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The 2022 Hunga eruption exercises the nuclear explosion monitoring community

The 2022 Hunga eruption was a global event recorded by all three Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) International Monitoring System (IMS) geophysical waveform sensor technologies: seismic, infrasound, and hydroacoustic. Large volcanic eruptions are rare and additionally present an opportunity to test seismoacoustic detection, location, and identification methods for nuclear explosion monitoring.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

PROGRESS TOWARDS NEXT GENERATION, WAVEFORM BASED THREE-DIMENSIONAL MODELS AND METRICS TO IMPROVE NUCLEAR EXPLOSION MONITORING IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Efforts to update current wave speed models of the Middle East require a thoroughly tested database of sources and recordings. Recordings of seismic waves traversing the region from Tibet to the Red Sea will be the principal metric in guiding improvements to the current wave speed model. Precise characterizations of the earthquakes, specifically depths and faulting mechanisms, are essential to avoid mapping source errors into the refined wave speed model. Errors associated with the source are manifested in amplitude and phase changes. Source depths and paths near nodal planes are particularly error prone as small changes may severely affect the resulting wavefield. Once sources are quantified, regions requiring refinement will be highlighted using adjoint tomography methods based on spectral element simulations [Komatitsch and Tromp (1999)]. An initial database of 250 regional Middle Eastern events from 1990-2007, was inverted for depth and focal mechanism using teleseismic arrivals [Kikuchi and Kanamori (1982)] and regional surface and body waves [Zhao and Helmberger (1994)]. From this initial database, we reinterpreted a large, well recorded subset of 201 events through a direct comparison between data and synthetics based upon a centroid moment tensor inversion [Liu et al. (2004)]. Evaluation was done using both a 1D reference model [Dziewonski and Anderson (1981)] at periods greater than 80 seconds and a 3D model [Kustowski et al. (2008)] at periods of 25 seconds and longer. The final source reinterpretations will be within the 3D model, as this is the initial starting point for the adjoint tomography. Transitioning from a 1D to 3D wave speed model shows dramatic improvements when comparisons are done at shorter periods, (25 s). Synthetics from the 1D model were created through mode summations while those from the 3D simulations were created using the spectral element method. To further assess errors in source depth and focal mechanism, comparisons between the three methods were made. These comparisons help to identify problematic stations and sources which may bias the final solution. Estimates of standard errors were generated for each event's source depth and focal mechanism to identify poorly constrained events. A final, well characterized set of sources and stations will be then used to iteratively improve the wave speed model of the Middle East. After a few iterations during the adjoint inversion process, the sources will be reexamined and relocated to further reduce mapping of source errors into structural features. Finally, efforts continue in developing the infrastructure required to 'quickly' generate event kernels at the n-th iteration and invert for a new, (n+1)-th, wave speed model of the Middle East. While development of the infrastructure proceeds, initial tests using a limited number of events shows the 3D model, while showing vast improvement compared to the 1D model, still requires substantial modifications. Employing our new, full source set and iterating the adjoint inversions at successively shorter periods will lead to significant changes and refined wave speed structures of the Middle East.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

135 Xe measurements with a two-element CZT-based radioxenon detector for nuclear explosion monitoring

Measurement of elevated concentrations of xenon radioisotopes ( 131m Xe, 133m Xe, 133 Xe and 135 Xe) in the atmosphere has been shown to be a very powerful method for verifying whether or not a detected explosion is nuclear in nature. These isotopes are among the few with enough mobility and with half-lives long enough to make their detection at long distances realistic. Existing radioxenon detection systems used by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) suffer from problems such as complexity, need for high maintenance and memory effect. To study the response of CdZnTe (CZT) detectors to xenon radioisotopes and investigate whether it is capable of mitigating the afore-mentioned issues with the current radioxenon detection systems, a prototype detector utilizing two coplanar CZT detectors was built and tested at Oregon State University. The detection system measures xenon radioisotopes through beta-gamma coincidence technique by detecting coincidence events be-tween the two detectors. Here in this paper, we introduce the detector design and report our measurement results with radioactive lab sources and 135 Xe produced in the OSU TRIGA reactor. Minimum Detectable Concentration (MDC) for 135 Xe was calculated to be 1.47 ± 0.05 mBq/m 3 .

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Bayesian event categorization matrix approach for explosion monitoring

Current efforts to correctly categorize natural events from suspected explosion sources with data that is collected by ground- or space-based sensors presents historical challenges that remain unaddressed by the Event Categorization Matrix (ECM) model. Smaller historical events (lower yield explosions) may have data available from fewer measurement techniques than are available today, and therefore, a historical event record can lack a complete set of discriminants. The covariance structures can also differ between such observations of event (source-type) categories. Both obstacles are problematic for the classic ECM model. Our work addresses this gap and presents a Bayesian update to the previous ECM model, termed the Bayesian Event Categorization Matrix model, which can be trained on partial observations and does not rely on a pooled covariance structure. We further augment the ECM model with Bayesian Decision Theory so that false negative or false positive rates of an event categorization can be reduced in an intuitive manner. To demonstrate improved categorization rates for the Bayesian Event Categorization Matrix model, we compare an array of Bayesian and classic models with multiple performance metrics using Monte Carlo experiments. We use both synthetic and real data. Our Bayesian models show consistent gains in overall accuracy and lower false negative rates relative to the classic ECM model. Here, we propose future avenues to improve Bayesian Event Categorization Matrix models’ decision making and predictive capability.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Applying Compression-Based Metrics to Seismic Data in Support of Global Nuclear Explosion Monitoring

