Chem Forensics : Multicomponent Forensic Signature Development: Interactions with Common Textiles; Mustard Precursors and Simulants.
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Nuclear forensics is important to our national security. Actions, including provision of appropriate funding, are needed now to sustain and improve the nation's nuclear forensics capabilities. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), working with cooperating agencies and national laboratories, should plan and implement a sustainable, effective nuclear forensics program. Nuclear forensics is the examination and evaluation of discovered or seized nuclear materials and devices or, in cases of nuclear explosions or radiological dispersals, of detonation signals and post-detonation debris. Nuclear forensic evidence helps law enforcement and intelligence agencies work toward preventing, mitigating, and attributing a nuclear or radiological incident. This report, requested by DHS, the National Nuclear Security Administration, and the Department of Defense, makes recommendations on how to sustain and improve U.S. nuclear forensics capabilities. The United States has developed a nuclear forensics capability that has been demonstrated in real-world incidents of interdicted materials and in exercises of actions required after a nuclear detonation. The committee, however, has concerns about the program and finds that without strong leadership, careful planning, and additional funds, these capabilities will decline. Major areas of concern include: Organization. The responsibility for nuclear forensics is shared by several agencies without central authority and with no consensus on strategic requirements to guide the program. This organizational complexity hampers the program and could prove to be a major hindrance operationally. Sustainability. The nation's current nuclear forensics capabilities are available primarily because the system of laboratories, equipment, and personnel upon which they depend was developed and funded by the nuclear weapons program. However, the weapons program's funds are declining. Workforce and Infrastructure. Personnel skilled in nuclear forensics are too few and are spread too thinly. Some key facilities are in need of replacement because they are old, outdated, and not built to modern environmental, health, and safety standards. Procedures and Tools. Most nuclear forensics techniques were developed to carry out Cold War missions and to satisfy a different, less restrictive set of environmental, health, and safety standards. Some of the equipment also does not reflect today's technical capabilities. The Executive Office of the President established the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center under the direction of the Secretary of Homeland Security, to coordinate nuclear forensics in the United States. DHS's responsibility can only be carried out with the cooperation and support of the other agencies involved. The committee recommends that DHS and the other cooperating agencies should: 1. Streamline the organizational structure, aligning authority and responsibility; and develop and issue appropriate requirements documents. 2. Issue a coordinated and integrated implementation plan for fulfilling the requirements and sustaining and improving the program's capabilities. This plan would form the basis for the agencies' multi-year program budget requests. 3. Implement a plan to build and maintain an appropriately sized and composed nuclear forensics workforce, ensuring sufficient staffing at the national laboratories and support for university research, training programs, and collaborative relationships among the national laboratories and other organizations. 4. Adapt nuclear forensics to the challenges of real emergency situations, including, for example, conducting more realistic exercises that are unannounced and that challenge regulations and procedures followed in the normal work environment, and implementing lessons learned. The national laboratories should: 5. Optimize procedures and equipment through R&D to meet program requirements. Modeling and simulation should play an increased role in research, development, and planning. The nuclear forensics community should: 6. Develop standards and procedures for nuclear forensics that are rooted in the same underlying principles that have been recommended to guide modern forensic science. DHS and the other cooperating agencies should: 7. Devise and implement a plan that enables access to relevant information in databases including classified and proprietary databases for nuclear forensics missions. The Executive Office of the President and the Department of State, working with the community of nuclear forensics experts, should: 8. Determine the classes of data and methods that are to be shared internationally and explore mechanisms to accomplish that sharing.
