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At least 37 records · Page 2

Computer program for post-flight evaluation of a launch vehicle upper-stage on-off reaction control system

This report describes a FORTRAN IV coded computer program for post-flight evaluation of a launch vehicle upper stage on-off reaction control system. Aerodynamic and thrust misalignment disturbances are computed as well as the total disturbing moments in pitch, yaw, and roll. Effective thrust misalignment angle time histories of the rocket booster motor are calculated. Disturbing moments are integrated and used to estimate the required control system total inpulse. Effective control system specific inpulse is computed for the boost and coast phases using measured control fuel useage. This method has been used for more than fifteen years for analyzing the NASA Scout launch vehicle second and third-stage reaction control system performance. The computer program is set up in FORTRAN IV for a CDC CYBER 175 system. With slight modification it can be used on other machines having a FORTRAN compiler. The program has optional CALCOMP plotting output. With this option the program requires 19K words of memory and has 786 cards. Running time on a CDC CYBER 175 system is less than three (3) seconds for a typical problem.

Knauber, R. N.↗

R2U2: Tool Overview

R2U2 (Realizable, Responsive, Unobtrusive Unit) is an extensible framework for runtime System HealthManagement (SHM) of cyber-physical systems. R2U2 can be run in hardware (e.g., FPGAs), or software; can monitorhardware, software, or a combination of the two; and can analyze a range of different types of system requirementsduring runtime. An R2U2 requirement is specified utilizing a hierarchical combination of building blocks: temporal formula runtime observers (in LTL or MTL), Bayesian networks, sensor filters, and Boolean testers. Importantly, the framework is extensible; it is designed to enable definitions of new building blocks in combination with the core structure. Originally deployed on Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), R2U2 is designed to run on a wide range of embedded platforms, from autonomous systems like rovers, satellites, and robots, to human-assistive ground systems and cockpits. R2U2 is named after the requirements it satisfies; while the exact requirements vary by platform and mission, the ability to formally reason about realizability, responsiveness, and unobtrusiveness is necessary for flight certifiability, safety-critical system assurance, and achievement of technology readiness levels for target systems. Realizability ensures that R2U2 is suficiently expressive to encapsulate meaningful runtime requirements while maintaining adaptability to run on different platforms, transition between different mission stages, and update quickly between missions. Responsiveness entails continuously monitoring the system under test, real-time reasoning, reporting intermediate status, and as-early-as-possible requirements evaluations. Unobtrusiveness ensures compliance with the crucial properties of the target architecture: functionality, certifiability, timing, tolerances, cost, or other constraints.

Rozier, Kristin Y.↗

Unobtrusive Software and System Health Management with R2U2 on a Parallel MIMD Coprocessor

Dynamic monitoring of software and system health of a complex cyber-physical system requires observers that continuously monitor variables of the embedded software in order to detect anomalies and reason about root causes. There exists a variety of techniques for code instrumentation, but instrumentation might change runtime behavior and could require costly software re-certification. In this paper, we present R2U2E, a novel realization of our real-time, Realizable, Responsive, and Unobtrusive Unit (R2U2). The R2U2E observers are executed in parallel on a dedicated 16-core EPIPHANY co-processor, thereby avoiding additional computational overhead to the system under observation. A DMA-based shared memory access architecture allows R2U2E to operate without any code instrumentation or program interference.

Schumann, Johann↗

Developing Deep Learning Models for System Remaining Useful Life Predictions: Application to Aircraft Engines

