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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2013

Automated Generation of Fault Management Artifacts from a Simple System Model

Our understanding of off-nominal behavior - failure modes and fault propagation - in complex systems is often based purely on engineering intuition; specific cases are assessed in an ad hoc fashion as a (fallible) fault management engineer sees fit. This work is an attempt to provide a more rigorous approach to this understanding and assessment by automating the creation of a fault management artifact, the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) through querying a representation of the system in a SysML model. This work builds off the previous development of an off-nominal behavior model for the upcoming Soil Moisture Active-Passive (SMAP) mission at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. We further developed the previous system model to more fully incorporate the ideas of State Analysis, and it was restructured in an organizational hierarchy that models the system as layers of control systems while also incorporating the concept of "design authority". We present software that was developed to traverse the elements and relationships in this model to automatically construct an FMEA spreadsheet. We further discuss extending this model to automatically generate other typical fault management artifacts, such as Fault Trees, to efficiently portray system behavior, and depend less on the intuition of fault management engineers to ensure complete examination of off-nominal behavior.

Spinup and Orient↗
NASA NTRS2015

Fault Management Architectures and the Challenges of Providing Software Assurance

The satellite systems Fault Management (FM) is focused on safety, the preservation of assets, and maintaining the desired functionality of the system. How FM is implemented varies among missions. Common to most is system complexity due to a need to establish a multi-dimensional structure across hardware, software and operations. This structure is necessary to identify and respond to system faults, mitigate technical risks and ensure operational continuity. These architecture, implementation and software assurance efforts increase with mission complexity. Because FM is a systems engineering discipline with a distributed implementation, providing efficient and effective verification and validation (VV) is challenging. A breakout session at the 2012 NASA Independent Verification Validation (IVV) Annual Workshop titled VV of Fault Management: Challenges and Successes exposed these issues in terms of VV for a representative set of architectures. NASA's IVV is funded by NASA's Software Assurance Research Program (SARP) in partnership with NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) to extend the work performed at the Workshop session. NASA IVV will extract FM architectures across the IVV portfolio and evaluate the data set for robustness, assess visibility for validation and test, and define software assurance methods that could be applied to the various architectures and designs. This work focuses efforts on FM architectures from critical and complex projects within NASA. The identification of particular FM architectures, visibility, and associated VVIVV techniques provides a data set that can enable higher assurance that a satellite system will adequately detect and respond to adverse conditions. Ultimately, results from this activity will be incorporated into the NASA Fault Management Handbook providing dissemination across NASA, other agencies and the satellite community. This paper discusses the approach taken to perform the evaluations and preliminary findings from the research including identification of FM architectures, visibility observations, and methods utilized for VVIVV.

Fault Management↗
NASA NTRS2010

Fault Management Practice: A Roadmap for Improvement

Autonomous fault management (FM) is critical for deep space and planetary missions where the limited communication opportunities may prevent timely intervention by ground control. Evidence of pervasive architecture, design, and verification/validation problems with NASA FM engineering has been revealed both during technical reviews of spaceflight missions and in flight. These problems include FM design changes required late in the life-cycle, insufficient project insight into the extent of FM testing required, unexpected test results that require resolution, spacecraft operational limitations because certain functions were not tested, and in-flight anomalies and mission failures attributable to fault management. A recent NASA initiative has characterized the FM state-of-practice throughout the spacecraft development community and identified common NASA, DoD, and commercial concerns that can be addressed in the near term through the development of a FM Practitioner's Handbook and the formation of a FM Working Group. Initial efforts will focus on standardizing FM terminology, establishing engineering processes and tools, and training.

