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Large Volume Airborne Contamination Monitoring To Support Nuclear Processes' Deactivation and Decommissioning

Current D and D operations at Hanford have demonstrated a flaw in the current state of the art capability of defining airborne contamination boundaries - Airborne particulate emissions of Pu-239 from CM2H operations on the Hanford Pu Finishing Plant were detected well beyond areas controlled for airborne Pu, putting numerous workers at risk for radiological assimilations - Current air samplers and CAM systems were surveying insufficient volumes of air to accurately predict where respiratory protection was required - Hanford is located in a high radon environment, making air monitoring for alpha emitting actinides challenging in high alpha radon induced backgrounds. - Inexpensive HEPA based home and industrial air purifiers filter significantly higher volumes of air than commercially available continuous-air monitoring (CAM) systems. - Inexpensive models capable of filtered air volumes exceeding 1000 times that of a CAM. - Detector system can be built to detect x-rays generated from actinide decay. - Branching ratios of x-rays are 4 orders of magnitude more intense from Plutonium decay than its gamma emissions. - Detector system can be a low resolution systems, as x-ray region of interest is not terribly congested. - Detection systems evaluated will be designed based on slabs of NaI or pixelated NaI or CsI panels. - Simple graphical user interface software will be developed to operate the detection system. - Concept is to deploy some of these air-purifying systems in nonradiological areas around SRNL to confirm radon can be rejected with confidence. - Generate some filters contaminated with plutonium via electroplated Pu or lab generated simulated particles. - then deploy units in known airborne radiological environments to establish systems ability to accurately measure actinide based hot particles Lab analyses will follow up the system analyses to ensure hot particles were correctly identified. Analysis by Scintillation: - Application of scintillation media to the surface of the filters is being explored. - Evaluating slabs of ZnS(Ag), application of powdered ZnS(Cu) and spray on Perkin Elmer Enhance. - Scintillation events would then be digitized with a digital camera and quantified. - Comparing against sensitivity of a PMT or SiPD readout. - Currently evaluating a Thorlabs 8 Megapixel Monochrome Scientific CCD Camera, hermetically sealed cooled package with a wide angle lens. - Wide angle lens allows complete view of HEPA filter from 7 inches away. - Images taken of glow in the dark paint, as well as plutonium-induced fluorescence. - Plutonium was flamed mounted on a 1 inch diameter stainless steel planchet, covered with a layer of mylar and a section of scintillating ZnS obtained from Eljon. - Currently working on reducing signal-to-noise levels to boost sensitivity. - Dark box to hold contaminated or electroplated source covered filters under fabrication. Analysis by x-ray Spectroscopy: - Branching ratios for x-ray emissions from Plutonium isotopes are orders of magnitude more intense than gamma-ray emissions. - The nuclear databases are incomplete on the branching ratios of some of the isotopes. - Evaluating some custom built SrI2 x-ray spectrometers vs a conventional windowed NaI detector. - SrI2 detectors are carbon-composite-windowed 51 mm x 51 mm. - MCNP calculations to establish self absorbance of filter media on 17 keV x-ray. Radon Rejection: - Activated charcoal pre-filter acts as a Radon trap. - Adding a time lapse feature to camera to aid in radon rejection. SRS Plutonium Fuel Form D and D Operations: Currently deploying air sampler to D and D operation of Pu-238 facility at SRS to generate some field samples to analyze.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

WIPP Safety Significant Confinement Ventilation System (SSCVS) HEPA Filtration System - 20165

