data are a major source of input uncertainties in reactor physics analysis. As part of an ongoing project at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, the effects of nuclear data uncertainties on key figures of merit associated with advanced reactor safety are being assessed for selected advanced reactor technologies. Key nuclear data relevant for reactor safety analysis for each selected advanced reactor technology were identified in Phase 1, and their impact on important key figures of merit was assessed in Phase 2. This report describes the outcome of Phase 3. Available benchmarks and fuel irradiation data for use in evaluating the impact of uncertainties and gaps in nuclear data that impact reactivity control for advanced reactor designs through the fuel cycle were identified and assessed. Benchmarks were identified by searching (1) the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)/Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (IRPhEP) handbook, (2) the OCED/NEA International Reactor Physics Experiment Evaluation Project (IRPhEP) handbook, (3) ongoing OECD/NEA benchmark activities, and (4) documentation in public literature. Relevant benchmarks were identified by selecting reactors with geometry, materials, and neutron energy spectra similar to those of selected advanced reactor technologies. This assessment identified six benchmarks, of which three are experimental and three are purely computational. One experimental and one computation benchmark contain depleted fuel; all others are limited to fresh fuel. This report provides short descriptions of the selected benchmarks along with the availability of measured data for comparison.
22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
Advanced Reactor Safeguards Program Roadmap
The Advanced Reactor Safeguards (ARS) program was established in 2020 as part of appropriations for the Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program (ARDP) through the Office of Nuclear Energy in the Department of Energy. The goal of this program is to help address near term challenges that advanced nuclear reactor vendors face in meeting domestic Material Control and Accountancy (MC&A) and Physical Protection System (PPS) requirements for U.S. construction. Existing regulations for safeguards and security, as outlined in the Code of Federal Regulations, were written for large light water reactors, and some of the requirements are not suited to smaller, safer advanced reactor designs. The ARS program seeks to remove roadblocks in the deployment of new and advanced reactors by solving regulatory challenges, reducing safeguards and security costs, and utilizing the latest technologies and approaches for robust plant monitoring and protection. Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD), or the consideration of safeguards and security requirements early in the design process, is an overarching principle that guides this program. This roadmap discusses the goals of the ARS program, current research, and program plan for the next five years.
21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