Banning design automation software implementation Interim report
Computer programming for automatic MOS-FET circuit design
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Computer programming for automatic MOS-FET circuit design
A manual containing computer programs for designing circuits is presented. A description of the pattern library, the plotter used to draw the circuit patterns, and program control cards is given. Sample printouts and cards are shown.
The research is reported for developing a system of computer programs to aid engineering in the design, fabrication, and testing of large scale integrated circuits, hybrid circuits, and printed circuit boards. The automatic layout programs, analysis programs, and interface programs are discussed.
A family of standardized thick-oxide P-MOS building blocks (standard cells) is described. The information is presented in a form useful for systems designs, logic design, and the preparation of inputs to both sets of Design Automation programs for array design and analysis. A data sheet is provided for each cell and gives the cell name, the cell number, its logic symbol, Boolean equation, truth table, circuit schematic circuit composite, input-output capacitances, and revision date. The circuit type file, also given for each cell, together with the logic drawing contained on the data sheet provides all the information required to prepare input data files for the Design Automation Systems. A detailed description of the electrical design procedure is included.
While Earth orbiting spacecraft navigation has routinely been able to use various sorts of range data at accuracies of 2 meters or better, interplanetary spacecraft navigation using long data arcs has had to artificially deweight range data to 1 kilometer or more, ....
Armed and ready to fire, Adams remained suspended under a balloon high over the Nevada Test Site throughout the day and night of October 31, 1958. Shortly after midnight, Adams was lowered to the ground and disarmed. With that, Operation Hardtack II ended and a test moratorium, primarily a gentlemen’s agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, took effect. As the possibility of a moratorium became more and more likely in late 1957, the Atomic Energy Commission and its two weapon laboratories sought Presidential approval for an unprecedented number of tests for the coming year, including a proposal by the UCRL for a series of underground and safety tests in an operation called Millrace. Not wanting to jeopardize ongoing international disarmament talks as well as the moratorium, itself, Eisenhower resisted giving approval for Millrace until late August 1958, barely two months before the anticipated start of the moratorium. Millrace, quickly renamed Hardtack II, was expanded to thirty-seven tests beginning with Otero on September 12 th and concluding with Titania on October 30 th . Eighteen devices, including Otero and Titania, were safety tests. Three of these tests explored “safety characteristics for underground detonations” in tunnels. Two of the three such tests vented. In this respect, Hardtack II was a harbinger of the future in that the problem of venting was never fully resolved. Other safety tests, designed to give no yield, were more successful with San Juan, Oberon, and Ganymede having “no measurable yield.”
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it will demonstrate how technical cooperation on verification contributed to the softening of tensions and the improvement of trust between the United States and the Soviet Union. Because the scope of this endeavor is too broad to be adequately considered in the length of this work, the primary focus will be on the private and public partnerships on seismic and hydroacoustic test ban treaty verification that were forged between Soviet and American scientists from 1986-1988. In order to orient the analysis within the political-scientific landscape of the time, the discussion begins with a brief description of the arms control landscape in the early 1980s, including both the stances of the Reagan and Gorbachev administrations vis a vis nuclear test ban verification. The section concludes with an analysis of the two primary US-USSR collaborative projects in this key sphere – the test ban verification project conducted by the National Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and Soviet Academy of Sciences (SAS) and the Joint Verification Experiment (JVE) between the US and Soviet National Laboratories.
This project was part of an effort by Commonwealth Edison Company (ComEd) to evaluate the energy and peak demand saving potential of emerging technologies in the Chicago area. This document focuses on the assessment of energy-efficient, medium-temperature, self-contained refrigerated display cases utilizing environmentally friendly refrigerants. The results of this evaluation will be considered by CLEAResult to develop a new energy efficiency rebate measure for ComEd's incentive programs. This rebate measure will become an addition to the Technical Reference Manual (TRM). In 2016, the United Nations passed the Kigali Montreal Protocol Amendment which placed restrictions on certain types of refrigerants. In compliance with this amendment, the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) placed a ban on the manufacture of refrigeration systems using hydrofluorocarbons including R134a starting in January 2020. Although the ban has halted manufacture, the EPA continues to allow the use of these refrigerants. Therefore, it is critical to provide incentives for replacing these refrigerants with other environmentally friendly and energy-efficient alternatives. The energy-efficient refrigerator cases evaluated here (referred to as EE Case A and B) contain environmentally-friendly refrigerants in compliance with the EPA hydrofluorocarbon ban. These consist of natural refrigerant propane (R290), and HFC drop-in hydrofluoroolefin R513a, respectively. These cases also contain other energy-efficient components including efficient lighting, more robust evaporator and condenser fans and different-sized heat exchangers. EE Case A is also built with materials that better insulate the case, which improves energy efficiency. To ascertain the energy efficiency contribution of these design components, the consumption of the evaporator and condenser fan motors, compressor, and lighting/controller were evaluated individually. The medium-temperature, self-contained reach-in refrigerated display case was selected due to its widespread use in convenience stores and small supermarkets. Self-contained refrigeration has also seen increased use in restaurants due to curbside pickup during the COVID-19 pandemic. For this study, the refrigerated display cases' performance was evaluated in a controlled environmental chamber at representative indoor dry-bulb and humidity conditions found in supermarkets within ComEd's service territory climate zone. The test method used in this project was foundationally inspired by the ANSI/ASHRAE 72-2018 method of testing. However, modifications to the ANSI/ASHRAE test methodology were implemented to better represent customer operation of the units. In addition to the indoor supermarket conditions, the cases were also evaluated at the "upper target," or environmental conditions used in ANSI/ASHRAE 72-2018. The case total power and case components were metered to obtain their daily power (kW) and energy consumption(kWh). The cases were filled with thermal filler mass to replicate thermal mass of product loading. Additionally, product simulators were used to provide product temperature information. Door actuators were mounted to each of the cases' three doors to replicate regular door openings and effects of shopper traffic.
