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At least 37 records · Page 2

Data from the Development Evolution of a Vehicle for Custom Control

In order to develop custom controllers intended to operate vehicles on a live highway, a series of data collection-focused tests were performed at increasing stages of complexity. Modern vehicles with features like Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) feature a rich set of sensors and drive-by-wire mechanisms. The presented stages of data collection begins with the analysis of raw data provided by various vehicles, and eventually results in spoofing Controller Area Network (CAN) protocols for sending control commands to operate a vehicle. This paper covers the data and technical efforts needed at various stages. The raw data and tools to plot the data are also publicly available.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

An evaluation of the CAN bus for use on the Europa Lander motor controller

This paper will present the application of the Controller Area Network (CAN) for communication between the Motor Control Processor and the Europa Lander Motor Control Cards. The Europa Lander preproject team is concerned about lowering the estimated mass, volume, and power of the mission concept so that it could maximize its science return. The motor controller uses multiple Motor Control Cards to control the 24 motors that will be operating in the extremes of the Europa environment. The CAN bus was considered because of its multi-drop nature, low power interface, and simple communication protocol.

Lias, Malcolm↗

An Evaluation of the CAN bus for Use on the Europa Lander Motor Controller

This paper will present the application of the Controller Area Network (CAN) for communication between the Motor Control Processor and the Europa Lander Motor Control Cards. The Europa Lander mission is concerned about lowering the mass, volume, and power so that it can maximize its science return. The motor controller uses multiple Motor Control Cards to control the 24 motors that will be operating in the extremes of the Europa environment. The CAN bus was considered because of its multi-drop nature, low power interface, and simple communication protocol. Beyond communication with the motor controller cards we also use the CAN bus interface to gather telemetry from the Power Conversion Card. Our system requires the collection of telemetry at a rate of 64Hz from the Power Conversion Card and all active motor controllers along with the sending of control packets and the receipt of control parameters at 512 Hz. In the paper we will address the ability of the CAN bus to meet these requirements along with our Arduino based test system used to learn about the CAN bus standard and verify our analysis.

Lias, Malcolm↗

Evaluating lightweight unsupervised online IDS for masquerade attacks in CAN

Vehicular controller area networks (CANs) are susceptible to masquerade attacks by malicious adversaries. In masquerade attacks, adversaries silence a targeted ID and then send malicious frames with forged content at the expected timing of benign frames. As masquerade attacks could seriously harm vehicle functionality and are the stealthiest attacks to detect in CAN, recent work has devoted attention to compare frameworks for detecting masquerade attacks in CAN. However, most existing works report offline evaluations using CAN logs already collected using simulations that do not comply with the domain’s real-time constraints. Here we contribute to advance the state of the art by presenting a comparative evaluation of four different non-deep learning (DL)-based unsupervised online intrusion detection systems (IDS) for masquerade attacks in CAN. Our approach differs from existing comparative evaluations in that we analyze the effect of controlling streaming data conditions in a sliding window setting. In doing so, we use realistic masquerade attacks being replayed from the ROAD dataset. We show that although evaluated IDS are not effective at detecting every attack type, the method that relies on detecting changes in the hierarchical structure of clusters of time series produces the best results at the expense of higher computational overhead. We discuss limitations, open challenges, and how the evaluated methods can be used for practical unsupervised online CAN IDS for masquerade attacks.

Anomaly detection↗

Comparison of Vehicle-Broadcasted Fuel Consumption Rates against Precise Fuel Measurements for Medium- and Heavy-Duty Vehicles and Engines

Vehicles continuously report real-time fuel consumption estimates over their data bus, known as the controller area network (CAN). However, the accuracy of these fueling estimates is uncertain to researchers who collect these data from any given vehicle. To assess the accuracy of these estimates, CAN-reported fuel consumption data are compared against fuel measurements from precise instrumentation. The data analyzed consisted of eight medium/heavy-duty vehicles and two medium-duty engines. Varying discrepancies between CAN fueling rates and the more accurate measurements emerged but without a vehicular trend-for some vehicles the CAN under-reported fuel consumption and for others the CAN over-reported fuel consumption. Furthermore, a qualitative real-time analysis revealed that the operating conditions under which these fueling discrepancies arose varied among vehicles. A drive cycle analysis revealed that while CAN fueling estimate accuracy differs for individual vehicles, that CAN estimates capture the relative fuel consumption differences between drive cycles within 4% for all vehicles and even more accurately for some vehicles. Furthermore, in situations where only CAN-reported data are available, CAN fueling estimates can provide relative fuel consumption trends but not accurate or precise fuel consumption rates.

