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At least 37 records · Page 2

Policy-managed physical access authentication

Systems and methods are disclosed that provide for physical access management of an access-controlled area of a distributed site of an electric power delivery system using one or more one or more articulated access control policies. In some embodiments, to authenticate rights to access an access-controlled area, a first user may provide an associated access control system with credentials satisfying first authentication requirements based on an applicable policy. In connection with subsequent access authentication requests, the access control system may accept credentials satisfying second authentication requirements that may be different than the first authentication requirements. In this manner, access control requirements to the access-controlled area may be managed based on an associated articulated policy.

Masters, George W.↗

A Hybrid Authentication and Authorization Process for Control System Networks

Convergence of control system and IT networks require that security, privacy, and trust be addressed. Trust management continues to plague traditional IT managers and is even more complex when extended into control system networks, with potentially millions of entities, a mission that requires 100% availability. Yet these very networks necessitate a trusted secure environment where controllers and managers can be assured that the systems are secure and functioning properly. We propose a hybrid authentication management protocol that addresses the unique issues inherent within control system networks, while leveraging the considerable research and momentum in existing IT authentication schemes. Our hybrid authentication protocol for control systems provides end device to end device authentication within a remote station and between remote stations and control centers. Additionally, the hybrid protocol is failsafe and will not interrupt communication or control of vital systems in a network partition or device failure. Finally, the hybrid protocol is resilient to transitory link loss and can operate in an island mode until connectivity is reestablished.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Precoder Design for Physical-Layer Security and Authentication in Massive MIMO UAV Communications

Supporting reliable and seamless wireless connectivity for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has recently become a critical requirement to enable various different use cases of UAVs. Due to their widespread deployment footprint, cellular networks can support beyond visual line of sight (BVLOS) communications for UAVs. In this paper, we consider cellular connected UAVs (C-UAVs) that are served by massive multiple input-multiple-output (MIMO) links to extend coverage range, while also improving physical layer security and authentication. Here, we consider Rician channel and propose a novel linear precoder design for transmitting data and artificial noise (AN). We derive the closed-form expression of the ergodic secrecy rate of CUAVs for both conventional and proposed precoder designs. In addition, we obtain the optimal power splitting factor that divides the power between data and AN by asymptotic analysis. Then, we apply the proposed precoder design in the fingerprint embedding authentication framework, where the goal is to minimize the probability of detection of the authentication tag at an eavesdropper. In simulation results, we show the superiority of the proposed precoder in both secrecy rate and the authentication probability considering moderate and large number of antenna massive MIMO scenarios.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Network-based Classification of Authentication Attempts using Machine Learning

Network security operators are challenged with protecting an increasing number of clients from authentication-based attacks such as password guessing. Host-based defenses help in preventing such attacks but are difficult to manage and monitor at scale. These challenges open the door for network-based defenses. In this work, we introduce AuthML. AuthML performs protocol-agnostic authentication modeling to detect successful and unsuccessful authentication attempts at the network level. Using machine learning (ML), AuthML operates directly on network communication to determine the outcome of authentication attempts in real time. To show AuthML’s efficacy, we validate our approach on multiple deployment scenarios. AuthML achieves an accuracy of 99.9% examining 29,015 new flows in this operational phase, demonstrating that we can achieve similar performance in real time to state-of-the-art techniques without manual protocol analysis.

Taylor, Curtis↗

Hardware authentication using transmission spectra modified optical fiber.

The ability to authenticate the source and integrity of data is critical to the monitoring and inspection of special nuclear materials, including hardware related to weapons production. Current methods rely on electronic encryption/authentication codes housed in monitoring devices. This always invites the question of implementation and protection of authentication information in an electronic component necessitating EMI shielding, possibly an on board power source to maintain the information in memory. By using atomic layer deposition techniques (ALD) on photonic band gap (PBG) optical fibers we will explore the potential to randomly manipulate the output spectrum and intensity of an input light source. This randomization could produce unique signatures authenticating devices with the potential to authenticate data. An external light source projected through the fiber with a spectrometer at the exit would 'read' the unique signature. No internal power or computational resources would be required.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Final Report for FY15 Spent Fuel Project Task 12: Data Authentication