All research and development has a story behind it, says Jacqueline Quinn, environmental engineer at Kennedy Space Center. For Quinn, one such story begins with the Saturn 1B launch stand at Kennedy and ends with a unique solution to a challenging environmental problem. Used in a number of Apollo missions and during the Skylab program, the Saturn 1B launch stand was dismantled following the transition to the Space Shuttle Program and stored in an open field at Kennedy. Decades later, the Center s Environmental Program Office discovered evidence of chemicals called polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) in the field s soil. The findings were puzzling since PCBs a toxin classified as a probable carcinogen by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have been banned in the United States since 1979. Before the ban, PCBs were commonly used in transformer oils that leached into the ground when the oils were changed out and dumped near transformer sites, but there were no electrical transformers near the dismantled stand. It soon became apparent that the source of the PCBs was the launch stand itself. Prior to the ban, PCBs were used extensively in paints to add elasticity and other desirable characteristics. The PCB-laden paint on the Saturn 1B launch stand was flaking off into the field s soil. Nobody knew there were PCBs in the paint, says Quinn, noting that the ingredient was not monitored carefully when it was in use in 1960s. In fact, she says, the U.S. EPA was not even established until 1970, a year after Neil Armstrong first set foot on the Moon. Nobody knew any better at the time, Quinn says, but today, we have the responsibility to return any natural environmental media to as close to pristine a condition as possible. Quinn, fellow engineer Kathleen Loftin, and other Kennedy colleagues already had experience developing unprecedented solutions for environmental contamination; the team invented the emulsified zero-valent iron (EZVI) technology to safely treat groundwater tainted by chlorinated solvents once used to clean rocket engine components. The award-winning innovation (Spinoff 2010) is now NASA s most licensed technology to date. PCBs in paint presented a new challenge. Removing the launch stand for recycling proved a difficult operation; the toxic paint had to be fully stripped from the steel structure, a lengthy and costly process that required the stripped paint to be treated before disposal. Noting the lack of efficient, environmentally friendly options for dealing with PCBs, Quinn and her colleagues developed the Activated Metal Treatment System (AMTS). AMTS is a paste consisting of a solvent solution containing microscale particles of activated zero-valent metal. When applied to a painted surface, the paste extracts and degrades the PCBs into benign byproducts while leaving the paint on the structure. This provides a superior alternative to other methods for PCB remediation, such as stripping the paint or incinerating the structure, which prevents reuse and can release volatized PCBs into the air. Since its development, AMTS has proven to be a valuable solution for removing PCBs from paint, caulking, and various insulation and filler materials in older buildings, naval ships, and former munitions facilities where the presence of PCBs interferes with methods for removing trace explosive materials. Miles of potentially toxic caulking join sections of runways at airports. Any of these materials installed before 1979 potentially contain PCBs, Quinn says. "This is not just a NASA problem," she says. "It s a global problem."
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) bans nuclear weapons testing and establishes the International Monitoring System (IMS) for the purpose of treaty verification. IMS is a detector network that confirms that global nuclear activity is peaceful in nature. These detector systems use β-γcoincidence measurements to characterize atmospheric samples containing radioxenon isotopes. The goal of this work is to use the system consisting of two sodium iodide detectors and two PIPSbox detectors to characterize isotopically pure samples of 131m Xe, 133m Xe, 133 Xe, and 135 Xe via β, γ, and β-γ coincidence measurements.