Construction and major equipment fabrication are underway for a new ventilation exhaust system at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The new system will provide continuous High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filtration of the exhaust from the WIPP underground while meeting the ventilation demands for expanded waste emplacement and mining operations over the next 40 years. The integrated system design provides for reducing the salt, clay and diesel particulates from the exhaust airflow from the mine, prior to full filtration using Nuclear Safety Significant HEPA filters. The SSCVS design and equipment provides for continuous HEPA filtration over a wide range of operating and environmental conditions. The new exhaust system connects to the existing underground exhaust shaft, and the exhaust air flows from the underground through Salt Reduction Units (SRUs) to protect the final filter banks from excessive moisture and rapid salt/dust buildup. Each of the six (6) SRUs consists of a demister to remove entrained moisture, a dry salt remover unit to filter approximately 90% of the entrained salt/dust, and an automated water treatment system to periodically clean the demisters and to remove salt from the SRU filters. At the maximum expected exhaust flowrate of 540,000 Cubic Feet per Minute (CFM) / 255 Cubic Meters per Second (m{sup 3}/s), five (5) salt removal units will be in operation with one unit in standby or maintenance. An in-line variable frequency drive booster fan will offset pressure losses through each SRU and reduce the relative humidity of the air exiting the SRUs. In the event of a high radiation alarm from the underground Continuous Air Monitors (CAMs), the SRUs will be automatically bypassed, which places the SRS and building outside of the Safety Significant confinement boundary. From the SRUs, the exhaust is directed to the HEPA filter banks located in the New Filter Building. The exhaust system is designed to provide continuous HEPA filtration prior to release to the exhaust stack. There are 22 HEPA filter banks rated at 27,000 CFM / 12.75 m{sup 3}/s each. Each filter bank has two stages of pre-filters and two stages of HEPA filters. The filtered air from each of the 22 filter banks discharges into a common concrete plenum, which is maintained under a negative pressure by the main exhaust fans. Six 1,000 HP variable frequency drive exhaust fans are provided on the south side of the plenum. At the maximum expected exhaust flow of 540,000 CFM, four exhaust fans and twenty filter banks will be in operation. The fans discharge vertically to a separate concrete exhaust plenum. The filtered exhaust is routed from the exhaust plenum to a 125-foot-tall exhaust stack via a 13-foot diameter duct. (authors)

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Comprehensive Air Monitoring Report for Measurements during the Las Conchas Fire at Los Alamos National Laboratory

During the Las Conchas Fire, ambient air was monitored for radionuclides and particulate matter at and around Los Alamos National Laboratory (the Laboratory). During the fire, a variety of samplers were deployed, including the radiological air sampling network, high-volume air samplers, Tapered Element Oscillating Microbalances (PM 2.5 and PM 10), and environmental continuous air monitors. These different types of samplers provided real time, more in-depth retrospective information on air quality. In total, roughly 220 air samples were collected, and the results were consistent with other regional fires. Laboratory officials and Los Alamos County used real-time data to make public health risk determinations according to the Air Quality Index. Particulate levels were elevated and exceeded the National Ambient Air Quality Standard during the fire because of smoke. Elevated levels of naturally occurring radon decay products, consistent with all forest fires, were detected. Gross-alpha measurements had an average of range of 400 aCi/m 3 to 13,400 aCi/m 3 . Measurements of gross beta during the fire had a range of 34,000 aCi/m 3 to 74,000 aCi/m 3 . These values are not statistically different from national or regional averages.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

WIPP - February 2014 operational events and the compliance re-certification application (CRA) 2014 - 15293

On Wednesday, February 5, 2014, an underground mine fire involving a salt haul truck occurred at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). There were 86 workers in the mine when the fire occurred. All workers were evacuated. Nine days later, on Friday, February 14, 2014, there was an incident in the underground repository at WIPP which resulted in the release of americium and plutonium from one or more transuranic (TRU) waste containers into the environment. The release was detected by an underground continuous air monitor and then directed through high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter banks located in the surface exhaust building. However, a measurable portion bypassed the HEPA filters via leakage through two ventilation system dampers and was discharged directly to the environment from an exhaust duct. No personnel were determined to have received external contamination; however, some individuals that were on site were identified through bioassay to have initially tested positive for low level amounts of internal contamination. Trace amounts of americium and plutonium were detected off-site.While significant to day-to-day operations, these events have no impact to the long-term performance of the repository. Because WIPP's re-certification is based solely on the post-closure performance of the repository (40 CFR 191, Subparts B and C), these recent events do not affect the long-term performance predictions or its technical and scientific basis. In this paper we will further explore the requirements for WIPP's re-certification, and the basis for our contention that the recent WIPP operational events do not impact long-term repository performance or have any implications on salt as a geologic disposal media, and that re-certification efforts should continue uninterrupted. (authors)

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Hanford Waste Treatment Plant Low Activity Waste Facility Stack Effluent Monitoring - Sampling Probe Location Qualification Evaluation

The Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant low activity waste (LAW) facility stack monitor locations were qualified using scale model stacks to mitigate the risk of identifying that sampling locations do not meet the qualification criteria on the full-scale stack. As required by the American National Standards Institute/Health Physics Society (ANSI/HPS) N13.1-1999 standard, the scale model and its sampling location were geometrically similar to the actual stack and the Reynolds numbers for both the actual and model stacks were >10,000. An additional criterion is that the product of the hydraulic diameter and mean velocity (DV) of the full-scale stack must be between 1/6 DV and 6 DV of the scale model stack tests. Verification tests of the LAW stacks were performed at normal operating conditions. The minimum 1/6 DV value, along with the maximum 6 DV value from the scale model testing determines the range of conditions for which the full-scale stack may be operated and remain in compliance with the stack verification criterion. Based on these DV values, the corresponding stack flow rates for each of the LAW stacks are 815–55,758 scfm for LV-S1, 980–112,078 scfm for LV-S2, 264–22,901 scfm for LV-S3, and 981–79,832 scfm for LV-C2. The remaining criteria for the stack verification to be considered valid involve the flow angle and velocity uniformity results. First, the flow angle at the full-scale stack must be =20°. Second, the velocity uniformity at the full-scale stack must be =20% coefficient of variance (COV). Finally, the velocity uniformity results for the actual and scale model stack tests must agree within 5% COV. These criteria were met through the full-scale stack tests at the LAW facility. Flow angle results were primarily less than 10°, except for one LV-S2 Fan A result, which was 13.2°; all flow angle results were within the =20° criterion. The velocity uniformity results for each test condition ranged between 1.5 COV and 9.2% COV, which were all within the range of the target % COV values from the scale model tests. Based on these stack verification test results, the four LAW filtered exhaust stack sampling locations meet the qualification criteria provided in the ANSI/HPS N13.1-1999 standard for all fan operating configurations. This includes single-fan operating conditions for LV-S1 and LV-S2, dual-fan operations for LV-S3 at both the continuous air monitor and record sampler locations, and both the single-fan as well as the dual-fan operations for LV-C2. Further changes to the system configuration or operating conditions that are outside the bounds described in this report may require additional tests or analyses to determine compliance with the standard.

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Consequence Assessment of the WIPP Radiological Release from February 2014

We report on 14 February 2014, a continuous air monitor (CAM) alarm at the exit of panel 7 in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) underground facility caused the mine ventilation to shift from unfiltered air over to HEPA filtration for its effluent. Subsequent measurements of the effluent at both pre- and post-HEPA filtration using representative sampling demonstrated that a release had occurred. Using modeling based on measured effluent activity, onsite dose estimates were calculated and later measured via bioassay to be less than 0,1 mSv from intakes of radioactivity. Lastly, the maximum offsite dose potential to nearby dwellings was modeled to be 1 µSv or less, which was consistent with air samples being taken at those dwellings during the release, demonstrating impressive accuracy and precision. No worker or public dose limits have been exceeded, and the release was substantially below the annual release limits for the WIPP site.

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Radiation Protection Instrument Reliability and Maintainability Data

This report is a collection of reliability and maintenance data on several types of radiation protection instrumentation. Some radiation detectors are used for personnel safety; others are used for environmental stewardship. Six types of instruments are addressed in this report. These are: continuous air monitors, tritium room air monitors, facility vent stack monitors, tritium bubbler monitors, tritium in effluent water monitors, and general purpose radiation survey meters. Literature searches, operating experience data, and occurrence reports were used to identify failure modes and to estimate quantitative failure rates for several general types of radiation protection instruments. Likewise, data on instrument repair has been found when possible and used to estimate the mean time to repair. These data can be useful for facility safety assessment, personnel safety assessment, environment assessment, and for equipment and labor planning purposes.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

Oak Ridge National Laboratory Analysis of Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Samples: Integrated Summary Report

Nondestructive and destructive analytical methods were used to analyze samples of debris collected from the top of R15 C5, the lip of R16 C4, the parent drum, and the continuous air monitor (CAM) and fixed air sampler (FAS) filters in addition to MgO samples collected from the tops of R14 C2, R14 C4, R14 C6 and R16 C4. The analytical evidence supports the conclusion that an exothermic oxidation reaction of Swheat Scoop® by metal nitrate salts produced sufficient quantities of gas to breach drum 68660. The metals and the acidic environment found in drum 68660 are known to accelerate these oxidation reactions. Moreover, the ratio of metal nitrate salts in drum 68660 was in a range in which a low melting eutectic mixture could form, which would also accelerate the oxidation reactions. Nitrated organics were not detected and they are not necessary to produce the exothermic reaction leading to the breach of drum 68660. All the contents of the drum were not consumed and the material ejected from drum 68660 either did not experience temperatures over 200 °C, or their exposure to elevated temperatures was very limited in duration (<seconds).