The data authentication task is concerned with the ability of a user to trust the output from an unattended measurement of spent nuclear fuel intended for disposal. Five high-level requirements that are driven from a data authentication perspective need to be considered for instrument development: The instrument must be secured. All data emerging from the instrument must be signed. Instrument inputs may also need to be signed and authenticated. The instrument environment needs to be controlled. A vulnerability assessment will be necessary for the full system before deployment. Additional requirements may be necessary, especially if operational scenarios include arrangements for joint use. None of the prototype instruments currently under development yet satisfies any of these requirements. From a data authentication perspective, the selection of a preferred instrument from among the candidates under development should consider the relative ability to secure the instrument, its relative needs for ancillary instrumentation, and ability of the instrument to self-interrogate its state of health. Further work is recommended to develop advanced technologies, methods and approaches for tamper indication. Beyond the development of any particular instrument for the nondestructive assay of spent fuel, efforts should be devoted to developing the system for spent fuel verification prior to long term disposal, including likely operational scenarios for routine use of the verification system.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Advanced Reactor Control Systems Authentication Methods and Recommendations

In the dynamic landscape of Operational Technology (OT), and specifically the emerging landscape for Advanced Reactors, the establishment of trust between digital assets emerges as a challenge for cybersecurity modernization. This report reviews existing approaches to authentication in Enterprise environments, and proposed methods for authentication in OT, and analyzes each for its applicability to future Advanced Reactor digital networks. Principles of authentication ranging from underlying cryptographic mechanisms to trust authorities are evaluated through the lens of OT. These facets emphasize the importance of mutual authentication in real-time environments, enabling a paradigm shift from the current approach of strong boundaries to a more malleable network that allows for flexible operation. This work finds that there is a need for evaluation and decision making by industry stakeholders, but current technologies and approaches can be adapted to fit needs and risk tolerances.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Verifiable process monitoring through enhanced data authentication.

To ensure the peaceful intent for production and processing of nuclear fuel, verifiable process monitoring of the fuel production cycle is required. As part of a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)-EURATOM collaboration in the field of international nuclear safeguards, the DOE Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), the European Commission Joint Research Centre (JRC) and Directorate General-Energy (DG-ENER) developed and demonstrated a new concept in process monitoring, enabling the use of operator process information by branching a second, authenticated data stream to the Safeguards inspectorate. This information would be complementary to independent safeguards data, improving the understanding of the plant's operation. The concept is called the Enhanced Data Authentication System (EDAS). EDAS transparently captures, authenticates, and encrypts communication data that is transmitted between operator control computers and connected analytical equipment utilized in nuclear processes controls. The intent is to capture information as close to the sensor point as possible to assure the highest possible confidence in the branched data. Data must be collected transparently by the EDAS: Operator processes should not be altered or disrupted by the insertion of the EDAS as a monitoring system for safeguards. EDAS employs public key authentication providing 'jointly verifiable' data and private key encryption for confidentiality. Timestamps and data source are also added to the collected data for analysis. The core of the system hardware is in a security enclosure with both active and passive tamper indication. Further, the system has the ability to monitor seals or other security devices in close proximity. This paper will discuss the EDAS concept, recent technical developments, intended application philosophy and the planned future progression of this system.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Simultaneous Authentication and Certification of Arms-Control Measurement Systems

Most arms-control-treaty-monitoring scenarios involve a host party that makes a declaration regarding its nuclear material or items and a monitoring party that verifies that declaration. A verification system developed for such a use needs to be trusted by both parties. The first concern, primarily from the host party's point of view, is that any sensitive information that is collected must be protected without interfering in the efficient operation of the facility being monitored. This concern is addressed in what can be termed a 'certification' process. The second concern, of particular interest to the monitoring party, is that it must be possible to confirm the veracity of both the measurement system and the data produced by this measurement system. The monitoring party addresses these issues during an 'authentication' process. Addressing either one of these concerns independently is relatively straightforward. However, it is more difficult to simultaneously satisfy host party certification concerns and monitoring party authentication concerns. Typically, both parties will want the final access to the measurement system. We will describe an alternative approach that allows both parties to gain confidence simultaneously. This approach starts with (1) joint development of the measurement system followed by (2) host certification of several copies of the system and (3) random selection by the inspecting party of one copy to be use during the monitoring visit and one (or more) copy(s) to be returned to the inspecting party's facilities for (4) further hardware authentication; any remaining copies are stored under joint seal for use as spares. Following this process, the parties will jointly (5) perform functional testing on the selected measurement system and then (6) use this system during the monitoring visit. Steps (1) and (2) assure the host party as to the certification of whichever system is eventually used in the monitoring visit. Steps (1), (3), (4), and (5) increase the monitoring party's confidence in the authentication of the measurement system.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Hardware device binding and mutual authentication