Prognostics and health management (PHM) is an important part of ensuring reliable operations of complex safety- critical systems. System-level remaining useful life (RUL) estimation is a much more complex problem than making estimations at the component level, and system-level RUL methodologies remain sparse in the literature. Model-based approaches have traditionally worked in the past for components such as capacitors, MOSFETs, batteries, or hard-drives (to name a few examples), but developing high fidelity dynamics models of cyber physical systems that can be used to study the effects of multiple degrading components in the system remains a challenging task. Some initial work on model-based System RUL predictions was demonstrated in Khorasgani, et al [1], but, to generalize the system-level prognostics problem, we have to resort to pure data driven and hybrid approaches. In this work, we propose an end-to-end data- driven framework for developing deep learning models to predict remaining useful life of cyber physical systems operating under unknown faulty conditions. The raw data is organized with a data schema that improves the model development process and down stream data analysis tasks. Due to the unknown faulty conditions, the raw sensor data is transformed into signals that expose the underlying degradation processes, which are then used for model development. Bayesian Optimization is used to tune the model parameters prior to training and validation. We show that this approach results in accurate predictions within 3 cycles to end of life (EOL). We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach by applying it to the N-CMAPSS turbofan engine dataset recently released by NASA, which includes high fidelity degradation modeling, real world operating conditions, and a large set of fault operating modes.

Prognostics↗

Runtime Monitoring with R2U2 for Aircraft Systems with Neural Networks

R2U2 (Realizable, Responsive, Unobtrusive Unit) is a hardware-supported tool and framework for real-time system monitoring and software health management of cyber-physical systems. During system operation, R2U2 continuously monitors properties about safety, performance, and security of the vehicle and its vital components and can perform diagnostic reasoning. Efficient observers for past-time and future-time Metric Temporal Logic, fast reasoners for Bayesian Networks, and model-based prognostics algorithms are key components of R2U2 and designed for minimal computational footprint. R2U2 has been implemented in software supporting ROS, NASA's cFS/cFE, and Simulink and as an FPGA configuration. The synergistic combination of monitors and observers in R2U2 makes it possible to design powerful models for system runtime monitoring, diagnostics, software health management, prognostics, and security monitoring. In this presentation, I will give a detailed overview of the R2U2 architecture and its features and will discuss the application of R2U2 for safety-monitoring of a neural-network based autonomous centerline tracking system (ACT) for autonomous aircraft.

Runtime Monitoring↗

Cyber Threat Assessment of Uplink and Commanding System for Mission Operation

Most of today's Mission Operations Systems (MOS) rely on Ground Data System (GDS) segment to mitigate cyber security risks. Unfortunately, IT security design is done separately from the design of GDS' mission operational capabilities. This incoherent practice leaves many security vulnerabilities in the system without any notice. This paper describes a new way to system engineering MOS, to include cyber threat risk assessments throughout the MOS development cycle, without this, it is impossible to design a dependable and reliable MOS to meet today's rapid changing cyber threat environment.

ground data↗

Mission-centric cyber security assessment of critical systems

We present a novel model-based, mission-centric approach to perform cyber security assessments for evaluating the impact of low-level cyber events on high-level mission objectives.We demonstrate the benefits of our approach using a system model and attack trees specific to the command-and-control system of a spacecraft. Specifically, we demonstrate how our approach enables a decision-maker to assess the security posture of the system, identify necessary mitigations and prioritize their deployment.

Tan, Kymie↗

Hazard Contribution Modes of Machine Learning Components

Amongst the essential steps to be taken towards developing and deploying safe systems with embedded learning-enabled components (LECs) i.e., software components that use ma- chine learning (ML)—are to analyze and understand the con- tribution of the constituent LECs to safety, and to assure that those contributions have been appropriately managed. This paper addresses both steps by, first, introducing the notion of hazard contribution modes (HCMs) a categorization of the ways in which the ML elements of LECs can contribute to hazardous system states; and, second, describing how argumentation patterns can capture the reasoning that can be used to assure HCM mitigation. Our framework is generic in the sense that the categories of HCMs developed i) can admit different learning schemes, i.e., supervised, unsupervised, and reinforcement learning, and ii) are not dependent on the type of system in which the LECs are embedded, i.e., both cyber and cyber-physical systems. One of the goals of this work is to serve a starting point for systematizing L analysis towards eventually automating it in a tool.