Fesq, Lorraine M.↗
NASA NTRS2015

A Vehicle Management End-to-End Testing and Analysis Platform for Validation of Mission and Fault Management Algorithms to Reduce Risk for NASA's Space Launch System

The development of the Space Launch System (SLS) launch vehicle requires cross discipline teams with extensive knowledge of launch vehicle subsystems, information theory, and autonomous algorithms dealing with all operations from pre-launch through on orbit operations. The characteristics of these systems must be matched with the autonomous algorithm monitoring and mitigation capabilities for accurate control and response to abnormal conditions throughout all vehicle mission flight phases, including precipitating safing actions and crew aborts. This presents a large complex systems engineering challenge being addressed in part by focusing on the specific subsystems handling of off-nominal mission and fault tolerance. Using traditional model based system and software engineering design principles from the Unified Modeling Language (UML), the Mission and Fault Management (M&FM) algorithms are crafted and vetted in specialized Integrated Development Teams composed of multiple development disciplines. NASA also has formed an M&FM team for addressing fault management early in the development lifecycle. This team has developed a dedicated Vehicle Management End-to-End Testbed (VMET) that integrates specific M&FM algorithms, specialized nominal and off-nominal test cases, and vendor-supplied physics-based launch vehicle subsystem models. The flexibility of VMET enables thorough testing of the M&FM algorithms by providing configurable suites of both nominal and off-nominal test cases to validate the algorithms utilizing actual subsystem models. The intent is to validate the algorithms and substantiate them with performance baselines for each of the vehicle subsystems in an independent platform exterior to flight software test processes. In any software development process there is inherent risk in the interpretation and implementation of concepts into software through requirements and test processes. Risk reduction is addressed by working with other organizations such as S&MA, Structures and Environments, GNC, Orion, the Crew Office, Flight Operations, and Ground Operations by assessing performance of the M&FM algorithms in terms of their ability to reduce Loss of Mission and Loss of Crew probabilities. In addition, through state machine and diagnostic modeling, analysis efforts investigate a broader suite of failure effects and detection and responses that can be tested in VMET and confirm that responses do not create additional risks or cause undesired states through interactive dynamic effects with other algorithms and systems. VMET further contributes to risk reduction by prototyping and exercising the M&FM algorithms early in their implementation and without any inherent hindrances such as meeting FSW processor scheduling constraints due to their target platform - ARINC 653 partitioned OS, resource limitations, and other factors related to integration with other subsystems not directly involved with M&FM. The plan for VMET encompasses testing the original M&FM algorithms coded in the same C++ language and state machine architectural concepts as that used by Flight Software. This enables the development of performance standards and test cases to characterize the M&FM algorithms and sets a benchmark from which to measure the effectiveness of M&FM algorithms performance in the FSW development and test processes. This paper is outlined in a systematic fashion analogous to a lifecycle process flow for engineering development of algorithms into software and testing. Section I describes the NASA SLS M&FM context, presenting the current infrastructure, leading principles, methods, and participants. Section II defines the testing philosophy of the M&FM algorithms as related to VMET followed by section III, which presents the modeling methods of the algorithms to be tested and validated in VMET. Its details are then further presented in section IV followed by Section V presenting integration, test status, and state analysis. Finally, section VI addresses the summary and forward directions followed by the appendices presenting relevant information on terminology and documentation.

