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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
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A method which uses initiating explosives for determining the sensitivity of solid explosives is described. The energy index of sensitivity is determined by the mechanical properties of the explosives. The results of the calculations are discussed.
An attempt is made to show that redundancies in some aerospace mechanisms do not generally improve the odds for success. Some of these redundancies may even be the very cause for failure of the system. To illustrate this fallacy, two designs based on the Control of Flexible Structures I (COFS I) Mast deployer and retractor assembly (DRA) are presented together with novel designs to circumvent such design inadequacies, while improving system reliability.
The practical importance of simple data adjustments for path (atmospheric) radiance and sensor calibration offsets prior to band ratioing has often been overlooked or misjudged. This paper describes and demonstrates the critical nature of data adjustments for the production of useful ratio images, including ratio images derived solely from long wavelength bands. A simple bispectral graphic model is used for illustrating and evaluating the impact of data offsets upon ratio images. Orthogonal indices, used as alternatives to band ratios, are shown to be sometimes less sensitive to topographic influences than ratios of unadjusted data but not less sensitive than ratios of properly adjusted data.
The rate of charge moment generation derived from Maxwell current densities at the ground is compared with the rate of charge moment removal by lightning for the initial stages of a small thunderstorm cell. It is shown that the current moment in the cell increased with time at a rate of 4.5 (A m/s) during the first seven minutes following detection of electrical activity on the ground. At the time of the first lightning flash which neutralized 0.48 (kC m) a charge moment of over 8 (kC m) had been separated. Theoretical and practical implications of these measurements are discussed.
A definition of "stalled fight" is presented as well as a detailed discussion on the how and why it occurs. Some suggestions are made to prevent its occurrence such as carrying an air speed instrument in the airplane.
A peculiar phenomena in seaplane landing is observed and reported. The seaplane having executed a normal fast landing at low incidence, a forward movement of the control stick effected an unusual condition in that the seaplane left the water suddenly in an abnormal attitude. The observations describing this phenomena are offered as a warning against possible accident and as a conjectural cause of seaplane landing accidents of a certain kind.
This report deals first with the fundamental data required for the investigation. These are chiefly the aerodynamic forces and moments acting on an airplane in a flat spin. It is shown that these forces and moments depend principally on the angle of attack and on the rotation about the path axis, and can therefore either be measured in a wind tunnel or calculated from wind-tunnel measurements of lift, drag and moment about the leading edge of the wing of an airplane model at rest. The lift, drag and moments about the span axis are so greatly altered by the rapid rotation in a flat spin, that they can no longer be regarded as independent of rotation. No substantial change in the angles of attack and glide occurring in a flat spin is involved. The cross-wind force, as compared with the lift and drag, can be disregarded in a flat spin.
MSCSurv computer program designed to quantify conditional probability of losing one or more crew members following remote likelihood of penetration of orbital debris into cluster of spacecraft modules containing crew members. Contributions to probability of losing one or more crew members quantified from three significant penetration-induced hazards: rupture of pressure wall (explosive decompression), injuries induced by fragments, and "slow" depressurization. Uses Monte Carlo-style subroutine to simulate penetration of thousands of orbital debris particles of various sizes, velocities, and angles of approach into spacecraft of selected exterior geometry. Written in FORTRAN 77.
Black holes such as GRO J1655-40 form from collapsed stars. When stars at least eight times more massive than our Sun exhaust their fuel supply, they no longer have the energy to support their tremendous bulk. These stars explode as supernovae, blasting their outer envelopes into space. If the core is more than three times the mass of the Sun, it will collapse into a singularity, a single point of infinite density.Although light cannot escape black holes, astronomers can see black holes by virtue of the hot, glowing gas often stolen from a neighboring star that orbits these objects. From our vantage point, the light seems to flicker. The Rossi Explorer has recorded this flickering (called quasiperiodic oscillations, or QPOs) around many black holes. QPOs are produced by gas very near the innermost stable orbit the closest orbit a blob of gas can maintain before falling pell-mell into the black hole. As gas whips around the black hole at near light speed, gravity pulls the gas in one direction, then another, adding to the flickering. The QPO is related to the speed and size of this orbit and the mass of the black hole.
