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28 records · Page 2

Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Integration in the National Airspace System (NAS) Project

NASA's UAS Integration in the NAS project, has partnered with Rockwell Collins to develop a concept Control and Non-Payload Communication system prototype radio, operating on recently allocated UAS frequency spectrum bands. The prototype radio will be used to validate initial proposed performance requirements for UAS control communications. This presentation will give an overview of the current status of the design, development, and flight test planning for this prototype radio.

Griner, James H.↗

Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Integration in the National Airspace System (NAS) Project - Gen-4 and Gen-5 Radio Plans

NASA's UAS Integration in the NAS project, has partnered with Rockwell Collins to develop a concept Control and Non-Payload Communication (CNPC) system prototype radio, operating on recently allocated UAS frequency spectrum bands. This prototype radio is being used to validate initial proposed performance requirements for UAS control communications. This presentation will give an overview of the current plans for the prototype radio development.

communication↗

Security Risk Assessment Process for UAS in the NAS CNPC Architecture

This informational paper discusses the risk assessment process conducted to analyze Control and Non-Payload Communications (CNPC) architectures for integrating civil Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) into the National Airspace System (NAS). The assessment employs the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Risk Management framework to identify threats, vulnerabilities, and risks to these architectures and recommends corresponding mitigating security controls. This process builds upon earlier work performed by RTCA Special Committee (SC) 203 and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to roadmap the risk assessment methodology and to identify categories of information security risks that pose a significant impact to aeronautical communications systems. A description of the deviations from the typical process is described in regards to this aeronautical communications system. Due to the sensitive nature of the information, data resulting from the risk assessment pertaining to threats, vulnerabilities, and risks is beyond the scope of this paper

data links↗

Security Risk Assessment Process for UAS in the NAS CNPC Architecture

This informational paper discusses the risk assessment process conducted to analyze Control and Non-Payload Communications (CNPC) architectures for integrating civil Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) into the National Airspace System (NAS). The assessment employs the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Risk Management framework to identify threats, vulnerabilities, and risks to these architectures and recommends corresponding mitigating security controls. This process builds upon earlier work performed by RTCA Special Committee (SC) 203 and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to roadmap the risk assessment methodology and to identify categories of information security risks that pose a significant impact to aeronautical communications systems. A description of the deviations from the typical process is described in regards to this aeronautical communications system. Due to the sensitive nature of the information, data resulting from the risk assessment pertaining to threats, vulnerabilities, and risks is beyond the scope of this paper.

Iannicca, Dennis C.↗

UAS Satellite Earth Station Emission Limits for Terrestrial System Interference Protection

Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) will have a major impact on future aviation. Medium and large UA operating at altitudes above 3000 feet will require access to non-segregated, that is, controlled airspace. In order for unmanned aircraft to be integrated into the airspace and operate with other commercial aircraft, a very reliable command and control (C2, a. k. a. control and non-payload communications, (CNPC)) link is required. For operations covering large distances or over remote locations, a beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS) CNPC link would need to be implemented through satellite. Significant progress has taken place on several fronts to advance the integration of UAS into controlled airspace, including the recent completion of Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for terrestrial line-of-sight (LOS) UAS command and control (C2) links. The development of MOPS for beyond line-of-sight C2 satellite communication links is underway. Meanwhile the allocation of spectrum for UAS C2 by the International Telecommunications Union Radiocommunication Sector (ITU-R) has also progressed. Spectrum for LOS C2 was allocated at the 2012 World Radiocommunication Conference (WRC-12), and for BLOS C2 an allocation was made at WRC-15, under WRC-15 Resolution 155. Resolution 155, however, does not come into effect until several other actions have been completed. One of these required actions is the identification of a power flux density (pfd) limit on the emissions of UAS Ku-Band satellite communications transmitters reaching the ground. The pfd limit is intended to protect terrestrial systems from harmful interference. WRC-19 is expected to finalize the pfd limit. In preparation for WRC-19, analyses of the required pfd limit are on-going, and supporting activities such as propagation modeling are also planned. This paper provides the status of these activities.

radiofrequency spectrum↗

Analysis of Terrestrial Interference Protection from UAS CNPC Satellite Transmitters