30 DIRECT ENERGY CONVERSION↗

Isolation contactor state control system

A controller area network (CAN) installed on a hybrid electric vehicle provides one node with control of high voltage power distribution system isolation contactors and the capacity to energize a secondary electro-mechanical relay device. The output of the secondary relay provides a redundant and persistent backup signal to the output of the node. The secondary relay is relatively immune to CAN message traffic interruptions and, as a result, the high voltage isolation contactor(s) are less likely to transition open in the event that the intelligent output driver should fail.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

Towards Secure Autonomous Vehicles: An Integrated Edge and Multi-Modal Machine Learning Framework for Intrusion Detection

Autonomous vehicles (AVs) are vulnerable to cyberattacks targeting both internal communication networks and external perception sensors. While edge-based intrusion de- tection for Controller Area Network (CAN) buses offers real-time protection, it cannot detect cross-modal threats. Conversely, multi-modal fusion approaches improve coverage but often lack efficiency for in-vehicle deployment. This thesis integrates two complemen- tary solutions: (1) a lightweight, edge-deployable machine learning framework for CAN bus intrusion detection, and (2) a late-fusion system combining CAN FD and LiDAR data. Together, they form a hierarchical defense capable of handling single-modality and coordi- nated attacks. Simulations show that CAN-only models reach 93% accuracy on simulated DoS, spoofing, replay, and fuzzy attacks, while the fusion system achieves 0.87 AUC and 0.82 F1-score at 2 ms latency. This unified framework establishes a scalable, explainable, and field-ready strategy for AV cybersecurity.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

NASA Deep Space Network Operations Scheduling

The functioning of the Deep Space Network Operations Scheduling, Jet Propulsion Laboratory, CA is reviewed. The primary objectives of the Operations Scheduling are: to schedule the worldwide global allocation of ground communications, tracking facilities, and equipment; and to provide deep space telecommunications for command, tracking, telemetry, and control in support of flight mission operations and tests. Elements of the earth set are Deep Space Stations (DSS) which provide the telecommunications link between the earth and spacecraft; NASA Communications Network; Network Data Processing Area; Network Operations Control Area which provides operational direction to the DSS; Mission Control and Computing systems; and Mission Support areas which provide flight control of the spacecraft. Elements of the space set include mission priorities and requirements which determine the spacecraft queue for allocating network resources. Scheduling is discussed in terms of long-range (3 years), mid-range (8 weeks), and short-range (2 weeks).

Enari, D. M.↗

From CAN to ROS: A Monitoring and Data Recording Bridge

The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus protocol is used in modern vehicles for sharing messages between several control units within a vehicle. CAN bus messages are encoded with unknown scheme and decoding these messages provide unlimited access to valuable information that is used in many autonomous vehicles applications. This paper proposes a ROS based package (CAN-to-ROS) for monitoring, recording, and real-time and offline decoding of CAN bus messages. The package is developed in the ROS framework to add modularity and ease of integration with other software, and it is written in C++ to guarantee speed of the execution during run-time. For realtime decoding of CAN bus data, CAN-to-ROS package used in conjunction with other library called Libpanda that provide access to CAN bus message from a vehicle. The package was evaluated and tested on a Raspberry Pi with real CAN bus data from a Toyota RAV4. The results confirm the capabilities of CAN-to-ROS package and resulted in using the package in other research projects.

