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At least 37 records · Page 2

UAS Integration into the NAS: Detect and Avoid Display Evaluations in Support of SC-228 MOPS Development

At the May 2015 SC-228 meeting, requirements for TCAS II interoperability became elevated in priority. A TCAS interoperability work group was formed to identify and address key issuesquestions. The TCAS work group came up with an initial list of questions and a plan to address those questions. As part of that plan, NASA proposed to run a mini HITL to address display, alerting and guidance issues. A TCAS Interoperability Workshop was held to determine potential displayalertingguidance issues that could be explored in future NASA mini HITLS. Consensus on main functionality of DAA guidance when TCAS II RA occurs. Prioritized list of independent variables for experimental design. Set of use cases to stress TCAS Interoperability.

detect and avoid↗

UAS Integration in the NAS Project: DAA-TCAS Interoperability "mini" HITL Primary Results

At the May 2015 SC-228 meeting, requirements for TCAS II interoperability became elevated in priority. A TCAS interoperability workgroup was formed to identify and address key issues/questions. The TCAS workgroup came up with an initial list of questions and a plan to address those questions. As part of that plan, NASA proposed to run a mini HITL to address display, alerting and guidance issues. A TCAS Interoperability Workshop was held to determine potential display/alerting/guidance issues that could be explored in future NASA mini HITLS. Consensus on main functionality of DAA guidance when TCAS II RA occurs. Prioritized list of independent variables for experimental design. Set of use cases to stress TCAS Interoperability.

human systems integration↗

A Human-in-the-Loop Evaluation of ACAS Xu

As part of the Phase 2 UAS DAA MOPS, a Class 3 DAA system has been under development with the potential to resolve many of the limitations of Class 1 and 2 systems. A Class 3 system would combine the DAA and CA functions into a single, unified system, and would also extend the CA capabilities relative to TCAS II. Class 3 is enabled by the Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) XU, a next generation CA system developed specifically for UAS operations. Unlike Class 2 systems, ACAS XU provides CA protection against both cooperative and non-cooperative traffic. Class 3 systems also expand the CA logic to allow horizontal RAs in addition to vertical RAs. The purpose of the current study was to evaluate ACAS XU in a real-time, HITL simulation. The latest version of ACAS XU was implemented and pilots were tasked with responding to scripted traffic conflicts over the course of four experimental trials. Variables included the location of the ACAS XU guidance information (standalone vs. integrated) and traffic conflict type (DAA or CA threat). Sixteen active UAS pilots participated in the study, with ATC and ‘pseudo’ pilots acting as airspace confederates. Results showed that pilots were able to maintain DWC with ACAS XU at a rate comparable to previous research (~5%). Compliance rates to initial RAs were high (~90%) but dropped significantly when the target heading value issued during horizontal RAs were updated over the course of an encounter (30-70%). The implications of these findings on the display, alerting, and guidance requirements for Class 3 systems will be discussed.

unmanned aircraft systems↗

A Human-in-the-Loop Evaluation of ACAS Xu

As part of the Phase 2 UAS DAA MOPS, a Class 3 DAA system has been under development with the potential to resolve many of the limitations of Class 1 and 2 systems. A Class 3 system would combine the DAA and CA functions into a single, unified system, and would also extend the CA capabilities relative to TCAS II. Class 3 is enabled by the Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) XU, a next generation CA system developed specifically for UAS operations. Unlike Class 2 systems, ACAS XU provides CA protection against both cooperative and non-cooperative traffic. Class 3 systems also expand the CA logic to allow horizontal RAs in addition to vertical RAs. The purpose of the current study was to evaluate ACAS XU in a real-time, HITL simulation. The latest version of ACAS XU was implemented and pilots were tasked with responding to scripted traffic conflicts over the course of four experimental trials. Variables included the location of the ACAS XU guidance information (standalone vs. integrated) and traffic conflict type (DAA or CA threat). Sixteen active UAS pilots participated in the study, with ATC and ‘pseudo’ pilots acting as airspace confederates. Results showed that pilots were able to maintain DWC with ACAS XU at a rate comparable to previous research (~5%). Compliance rates to initial RAs were high (~90%) but dropped significantly when the target heading value issued during horizontal RAs were updated over the course of an encounter (30-70%). The implications of these findings on the display, alerting, and guidance requirements for Class 3 systems will be discussed.

