Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “cybersecure”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 37 records · Page 2

Selection of Ten (10) Cybersecurity Scenarios For Project Cybersecure Interconnection of Distributed Energy Resources

Utilities use state-of-the-art tools for reliable integration of Distributed Energy Resources (DER) within the power grid. These tools evaluate how power grid operations might be affected by various DER integration scenarios, and help the utility develop strategies to ensure reliability and safety of the power grid. These tools were developed in response to rapid wide-scale DER deployment, and are now in common use to aid the process of operating a grid with high penetration of DER. As power system technologies continually advance, these tools must also be advanced to assist the development of cyber-secure architectures for the new communication and control pathways that are being introduced with technologies such as smart inverters and local storage control.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

A new international standard on cybersecurity for nuclear power plants: IEC 62645 - cybersecurity requirements - 161

This paper provides an overview of the IEC 62645, an actual standard by the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) focused on the issue of requirements for computer security programmes and system development processes to prevent and/or minimize the impact of cyber attacks against computer-based I and C systems. Developed since 2009 and published end of 2014, the standard is intended to be used for changing or establishing new security programmes for I and C systems of operating and new Nuclear Power Plants (NPP). This paper also presents the key issues being considered in the new revision to IEC 62645, currently in process. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

The CYBER security – Competency Health and Maturity Progression (CYBER-CHAMP) model: Extending the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) Framework Across Organizational Security

Problem Statement: There is a pervasive talent deficit in the cybersecurity industry that prevents employers from being able to fill their open positions efficiently. A holistic approach to security is required to ensure organizations have adequate prevention and response capabilities in case of a cyberattack. Specifically, industrial control systems (ICS’s) and their operational technology (OT) components have become a constant target for cyberattacks. Research Questions: It is proposed that the NICE Framework should be extended in the following areas: 1) Include guidance regarding the job roles and competencies for both IT and OT professionals. 2) Offer step-by-step solutions, based on the work role mappings from the NICE Framework, to increase cybersecurity through employee training and education. 3) Provide a streamlined, lifecycle approach to building a cybersecurity program. Contribution: The CYBER security – Competency Health and Maturity Progression (CYBER-CHAMP©) model provides a customized solution for businesses to understand their education gaps in organizational security and target areas for improvement. Rationale: The Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity v1.1 addresses ICS but does not offer a measurement of cybersecurity maturity or clear methods to ascertain an organization’s current risk profile. In Phases 1 and 5 of the model, measurements are provided to help an organization build their current and target risk profiles. The NICE framework provides a structure for planning an IT cybersecurity workforce, but the OT aspects of cybersecurity are only briefly discussed. The model uses Phases 2-3 to examine the competencies of an organization’s workforce, which includes both IT and OT roles. Current frameworks do not offer next steps to increase an organization’s cybersecurity. During Phase 4, employees’ roles are mapped to training, education, and/or certifications from common vendors. Investigative Approach: The model provides measurements and metrics for both an organization’s status and continual improvement. This improvement methodology includes guidance for creating an overall strategic plan for security improvement via products designed to increase an organization’s operational readiness through workforce competency health. Lessons Learned: Depending on who was participating, there were contradicting answers given in Phase 1 due to different security cultures in the organization. This revelation has influenced the steps listed in the User’s Guide, where Phase 1’s first recommended step is to assemble a team that champions the facilitation and implementation of the model in the organization. During Phase 2, the discovery was made that organizations may be missing roles that are necessary to perform critical cybersecurity functions. By understanding the functional roles and competencies needed, they can contract or hire cybersecurity help to fill these gaps. Implications: Using the model, organizations can discuss quantitative measures for improvement as a business case for advancing their security program. Future research can validate and extend the present theory and model to a variety of environments. It is of interest to investigate additional security roles and knowledge domains that are used to build standardized cybersecurity curriculum.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Cybersecurity Lessons Learned from Vehicle to Grid Engagement