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) bans the testing of nuclear weapons anywhere on the earth (atmospheric, surface, underwater and subsurface). Identification of nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, surface, and underwater is relatively straightforward considering a wide range of signatures resulting from such an event. However, for a subsurface explosion, most of the signatures traditionally associated with a nuclear explosion are not readily available. Therefore, the international community has increasingly relied on the atmospheric measurement of noble gases to identify subsurface nuclear weapon explosions. This chapter initially covers the basic principles of subsurface nuclear explosion identification and the importance of detecting radioxenon. This is followed by reviewing some of the early radioxenon detection systems that were developed by research groups around the world in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The detection media employed, results from laboratory and field testing, and some challenges/drawbacks for these systems are detailed. The next section of the chapter is dedicated to innovative detector concepts that have emerged in the past ten to fifteen years using novel detection material, algorithms, and signal readout techniques. The advances achieved in terms of energy resolution, coincidence detection efficiencies, system performance, and the minimum detectable concentration are covered. The final section goes over some of the potential improvements that can be incorporated in the design to enhance detector sensitivity and new detection material that can be explored in the field of radioxenon detection.
The purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is to establish a legally binding ban on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. The Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization (CTBTO PrepCom) is developing the International Monitoring System (IMS) that includes a global network of 80 stations to monitor for airborne radionuclides upon entry into force of the CTBT. All 80 radionuclide stations will monitor for particulate radionuclides and at least half of the stations will monitor for radioxenon. The airborne radionuclide monitoring is an important verification technology both for the detection of a radionuclide release and in the determination of whether the release event originates from a nuclear explosion as opposed to an industrial use of nuclear materials. Nuclear power plants and many medical isotope production facilities release radioxenon into the atmosphere. Low levels of a few particulate isotopes, such as iodine, may also be released. Detections of multiple isotopes are useful for screening the radionuclide samples for relevance to the Treaty. This paper examines the anticipated joint detections in the IMS of noble gas and particulate isotopes from underground nuclear explosions where breaches in the underground containment vents from low levels to up to 1% of the radionuclide inventory of the resulting fission products to the atmosphere. Detection probabilities are based on 844 simulated release events spaced out at 17 release locations and one year in time. Six different release (venting) scenarios, including two fractionated scenarios, were analyzed. When ranked by detection probability, 11 particulate isotopes and one noble gas isotope ( 133 Xe) appear in the top 20 isotopes for all six release scenarios. Using the 11 particulate isotopes and the one noble gas isotope, the IMS has nearly the same detection probability as when 45 particulate and 4 noble gas isotopes are used. Thus, a limited list of relevant radionuclides may be sufficient for treaty verification purposes. The probability that at least one particulate and at least one radioxenon isotope would be detected in the IMS from the release events ranged from 0.15 to 0.86 depending on the release scenario.
Here, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty bans all nuclear tests worldwide. As part of treaty compliance, the concentration of radioactive nuclides in the atmosphere is monitored to detect nuclear weapons tests. Radioactive noble gas fission products, specifically radioxenon, can vent into the atmosphere after a nuclear weapons test, even if the test is well contained underground or underwater. Radioxenon thus serves as a signal for nuclear weapons tests. All atmospheric monitoring systems require samples of radioxenon isotopes for detector calibration, quality control, and certification. Here, we present a novel, improved method for creating samples of 133m Xe via neutron irradiation of 132 Xe in the Washington State University TRIGA reactor. 132 Xe neutron absorption results in either 133 Xe or 133m Xe—thermal neutron absorption results in 133m Xe 12% of the time, while fast neutron absorption (above ~1 MeV) results in 133m Xe ~50% of the time. To optimize the production of 133m Xe via neutron absorption in 132 Xe in the thermal TRIGA reactor, spectral tuning using an irradiation chamber is required to maximize the fraction of fast neutrons being absorbed and minimize the number of thermal neutrons interacting with the 132 Xe. We used MCNP to tally 132 Xe absorptions with the isotopic tally function, flux tallies and neutron attenuation to estimate the number of neutrons reaching the 132 Xe through the irradiation chamber, and the adjoint importance function to improve the source strength estimate. Additionally, we performed a heat transfer analysis for safety considerations. It was determined that the use of a 96% enriched 10 B boron carbide chamber, placed next to the fuel elements in reactor position D8, increases the 133m Xe/ 133 Xe activity ratio from a baseline value of 0.3 to 1.0, a 233% increase. Additionally, it was determined that the alpha heating produced in the boron does not become an unmanageable problem in the Washington State University reactor.