unmanned aircraft systems↗

A Human-in-theLoop Evaluation of ACAS Xu

As part of the Phase 2 UAS DAA MOPS, a Class 3 DAA system has been under development with the potential to resolve many of the limitations of Class 1 and 2 systems. A Class 3 system would combine the DAA and CA functions into a single, unified system, and would also extend the CA capabilities relative to TCAS II. Class 3 is enabled by the Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) XU, a next generation CA system developed specifically for UAS operations. Unlike Class 2 systems, ACAS XU provides CA protection against both cooperative and non-cooperative traffic. Class 3 systems also expand the CA logic to allow horizontal RAs in addition to vertical RAs. The purpose of the current study was to evaluate ACAS XU in a real-time, HITL simulation. The latest version of ACAS XU was implemented and pilots were tasked with responding to scripted traffic conflicts over the course of four experimental trials. Variables included the location of the ACAS XU guidance information (standalone vs. integrated) and traffic conflict type (DAA or CA threat). Sixteen active UAS pilots participated in the study, with ATC and ‘pseudo’ pilots acting as airspace confederates. Results showed that pilots were able to maintain DWC with ACAS XU at a rate comparable to previous research (~5%). Compliance rates to initial RAs were high (~90%) but dropped significantly when the target heading value issued during horizontal RAs were updated over the course of an encounter (30-70%). The implications of these findings on the display, alerting, and guidance requirements for Class 3 systems will be discussed.

unmanned aircraft systems↗

Investigation of Alert Zone and Display Concepts for Free Flight

To better understand the potential benefits and drawbacks of utilizing a probability-based method, a number of alternative approaches to the collision avoidance problem were examined and summarized in the paper "Survey of Conflict Detection and Resolution Modeling Methods" which was presented in August 1997 at the AIAA Guidance, Navigation, and Control Conference. The paper provides a summary and comparative evaluation of the many different approaches that have been used in the past to perform conflict analysis. Each method is categorized in its dynamic modeling approach and method of handling conflict detection and conflict resolution. For example, one category included the extrapolation method used to predict future trajectories of which 3 were defined: nominal, probabilistic, and worst-case. Another category listed the metrics and parameters used by each method to make conflict decisions (i.e. estimated time to closest point of approach, miss distance, current separation, expected maneuvering cost, probability of conflict). Other useful information such as the ability to handle multi-aircraft conflicts and cooperative and non-cooperative maneuvering is also included.

Yang, Lee C.↗

Pilot Non-Conformance to Alerting System Commands

This research project examined the effects of consonance between cockpit displays and alerting system as a technique to encourage pilots to conform to alerting system commands. An experiment used the task of collision avoidance during closely spaced parallel approaches as a case study, building upon previous experiments which identified instances of non-conformance and conflicts between the alerting criteria preferred by pilots, compared to that used by alerting systems. Using a workstation based, part-task simulator, each of 45 subjects completed 45 experiment runs. In each run, the subjects were told they were flying an approach. Their primary task was to keep their wings level despite turbulence through the use of a sidestick. The sidestick commands did not affect the path of the aircraft, however, so that consistent approach paths were be followed. Their secondary task was to indicate when an aircraft on a parallel approach is blundering towards them, as evidenced by the traffic display. Subjects were asked to press different buttons indicating whether they feel an avoidance maneuver is required by the traffic situation or not. At the completion of each run, subjects were asked to rate their confidence in their decision and, if appropriate, to rate the timeliness of automatic alerts when had been given. Three different automatic alert conditions were tested. The "No Automatic Alerts Given" condition is self-explanatory. In the "Automatic Alerts Based on NTZ Criteria" condition, an automatic alert was given when the NTZ criteria was triggered; this criteria is consistent with subject reactions in other studies, in which subjects were found to react, on average, when the other aircraft was 1350 min to the side of the own aircraft. In the "Automatic Alerts Based on MIT Criteria" condition, an automatic alert was given when the MIT criteria was triggered; this criteria was developed by Carpenter and Kuchar for parallel approaches to have better performance, at the cost of increased complexity and higher sensitivity to pilot non-conformance. Three displays were tested. The "Baseline Display" is based on a moving map display, with a top-down view, track-up orientation, iconic presentation of the other aircraft's positions and a text presentation of the other aircraft's altitude. The "NTZ Alert Criteria Shown" display added to the Baseline Display an explicit presentation on the display of the boundary delineating the NTZ criteria, allowing for quick comparison of the other aircraft's position relative to this alert criteria. Likewise, the "MIT Alert Criteria Shown" display added to the Baseline Display an explicit presentation on the display of the boundary delineating the MIT criteria, allowing for quick comparison of the other aircraft's position relative to this alert criteria The test matrix for this experiment was three dimensional, varying displays, alerts and traffic conflict scenarios.