Nuclear forensics is a key part of the nuclear security strategy for the United States and the international community. The NACS Division is central to the leadership role that LLNL has had in nuclear forensics over the past 25 years. Our current nuclear forensic program includes conducting R&D on provenance and attribution signatures, collaborating with international partners, training the next generation of nuclear forensic experts, developing test materials for verification and validation exercises, and providing expert advice to national and international policy makers. Key to our success in these areas has been the strong and continuing involvement in nuclear forensic casework obtained through law enforcement and intelligence channels as well as our outstanding analytical capabilities. NACS must continue to conduct forward-thinking R&D in nuclear forensics that supports operational programs and addresses intelligence gaps. To maintain leadership in nuclear forensics, we must attract, develop, and retain the best talent. The NNSA has a central leadership role in developing educational initiatives for nuclear forensics. In concert with the Glenn T. Seaborg Institute, the NACS Division will continue to participate in all nuclear forensic educational initiatives (undergraduate, graduate, postdoctoral) and incorporate LLNL’s D&I vision into its student and postdoc recruitment efforts. We will continue to build formal relationships with key academic partners and institutions with active and emerging nuclear forensic research interests. We will also strengthen relationships with NNSA DNN and SSAA funded university consortia (e.g. NSSC, ACE, CNEC, CVT, ETI, MTV), helping them conduct research of interest and relevance to nuclear forensics, while at the same time evaluating and recruiting promising talent from these programs.
In the event of a nuclear detonation in the United States (U.S.), the interdiction of a nuclear device, or the seizure of nuclear materials, there will be tremendous pressure to attribute the source of the material, establish responsibility, and ensure the prevention of another incident. Along with intelligence and law enforcement investigations, nuclear forensics is one of the three pillars supporting attribution. The field of nuclear forensics includes the collection, analysis, and evaluation of radiological or nuclear materials, devices, and debris after an event or interdiction. The nuclear forensics scientific workforce is situated primarily in national and defense laboratories, but in recent decades has experienced a decline in numbers. The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office has implemented an expertise development program in order to off-set these declines and sustain a workforce of educated and trained scientists skilled in areas needed for nuclear forensics. Since its inception in 2008, the National Nuclear Forensics Expertise Development Program (NNFEDP) addresses this challenge holistically, through support to undergraduate and graduate students, university faculty and programs, as well as post-doctoral researchers at national laboratories in fields which are directly relevant to nuclear forensics. In that time, the program has placed 44 Ph.D.'s directly into national laboratories and U.S. federal agencies, maintaining the technical expertise required to execute the Nation's nuclear forensics mission. In 2017, the NNFEDP will institute the new Nuclear Forensics Research Award that will foster collaborations between university students and faculty with national laboratory researchers to further support and reinforce the advancement of nuclear forensic science through joint efforts. This opportunity will increase participation in this exciting and critically important national security mission space and contribute to the sustained development of the nuclear forensics workforce. (authors)
The study of nuclear forensics harkens back to the Manhattan Project-era, when scientists first started to analyze the debris from the 1945 Trinity test. Political turmoil stemming from the Cold War and the rehabilitation of Germany following WWII has led to new challenges in international security involving nuclear proliferation. Nuclear materials have, on occasion, been lost, misplaced, or stolen from former Soviet countries, and illicit materials have been interdicted all over the world. The National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center (NTNFC) was established in 2006, and has been at the forefront of drive to advance nuclear forensic capabilities in the United States. The ultimate goal of nuclear forensics is to examine nuclear and other radioactive materials using analytical techniques to determine origin and history of the material, particularly in the context of law enforcement investigations. Nuclear forensics can be divided into two parts: predetonation and post-detonation. Pre-detonation forensics, as the name implies, is the investigation of a nuclear material or weapon that has not been detonated or involved in an explosion, whereas postdetonation forensics is the study of activation or fission products in debris or the environment following the use of a nuclear or radiological dispersal device (RDD). Both parts require a number of analytical chemical and radiochemical techniques to determine identification of the material. Many advancements in analytical techniques, including rapidity, sample size, and forensic signatures have been made in recent years. The analytical methods that can be used in a nuclear forensic investigation, such as mass spectrometry and gamma spectroscopy, have been described in detail in previous reviews, including Straub et.al, and will not be explained here. This review will discuss recent publications (from 2016 to present) describing advancements of techniques such as radiochronometry, morphology, development of novel reference materials, and inter-laboratory collaborations for both pre- and post-detonation nuclear forensics.