Trevino, Luis↗
NASA NTRS2006

Fault Management Techniques in Human Spaceflight Operations

This paper discusses human spaceflight fault management operations. Fault detection and response capabilities available in current US human spaceflight programs Space Shuttle and International Space Station are described while emphasizing system design impacts on operational techniques and constraints. Preflight and inflight processes along with products used to anticipate, mitigate and respond to failures are introduced. Examples of operational products used to support failure responses are presented. Possible improvements in the state of the art, as well as prioritization and success criteria for their implementation are proposed. This paper describes how the architecture of a command and control system impacts operations in areas such as the required fault response times, automated vs. manual fault responses, use of workarounds, etc. The architecture includes the use of redundancy at the system and software function level, software capabilities, use of intelligent or autonomous systems, number and severity of software defects, etc. This in turn drives which Caution and Warning (C&W) events should be annunciated, C&W event classification, operator display designs, crew training, flight control team training, and procedure development. Other factors impacting operations are the complexity of a system, skills needed to understand and operate a system, and the use of commonality vs. optimized solutions for software and responses. Fault detection, annunciation, safing responses, and recovery capabilities are explored using real examples to uncover underlying philosophies and constraints. These factors directly impact operations in that the crew and flight control team need to understand what happened, why it happened, what the system is doing, and what, if any, corrective actions they need to perform. If a fault results in multiple C&W events, or if several faults occur simultaneously, the root cause(s) of the fault(s), as well as their vehicle-wide impacts, must be determined in order to maintain situational awareness. This allows both automated and manual recovery operations to focus on the real cause of the fault(s). An appropriate balance must be struck between correcting the root cause failure and addressing the impacts of that fault on other vehicle components. Lastly, this paper presents a strategy for using lessons learned to improve the software, displays, and procedures in addition to determining what is a candidate for automation. Enabling technologies and techniques are identified to promote system evolution from one that requires manual fault responses to one that uses automation and autonomy where they are most effective. These considerations include the value in correcting software defects in a timely manner, automation of repetitive tasks, making time critical responses autonomous, etc. The paper recommends the appropriate use of intelligent systems to determine the root causes of faults and correctly identify separate unrelated faults.

O'Hagan, Brian↗
NASA NTRS1988

Concurrent development of fault management hardware and software in the SSM/PMAD

Space Station issues in fault management are discussed. The system background is described with attention given to design guidelines and power hardware. A contractually developed fault management system, FRAMES, is integrated with the energy management functions, the control switchgear, and the scheduling and operations management functions. The constraints that shaped the FRAMES system and its implementation are considered.

Freeman, Kenneth A.↗
NASA NTRS1994

Breaking down barriers in cooperative fault management: Temporal and functional information displays

At the highest level, the fundamental question addressed by this research is how to aid human operators engaged in dynamic fault management. In dynamic fault management there is some underlying dynamic process (an engineered or physiological process referred to as the monitored process - MP) whose state changes over time and whose behavior must be monitored and controlled. In these types of applications (dynamic, real-time systems), a vast array of sensor data is available to provide information on the state of the MP. Faults disturb the MP and diagnosis must be performed in parallel with responses to maintain process integrity and to correct the underlying problem. These situations frequently involve time pressure, multiple interacting goals, high consequences of failure, and multiple interleaved tasks.

Potter, Scott S.↗
DOE OSTI2022

Cooperative fault management for resilient integration of renewable energy

Cooperative fault management (CFM) is designed herein to control different types of renewable energy resources cooperatively during electrical faults. This paper studies systems with a high penetration of photovoltaic (PV) energy and wind energy. First, CFM leverages power converters of PV farms to boost the ride-through capability of nearby doubly-fed induction generators (DFIGs). By controlling PV farms’ output voltages to change smoothly during both fault initiation and fault clearance, the widely used crowbar in DFIGs is less likely to be activated. Crowbar activation adversely makes DFIGs lose controllability and absorb reactive power. The second contribution is the development of a software-defined CFM controller and a controller in-the-loop demonstration of the real-time performance of this optimization-based CFM. CFM capitalizes on distributed optimization formulation to enable flexibility, plug-and-play, and privacy-preserving. Computation time, however, is a major concern for optimization-based dynamics control. Here, real-time controller-in-the-loop simulation results show optimization-based CFM can output reference values around 60 ms and is quick enough for dynamic control.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2023

Open Circuit Switch Fault Management Method of a Multi-Phase Synchronous Buck Converter for EV Charging Application