Pritchett, Amy↗

Flight crew interface aspects of forward-looking airborne windshear detection systems

The goal of this research effort was to conduct analyses and research which could provide guidelines for design of the crew interface of an integrated windshear system. Addressed were HF issues, crew/system requirements, candidate display formats, alerting criteria, and crew procedures. A survey identified five flight management issues as top priority: missed alert acceptability; avoidance distance needed; false alert acceptability; nuisance rate acceptability; and crew procedures. Results of a simulation study indicated that the warning time for a look-ahead alert needs to be between 11 and 36 seconds (target of 23 seconds) before the reactive system triggers in order to be effective. Pilots considered the standard go-around maneuver most appropriate for look-ahead alerts, and the escape maneuvers used did not require lateral turns. Prototype display formats were reviewed or developed for alerting the crew; providing guidance to avoid or escape windshear; and status displays to provide windshear situational awareness. The three alerting levels now in use were considered appropriate, with a fourth (time-critical) level as a possible addition, although many reviewers felt only two levels of alerting were needed. Another survey gathered expert opinion on what crew procedures and alerting criteria should be used for look-ahead, or integrated, windshear systems, with a wide diversity of opinion in these areas.

Anderson, Charles D.↗

Experimental evaluation of a wind shear alert and energy management display

A method is proposed for onboard measurement and display of specific windshear and energy management data derived from an air data computer. An open-loop simulation study is described which was carried out to verify the feasibility of this display concept, and whose results were used as a basis to develop the respective cockpit instrumentation. The task was to fly a three-degree landing approach under various shear conditions with and without specific information on the shear. Improved performance due to augmented cockpit information was observed. Critical shears with increasing tailwinds could be handled more consistently and with less deviation from the glide path.

Kraiss, K.-F.↗

An experimental cockpit display for TDWR wind shear alerts

The first successful ground-to-air data link and cockpit display of terminal Doppler weather radar (TDWR) wind shear warnings in real-time are reported. During the summer of 1990, wind shear warnings generated by the TDWR testbed radar at Orlando, Florida, were transmitted in real-time to a research aircraft performing microburst penetrations. Automatic delivery of TDWR wind shear warnings potentially result in decreased controller workload and improved pilot information. Pilot responses indicate that the information provided by the cockpit displays was useful in visualizing the location of wind shear hazards. The graphical display of microburst hazards provided better information than that currently provided by ATC verbal messages and pilot reports. This information was useful in assessing the microburst hazard, deciding whether to continue the approach, and planning escape maneuvers.

Campbell, Steven D.↗

Flight Testing an Integrated Synthetic Vision System

NASA's Synthetic Vision Systems (SVS) project is developing technologies with practical applications to eliminate low visibility conditions as a causal factor to civil aircraft accidents while replicating the operational benefits of clear day flight operations, regardless of the actual outside visibility condition. A major thrust of the SVS project involves the development/demonstration of affordable, certifiable display configurations that provide intuitive out-the-window terrain and obstacle information with advanced pathway guidance for transport aircraft. The SVS concept being developed at NASA encompasses the integration of tactical and strategic Synthetic Vision Display Concepts (SVDC) with Runway Incursion Prevention System (RIPS) alerting and display concepts, real-time terrain database integrity monitoring equipment (DIME), and Enhanced Vision Systems (EVS) and/or improved Weather Radar for real-time object detection and database integrity monitoring. A flight test evaluation was jointly conducted (in July and August 2004) by NASA Langley Research Center and an industry partner team under NASA's Aviation Safety and Security, Synthetic Vision System project. A Gulfstream GV aircraft was flown over a 3-week period in the Reno/Tahoe International Airport (NV) local area and an additional 3-week period in the Wallops Flight Facility (VA) local area to evaluate integrated Synthetic Vision System concepts. The enabling technologies (RIPS, EVS and DIME) were integrated into the larger SVS concept design. This paper presents experimental methods and the high level results of this flight test.