Detection and deterrence of device tampering and subversion by substitution may be achieved by including a cryptographic unit within a computing device for binding multiple hardware devices and mutually authenticating the devices. The cryptographic unit includes a physically unclonable function ("PUF") circuit disposed in or on the hardware device, which generates a binding PUF value. The cryptographic unit uses the binding PUF value during an enrollment phase and subsequent authentication phases. During a subsequent authentication phase, the cryptographic unit uses the binding PUF values of the multiple hardware devices to generate a challenge to send to the other device, and to verify a challenge received from the other device to mutually authenticate the hardware devices.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Sensor Authentication in Collaborating Sensor Networks

In this thesis, we address a new security problem in the realm of collaborating sensor networks. By collaborating sensor networks, we refer to the networks of sensor networks collaborating on a mission, with each sensor network is independently owned and operated by separate entities. Such networks are practical where a number of independent entities can deploy their own sensor networks in multi-national, commercial, and environmental scenarios, and some of these networks will integrate complementary functionalities for a mission. In the scenario, we address an authentication problem wherein the goal is for the Operator O i of Sensor Network S i to correctly determine the number of active sensors in Network Si. Such a problem is challenging in collaborating sensor networks where other sensor networks, despite showing an intent to collaborate, may not be completely trustworthy and could compromise the authentication process. We propose two authentication protocols to address this problem. Our protocols rely on Physically Unclonable Functions, which are a hardware based authentication primitive exploiting inherent randomness in circuit fabrication. Our protocols are light-weight, energy efficient, and highly secure against a number of attacks. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first to addresses a practical security problem in collaborating sensor networks.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Multi-factor authentication using quantum communication

Multi-factor authentication using quantum communication ("QC") includes stages for enrollment and identification. For example, a user enrolls for multi-factor authentication that uses QC with a trusted authority. The trusted authority transmits device factor information associated with a user device (such as a hash function) and user factor information associated with the user (such as an encrypted version of a user password). The user device receives and stores the device factor information and user factor information. For multi-factor authentication that uses QC, the user device retrieves its stored device factor information and user factor information, then transmits the user factor information to the trusted authority, which also retrieves its stored device factor information. The user device and trusted authority use the device factor information and user factor information (more specifically, information such as a user password that is the basis of the user factor information) in multi-factor authentication that uses QC.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

System for authenticating an additively manufactured object

A method for authenticating an additively manufactured (AM) object is disclosed herein. A computing device obtains a measurement that is indicative of a stochastic distribution of dopant incorporated into the AM object. The computing device generates authentication data for the AM object based upon the measurement, and authenticates the AM object based upon the authentication data.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Data source authentication of synchrophasor measurement devices based on 1D-CNN and GRU

Synchrophasor measurement devices (SMDs) have been widely deployed to support real-time monitoring and control of power systems. In the meantime, data spoofing has emerged in recent years. Therefore, it is of great importance to study data authentication algorithms for detecting and defending the data spoofing effectively. Here, a one-dimensional convolutional neural network (1D-CNN) is utilized to extract temporal signatures hidden in frequency, voltage angle and amplitude data; then the gated recurrent unit (GRU) employs these temporal signatures for data source authentication. In case studies, the performances of different algorithms are tested in large-scale power systems with numerous SMDs for the first time, and comparisons among different algorithms show that the proposed algorithm can achieve a higher accuracy of data source authentication with a shorter time window.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

PUF-Based Two-Factor Authentication Protocol for Securing the Power Grid Against Insider Threat

Recent advances in smart grid technologies have enabled additional distributed control paradigms that allow more efficient and reliable operation. However, this creates new security concerns for the grid, such as attackers using spoofed grid control devices to generate false measurements. This paper introduces a two-factor authentication protocol leveraging standard public-key cryptography as one authentication factor and a hardware-based fingerprint, known as a Physical Unclonable Function, as a second authentication factor. This protocol incurs a small overhead and prevents cyber-attacks even when an adversary is able to compromise the cryptographic keys stored in the non-volatile memory of an intelligent control device.