Smith, Colin↗

Cyber-Threat Assessment for the Air Traffic Management System: A Network Controls Approach

Air transportation networks are being disrupted with increasing frequency by failures in their cyber- (computing, communication, control) systems. Whether these cyber- failures arise due to deliberate attacks or incidental errors, they can have far-reaching impact on the performance of the air traffic control and management systems. For instance, a computer failure in the Washington DC Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZDC) on August 15, 2015, caused nearly complete closure of the Centers airspace for several hours. This closure had a propagative impact across the United States National Airspace System, causing changed congestion patterns and requiring placement of a suite of traffic management initiatives to address the capacity reduction and congestion. A snapshot of traffic on that day clearly shows the closure of the ZDC airspace and the resulting congestion at its boundary, which required augmented traffic management at multiple locations. Cyber- events also have important ramifications for private stakeholders, particularly the airlines. During the last few months, computer-system issues have caused several airlines fleets to be grounded for significant periods of time: these include United Airlines (twice), LOT Polish Airlines, and American Airlines. Delays and regional stoppages due to cyber- events are even more common, and may have myriad causes (e.g., failure of the Department of Homeland Security systems needed for security check of passengers, see [3]). The growing frequency of cyber- disruptions in the air transportation system reflects a much broader trend in the modern society: cyber- failures and threats are becoming increasingly pervasive, varied, and impactful. In consequence, an intense effort is underway to develop secure and resilient cyber- systems that can protect against, detect, and remove threats, see e.g. and its many citations. The outcomes of this wide effort on cyber- security are applicable to the air transportation infrastructure, and indeed security solutions are being implemented in the current system. While these security solutions are important, they only provide a piecemeal solution. Particular computers or communication channels are protected from particular attacks, without a holistic view of the air transportation infrastructure. On the other hand, the above-listed incidents highlight that a holistic approach is needed, for several reasons. First, the air transportation infrastructure is a large scale cyber-physical system with multiple stakeholders and diverse legacy assets. It is impractical to protect every cyber- asset from known and unknown disruptions, and instead a strategic view of security is needed. Second, disruptions to the cyber- system can incur complex propagative impacts across the air transportation network, including its physical and human assets. Also, these implications of cyber- events are exacerbated or modulated by other disruptions and operational specifics, e.g. severe weather, operator fatigue or error, etc. These characteristics motivate a holistic and strategic perspective on protecting the air transportation infrastructure from cyber- events. The analysis of cyber- threats to the air traffic system is also inextricably tied to the integration of new autonomy into the airspace. The replacement of human operators with cyber functions leaves the network open to new cyber threats, which must be modeled and managed. Paradoxically, the mitigation of cyber events in the airspace will also likely require additional autonomy, given the fast time scale and myriad pathways of cyber-attacks which must be managed. The assessment of new vulnerabilities upon integration of new autonomy is also a key motivation for a holistic perspective on cyber threats.