As the transportation industry continues to become electrified, introduction of additional digital devices within associated actions such as recharging bring additional potential for cybersecurity attacks. Devices that are designed, implemented, and operated with cybersecurity as a crucial consideration exacerbate these concerns by failing to provide strict boundaries on access to and use of the equipment. Emerging use cases such as Vehicle to Grid (V2G) charging may expand the potential physical effects of a cybersecurity attack by providing indirect access to electrical components of a building microgrid or portions of the larger power grid. This paper serves as an overview of findings and recommendations based on cybersecurity testing performed at a V2G implementation site operated by a member of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to Establish the Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) Collaboration [1]. The Department of Energy Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response is a signatory of the MOU, and has funded this research paper and associated body of work regarding V2X cybersecurity. Sandia has a large background of previous research focused on Electric Vehicle (EV) cybersecurity, such as reference [2], which includes an overall survey of EV infrastructure cybersecurity and recommendations based on those findings. This report seeks to expand knowledge of EV cybersecurity status and needs by focusing on a specific implementation of V2G charging, and providing recommendations based on the relevant findings. This report serves as a publicly available, sanitized description of applied vulnerability testing on an operational V2G implementation. A more in-depth technical version of the report is provided to the MOU partner, but not available at the time of writing due to inclusion of proprietary information. V2G charging comes with many research problems that must be solved before the technology can securely implemented in sites with unrestricted public access or where cybersecurity attacks could have increased consequences, such as government offices. V2G charging requires many stakeholders such as end users, host sites, equipment vendors, and integrators, which all rely on operational safety and security as well as security and trustworthiness of any associated financial transactions.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

APPLICATION OF MATURITY MODELS FOR EVALUATING CYBERSECURITY PROGRAMS AT NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL FACILITIES

Maturity models can be used to provide government agencies, industry associations, and organizations operating nuclear facilities with the ability to quickly evaluate the maturity of their cybersecurity programs and identify areas to prioritize for improvement. The Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (C2M2) was developed by the U.S. Department of Energy to allow organizations in the energy sector to evaluate the programmatic capabilities of their cybersecurity programs in a consistent manner, communicate programmatic maturity information, prioritize cybersecurity investments in targeted areas of concern, and track how the maturity of their cybersecurity program evolves over time. The C2M2 is designed for use by any critical infrastructure organization regardless of ownership, structure, or size. The C2M2 can be easily fine-tuned to access the maturity of nuclear cybersecurity programs and their application at individual facilities. Built on a foundation of existing cybersecurity standards, frameworks, programs, and initiatives, the model features 10 security domains. Performance in each security domain is characterized using a structured set of cybersecurity practices that represent activities an organization can perform to improve cybersecurity in their domain. Each practice can be quickly evaluated as being either fully, largely, partially, or not implemented. Once practices are evaluated for each security domain, the model defines four maturity indicator levels that apply independently to each domain in the model. To earn a maturity level in a given domain, an organization must adequately perform all the practices for that maturity level and its predecessor level(s). A small assessment team can conduct a C2M2 assessment in a single day. A screening version of the C2M2 allows an initial look at the maturity of nuclear cybersecurity programs that could be completed in under an hour.

Cyber security, Nuclear security, maturity model↗

Cybersecurity Considerations for Hydrogen Infrastructure in Airport Environments

This report explores key cybersecurity concerns and best practices within environments that serve as reference points for the development of hydrogen fueling infrastructure for aviation. This cybersecurity analysis leverages prior NREL studies: 1) hydrogen fueling station component validation to identify vulnerabilities and failure events documented in physical equipment, and 2) electric aircraft charging infrastructure analysis to explore primary cybersecurity vulnerabilities. It reviews the criticality of digitized technologies in sustaining hydrogen fuel production, storage, and fueling systems, noting cybersecurity concerns that are universal to power systems and industrial control systems in general. In considering cybersecurity vulnerabilities within a future landscape of hydrogen energy for aviation applications, a reference architecture was intended to reveal the points of connection between assets and the potential sensors that are vulnerable to manipulation in the event of compromised access or communication within a SCADA system. A generalized reference architecture can help stakeholders, engineers, or strategists understand connections, criticalities, and standard practices when it comes to designing and planning for new systems. There are several gaps to account for in assessing the future of hydrogen production, storage, and fueling for aviation. Engaging stakeholders, including aircraft manufacturers, electric utilities, site property owners, and local communities, will inform decision-making around site structure, operations, and resources for future hydrogen fueling infrastructure to understand operational needs and cybersecurity awareness. Cybersecurity mitigation strategy must consider physical attack vectors that emerge with the integration of hydrogen systems into existing airport security requirements. The cybersecurity risk assessment contained in this report is an entry point into potential future granular-level analyses to be conducted as part of hazard and risk assessments for safe aviation hydrogen infrastructure, determining how the scale of hydrogen fuel infrastructure for aviation impacts the volume of cyber attack vectors, and what, if any, are the vulnerabilities associated with different types of on-board hydrogen systems. In this nascent development phase, assessing how best to integrate cybersecurity practices into an evolving U.S. aviation landscape provides critical insights into building increased awareness and stakeholder engagement to support a cyber-resilient infrastructure.