Elmadani, Safwan↗

Mathematical approaches to secure in-vehicle networks

Modern vehicles rely on numerous small computers called electronic control units (ECUs) that continually communicate life-critical messages, e.g., wheel speeds and steering angle, through a few controller area networks (CANs). Originally designed as a closed network for the life of the vehicle, CAN protocol developed bereft of security features (e.g., authentication or encryption). For emission testing, updates, and other diagnostics, vehicle CANs are now physically accessible, but this comes with vulnerability to cyber attack. Mandatory on-board diagnostic ports (OBD-II) provide adversaries with direct access to the vehicle. Remote attacks, e.g., via Bluetooth or cellular connections, are possible but require deep expertise. In short, the critical networks for vehicle functionality are exposed to remote and local cyber attacks with little to no built-in defenses. Most notably, the infamous 2015 research of Miller and Valasek exhibited a remote takeover of a Jeep’s brakes resulting in a massive recall and ample media coverage.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Modular Battery Charge Controller

A new approach to masterless, distributed, digital-charge control for batteries requiring charge control has been developed and implemented. This approach is required in battery chemistries that need cell-level charge control for safety and is characterized by the use of one controller per cell, resulting in redundant sensors for critical components, such as voltage, temperature, and current. The charge controllers in a given battery interact in a masterless fashion for the purpose of cell balancing, charge control, and state-of-charge estimation. This makes the battery system invariably fault-tolerant. The solution to the single-fault failure, due to the use of a single charge controller (CC), was solved by implementing one CC per cell and linking them via an isolated communication bus [e.g., controller area network (CAN)] in a masterless fashion so that the failure of one or more CCs will not impact the remaining functional CCs. Each micro-controller-based CC digitizes the cell voltage (V(sub cell)), two cell temperatures, and the voltage across the switch (V); the latter variable is used in conjunction with V(sub cell) to estimate the bypass current for a given bypass resistor. Furthermore, CC1 digitizes the battery current (I1) and battery voltage (V(sub batt) and CC5 digitizes a second battery current (I2). As a result, redundant readings are taken for temperature, battery current, and battery voltage through the summation of the individual cell voltages given that each CC knows the voltage of the other cells. For the purpose of cell balancing, each CC periodically and independently transmits its cell voltage and stores the received cell voltage of the other cells in an array. The position in the array depends on the identifier (ID) of the transmitting CC. After eight cell voltage receptions, the array is checked to see if one or more cells did not transmit. If one or more transmissions are missing, the missing cell(s) is (are) eliminated from cell-balancing calculations. The cell-balancing algorithm is based on the error between the cell s voltage and the other cells and is categorized into four zones of operation. The algorithm is executed every second and, if cell balancing is activated, the error variable is set to a negative low value. The largest error between the cell and the other cells is found and the zone of operation determined. If the error is zero or negative, then the cell is at the lowest voltage and no balancing action is needed. If the error is less than a predetermined negative value, a Cell Bad Flag is set. If the error is positive, then cell balancing is needed, but a hysteretic zone is added to prevent the bypass circuit from triggering repeatedly near zero error. This approach keeps the cells within a predetermined voltage range.

Button, Robert↗

Lightweight LSTM for CAN Signal Decoding

This paper describes an approach to identify undecoded Controller Area Network (CAN) data from one vehicle, based on the data similarity to previously decoded CAN data from another vehicle. Modern vehicles communicate data and signals from on-board sensors and controllers through the CAN bus. Networked sensors contain information such as wheel speeds, fuel gauges, turn signals, and radar signals. In the effort to use this information and make cars safer through human-in-the-loop CPS, signals on the CAN bus such as wheel speed and radar can be used to support the driver. However, data from the CAN bus are encoded and in some cases compressed, and different car manufacturers use different encoding schemes to represent data on the CAN bus. With hundreds of messages and thousands of possible encoding schemes to consider, it is laborious to identify the unique bits and encoding schemes that represent signals on each vehicle. In this study, we propose a method for training a Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) neural network on known radar signals from one vehicle manufacturer, a Toyota, and successfully apply the network to identify the encoding for radar signals on a different vehicle, a Honda. By augmenting the training dataset with varied encoding bit boundaries, a small and lightweight LSTM network can learn to recognize radar data across different encoding schemes. The results are an improvement on exhaustive-search algorithms and other methods previously used in the search for such signals.