This viewgraph presentation reviews the sources, problems and some solutions to dust on the moon. While there appeared to be no long term effects from Lunar Dust in Apollo astronauts, the future lunar missions will be longer in duration, and therefore more problems may present themselves. Some of the se problems are reviewed, and plans to deal with them are reviewed.
On 1 August 2005, a Boeing Company 777-200 aircraft, operating on an international passenger flight from Australia to Malaysia, was involved in a significant upset event while flying on autopilot. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau's investigation into the event discovered that an anomaly existed in the component software hierarchy that allowed inputs from a known faulty accelerometer to be processed by the air data inertial reference unit (ADIRU) and used by the primary flight computer, autopilot and other aircraft systems. This anomaly had existed in original ADIRU software, and had not been detected in the testing and certification process for the unit. This paper describes the software aspects of the incident in detail, and suggests possible implications concerning complex, safety-critical, fault-tolerant software.
We have developed a space-weather forecasting tool using an active-region free-energy proxy that was measured from MDI line-of-sight magnetograms. To develop this forecasting tool (Falconer et al 2011, Space Weather Journal, in press), we used a database of 40,000 MDI magnetograms of 1300 active regions observed by MDI during the previous solar cycle (cycle 23). From each magnetogram we measured our free-energy proxy and for each active region we determined its history of major flare, CME and Solar Particle Event (SPE) production. This database determines from the value of an active region s free-energy proxy the active region s expected rate of production of 1) major flares, 2) CMEs, 3) fast CMEs, and 4) SPEs during the next few days. This tool was delivered to NASA/SRAG in 2010. With MDI observations ending, we have to be able to use HMI magnetograms instead of MDI magnetograms. One of the difficulties is that the measured value of the free-energy proxy is sensitive to the spatial resolution of the measured magnetogram: the 0.5 /pixel resolution of HMI gives a different value for the free-energy proxy than the 2 /pixels resolution of MDI. To use our MDI-database forecasting curves until a comparably large HMI database is accumulated, we smooth HMI line-of-sight magnetograms to MDI resolution, so that we can use HMI to find the value of the free-energy proxy that MDI would have measured, and then use the forecasting curves given by the MDI database. The new version for use with HMI magnetograms was delivered to NASA/SRAG (March 2011). It can also use GONG magnetograms, as a backup.
In 1990, NASA grounded its space shuttle fleet. The reason: leaks detected in the hydrogen fuel systems of the Space Shuttles Atlantis and Columbia. Unless the sources of the leaks could be identified and fixed, the shuttles would not be safe to fly. To help locate the existing leaks and check for others, Kennedy Space Center engineers used portable ultrasonic detectors to scan the fuel systems. As a gas or liquid escapes from a leak, the resulting turbulence creates ultrasonic noise, explains Gary Mohr, president of Elmsford, New York-based UE Systems Inc., a long-time leader in ultrasonic detector technologies. "In lay terms, the leak is like a dog whistle, and the detector is like the dog ear." Because the ultrasound emissions from a leak are highly localized, they can be used not only to identify the presence of a leak but also to help pinpoint a leak s location. The NASA engineers employed UE s detectors to examine the shuttle fuel tanks and solid rocket boosters, but encountered difficulty with the devices limited range-certain areas of the shuttle proved difficult or unsafe to scan up close. To remedy the problem, the engineers created a long-range attachment for the detectors, similar to "a zoom lens on a camera," Mohr says. "If you are on the ground, and the leak is 50 feet away, the detector would now give you the same impression as if you were only 25 feet away." The enhancement also had the effect of reducing background noise, allowing for a clearer, more precise detection of a leak s location.