08 HYDROGEN↗

Cybersecurity Risk Profiles for Distributed Energy Resource Management Systems

Managing the digitalization of increasingly diversity energy resources is a complex challenge for energy systems planners and managers. As the penetration of solar photovoltaics (PV) and other distributed renewable energy resources (DERs) expands, distributed energy resource management systems (DERMS) will play an increasingly important role in managing, monitoring, and controlling DERs as electric systems before more distributed, interconnected, and networked. However, the cybersecurity implications of DERMS deployments are not well understood today. A lack of understanding around the cybersecurity implications of DERMS deployments and variability in the security posture of DERMS vendors, owners, and operators could introduce new security risks to evolving electric power systems. This paper describes cybersecurity attack scenarios on DERMS, identifies related cybersecurity standards and guidelines, reviews the security features of state-of-the-art DERMS solutions, and offers cybersecurity guidance for DERMS vendors, owners, and operators to protect DERMS' unique capabilities. Standardizing cybersecurity requirements for DERMS could help improve the security of DERMS integrations and improve innovations that are more secure by design. The cybersecurity guidance found in this paper is intended to offer a unified approach and lay the foundation for future standardization of DERMS cybersecurity to reduce risk to the solar industry and other renewable energy stakeholders when integrating these technologies with electric power systems.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Cybersecurity Platform and Certification Framework Development for Extreme Fast Charging (XFC)-Integrated Charging Ecosystem (Final Project Report)

This report summarizes a pioneering effort in Electric Vehicle charging infrastructure ecosystem cybersecurity requirements, assessment methodologies, functional verification, as well as embodiment of the key technologies in the form of hardware and software tools being made available to the public. EPRI led a team of experts, as well as a stakeholder coalition encompassing all key actors in the EV charging infrastructure ecosystem that includes eXtreme Fast Charging (XFC) equipment (defined as 200kW or above). EV charging infrastructure in the United States is a patchwork of networks that have continued to grow organically and have been designed to serve the charging needs of the EV owners, who are their customers. In doing so, each network provider, as well as their connected entities such as the cloud Electric Vehicle Service Providers or EVSPs, utility back office, utility AMI networks, payment networks, as well as Original Equipment Manufacturer (EV manufacturer) telematics networks, have designed systems that may work well individually, but no single entity is responsible for the entire ecosystem to be secure in terms of data exchange. Furthermore, there is no uniformity in how each actor has implemented the cybersecurity requirements since no system-wide cybersecurity requirements existed prior to this project. The final project report describes the technical approach guided by the EV charging infrastructure cybersecurity working group, convened specifically for this project. The technical approach included definition of requirements at the ecosystem level, treated as a ‘system of systems’, and then passed down to individual systems (EVSE, EV, cloud EVSP, utility, and the payment networks), followed by developing the cybersecurity risk and vulnerability assessment methods, that were later applied to real-world cyber-physical systems at EPRI, ANL, and NREL laboratories, to validate both the process and the results. Finally, in a spotlight over the most vulnerable equipment, which is the EV charge station (AC or DC), the team developed a multi-layer cybersecurity implementation in the embedded domain embodied by the open-source Secure Network Interface Card (SNIC) demonstrating the various ways in which the infrastructure can be secured protecting against the identified attack surfaces. Finally, the entire process of EV infrastructure cybersecurity assessment was encapsulated in the Electric Vehicle Charging Cybersecurity Management (EVC2M) online GUI-based tool, that is expected to be released to the public. The report presents the objectives, the technical approach, the key results, and recommendations for future work.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Creating Cybersecurity Professionals of the Future