Multi-phase synchronous buck converter (MSBC) is becoming popular for the electric vehicle (EV) charging application because of its higher efficiency, smaller passive component sizes, bidirectional power flow, and output current ripple reduction through interleaving. This converter also provides higher reliability than the traditional single phase converter since its modular structure enables fault tolerant operation. Fault management in the converter requires the detection of switch fault, shut down of the faulty phase, and reconfiguration of the PWM signals for the healthy phases to avoid circulating current and high output current ripple. In addition, it is desirable that the fault management method can be implemented using the micro-controller unit (MCU) or digital signal processor (DSP), which are widely used to control power converters. This paper presents a fault management method for detecting switch faults and reconfiguring healthy phases using a DSP. The method is validated through simulations and experiments using a commercial off-the-shelf power stack.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗
NASA NTRS2017

Risk-Significant Adverse Condition Awareness Strengthens Assurance of Fault Management Systems

As spaceflight systems increase in complexity, Fault Management (FM) systems are ranked high in risk-based assessment of software criticality, emphasizing the importance of establishing highly competent domain expertise to provide assurance. Adverse conditions (ACs) and specific vulnerabilities encountered by safety- and mission-critical software systems have been identified through efforts to reduce the risk posture of software-intensive NASA missions. Acknowledgement of potential off-nominal conditions and analysis to determine software system resiliency are important aspects of hazard analysis and FM. A key component of assuring FM is an assessment of how well software addresses susceptibility to failure through consideration of ACs. Focus on significant risk predicted through experienced analysis conducted at the NASA Independent Verification Validation (IVV) Program enables the scoping of effective assurance strategies with regard to overall asset protection of complex spaceflight as well as ground systems. Research efforts sponsored by NASA's Office of Safety and Mission Assurance defined terminology, categorized data fields, and designed a baseline repository that centralizes and compiles a comprehensive listing of ACs and correlated data relevant across many NASA missions. This prototype tool helps projects improve analysis by tracking ACs and allowing queries based on project, mission type, domaincomponent, causal fault, and other key characteristics. Vulnerability in off-nominal situations, architectural design weaknesses, and unexpected or undesirable system behaviors in reaction to faults are curtailed with the awareness of ACs and risk-significant scenarios modeled for analysts through this database. Integration within the Enterprise Architecture at NASA IVV enables interfacing with other tools and datasets, technical support, and accessibility across the Agency. This paper discusses the development of an improved workflow process utilizing this database for adaptive, risk-informed FM assurance that critical software systems will safely and securely protect against faults and respond to ACs in order to achieve successful missions.

Fault management↗
NASA NTRS2017

Risk-Significant Adverse Condition Awareness Strengthens Assurance of Fault Management Systems

As spaceflight systems increase in complexity, Fault Management (FM) systems are ranked high in risk-based assessment of software criticality, emphasizing the importance of establishing highly competent domain expertise to provide assurance. Adverse conditions (ACs) and specific vulnerabilities encountered by safety- and mission-critical software systems have been identified through efforts to reduce the risk posture of software-intensive NASA missions. Acknowledgement of potential off-nominal conditions and analysis to determine software system resiliency are important aspects of hazard analysis and FM. A key component of assuring FM is an assessment of how well software addresses susceptibility to failure through consideration of ACs. Focus on significant risk predicted through experienced analysis conducted at the NASA Independent Verification & Validation (IV&V) Program enables the scoping of effective assurance strategies with regard to overall asset protection of complex spaceflight as well as ground systems. Research efforts sponsored by NASAs Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA) defined terminology, categorized data fields, and designed a baseline repository that centralizes and compiles a comprehensive listing of ACs and correlated data relevant across many NASA missions. This prototype tool helps projects improve analysis by tracking ACs and allowing queries based on project, mission type, domain/component, causal fault, and other key characteristics. Vulnerability in off-nominal situations, architectural design weaknesses, and unexpected or undesirable system behaviors in reaction to faults are curtailed with the awareness of ACs and risk-significant scenarios modeled for analysts through this database. Integration within the Enterprise Architecture at NASA IV&V enables interfacing with other tools and datasets, technical support, and accessibility across the Agency. This paper discusses the development of an improved workflow process utilizing this database for adaptive, risk-informed FM assurance that critical software systems will safely and securely protect against faults and respond to ACs in order to achieve successful missions.