We assess climate impacts of global warming using ongoing observations and paleoclimate data. We use Earth's measured energy imbalance, paleoclimate data, and simple representations of the global carbon cycle and temperature to define emission reductions needed to stabilize climate and avoid potentially disastrous impacts on today's young people, future generations, and nature. A cumulative industrial-era limit of approx.500 GtC fossil fuel emissions and 100 GtC storage in the biosphere and soil would keep climate close to the Holocene range to which humanity and other species are adapted. Cumulative emissions of approx.1000 GtC, sometimes associated with 2 C global warming, would spur "slow" feedbacks and eventual warming of 3-4 C with disastrous consequences. Rapid emissions reduction is required to restore Earth's energy balance and avoid ocean heat uptake that would practically guarantee irreversible effects. Continuation of high fossil fuel emissions, given current knowledge of the consequences, would be an act of extraordinary witting intergenerational injustice. Responsible policymaking requires a rising price on carbon emissions that would preclude emissions from most remaining coal and unconventional fossil fuels and phase down emissions from conventional fossil fuels.
Building a parametric cost model is hard work. The data is noisy and often does not behave like we want it to. We need statistics to give us an indication of the goodness of our models, but; statistics can be manipulated and mislead. On top of all of that, our own very human biases can lead us astray; causing us to see patterns in the noise and draw false conclusions from the data. Yet, it is the data itself that is the foundation for making better cost estimates and cost models. I believe the mistake we often make is we believe that our models are representative of the data; that our models summarize the experiences, the knowledge, and the stories contained in the data. However, it is the opposite that is true. Our models are but imitations of reality. They give us trends, but not truth. The experiences, the knowledge, and the stories that we need in order to make good cost estimates is bound up in the data. You cannot separate good cost estimating from a knowledge of the historical data. One final thought. It is our attempts to make sense out of the randomness that leads us astray. In order to make progress as cost modelers and cost estimators, we must accept that there are real limitations on our ability to model the past and predict the future. I do not believe we should throw up our hands and say this is the best we can do. Rather, to see real improvement we must first recognize these limitations, avoid the easy but misleading solutions, and seek to find ways to better model the world we live in. I don't have any simple solutions. Perhaps the answers lie in better data or in a totally different approach to simulating how the world works. All I know is that we must do our best to speak truth to ourselves and our customers. Misleading ourselves and our customers will, in the end, result in an inability to have a positive impact on those we serve.
Building a parametric cost model is hard work. The data is noisy and often does not behave like we want it to. We need statistics to give us an indication of the goodness of our models, but; statistics can be manipulated and mislead. On top of all of that, our own very human biases can lead us astray; causing us to see patterns in the noise and draw false conclusions from the data. Yet, it is the data itself that is the foundation for making better cost estimates and cost models. I believe the mistake we often make is we believe that our models are representative of the data; that our models summarize the experiences, the knowledge, and the stories contained in the data. However, it is the opposite that is true. Our models are but imitations of reality. They give us trends, but not truth. The experiences, the knowledge, and the stories that we need in order to make good cost estimates is bound up in the data. You cannot separate good cost estimating from a knowledge of the historical data. One final thought. It is our attempts to make sense out of the randomness that leads us astray. In order to make progress as cost modelers and cost estimators, we must accept that there are real limitations on our ability to model the past and predict the future. I do not believe we should throw up our hands and say this is the best we can do. Rather, to see real improvement we must first recognize these limitations, avoid the easy but misleading solutions, and seek to find ways to better model the world we live in. I don't have any simple solutions. Perhaps the answers lie in better data or in a totally different approach to simulating how the world works. All I know is that we must do our best to speak truth to ourselves and our customers. Misleading ourselves and our customers will, in the end, result in an inability to have a positive impact on those we serve.
The Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) in a partnership between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), participating carriers, and labor organizations. It is designed to improve the National Airspace System by collecting and studying reports detailing unsafe conditions and events in the aviation industry. Employees are able to report safety issues or concerns with confidentiality and without fear of discipline.
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