Complex Networks↗

Towards Reliable Evaluation of Anomaly-Based Intrusion Detection Performance

This report describes the results of research into the effects of environment-induced noise on the evaluation process for anomaly detectors in the cyber security domain. This research was conducted during a 10-week summer internship program from the 19th of August, 2012 to the 23rd of August, 2012 at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, California. The research performed lies within the larger context of the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP) Smart Grid cyber security project, a Department of Energy (DoE) funded effort involving the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology and the University of Southern California/ Information Sciences Institute. The results of the present effort constitute an important contribution towards building more rigorous evaluation paradigms for anomaly-based intrusion detectors in complex cyber physical systems such as the Smart Grid. Anomaly detection is a key strategy for cyber intrusion detection and operates by identifying deviations from profiles of nominal behavior and are thus conceptually appealing for detecting "novel" attacks. Evaluating the performance of such a detector requires assessing: (a) how well it captures the model of nominal behavior, and (b) how well it detects attacks (deviations from normality). Current evaluation methods produce results that give insufficient insight into the operation of a detector, inevitably resulting in a significantly poor characterization of a detectors performance. In this work, we first describe a preliminary taxonomy of key evaluation constructs that are necessary for establishing rigor in the evaluation regime of an anomaly detector. We then focus on clarifying the impact of the operational environment on the manifestation of attacks in monitored data. We show how dynamic and evolving environments can introduce high variability into the data stream perturbing detector performance. Prior research has focused on understanding the impact of this variability in training data for anomaly detectors, but has ignored variability in the attack signal that will necessarily affect the evaluation results for such detectors. We posit that current evaluation strategies implicitly assume that attacks always manifest in a stable manner; we show that this assumption is wrong. We describe a simple experiment to demonstrate the effects of environmental noise on the manifestation of attacks in data and introduce the notion of attack manifestation stability. Finally, we argue that conclusions about detector performance will be unreliable and incomplete if the stability of attack manifestation is not accounted for in the evaluation strategy.

cyber defense↗

SimCheck: An Expressive Type System for Simulink

MATLAB Simulink is a member of a class of visual languages that are used for modeling and simulating physical and cyber-physical systems. A Simulink model consists of blocks with input and output ports connected using links that carry signals. We extend the type system of Simulink with annotations and dimensions/units associated with ports and links. These types can capture invariants on signals as well as relations between signals. We define a type-checker that checks the wellformedness of Simulink blocks with respect to these type annotations. The type checker generates proof obligations that are solved by SRI's Yices solver for satisfiability modulo theories (SMT). This translation can be used to detect type errors, demonstrate counterexamples, generate test cases, or prove the absence of type errors. Our work is an initial step toward the symbolic analysis of MATLAB Simulink models.

Roy, Pritam↗

Simulation and Modeling Concepts for Secure Airspace Operations

With the expected advent of new entrants including Unmanned Aerial Systems, Commercial Launch Vehicles and Urban Air Mobility aircraft, the future United States National Airspace System will have to evolve to include their operations along with the current commercial, general aviation and military operations. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Federal Aviation Administration are working together to provide a vision for aviation operations in the future—2045 and beyond. Their National Airspace System Horizons initiative seeks to provide stakeholders a list of operational scenarios and technologies, concepts and strategies needed for supporting that vision. They have identified cybersecurity as one of the seven strategic interest areas for realizing this vision. Consequently, NASA is studying cyber resiliency for secure airspace operations. This paper examines cyber security vulnerabilities of Urban Air Mobility operations. While there are many pathways to attack a cyber physical system such as Urban Air Mobility, their effect is expressed in modification or corruption of data/information used for controlling vehicles and making operational decisions. The paper describes cybersecurity technologies of Encryption, Blockchain, Virtual Information Fabric Infrastructure, Trusted Platform Module and Anomaly Detection for protecting the data, thus, improving the cyber resiliency of the current and future air traffic management system.

Cybersecurity↗

Reflecting on Planning Models: A Challenge for Verification and Validation of Planning Systems

We discuss the opportunities for autonomous sys- tems to perform reflection on their planners by adapting the models used to build plans. We first describe model-based planning systems, a form of automated planning system driven by declarative models of the planning domain. These models include descriptions of the conditions and effects of actions on the state of the world. When planning the activities of cyber-physical systems, the command and data representation of the system must be formally abstracted to the actions and states described in the planning system model. When the execution of a plan either fails or produces unexpected outcomes, the execution trace can be abstracted and compared to the predicted state according to the planning model, producing a list of discrepancies; these discrepancies can then be used to fix the model. This provides part of a reflection capability, namely, a set of well-formed problems with the domain model, the abstractions, or both. The challenge lies in the rest of the reflection capability, namely, a set of techniques for changing the models or the abstractions. We discuss these challenges and describe some of the options for addressing them