Cybersecurity is a growing public concern with more threats and vulnerabilities being discovered and exploited by adversaries each day. In particular, industrial control systems (ICS) are at a higher risk because their components were not designed with cybersecurity in mind. With increased risk to ICS, it is vital that the employees who work on the system are trained in cybersecurity best practices and the latest threats. Research has shown that there are currently no curriculum standards for an ICS cybersecurity professional, which may contribute to the issues faced during the hiring process. In fact, most individuals require extensive post-hire training before they can begin normal operations. The goal in cybersecurity is to become operationally resilient, which means in part that employees of an organization are trained to prevent and handle a cybersecurity incident. Therefore, the authors present a project that offers a solution to the education gap by creating a workforce pipeline for ICS cybersecurity professionals. The project is a virtual ecosystem for collaboration and transforming operational resilience (VECTOR). VECTOR incorporates many different efforts to increase operational resilience including the development of ICS cybersecurity curriculum and apprenticeships.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Application of Rank-Weight Methods to Blockchain Cybersecurity Vulnerability Assessment Framework

Cybersecurity vulnerability assessment tools, frameworks, and methodologies are used to understand the cybersecurity maturity of a system or a facility. However, these tools are strictly developed based on standards defined by organizations such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the U.S. Department of Energy; the majority of these tools and frameworks do not provide a platform to prioritize the requirements to reach a desired cybersecurity maturity. To address that challenge, we have been developing a framework and software application called cybersecurity vulnerability mitigation framework through empirical paradigm (CyFEr). CyFEr treats the problem at hand as a multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) problem, which requires that various criteria be weighed relatively. Defining those weights is non-trivial and often leads to subjective decisions leading to undesired complications. To facilitate such a weighting system in CyFEr, we evaluated the application of various rank-weight methods (such as rank sum, reciprocal rank, rank exponent, and rank order centroid). The efficacy of those rank-weight methods was evaluated by applying them and testing against the blockchain cybersecurity framework (BC2F). BC2F was developed using the NIST cybersecurity framework to evaluate the cybersecurity posture of the blockchain nodes and networks in a given blockchain application or use-case. This paper provides 1) technical insights on the application of rank-weight methods to cybersecurity vulnerability assessments, 2) an overview of BC2F, 3) the application of rank-weight methods to BC2F, and 4) a depiction of the integration of the discussed rank-weight methods in CyFEr.

Gourisetti, Sri Nikhil G.↗

Multi-Scenario Use Case based Demonstration of Buildings Cybersecurity Framework Webtool

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the cybersecurity and software capabilities of Buildings Cybersecurity Framework (BCF) webtool. The webtool is designed based on BCF document and existing NIST standards. It’s capabilities and features are depicted through a building usecase with four different investment scenarios geared towards improving the cybersecurity posture of the building. BCF webtool also facilitates implementation of the goals outlined in Presidential Executive Order (EO) on Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure (May 2017. In realization of the EO goals, BCF includes five core elements: Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover, to help determine various policy and process level vulnerabilities and provide mitigation strategies. With the BCF webtool, an organization can perform a cybersecurity self-assessment; determine the current cybersecurity posture; define investment based goals to achieve a target state; connect the cybersecurity posture with business processes, functions, and continuity; and finally, develop plans to answer critical organizational cybersecurity questions. In this paper, the webtool and its core capabilities are depicted by performing an extensive comparative assessment over four different scenarios.