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AFCI Glovebox Radiological Release - Evaluation, Corrective Actions and Testing

Scope of Report Releases of airborne radioactivity occurred in the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI) glovebox enclosure (room) located in the Fuel Manufacturing Facility (FMF) at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) in late August and early September, 2014. The subsequent investigation activities identified two primary issues: 1) The AFCI glovebox confinement was compromised providing a pathway for airborne radiological contamination releases, particularly when arc melting activities with transuranics were performed. 2) The Continuous Air Monitors (CAMs) located in the AFCI enclosure did not correctly identify americium (Am)-241 (predominant isotope in release) and provided nonconservative responses. This report documents the results of the investigations into both issues and the corrective actions taken. Finally, lessons learned are provided.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Practical applications of the sigma factor alarm method within alpha CAMs utilizing either ROI, tail-fitting, or peak-fitting algorithms

Some test must be applied to the low-level count data from alpha continuous air monitors (CAMs) to determine if the count is statistically significant (i.e., significantly above background). The test should also automatically account for different levels of background (i.e., different ambient radon progeny concentrations). In other words, the method should be as sensitive as possible, automatically desensitizing when required, yet in such a manner as to not exceed some previously-chosen acceptable false-alarm rate. The test that has been historically utilized within many alpha CAMs to accomplish these goals is the so-called sigma factor approach.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Aerosol Engineering Facility 2021-22 summary sheet [Slides]

The Aerosol Engineering Facility solves problems that involve radioactive particulates, including HEPA air filters, storage containers, exhaust stacks, and continuous air monitors. Other work includes silica dust sampling, bioaerosols, and insecticide sprays. Aerosol technology science describes the behavior of microscopic and nano-sized particles, in both molecular and continuum gas flow regimes.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

RCT Continuing Training: Radiological Emergency Response

Objectives: 1) List the revised initial response and supplemental actions while responding to a major injury inside of a radiological area; 2) List the initial response and supplemental actions while responding to a minor injury inside of a radiological area; 3) List the initial response and supplemental actions for responding to a Continuous Air Monitoring (CAM) alarm; 4) List the initial response and supplemental actions for responding to a radioactive spill; 5) List the initial response and supplemental actions of responding to an Area Radiation Monitor (ARM) alarm; 6) List the initial response and supplemental actions of an Electronic Personal Dosimeter (EPD) dose and dose rate alarm; 7) List the initial response and supplemental actions of responding to a Stationary Contamination Monitor (SCM) alarm; 8) Identify the methods to perform personnel decontamination.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Optimal Estimation-Based Algorithm to Retrieve Aerosol Optical Properties for GEMS Measurements Over Asia

The Geostationary Environment Monitoring Spectrometer (GEMS) is scheduled to be in orbit in 2019 onboard the GEO-KOMPSAT 2B satellite and will continuously monitor air quality over Asia. The GEMS will make measurements in the UV spectrum (300-500 nm) with 0.6 nm resolution. In this study, an algorithm is developed to retrieve aerosol optical properties from UV-visible measurements for the future satellite instrument and is tested using 3 years of existing OMI L1B data. This algorithm provides aerosol optical depth (AOD), single scattering albedo (SSA) and aerosol layer height (ALH) using an optimized estimation method. The retrieved AOD shows good correlation with Aerosol Robotic Network (AERONET) AOD with correlation coefficients of 0.83, 0.73 and 0.80 for heavy-absorbing fine (HAF) particles, dust and non-absorbing (NA) particles, respectively. However, regression tests indicate underestimation and overestimation of HAF and NA AOD, respectively. In comparison with AOD from the OMI/Aura Near-UV Aerosol Optical Depth and Single Scattering Albedo 1-orbit L2 Swath 13 km x 24 km V003 (OMAERUV) algorithm, the retrieved AOD has a correlation coefficient of 0.86 and linear regression equation, AOD(sub GEMS) = 1.18AOD(sub OMAERUV) + 0.09. An uncertainty test based on a reference method, which estimates retrieval error by applying the algorithm to simulated radiance data, revealed that assumptions in the spectral dependency of aerosol absorptivity in the UV cause significant errors in aerosol property retrieval, particularly the SSA retrieval. Consequently, retrieved SSAs did not show good correlation with AERONET values. The ALH results were qualitatively compared with the Cloud-Aerosol Lidar with Orthogonal Polarization (CALIOP) products and were found to be well correlated for highly absorbing aerosols. The difference between the attenuated-backscatter-weighted height from CALIOP and retrieved ALH were mostly closed to zero when the retrieved AOD is higher than 0.8 and SSA is lower than 0.93. Although retrieval accuracy was not significantly improved, the simultaneous consistent retrieval of AOD, SSA and ALH alone demonstrates the value of this stand-alone algorithm, given their nature for error using other methods. The use of these properties as input parameters for the air mass factor calculation is expected to improve the retrieval of other trace gases over Asia.