IV&V↗
NASA NTRS2016

Orion GN&C Fault Management System Verification: Scope And Methodology

In order to ensure long-term ability to meet mission goals and to provide for the safety of the public, ground personnel, and any crew members, nearly all spacecraft include a fault management (FM) system. For a manned vehicle such as Orion, the safety of the crew is of paramount importance. The goal of the Orion Guidance, Navigation and Control (GN&C) fault management system is to detect, isolate, and respond to faults before they can result in harm to the human crew or loss of the spacecraft. Verification of fault management/fault protection capability is challenging due to the large number of possible faults in a complex spacecraft, the inherent unpredictability of faults, the complexity of interactions among the various spacecraft components, and the inability to easily quantify human reactions to failure scenarios. The Orion GN&C Fault Detection, Isolation, and Recovery (FDIR) team has developed a methodology for bounding the scope of FM system verification while ensuring sufficient coverage of the failure space and providing high confidence that the fault management system meets all safety requirements. The methodology utilizes a swarm search algorithm to identify failure cases that can result in catastrophic loss of the crew or the vehicle and rare event sequential Monte Carlo to verify safety and FDIR performance requirements.

Brown, Denise↗
NASA NTRS1992

Failure detection and fault management techniques for flush airdata sensing systems

Methods based on chi-squared analysis are presented for detecting system and individual-port failures in the high-angle-of-attack flush airdata sensing system on the NASA F-18 High Alpha Research Vehicle. The HI-FADS hardware is introduced, and the aerodynamic model describes measured pressure in terms of dynamic pressure, angle of attack, angle of sideslip, and static pressure. Chi-squared analysis is described in the presentation of the concept for failure detection and fault management which includes nominal, iteration, and fault-management modes. A matrix of pressure orifices arranged in concentric circles on the nose of the aircraft indicate the parameters which are applied to the regression algorithms. The sensing techniques are applied to the F-18 flight data, and two examples are given of the computed angle-of-attack time histories. The failure-detection and fault-management techniques permit the matrix to be multiply redundant, and the chi-squared analysis is shown to be useful in the detection of failures.

Whitmore, Stephen A.↗
NASA NTRS2020

Evolution of the Preliminary Fault Management Architecture and Design for the Psyche Mission

The Psyche Mission presents the first opportunity toexplore the largest metal asteroid in the solar system, (16)Psyche, which is believed to be the exposed core of a largerplanetesimal that was stripped of its rocky mantle throughmultiple collisions during early solar system formation. Themission was selected in January 2017 for a 2022 launch as partof NASA’s Discovery Program and is uniquely enabled by theintegration of a Solar Electric Propulsion (SEP) Chassisdelivered by Maxar Space Solutions with JPL’s core deepspace avionics, flight software, and fault managementarchitectures. One of the key design tasks is the development ofa fault management system capable of being responsive to theunique elements of the combined JPL and Maxar spacecraftarchitecture. This new design leverages the strengths of eachorganization, with Maxar delivering its well-proven highvoltage power bus and low-thrust electric propulsionsubsystem from its GEO communications satellite product line,and JPL delivering its deep space mission expertise and thehardware and software most critical to deep space missiondesign. The development of a robust low-thrust mission andthe integration of design philosophies and hardware from twoorganizations is not without its challenges though.A key challenge in the development of the Psyche faultmanagement architecture and design is in the integration ofdesign philosophies and hardware from JPL and Maxar. Atthe architecture level, Maxar GEO communications satellitesare developed under the premise of highly responsive groundin the loop for the resolution of anomalies, and theimplementation takes a fail-operational approach to minimizedown time for its customers. In contrast, a deep space missionmust be able to maintain safety with long periods of groundcommunication outage. Additionally, with no time-criticalevents after launch, the Psyche spacecraft will generally failsafe in the presence of anomalous conditions; specialconsideration is being given to this approach, however, tominimize the loss of electric propulsion thrust time, which iscritical to low-thrust missions. At the hardware level, thedetailed definition of interfaces between JPL and Maxarhardware presents a unique challenge in the development andflowdown of fault management requirements, the developmentand implementation of fault monitors and responses, and thedevelopment and verification of fault containment boundaries.This paper describes the evolution of the Psyche faultmanagement architecture and design from the concept studyinto the preliminary design phase, with a focus on the uniquechallenges associated with flying GEO communicationssatellite hardware in deep space, implementing a robust lowthrust mission, and the integration of design philosophies andhardware from JPL and Maxar. Details regarding how thesechallenges are addressed in the fault management design inorder to maximize heritage, leverage the strengths of eachorganization, and minimize risk across the design are alsodiscussed.