Kramer, Lynda J.↗

Airborne derivation of microburst alerts from ground-based Terminal Doppler Weather Radar information: A flight evaluation

An element of the NASA/FAA windshear program is the integration of ground-based microburst information on the flight deck, to support airborne windshear alerting and microburst avoidance. NASA conducted a windshear flight test program in the summer of 1991 during which airborne processing of Terminal Doppler Weather Radar (TDWR) data was used to derive microburst alerts. Microburst information was extracted from TDWR, transmitted to a NASA Boeing 737 in flight via data link, and processed to estimate the windshear hazard level (F-factor) that would be experienced by the aircraft in each microburst. The microburst location and F-factor were used to derive a situation display and alerts. The situation display was successfully used to maneuver the aircraft for microburst penetrations, during which atmospheric 'truth' measurements were made. A total of 19 penetrations were made of TDWR-reported microburst locations, resulting in 18 airborne microburst alerts from the TDWR data and two microburst alerts from the airborne reactive windshear detection system. The primary factors affecting alerting performance were spatial offset of the flight path from the region of strongest shear, differences in TDWR measurement altitude and airplane penetration altitude, and variations in microburst outflow profiles. Predicted and measured F-factors agreed well in penetrations near microburst cores. Although improvements in airborne and ground processing of the TDWR measurements would be required to support an airborne executive-level alerting protocol, the practicality of airborne utilization of TDWR data link data has been demonstrated.

Hinton, David A.↗

Air/ground wind shear information integration: Flight test results

An element of the NASA/FAA wind shear program is the integration of ground-based microburst information on the flight deck, to support airborne wind shear alerting and microburst avoidance. NASA conducted a wind shear flight test program in the summer of 1991 during which airborne processing of Terminal Doppler Weather Radar (TDWR) data was used to derive microburst alerts. High level microburst products were extracted from TDWR, transmitted to a NASA Boeing 737 in flight via data link, and processed to estimate the wind shear hazard level (F-factor) that would be experienced by the aircraft in the core of each microburst. The microburst location and F-factor were used to derive a situation display and alerts. The situation display was successfully used to maneuver the aircraft for microburst penetrations, during which in situ 'truth' measurements were made. A total of 19 penetrations were made of TDWR-reported microburst locations, resulting in 18 airborne microburst alerts from the TDWR data and two microburst alerts from the airborne in situ measurements. The primary factors affecting alerting performance were spatial offset of the flight path from the region of strongest shear, differences in TDWR measurement altitude and airplane penetration altitude, and variations in microburst outflow profiles. Predicted and measured F-factors agreed well in penetrations near microburst cores. Although improvements in airborne and ground processing of the TDWR measurement would be required to support an airborne executive-level alerting protocol, the feasibility of airborne utilization of TDWR data link data has been demonstrated.

Hinton, David A.↗

Validation of Minimum Display Requirements for a UAS Detect and Avoid System

The full integration of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) into the National Airspace System (NAS), a prerequisite for enabling a broad range of public and commercial UAS operations, presents several technical challenges to UAS developers, operators and regulators. A primary barrier is the inability for UAS pilots (situated at a ground control station, or GCS) to comply with Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations sections 91.111 and 91.113, which require pilots to “see and avoid” other aircraft in order to maintain well clear. UAS pilots’ removal from the flight deck of the aircraft necessitates the development of a UAS-specific system for detecting nearby traffic and displaying traffic information to the pilot to support their ability to maintain an objectively defined “DAA well clear” threshold from other aircraft. This new UAS-specific function of remaining DAA well clear is called traffic avoidance. The resulting Detect and Avoid (DAA) system, however, will be subject to a collection of requirements that manufacturers will be obligated to meet in order to certify their equipment. RTCA Special Committee 228 (SC-228), a consortium of representatives from government, industry and academia, is responsible for developing and documenting the Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for UAS DAA systems. The present study is the final in a series of human-in-the-loop (HITL) experiments designed to explore and test the various display and alerting requirements being incorporated into the DAA MOPS. Whereas the prior DAA HITLs examined a wide variety of DAA display features and concepts, the current experiment aims to validate the latest minimum display requirements for Phase 1 of the DAA MOPS. Rather than test different display concepts, this study tests two configurations of a MOPS-compatible DAA display: a version that is integrated into the primary navigation and control display of the GCS and a version that is physically separated from the primary display. This manipulation tests the draft minimum requirement that allows the DAA traffic display to be a separate, or standalone, configuration. This type of configuration is a more achievable near-term technology solution since it does not stipulate additional certification or integration requirements on UAS manufacturers. However, a standalone display configuration has the potential to result in pilot performance issues resulting from the cognitive costs of switching between the primary DAA display and the primary navigation and control display. This configuration is also particularly susceptible to errors if the displays are in different orientations (e.g., north-up versus track-up). Both the integrated and standalone display configurations were presented to 16 active UAS pilots in a medium-fidelity simulation, which included confederate air traffic controllers and pseudo pilots operating simulated manned traffic. Pilots were tasked with navigating two different mission routes while maintaining DAA well clear with scripted conflicts. Pilot response times (i.e., measured response) and ability to remain DAA well clear are reported. Primary results indicate that both display configurations resulted in favorable response times and well clear rates. While there were clear trends of pilots objectively performing better in the integrated display condition, with several measured response metrics reaching statistical significance, the differences between the two displays were typically moderate. While the primary variable of DAA display location did not have an especially large impact on pilot performance on its own, when examined alongside the type of DAA threat the pilot was facing (a caution-level versus a warning-level alert), the response time benefits associated with the integrated display were amplified. The implications of these American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 2 results on the Phase 1 DAA MOPS and the connection of this data to previous studies is also discussed.