Geostationary Environment Monitoring Spectrometer ↗

Dynamic radioactive particle source

A method and apparatus for providing a timed, synchronized dynamic alpha or beta particle source for testing the response of continuous air monitors (CAMs) for airborne alpha or beta emitters is provided. The method includes providing a radioactive source; placing the radioactive source inside the detection volume of a CAM; and introducing an alpha or beta-emitting isotope while the CAM is in a normal functioning mode.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Discovery of the First Leaking Double-Shell Tank - Hanford Tank 241-AY-102

Full text - Long Abstract. A routine video inspection of the annulus region of double-shell tank 241-A Y-102 in August of 2012 indicated the presence material in the annulus space between the primary and secondary liners. A comparison was made to previous inspections performed in 2006 and 2007. which indicated that a change had occurred. The material was observed at two locations on the floor of the annulus and one location at the top of the annulus region where the primary and secondary top knuckles meet (RPP-ASMT-53793). Subsequent inspections were performed. leading to additional material observed on the floor of the annulus space in a region that had not previously been inspected (WRPS-PER-2012-1363). The annulus Continuous Air Monitor (CAM) was still operational and was not indicating elevated radiation levels in the annulus region. When the camera from the inspections was recovered. it also did not indicate increased radiation above minimum contamination levels (WRPS-PER-2012-1363). A formal leak assessment team was established August 10, 2012 to review tank 241-AY-102 construction and operating histories and to determine whether the material observed in the annulus had resulted from a leak in the primary tank. The team consisted of individuals from Engineering. Base Operations and Environmental Protection. As this was a first-of-its-kind task. a method for obtaining a sample of the material in the annulus was needed. The consistency of the material was unknown.and the location of a majority of the material was not conducive to using the sampling devices that were currently available at Hanford. A subcontractor was tasked with the development fabrication.and testing of a sampling device that would be able to obtain multiple samples from the material on the annulus floor. as well as the material originating from a refractory air-slot near the floor of the annulus space. This sampler would need to be able to collect and dispense the material it collected into a sample jar retrieval device for transportation of the material to the 222-S laboratory on the Hanford site for analysis. The subcontractor agency fabricated a remote underground sampler by modifying off-the-shelf robotics and parts. Limited testing of the sampler was conducted using a mock-up of the tank annulus and one simulated material type -a salt block. The mock-up testing indicated that the sampler would be able to maneuver within the confined space and that the device worked with full functionality. A total of six weeks had passed from initiation to implementation of the new sampler in the 241-AY-102 tank annulus. Initial sample material was obtained from the annulus floor using the Off-Riser Sampler System that has been used at Hanford tor years to obtain material from the primary tanks. This could be used at the location near Riser 83 since the material was collected directly from the annulus floor and not from a location on the wall or behind a pipe, as was needed from the two locations near Riser 90. After obtaining a small sample of the material on the annulus floor.this sampler sustained terminal damage due to conduit pipes it had to transverse in order to collect and recover material from this location. Several issues were also encountered during deployment of the new sampler into the annulus near Riser 90. These included: Difficulty fitting the sampler down the 12-inch riser into the annulus due to a small tolerance in the size of the sampler; Failure of sampler components and functions during deployment including the camera. pneumatics.and bearing seals; Delays in the field due to supporting equipment issues including cables. cameras. and scaffolding; and, Low recovery of sample material obtained for analysis. The complications that occurred during deployment and use of the new sampler during the sampling event ultimately resulted in lower recovery of material from these locations in the annulus than was obtained using the Off-Riser Sampler System and limited the analyses that could be performed for determining the origin of the material. Following completion of the sample analyses and the assessment of its construction history and use. there was a consensus among the leak assessment team members that two of the three materials sampled from the annulus floor region were the result of waste leaking from a breach in the primary tank. The probable leak cause was identified as corrosion at high temperatures in a tank whose containment margins had been reduced due to construction difficulties (RPP-ASMT-53793). A formal Lessons Learned was created concerning designing equipment tor unique purposes under time constraints. This document was published in OPEXShare on May 20. 2013. It highlighted some of the issues that arose with the subcontractor sampler development and provided recommendations to prevent a recurrence should this task need to be performed again in the future. The document can be found at http://msa.hanford.gov/opex/lesson.cfm/2013/5/20/3481/AY-102-Annulus-Sampler-Designing-Equipment-for-Unique-Purposes-under-Time-Constraints/.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Artificial neural network based isotopic analysis of airborne radioactivity measurement for radiological incident detection