Ngo, Paul↗

WiP Abstract: Edge-Based Privacy of Naturalistic Driving Data Collection

Collecting large driving datasets is important for data-driven transportation research and studied in naturalistic driving [3]. Due to the standard implementation of a Controller Area Network (CAN) bus for a vehicle’s inter-module communication, many off-the-shelf devices can easily transform a vehicle into a rich data collection utility [2]. Vehicles with Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) are an example of a feature resulting in emergent traffic behavior when scaled [4]. While these utilities were designed with particular data use cases, data may be publicly shared to benefit other researchers through online tools like CyVerse [1]. However, such data should only be shared when any private information is removed. This private information may exist as a set of GPS coordinates, since the start and end points of a trip may designate a driver’s place of residence or work. When considering larger continuously-collected data sets with a focus on naturalistic driving, many drivers are needed to make data collection feasible. Removal of private information becomes much more of a challenge since every driver may uniquely define their geographic privacy. This project aims to build upon the foundation of libpanda [2] by adding features of edge-based data privacy enforcement. In it’s current form, libpanda uses a GPS in conjunction with a CAN interface to record data. Libpanda feature s a set of startup and shutdown scripts to perform automatic data collection and upload. With additional support hardware on a Raspberry Pi, the Pi can maintain power on vehicle shutdown to automatically upload data before shutdown.

Bunting, Matt↗

Firmware Tampering Detection in Heavy-Duty Vehicles through J1939 CAN Analysis

Modern heavy-duty vehicles rely on complex networks of Electronic Control Units (ECUs) that communicate using the J1939 protocol. While this system makes it easier to update and configure vehicle components, it also opens the door to serious cybersecurity risks if not properly secured. This work investigates the potential for firmware tampering through the J1939 communication protocol, which enables ECU configuration and reprogramming over the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus. By monitoring CAN traffic during legitimate maintenance operations and reverse-engineering OEM diagnostic software, we identified common and proprietary J1939 message identifiers, authentication patterns, and vulnerabilities within Unified Diagnostic Services (UDS). These findings demonstrate that inadequate authentication mechanisms can allow malicious actors to alter ECU firmware or disable safety functions, posing severe operational and safety risks. Our analysis contributes to the development of vehicle intrusion detection systems capable of recognizing abnormal reprogramming activity and future firmware fingerprinting methods to verify software integrity across ECUs. This work highlights the importance of standardizing secure firmware authentication across manufacturers to strengthen cyber resilience in heavy-duty vehicle systems.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

Strym: A Python Package for Real-time CAN Data Logging, Analysis and Visualization to Work with USB-CAN Interface

In this report, we describe a data analysis tool developed for decoding and analyzing vehicle data obtained from a passenger vehicle’s onboard controller area network (CAN) bus. The tool developed in this paper provides a timeseries framework to perform domain-specific analysis at scale when interpreting data from a vehicle or a collection of vehicles in light of how to design intelligent vehicle applications. The tool, called Strym, exploits the CAN bus mechanism of modern vehicles to capture data using commercially available CAN-to-USB hardware Comma.ai Panda devices, managed through open-source software Libpanda. Strym permits the decoding of vendor-specific CAN messages in a vehicle-agnostic manner. Through this, a researcher can characterize data throughput, assess data quality, and perform analyses. Such analyses are useful in a number of research such as studying human driving behavior in mixed-autonomy, new driver models, rare-event detection, traffic flow estimation, and custom control of vehicles.

Performance evaluation, Smart cities, Intelligent ↗

On the Performance of Detecting Injection of Fabricated Messages into the CAN Bus

There have been several public demonstrations of attacks on connected vehicles showing the ability of an attacker to take control of a targeted vehicle by injecting messages into their Controller Area Network (CAN) bus. In this article, using injected speed reading and Revolutions Per Minute (RPM) reading messages in in-motion vehicle, we examine the ability of the Pearson correlation and the unsupervised learning methods k-means clustering and Hidden Markov Model (HMM) to differentiate ’no-attack’ and ’under-attack’ states of the given vehicle. We found that the Pearson correlation distinguishes the two states, the k-means clustering method has an acceptable accuracy but high false positive rate and HMM detects attacks with acceptable detection rate but has a high false positive in detecting attacks from speed readings when there is no attack. The accuracy of these unsupervised learning methods are comparable to the ones of the supervised learning methods used by CAN bus Intrusion Detection System (IDS) suppliers. In addition, the article shows that studying CAN anomaly detection techniques using off-vehicle test facilities may not properly evaluate the performance of the detection techniques. Finally, the results suggest using other features besides the data content of the CAN messages and integrate knowledge about how the Electronic Control Units (ECUs) collaborate in building effective techniques for the detection of injection of fabricated message attacks.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Impacts of Vehicle (In)Security