Unmanned aircraft (UA) are projected to have a major impact on future aviation. Larger UA operating at altitudes above 3000 feet will require at least occasional access to non-segregated, that is, controlled airspace. In order for unmanned aircraft to be integrated into the airspace and operate with other commercial aircraft, a very reliable command and control (a. k. a. control and non-payload communications, (CNPC)) link is required. For operations covering large distances or over remote locations, a beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS) CNPC link implemented through a satellite will almost always be required. Protected aviation spectrum (aeronautical mobile satellite (route) service, or AMS(R)S) would normally be used for such a safety-critical link, however studies have shown that currently available aviation safety satellite spectrum is inadequate to support the projected BLOS CNPC link bandwidth requirements. To address this inadequacy, the 2015 World Radio communication Conference studied the possible use of the Fixed Satellite Service (FSS) to provide CNPC, including possible allocations in Ku-Band and Ka-Band, under Agenda Item (AI) 1.5. Although UA CNPC satellite links in these bands were shown to meet operational availability and continuity requirements, a serious complication exists in that there are also terrestrial service allocations in these bands, in particular, Fixed Service (FS) point-to-point and point-to-multipoint microwave digital links. During the WRC-15 study cycle, much opposition to AI 1.5 was generated based on fears that UA CNPC satellite transmitters in these bands would impose unacceptable levels of interference to the FS receivers. NASA analyzed the possible interference from the UA transmitters based on probable UA transmission and FS receiver characteristics, and UA traffic distributions and densities to determine conditions under which UA could operate without imposing unacceptable interference levels to the FS. Ultimately, UA power flux density transmission limits were proposed as a way to insure protection of FS receivers and further studies were prepared on the various proposals. This paper presents the results of these studies and discusses possible implications on future UA BLOS operations.

aircraft communications↗

Parameter Impact on Sharing Studies Between UAS CNPC Satellite Transmitters and Terrestrial Systems

In order to provide a control and non-payload communication (CNPC) link for civil-use unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) when operating in beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS) conditions, satellite communication links are generally required. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has determined that the CNPC link must operate over protected aviation safety spectrum allocations. Although a suitable allocation exists in the 5030-5091 MHz band, no satellites provide operations in this band and none are currently planned. In order to avoid a very lengthy delay in the deployment of UAS in BLOS conditions, it has been proposed to use existing satellites operating in the Fixed Satellite Service (FSS), of which many operate in several spectrum bands. Regulatory actions by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) are needed to enable such a use on an international basis, and indeed Agenda Item (AI) 1.5 for the 2015 World Radiocommunication Conference (WRC) was established to decide on the enactment of possible regulatory provisions. As part of the preparation for AI 1.5, studies on the sharing FSS bands between existing services and CNPC for UAS are being contributed by NASA and others. These studies evaluate the potential impact of satellite CNPC transmitters operating from UAS on other in-band services, and on the potential impact of other in-band services on satellite CNPC receivers operating on UAS platforms. Such studies are made more complex by the inclusion of what are essentially moving FSS earth stations, compared to typical sharing studies between fixed elements. Hence, the process of determining the appropriate technical parameters for the studies meets with difficulty. In order to enable a sharing study to be completed in a less-than-infinite amount of time, the number of parameters exercised must be greatly limited. Therefore, understanding the impact of various parameter choices is accomplished through selectivity analyses. In the case of sharing studies for AI 1.5, identification of worst-case parameters allows the studies to be focused on worst-case scenarios with assurance that other parameter combinations will yield comparatively better results and therefore do not need to be fully analyzed. In this paper, the results of such sensitivity analyses are presented for the case of sharing between UAS CNPC satellite transmitters and terrestrial receivers using the Fixed Service (FS) operating in the same bands, and the implications of these analyses on sharing study results.