Mission Planning↗

A Verification Framework for Runtime Assurance of Autonomous UAS

Runtime Assurance (RTA) is a design-time architecture for safety-critical systems where an internal monitor acts upon detecting a violation of a property. The simplex architecture is an instance of RTA, where the action taken is to hand control of the overall system to a trusted controller when an untrusted one violates a safety property. Simplex RTA is emerging as a method for allowing AI/ML and other unverified software to be integrated into safety-critical applications like aircraft. To this end, the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) and NASA have each published guidelines on the use of RTA in such systems. In the simplex RTA framework, a system has an advanced controller (AC) and a reversionary controller (RC). The system is allowed to operate with the AC until a runtime monitor detects that some property has been violated and then the RC takes over. Assuming that the sample rate of the monitor will detect improper functioning with enough time for the RC to correct the impending problem, and that the RC is trusted, the system will operate as intended. This use of the simplex RTA framework can allow for the integration of untrusted, but possibly more performant, controllers in a safe way. This paper presents a formalization of a simplex RTA framework in the Prototype Verification System (PVS) theorem prover using an embedding of differential dynamic logic (DDL) called Plaidypvs. A novel feature of this framework is that it can be instantiated at different levels of abstraction. This feature allows for the formal verification of a system with an untrusted black box component, such as an AI/ML controller. This paper does not address the many difficulties in deploying RTA in an industrial-level system. Instead, the focus is on the formal verification of the simplex RTA framework in the language of hybrid programs. Hybrid programs are programs that include both discrete and continuous dynamics and can be used to model complex cyber-physical systems. Plaidypvs is a tool that enables formalization of hybrid programs in the PVS theorem prover. Plaidypvs enables the verification of the general simplex RTA framework and then, by specializing some components of the hybrid program, verifying instances of the framework while treating the untrusted component as a black box. A selection of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) operations are shown as instances of the general RTA framework in PVS. This offers the benefit of design time verification of relevant safety properties to the system, and it also gives requirements on the sample rate of sensors that determine the time interval in which the ‘switch’ property of the RTA framework is checked.

PVS↗

Serious Gaming for Building a Basis of Certification via Trust and Trustworthiness of Autonomous Systems

Autonomous systems governed by a variety of adaptive and nondeterministic algorithms are being planned for inclusion into safety-critical environments, such as unmanned aircraft and space systems in both civilian and military applications. However, until autonomous systems are proven and perceived to be capable and resilient in the face of unanticipated conditions, humans will be reluctant or unable to delegate authority, remaining in control aided by machine-based information and decision support. Proving capability, or trustworthiness, is a necessary component of certification. Perceived capability is a component of trust. Trustworthiness is an attribute of a cyber-physical system that requires context-driven metrics to prove and certify. Trust is an attribute of the agents participating in the system and is gained over time and multiple interactions through trustworthy behavior and transparency. Historically, artificial intelligence and machine learning systems provide answers without explanation - without a rationale or insight into the machine “thinking”. In order to function as trusted teammates, machines must be able to explain their decisions and actions. This transparency is a product of both content and communication. NASA’s Autonomy Teaming & TRAjectories for Complex Trusted Operational Reliability (ATTRACTOR) project seeks to build a basis for certification of autonomous systems via establishing metrics for trustworthiness and trust in multi-agent team interactions, using AI (Artificial Intelligence) explainability and persistent modeling and simulation, in the context of mission planning and execution, with analyzable trajectories. Inspired by Massively Multiplayer Online Role Playing Games (MMORPG) and Serious Gaming, the proposed ATTRACTOR modeling and simulation environment is similar to online gaming environments in which player (aka agent) participants interact with each other, affect their environment, and expect the simulation to persist and change regardless of any individual agent’s active participation. This persistent simulation environment will accommodate individual agents, groups of self-organizing agents, and large-scale infrastructure behavior. The effects of the emerging adaptation and coevolution can be observed and measured to building a basis of measurable trustworthiness and trust, toward certification of safety-critical autonomous systems.