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty mandates the four verification technologies to be used by the International Monitoring System (IMS) to monitor compliance to the Treaty. These technologies are seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide. Operational manuals for each of these technologies specify the requirements that equipment installed at IMS stations must meet for data from said stations to be accepted by the International Data Center. Following a model in which a revised set of infrasound sensor specifications and accompanying test procedures were developed in an international collaboration overseen by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, the same process was recently followed for seismometers potentially of use by the IMS. This document, a product of that collaboration, defines key concepts and recommends test procedures to be followed to characterize broadband seismometers in a consistent and standardized way. Results from these test procedures can be used to verify that a seismometer meets the manufacturers stated specifications and IMS requirements. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The writers of this document would like to acknowledge Charles R. Hutt, John R. Evans, Fred Followill, Robert L. Nigbor, and Erhard Wielandt, the authors of the 2009 Guidelines for Standardized Testing of Broadband Seismometers and Accelerometers funded by the U.S. Department of Interior, on which this document is based. Although this document is limited in scope to seismometers and much of the document has been updated, the structure remains essentially the same.
In the wake of California’s new regulations for Underground Injection Control (enacted in April 2019) and several recent high-visibility surface expressions associated with high-pressure cyclic steaming in diatomite formations, a Moratorium on the issuance of permits for new wells using high pressure steam injection was announced on November 19, 2019. We, a panel consisting of technical experts and regulators from CalGEM and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, were commissioned by CalGEM to carry out the study as documented in this report, to: Determine if projects using cyclic steam injection above fracturing pressure (referred to as “cyclic steaming” hereafter) can be implemented safely, and Identify specific criteria for future permitting should the Moratorium be lifted.
Environmental Protection and Compliance, Environmental Stewardship Group (EPC-ES) has evaluated the survey results for metal items from the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE) at Technical Area 53 (TA-53) and found that the metal items described in Table 1 of this report (identified by Radiation Protection [RP] Tracking Numbers) meet the criteria for unrestricted release under Department of Energy (DOE) Order 458.1 Chg 4, Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment (DOE 2020) and can be recycled. This conclusion is based on the known history of the metal items and radiation survey data (see the completed RP-Form-031 LANSCE Metals Clearance Log [LANL 2021a] for each item in Attachment 1). Process knowledge indicates that items were released from radiological areas, including radiation areas, prior to the implementation of the 2000 metals moratorium. Therefore, the items are considered unencumbered and are not subject to the moratorium suspension on metal recycling from DOE facilities. Additionally, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has determined that there is no practical opportunity for internal DOE reuse of this metal. Process knowledge indicates that these metal items were unlikely to ever be in direct contact with the beam and thus are unlikely to have become activated. Surface contamination measurements (both total and removable) showed either no detectable radioactivity or activity levels within the range of background. All measurements for volumetric contamination were indistinguishable from background based on calculated decision limits. Additionally, all gamma isotopic surveys conducted for defense-in depth showed no identifiable gamma radiation from beam activation.
The relative merits and difficulties of the primary and secondary origin hypotheses for the observed cosmic-ray antiprotons, including the new low-energy measurement of Buffington, et al. We conclude that the cosmic-ray antiproton data may be evidence for antimatter galaxies and baryon symmetric cosmology. The present bar P data are consistent with a primary extragalactic component having /p=/equiv 1+/- 3.2/0.7x10 = to the -4 independent of energy. We propose that the primary extragalactic cosmic ray antiprotons are most likely from active galaxies and that expected disintegration of bar alpha/alpha ban alpha/alpha. We further predict a value for ban alpha/alpha =/equiv 10 to the -5, within range of future cosmic ray detectors.
Polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) are a group of synthetic aromatic compounds with the general formula C 12H1oCl that were historically used in industrial paints, caulking material and adhesives, as their properties enhanced structural integrity, reduced flammability and boosted antifungal properties. Although the United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) has banned the manufacture of PCBs since 1979, they have been found in at least 500 of the 1,598 National Priorities List (Superfund) sites identified by the USEPA. Prior to the USEPA's ban on PCB production, PCBs were commonly used as additives in paints and asphalt-based adhesives that were subsequently applied to a variety of structures. Government facilities constructed as early as 1930 utilized PCB-containing binders or PCB-containing paints, which are now leaching into the environment and posing ecological and worker health concerns. To date, no definitive in situ, non-destructive method is available for the removal of PCBs found in weathered coatings or on painted structures/equipment. The research described in this paper involves the laboratory development and field-scale deployment of a new and innovative solution for the removal and destruction of PCBs found in painted structures or within the binding or caulking material on structures. The technology incorporates a Bimetallic Treatment System (BTS) that extracts and degrades only the PCBs found on the facilities, leaving the structure virtually unaltered.