42 ENGINEERING↗

A Proxy Signature-Based Drone Authentication in 5G D2D Networks

5G is the beginning of a new era in cellular communication, bringing up a highly connected network with the incorporation of the Internet of Things (IoT). To flexibly operate all the IoT devices over a cellular network, Device-toDevice (D2D) communication standard was developed. However, IoT devices such as drones utilizing 5G D2D services could be a perfect target for malicious attacks as they pose several safety threats if they are compromised. Furthermore, there will be heavy traffic with an increased number of IoT devices connected to the 5G core. Therefore, we propose a lightweight, fast, and reliable authentication mechanism compatible with the 5G D2D ProSe standard mechanisms. Specifically, we propose a distributed authentication with a delegation-based scheme instead of the repeated access to the 5G core network key management functions. Hence, a legitimate drone is authorized by the core network via offering a proxy signature to authenticate itself to other drones. We implemented the proposed protocol in ns-3 that supports 5G D2D-based communication. We also conducted computational calculations on the RaspberryPi3 IoT device to mimic the drone calculation process and delays. The results demonstrate that the proposed protocol is lightweight and reliable

5G security↗

Clean Energy Cybersecurity Accelerator Cohort 1: Authentication and Authorization

In the 2023 National Cybersecurity Strategy, the Biden-Harris Administration defines the need for a "defensible, resilient digital ecosystem where it is costlier to attack systems than defend them." The strategy cites the Clean Energy Cybersecurity Accelerator (CECA) as an exemplary effort to bolster the security and resilience of clean energy generation. These efforts help "secure the clean energy grid of the future and [generate] security best practices that extend to other critical infrastructure sectors" and promise broad and far-reaching impacts to bridge the capabilities of private industry and the needs of energy production. Cohort 1 of CECA launched in the fall of 2022 with a focus on solutions that provide strong authentication and authorization for industrial control systems to mitigate attacks on the energy grid. Authentication and authorization verify that the identity (authentication) and permissions (authorization) of a user or device are aligned with their assigned roles. Weaknesses in either can have serious repercussions. To assess the strength of Cohort 1's solutions, CECA devised threat scenarios grounded in historical precedents: the CECA team reviewed exploits from real-world case studies of state-sponsored actors to match the assessment's attack paths and targets. Cohort 1 results provided the energy industry, product vendors, and related agencies valuable insights into the efficacy and applicability of solutions in common system configurations under realistic threat scenarios. The results of the assessment highlight points for interrogation and improvement in subsequent technology iterations. CECA's evaluations are part of an ongoing conversation and collaboration to bolster U.S. cyber resilience against adversaries today and in the future.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Highlighting the Importance of Authentic Reference Chemicals in the Unambiguous Identification of Unknowns during Routine Sample Analysis─An OPCW Proficiency Test Case

The unequivocal identification of unknown chemicals during routine sample analysis is a constant occurrence in the field of analytical chemistry. The process can be painstakingly tedious, particularly in situations where a tentatively identified unknown may possess isomeric counterparts yielding identical accurate mass values and very similar mass spectra. In this work, we present the experimental process involved in the correct identification of 1,4-oxathiane 4,4-dioxide and differentiation from its constitutional isomer, 2-hydroxyethyl vinyl sulfone, when present in a silica gel matrix featured in the 54th Environmental Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) proficiency test. After discovering that the library-generated mass spectrum for 2-hydroxyethyl vinyl sulfone in a preliminary gas chromatography–mass spectrometry (GC-MS) analysis did not match the one from an authentic reference chemical, we embarked on an unknown structure determination campaign involving GC-MS, liquid chromatography-tandem mass spectrometry (LC-MS-MS), and nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) spectroscopy. All of the information obtained, coupled to the synthesis of an authentic reference chemical, was used to determine the identity of the unknown as 1,4-oxathiane 4,4-dioxide. The process described in this work highlights the important role played by authentic reference chemicals in the identification of unknown chemicals during routine sample analysis.

Chemistry↗