detect and avoid↗

Upgrading the Space Shuttle Caution and Warning System

A report describes the history and the continuing evolution of an avionic system aboard the space shuttle, denoted the caution and warning system, that generates visual and auditory displays to alert astronauts to malfunctions. The report focuses mainly on planned human-factors-oriented upgrades of an alphanumeric fault-summary display generated by the system. Such upgrades are needed because the display often becomes cluttered with extraneous messages that contribute to the difficulty of diagnosing malfunctions. In the first of two planned upgrades, the fault-summary display will be rebuilt with a more logical task-oriented graphical layout and multiple text fields for malfunction messages. In the second upgrade, information displayed will be changed, such that text fields will indicate only the sources (that is, root causes) of malfunctions; messages that are not operationally useful will no longer appear on the displays. These and other aspects of the upgrades are based on extensive collaboration among astronauts, engineers, and human-factors scientists. The report describes the human-factors principles applied in the upgrades.

McCandless, Jeffrey W.↗

Validation of Minimum Display Requirements for a UAS Detect and Avoid System

The full integration of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) into the National Airspace System (NAS), a prerequisite for enabling a broad range of public and commercial UAS operations, presents several technical challenges to UAS developers, operators and regulators. A primary barrier is the inability for UAS pilots (situated at a ground control station, or GCS) to comply with Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations sections 91.111 and 91.113, which require pilots to see and avoid other aircraft in order to maintain well clear. The present study is the final in a series of human-in-the-loop experiments designed to explore and test the various display and alerting requirements being incorporated into the minimum operational performance standards (MOPS) for a UAS-specific detect and avoid system that would replace the see and avoid function required of manned aircraft. Two display configurations were tested - an integrated display and a standalone display - and their impact on pilot response times and ability to maintain DAA well clear were compared. Results indicated that the current draft of the MOPS result in high-level performance and did not meaningfully differ by display configuration.

unmanned aircraft systems↗

Unmanned Aircraft Systems Minimum Operations Performance Standards End-to-End Verification and Validation (E2-V2) Simulation

As Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) make their way to mainstream aviation operations within the National Airspace System (NAS), research efforts are underway to develop a safe and effective environment for their integration into the NAS. Detect and Avoid (DAA) systems are required to account for the lack of "eyes in the sky" due to having no human on-board the aircraft. The current NAS relies on pilot's vigilance and judgement to remain Well Clear (CFR 14 91.113) of other aircraft. RTCA SC-228 has defined DAA Well Clear (DAAWC) to provide a quantified Well Clear volume to allow systems to be designed and measured against. Extended research efforts have been conducted to understand and quantify system requirements needed to support a UAS pilot's ability to remain well clear of other aircraft. The efforts have included developing and testing sensor, algorithm, alerting, and display requirements. More recently, sensor uncertainty and uncertainty mitigation strategies have been evaluated. This paper discusses results and lessons learned from an End-to-End Verification and Validation (E2-V2) simulation study of a DAA system representative of RTCA SC-228's proposed Phase I DAA Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS). NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC) was called upon to develop a system that evaluates a specific set of encounters, in a variety of geometries, with end-to-end DAA functionality including the use of sensor and tracker models, a sensor uncertainty mitigation model, DAA algorithmic guidance in both vertical and horizontal maneuvering, and a pilot model which maneuvers the ownship aircraft to remain well clear from intruder aircraft, having received collective input from the previous modules of the system. LaRC developed a functioning batch simulation and added a sensor/tracker model from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) William J. Hughes Technical Center, an in-house developed sensor uncertainty mitigation strategy, and implemented a pilot model similar to one from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Lincoln Laboratory (MIT/LL). The resulting simulation provides the following key parameters, among others, to evaluate the effectiveness of the MOPS DAA system: severity of loss of well clear (SLoWC), alert scoring, and number of increasing alerts (alert jitter). The technique, results, and lessons learned from a detailed examination of DAA system performance over specific test vectors and encounter cases during the simulation experiment will be presented in this paper.

Ghatas, Rania W.↗