The analysis of seismic data for evidence of possible nuclear explosion testing is a critical global security mission that relies heavily on human expertise to identify and mark seismic signals embedded in background noise. To assist analysts in making these determinations, we adapted two compression distance metrics for use with seismic data. First, we demonstrated that the Normalized Compression Distance (NCD) metric can be adapted for use with waveform data and can identify the arrival times of seismic signals. Then we tested an approximation for the NCD called Sliding Information Distance (SLID), which can be computed much faster than NCD. We assessed the accuracy of the SLID output by comparing it to both the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the judgments of expert seismic analysts. Our results indicate that SLID effectively identifies arrival times and provides analysts with useful information that can aid their analysis process.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Multi-Phenomenology Explosion Monitoring (Multi-PEM). Signal Detection. Research to target smaller sources for tomorrow’s missions

This a guide on how to detect and identify explosions from various sources. For example, nuclear explosions produce acoustic, optical, and EMP outputs. Each signal can be buried in noise, but fusing detection statistics from seismic, acoustic, and electromagnetic signals results in clear detection otherwise unobtainable.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Multiphenomenology explosion monitoring (MultiPEM): a general framework for data interpretation and yield estimation

SUMMARY An underground nuclear explosion (UNE) couples mechanical energy into crustal rock, which propagates as seismic and acoustic waves. These different physical phenomena transport, by different pathways, to standoff detectors at varying distances. The transport pathways attenuate the original signal but in different ways. Enabled by correct statistical weighting, signal attenuation models can be used to combine these disparate sensor data to estimate the yield of an UNE. Contemporaneous statistical models, used in yield estimation, can be improved with an advanced partition of error for these physical signal propagation models. We present an advanced multivariate approach to error modelling of multiphenomenology physical signatures. In addition to measurement error, our error model represents physical model biases as random with a physics-based covariance structure. To illustrate this proposed framework, we demonstrate the estimation of explosion yield using openly available seismic and acoustic data from chemical single-point explosions.

Williams, Brian J.↗

A multi-Physics Experiment for Low-Yield Nuclear Explosion Monitoring

A series of multi-physics experiments, referred to as Physics Experiment 1 (PE1) is underway at the United States’ Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The PE1 series includes detonations of three underground chemical explosions in P-tunnel, with fully coupled (PE1 A), partially decoupled (PE1 D L ), and fully decoupled (PE1 B) emplacements. Canisters with gas tracers are imbedded in the explosives, and the tracers are released when the canister is destroyed by the detonation. A dedicated electromagnetic (EM) experiment (EMX) generates well-characterized EM signals at an underground location near the chemical explosive experiments. A series of atmospheric experiments (METEX, REACT, and METREX) release smoke and radioactive tracers around Aqueduct Mesa to test gas transport in complex topography. Each of the chemical explosive experiments includes a network of sensors to record seismic, acoustic, and electromagnetic waves, measurement of atmospheric conditions, and air sample collection for measurement of tracer concentration. EMX records EM signals underground and on the surface of Aqueduct Mesa. METEX, REACT, and METREX include measurement of atmospheric condition, as well as tracking smoke releases. REACT and METREX add low-level radioactive gas tracers to the atmospheric releases.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Improved performance comparisons of radioxenon systems for low level releases in nuclear explosion monitoring

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty bans all nuclear tests and mandates development of verification measures to detect treaty violations. One verification measure is detection of radioactive xenon isotopes produced in the fission of actinides. The International Monitoring System (IMS) currently deploys automated radioxenon systems that can detect four radioxenon isotopes. Radioxenon systems with lower detection limits are currently in development. Historically, the sensitivity of radioxenon systems was measured by the minimum detectable concentration for each isotope. In this paper we analyze the response of radioxenon systems using rigorous metrics in conjunction with hypothetical representative releases indicative of an underground nuclear explosion instead of using only minimum detectable concentrations. Our analyses incorporate the impact of potential spectral interferences on detection limits and the importance of measuring isotopic ratios of the relevant radioxenon isotopes in order to improve discrimination from background sources particularly for low-level releases. To provide a sufficient data set for analysis, hypothetical representative releases are simulated every day from the same location for an entire year. The performance of three types of samplers are evaluated assuming they are located at 15 IMS radionuclide stations in the region of the release point. The performance of two IMS-deployed samplers and a next-generation system is compared with proposed metrics for detection and discrimination using representative releases from the nuclear test site used by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

Haas, Derek A.↗

Nuclear explosion monitoring network design considerations

Design of an efficient monitoring network requires information on the type and size of releases to be detected, the accuracy and reliability of the measuring equipment, and the desired network performance. This work provides a scientific basis for optimizing or minimizing networks of 133 Xe samplers to achieve a desired performance level for different levels of release. The approach of this work varies the density of sampling locations to find optimal location subsets, and to explore the properties of variations of those subsets – how crucial is a specific subset; are substitutions problematic? The choice of possible station locations is arbitrary but constrained to some extent by the location of islands, land masses, difficult topography (mountains, etc.) and the places where infrastructure exists to run and support a sampler. Performance is evaluated using hypothetical releases and atmospheric transport models that cover an entire year.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