Marsh, Danielle↗
NASA NTRS2014

Application of Fault Management Theory to the Quantitative Selection of a Launch Vehicle Abort Trigger Suite

This paper describes the quantitative application of the theory of System Health Management and its operational subset, Fault Management, to the selection of abort triggers for a human-rated launch vehicle, the United States' National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Space Launch System (SLS). The results demonstrate the efficacy of the theory to assess the effectiveness of candidate failure detection and response mechanisms to protect humans from time-critical and severe hazards. The quantitative method was successfully used on the SLS to aid selection of its suite of abort triggers.

Lo, Yunnhon↗
NASA NTRS2014

Application of Fault Management Theory to the Quantitative Selection of a Launch Vehicle Abort Trigger Suite

This paper describes the quantitative application of the theory of System Health Management and its operational subset, Fault Management, to the selection of Abort Triggers for a human-rated launch vehicle, the United States' National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Space Launch System (SLS). The results demonstrate the efficacy of the theory to assess the effectiveness of candidate failure detection and response mechanisms to protect humans from time-critical and severe hazards. The quantitative method was successfully used on the SLS to aid selection of its suite of Abort Triggers.

Lo, Yunnhon↗
NASA NTRS2014

Fault Management Design Strategies

Development of dependable systems relies on the ability of the system to determine and respond to off-nominal system behavior. Specification and development of these fault management capabilities must be done in a structured and principled manner to improve our understanding of these systems, and to make significant gains in dependability (safety, reliability and availability). Prior work has described a fundamental taxonomy and theory of System Health Management (SHM), and of its operational subset, Fault Management (FM). This conceptual foundation provides a basis to develop framework to design and implement FM design strategies that protect mission objectives and account for system design limitations. Selection of an SHM strategy has implications for the functions required to perform the strategy, and it places constraints on the set of possible design solutions. The framework developed in this paper provides a rigorous and principled approach to classifying SHM strategies, as well as methods for determination and implementation of SHM strategies. An illustrative example is used to describe the application of the framework and the resulting benefits to system and FM design and dependability.

systems engineering↗
NASA NTRS2013

V&V of Fault Management: Challenges and Successes

This paper describes the results of a special breakout session of the NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Workshop held in the fall of 2012 entitled "V&V of Fault Management: Challenges and Successes." The NASA IV&V Program is in a unique position to interact with projects across all of the NASA development domains. Using this unique opportunity, the IV&V program convened a breakout session to enable IV&V teams to share their challenges and successes with respect to the V&V of Fault Management (FM) architectures and software. The presentations and discussions provided practical examples of pitfalls encountered while performing V&V of FM including the lack of consistent designs for implementing faults monitors and the fact that FM information is not centralized but scattered among many diverse project artifacts. The discussions also solidified the need for an early commitment to developing FM in parallel with the spacecraft systems as well as clearly defining FM terminology within a project.

Verification↗