Allen, B. Danette↗

Integrating Realizability Checking in FRET

Realizability (alternatively referred to as relative consistency or implementability) - checking whether a specification can be implemented by an open system - has been the subject of extensive study. Realizability can be viewed as a stronger analysis method when compared to consistency checking in that it does not only check whether the system works in some environment, but instead whether the system works in all environments. In this report, we experiment and build on the approach presented by Gacek et al. that supports checking realizability of contracts involving infinite theories using SMT solvers. In particular, we 1) extend the Formal Requirements Elicitation Tool (FRET) to support generation of Lustre contracts that can be checked for realizability with the JKind k-induction and fix point generation engines; 2) study a compositional way for checking realizability based on the notion of connected components; and 3) test our approach and the capabilities of the JKind realizability engines on a large subset of the Lockheed Martin Cyber Physical System Challenge Problems.

Kooi, David↗

Challenges and Demands on Automated Software Revision

In the past three decades, automated program verification has undoubtedly been one of the most successful contributions of formal methods to software development. However, when verification of a program against a logical specification discovers bugs in the program, manual manipulation of the program is needed in order to repair it. Thus, in the face of existence of numerous unverified and un- certified legacy software in virtually any organization, tools that enable engineers to automatically verify and subsequently fix existing programs are highly desirable. In addition, since requirements of software systems often evolve during the software life cycle, the issue of incomplete specification has become a customary fact in many design and development teams. Thus, automated techniques that revise existing programs according to new specifications are of great assistance to designers, developers, and maintenance engineers. As a result, incorporating program synthesis techniques where an algorithm generates a program, that is correct-by-construction, seems to be a necessity. The notion of manual program repair described above turns out to be even more complex when programs are integrated with large collections of sensors and actuators in hostile physical environments in the so-called cyber-physical systems. When such systems are safety/mission- critical (e.g., in avionics systems), it is essential that the system reacts to physical events such as faults, delays, signals, attacks, etc, so that the system specification is not violated. In fact, since it is impossible to anticipate all possible such physical events at design time, it is highly desirable to have automated techniques that revise programs with respect to newly identified physical events according to the system specification.

Bonakdarpour, Borzoo↗

Proceedings of the First NASA Formal Methods Symposium

Topics covered include: Model Checking - My 27-Year Quest to Overcome the State Explosion Problem; Applying Formal Methods to NASA Projects: Transition from Research to Practice; TLA+: Whence, Wherefore, and Whither; Formal Methods Applications in Air Transportation; Theorem Proving in Intel Hardware Design; Building a Formal Model of a Human-Interactive System: Insights into the Integration of Formal Methods and Human Factors Engineering; Model Checking for Autonomic Systems Specified with ASSL; A Game-Theoretic Approach to Branching Time Abstract-Check-Refine Process; Software Model Checking Without Source Code; Generalized Abstract Symbolic Summaries; A Comparative Study of Randomized Constraint Solvers for Random-Symbolic Testing; Component-Oriented Behavior Extraction for Autonomic System Design; Automated Verification of Design Patterns with LePUS3; A Module Language for Typing by Contracts; From Goal-Oriented Requirements to Event-B Specifications; Introduction of Virtualization Technology to Multi-Process Model Checking; Comparing Techniques for Certified Static Analysis; Towards a Framework for Generating Tests to Satisfy Complex Code Coverage in Java Pathfinder; jFuzz: A Concolic Whitebox Fuzzer for Java; Machine-Checkable Timed CSP; Stochastic Formal Correctness of Numerical Algorithms; Deductive Verification of Cryptographic Software; Coloured Petri Net Refinement Specification and Correctness Proof with Coq; Modeling Guidelines for Code Generation in the Railway Signaling Context; Tactical Synthesis Of Efficient Global Search Algorithms; Towards Co-Engineering Communicating Autonomous Cyber-Physical Systems; and Formal Methods for Automated Diagnosis of Autosub 6000.

Denney, Ewen↗