Gourisetti, Sri Nikhil G.↗

Applying the Scientific Method of Cybersecurity Research

The cyber environment has rapidly evolved from a curiosity to an essential component of the contemporary world. As the cyber environment has expanded and become more complex, so have the nature of adversaries and styles of attacks. Today, cyber incidents are an expected part of life. As a result, cybersecurity research emerged to address adversarial attacks interfering with or preventing normal cyber activities. Historical response to cybersecurity attacks is heavily skewed to tactical responses with an emphasis on rapid recovery. While threat mitigation is important and can be time critical, a knowledge gap exists with respect to developing the science of cybersecurity. Such a science will enable the development and testing of theories that lead to understanding the broad sweep of cyber threats and the ability to assess trade-offs in sustaining network missions while mitigating attacks. The Asymmetric Resilient Cybersecurity Initiative at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory is a multi-year, multi-million dollar investment to develop approaches for shifting the advantage to the defender and sustaining the operability of systems under attack. The initiative established a Science Council to focus attention on the research process for cybersecurity. The Council shares science practices, critiques research plans, and aids in documenting and reporting reproducible research results. The Council members represent ecology, economics, statistics, physics, computational chemistry, microbiology and genetics, and geochemistry. This paper reports the initial work of the Science Council to implement the scientific method in cybersecurity research. The second section describes the scientific method. The third section in this paper discusses scientific practices for cybersecurity research. Section four describes initial impacts of applying the science practices to cybersecurity research.

Tardiff, Mark F.↗

Facility Cybersecurity Framework Best Practices

Federal facilities are increasingly adopting automation and connecting to the Internet creating an energy-internet-of-things environment that converges operational technology (OT) and information technology (IT). Today's buildings increasingly weave together networked sensors and cyber and physical systems that enable data to be collected, aggregated, exchanged, stored and monetized in new ways. Building technological advances have created new energy technology, services, markets and value creation opportunities (e.g. transactive energy, two-way grid communications, machine learning, and increased use of renewable and distributed energy resources). But as larger data sets are being exchanged at faster speeds between an increasing number of OT systems, it becomes more difficult to protect the security of the data lifecycle and the physical equipment it interacts with. These challenges are especially difficult to overcome because the economic and environmental gain (interoperability, big data, social networks and ubiquitous information sharing) are driving these prominent trends in the digital age. Often cybersecurity is an afterthought. The U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP) funded the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) to develop various cybersecurity tools, trainings, and reports to aid federal facility managers – and other building owners and operators – in better applying frameworks and lessons learned from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework (CSF), risk management framework (RMF), DOE’s cybersecurity capability maturity model (C2M2), and a wide variety of industry best practices and guidance documents (i.e., NIST 800 series, Department of Defense United Facilities Criteria). This set of tools, collectively known as the FEMP Facility-Related Control System Cyber Toolkit (FRCS Cyber Toolkit)2, is focused on cybersecurity concerns from facility-related control systems and other operational technology (OT), such as industrial control systems (ICS). The FRCS Cyber Toolkit can be applied across six of the sixteen critical infrastructure sectors designated by the Department of Homeland Security, including government facilities, healthcare and public health, commercial facilities (e.g., public assembly, offices, lodging), financial services (e.g., banking and insurance), emergency services (e.g., fire and police stations), and information technology. With increasingly converged IT and OT systems, it is crucial to address OT cybersecurity considerations and assess how the seam of these two systems could impact the overall cybersecurity posture of a facility. The objective of this report is to provide an overview of the best possible method to use FRCS Cyber Toolkit (section 2.0) and distilled cybersecurity best practices for the federal facilities to address growing non-linear cyber threats (section 3.0). Recommendations in this document are aggregated from several NIST and other documents (see Appendix A for additional details).

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Cybersecurity assessment and risk management tool

Techniques and apparatuses are described for a cybersecurity risk management tool to assess cybersecurity risk and prioritize cybersecurity correction plans. The cybersecurity risk management tool categorizes cybersecurity framework security controls into maturity indicator levels, identifies implementation states achieved by an entity with respect to the cybersecurity framework security controls, and determines which of the maturity indicator levels represents the implementation state achieved by the entity with respect to each of the cybersecurity framework security controls. A cost-benefit analysis for modifying from the implementation state achieved by the entity to a next implementation state to be achieved by the entity with respect to the cybersecurity framework security controls is also enabled. The cost-benefit analysis leverages factored weights including aspects indicative of security perspectives, Gaussian distributions, and the maturity indicator levels.

Gourisetti, Sri Nikhil Gupta↗