Nuclear and radioactive material is routinely transported worldwide every day. Since 2010, the complexity of the transport vehicle to support such activities has grown exponentially. Many core functions of a vehicle are now handled by small embedded computer modules with more being added each year to enhance the owner’s experience and convenience. With a system as complex as today’s automobile, the potential for cyber security issues is certain. Hackers have begun exploring this new domain with public information increasingly disseminated. Because vehicles are allowed into and around secure nuclear facilities, the potential for using a vehicle as a new cyber entry point or vector into the facility is now plausible and must be mitigated. In addition, compromising such a vehicle could aide in illicit removal of nuclear material, putting sensitive cargo at risk. Because cyber attacks can now be introduced using vehicles, cyber security, needs to be integrated into an organization’s design basis threat document. Essentially, a vehicle now extends the perimeter for which security professionals are responsible.Electronic Control Units (ECU) responsible for handling all core and ancillary vehicle functions are interconnected using the controller area network (CAN) bus. A typical CAN network in a modern automobile contains 50 or more ECUs. The CAN protocol now supports a wide variety of areas, including automotive, road transportation, rail transportation, industrial automation, power generation, maritime, military vehicles, aviation, and medical devices. In many ways, the nuclear industry is employing the CAN bus protocol or other similar broadcast serial networks. This paper will provide an overview of the current state of automobile and CAN Bus security, as well as an overview of what has been publicly disclosed by many research organizations. It will then present several hypotheses of how vehicle security issues may impact nuclear activities. An initial discussion of how a vehicle can be used as a new threat vector to penetrate secure facilities will be presented. This includes how a modern automobile can be used as the exploitation mechanism for nearby devices such as laptops, cell phones, and wireless access points. Additional discussion will highlight how vehicle security might impact transportation of nuclear material through remote exploitation of a moving vehicle. The final discussion will include what possible implications might be relative to the physical protection systems at nuclear facilities. The audience will also be given details regarding the complexity of attack, thus implying the likelihood of successful exploitation, and information on how such attacks may be mitigated. Emerging security products for automobiles will be discussed and other mitigation methods will be detailed (e.g. disabling vehicle cellular modems). As a result, the audience will have a greater understanding of how to add vehicle security as a part of a comprehensive nuclear security policy.Finally, this paper will highlight the similarities between CAN Bus and other broadcast serial bus networks such as Profibus or DeviceNet, helping educate the reader on how susceptible this type of networking is to nefarious attacks and how it might affect components connected to many different nuclear systems, including control systems, safety systems, emergency systems, and support systems.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

A methodology to develop multi-physics dynamic fuel cell system models validated with vehicle realistic drive cycle data

Fuel cell (FC) technology has been identified as a technically attractive solution to decarbonize the transportation sector, especially for heavy-duty vehicles. In this context, the industry and the scientific community are in need of advanced fuel cell systems (FCS) models that are able to replicate real -world operating conditions. Due to the scarcity of said models in the open literature, this study aimed to develop a comprehensive methodology to calibrate and validate multi -physics dynamic FCS models. Therefore, the key contribution of this paper is the detailed description of the calibration process for each component and the calibration order. The specific focus here was to accurately describe the behavior of the FC stack as well as the cathode, anode, and cooling circuits of the balance of plant. The model was calibrated with the aid of experimental data from a Toyota Mirai FC electric vehicle, which was predominantly retrieved from the vehicle's Controller Area Network (CAN) bus system thereby negating the need for major intrusion into the powertrain system. The validation process was deemed successful with the model being able to truthfully replicate the characteristics of the FC vehicle operated on the World-wide harmonized Light duty Test Cycle (WLTC) 3b and US06 driving cycle. The time -resolved physical parameters such as the cathode pressure, mass flow, or the FC stack temperature were captured with high fidelity, while the overall performance parameters such as the H2 consumption in the stack and the system, and the compressor energy consumption were predicted accurately with a deviation lower than 0.47%, 1.75% and 1.89% with respect to the experimental data, respectively.

Lopez-Juarez, Marcos↗