Responders need tools to rapidly detect and identify airborne alpha radioactivity during consequence management scenarios. Traditional continuous air monitor systems used for this purpose compute the net counts in various energy windows to determine the presence of specified isotopes, such as 235U, 239Pu, and 241Am. These calculations rely on having a well-calibrated detector, which is challenging in low-background environments. Here an alternative approach of using artificial neural networks to classify alpha spectra is presented. Two network architectures, fully connected and convolutional networks, were trained to classify alpha spectra into four categories: background and background plus the three isotopes above. Sources were injected into measured background at various fractions of the derived response level (DRL) corresponding to early-phase Protective Action Guides. The convolutional network identifies all sources at 1% of the DRL with average probability of detection of 95% and false alarm probability of 1%. Further, the network identifies sources ranging between 0.25% and 1% of the DRL with higher than 80% probability of detection and lower than 7% false alarm probability. Most significantly, the network performance improves in low-count background conditions, increasing its minimum probability of detection to 93% and reducing the false alarm probabilities to lower than 0.25%. These results show that, once trained on datasets representing a range of detection scenarios, artificial neural networks can accurately identify alpha isotopes of interest without the need for detector calibration.

Woldegiorgis, Surafel F.↗

Regulatory Compliance Strategy For Recovery-Driven Underground Ventilation System Changes - 16355

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) facility is managed and operated by Nuclear Waste Partnership LLC (NWP) for the U.S Department of Energy (DOE). On February 14, 2014, a radiological event occurred in the WIPP facility underground repository, which resulted in the release of transuranic isotopes contaminating a portion of the underground primarily along the ventilation path from Panel 7, the location of the incident. The release was initially detected by an underground continuous air monitor (CAM) which caused an automatic switch of the ventilation system to filtration mode and ventilation was directed through high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filtration banks located in the surface exhaust building. When the HEPA filtration was engaged, the underground normal ventilation was reduced from 425,000 standard cubic feet per minute (scfm) to 60,000 scfm. Since the event, all exhaust air is filtered through HEPA filters at 60,000 scfm to minimize the possibility of exposure to workers, the public and the environment. Ventilation of fresh air to the WIPP underground is a primary limitation to performing underground recovery activities; therefore, recovery-driven ventilation changes are needed. The safe recovery of the WIPP facility and resumption of normal waste emplacement activities require an increase in ventilation capacity to be accomplished in three phases: 1) Interim Ventilation System, 2) Supplemental Ventilation System and 3) Permanent Ventilation System. Each phase adds increased air flow to the underground and allows for underground activities to be performed concurrently. The regulatory strategy for ventilation recovery focuses on ensuring that needed changes to the WIPP facility are protective of human health and the environment. Recovery-driven ventilation changes are implemented using the procedures, processes, and regulations that are required by the two primary regulatory agencies for the WIPP facility: the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) as well as DOE requirements. Regulatory compliance is being achieved for the three ventilation phases to restore underground ventilation by providing the regulators and stakeholders opportunities for involvement during the design and development processes. A strategy for a tiered NMED permitting process and a plan for developing required EPA documentation are under consideration. The Project's objective is to resume normal waste emplacement activities with safety, protection of the public, the worker and the environment as the highest priorities. Important elements of ensuring that WIPP facility recovery and future waste emplacement activities occur as planned are transparency and communication with the regulatory community. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Technical aspects of the sigma factor alarm method in alpha CAMs

Some test must be applied to the low-level count data from alpha continuous air monitors (CAMs) to determine if the count is statistically significant (i.e., different from background). The test should also automatically account for different levels of background (i.e., ambient radon progeny concentrations). The method should, in other words, be as sensitive as possible, automatically desensitize when required, but in such a manner as to not exceed a previously-chosen acceptable false-alarm rate.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