air traffic control↗

UAS CNPC Satellite Link Performance - Sharing Spectrum with Terrestrial Systems

In order to provide for the safe integration of unmanned aircraft systems into the National Airspace System, the control and non-payload communications (CNPC) link connecting the ground-based pilot with the unmanned aircraft must be highly reliable. A specific requirement is that it must operate using aviation safety radiofrequency spectrum. The 2012 World Radiocommunication Conference (WRC-12) provided a potentially suitable allocation for radio line-of-sight (LOS), terrestrial based CNPC link at 5030-5091 MHz. For a beyond radio line-of-sight (BLOS), satellite-based CNPC link, aviation safety spectrum allocations are currently inadequate. Therefore, the 2015 WRC will consider the use of Fixed Satellite Service (FSS) bands to provide BLOS CNPC under Agenda Item 1.5. This agenda item requires studies to be conducted to allow for the consideration of how unmanned aircraft can employ FSS for BLOS CNPC while maintaining existing systems. Since there are terrestrial Fixed Service systems also using the same frequency bands under consideration in Agenda Item 1.5 one of the studies required considered spectrum sharing between earth stations on-board unmanned aircraft and Fixed Service station receivers. Studies carried out by NASA have concluded that such sharing is possible under parameters previously established by the International Telecommunications Union. As the preparation for WRC-15 has progressed, additional study parameters Agenda Item 1.5 have been proposed, and some studies using these parameters have been added. This paper examines the study results for the original parameters as well as results considering some of the more recently proposed parameters to provide insight into the complicated process of resolving WRC-15 Agenda Item 1.5 and achieving a solution for BLOS CNPC for unmanned aircraft.

Pilotless aircraft↗

Progress on the Development of the UAS C2 Link and Supporting Spectrum - from LOS to BLOS

In order to provide for the safe integration of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) into the National Airspace System, the control and non-payload communications (CNPC) link connecting the ground-based pilot with the unmanned aircraft must be highly reliable and robust, based upon standards that enable certification. Both line-of-sight (LOS) links using terrestrial-based communications and beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS) links using satellite communications are required to support UAS operations. The development of standards has been undertaken by RTCA Special Committee 228 (SC-228), with supporting technical data developed by NASA under the UAS in the National Airspace (NAS) Project. As a result of this work minimum operational performance standards (MOPS) have been completed and published for the LOS CNPC system. The second phase of work, for both NASA and RTCA involves the BLOS CNPC systems. The development of technical data to support MOPS development for UAS BLOS satellite-based CNPC links has now been initiated by NASA, and RTCA SC-228 has organized itself to begin the MOPS development process. This paper will provide an overview of the work that has been completed to date by the Communications Subproject in support of LOS C2 communications for UAS followed by an update of plans and progress for the BLOS phase of the project, with the focus on the UAS C2 spectrum aspects.

Pilotless aircraft↗

GA-ASI Final Report and Program Wrap-up for NASA System Integration and Operationalization (SIO)

The NASA SIO demonstration flight of April 3, 2020 represents a successful culmination of 18 months of coordinated effort between GA-ASI, NASA, the FAA, Collins Aerospace, and Honeywell Aerospace to operate a Medium Altitude, Long Endurance (MALE) Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) safely in the National Airspace System (NAS) using industry leading prototype technologies. The GA-ASI team consisted of technical experts, program managers, engineers, mechanics, flight technicians, flight crews, and numerous other subject matter experts. This final report describes the most significant and potentially impactful aspects of the planning, integration, test, and flight aspects of this effort. GA-ASI successfully integrated the key technologies needed for UAS to fly in the NAS onto our prototype SkyGuardian UAS, which was designed to meet the most stringent airworthiness standards applicable to an aircraft of its size category. A proven Detect and Avoid (DAA) system, developed by GA-ASI and utilizing Honeywell Aerospace technology was integrated onto SkyGuardian for the first time, along with datalink radios from Collins Aerospace that meet the new civil standard for Control and Non-Payload Communication (CNPC) links. GA-ASI also obtained approvals from the FAA and FCC to operate the reconfigured UAS. The SIO demonstration flight represented a commercial aerial surveying operation conducted at medium altitude (>10,000ft above mean sea level). The aircraft’s onboard sensors were used to capture photographic, infrared and radar imagery of public and commercial infrastructure and land, and to subsequently produce the types of data products that would provide business value to potential customers. These survey services would supplement or replace services currently provided by manned airplanes and helicopters, small drones or satellites. A “virtual” mission was also planned, to show what additional survey data could have been captured during the flight if additional sensors had been installed on the aircraft’s external hardpoints. This revision of the final report focuses on information of value to the wider UAS community, and avoids propriety data to facilitate broad dissemination. It also includes a description of GA-ASI’s engagement with the FAA following the SIO flight, which led to the award of an updated Special Airworthiness Certificate in the Experimental Category (SAC-EC) and a Certificate of Waiver or Authorization (COA) allowing operation of the SkyGuardian UAS using its DAA system to satisfy right-of-way rules, instead of a chase plane. The associated operational limitations are described to illustrate the further steps that would be needed to remove those limitations for unhindered commercial operations.

Flight demonstration↗