Combination of information from disparate data sources into a single decision is a core challenge in many fields, including the field of technical forensics. Technical forensics (TF) utilizes technical characterization of questioned samples to determine properties of that sample; these properties are then used to infer information of forensic interest, such as provenance, age, or attribution. TF is utilized in traditional forensic applications, such as the attribution of material fragments from an explosive, and in nuclear forensic applications, such as the attribution of actinides which have been interdicted out of regulatory control. The challenge of combining information from disparate sources, described alternately by many terms including “Data Fusion” and “Data Integration”, is exacerbated in the technical forensics domain due to at least two factors: the challenge of interpreting each information source singularly, and the relatively small data set sizes available. Extensive literature exists attempting to combine technical forensics information sources, both in manual and automated processes. These attempts are often bespoke to the specific information sources (such as the bi-, tri-, or quad-isotope chart (Moody, Grant, and Hutcheon 2005)), with some emerging examples of simple early- and late- fusion (, respectively). Simultaneous to the information combination efforts described in the previous paragraph, the field of natural language processing attempted (and largely succeeded) in combining information from multiple non-technical information sources. The ecosystem of “multi-modal” language models, which can take text and images as input, and generate text and images as output, became large and diverse by 2025 (Khan et al. 2025). In a generalized sense, many of these methods are trained by learning neural networks which can convert raw text or images into a vector of numbers describing the text or image, hereafter called “embeddings” and the neural networks performing the conversion are called “embedders”. By using a separate embedder for text and images, finding coincident text and images (such as images with their captions), and optimizing the parameters of the embedders such that the embeddings for the text and the image are similar, the field has found a bridge between text and images (Girdhar et al. 2023). It is the contention of the authors of this report that this insight is not limited to text and images but instead can be extended to any modality which can be found coincidently. The subject of the rest of this report is the application of this method to example multi-modal technical forensic data. Some details about the data used in this report are not appropriate for this report, and are included in a companion report (PNNL-38669).
Security aspects of SCADA environments and the systems within are increasingly a center of interest to researchers and security professionals. As the rise of sophisticated and nation-state malware targeting such systems flourishes, traditional digital forensics tools struggle to transfer the same capabilities to systems lacking typical volatile memory primitives, monitoring software, and the compatible operating-system primitives necessary for conducting forensic investigations. Even worse, SCADA systems are typically not designed and implemented with security in mind, nor were they purpose-built to monitor and record system data at the granularity associated with traditional IT systems. Rather, these systems are often built to control field devices and drive industrial processes. More succinctly, SCADA systems were not designed with a primary goal of interacting with the digital world. Consequently, forensics investigators well-versed in the world of digital forensics and incident response face an array of challenges that prevent them from conducting effective forensic investigation in environments with vast amounts of critical infrastructure. In order to bring SCADA systems within the reach of the armies of digital forensics professionals and tooling already available, both researchers and practitioners need a guide to the current state-of-the-art techniques, a road-map to the challenges lying on the path forward, and insight into the future directions R&D must move towards. To that end, this paper presents a survey into the literature on digital forensics applied to SCADA systems. We cover not only the challenges to applying digital forensics to SCADA like most other reviews, but also the range of proposed frameworks, methodologies, and actual implementations in literature.
This report addresses the recent Department of Homeland Security (DHS) call for a Phase I study to (1) assess gaps in the forensically relevant knowledge about the population genetics of eight bacterial agents of concern, (2) formulate a technical roadmap to address those gaps, and (3) identify new bioinformatics tools that would be necessary to analyze and interpret population genetic data in a forensic context. The eight organisms that were studied are B. anthracis, Y. pestis, F. tularensis, Brucella spp., E. coli O157/H7, Burkholderia mallei, Burkholderia pseudomallei, and C. botulinum. Our study focused on the use of bacterial population genetics by forensic investigators to test hypotheses about the possible provenance of an agent that was used in a crime or act of terrorism. Just as human population genetics underpins the calculations of match probabilities for human DNA evidence, bacterial population genetics determines the level of support that microbial DNA evidence provides for or against certain well-defined hypotheses about the origins of an infecting strain. Our key findings are: (1) Bacterial population genetics is critical for answering certain types of questions in a probabilistic manner, akin (but not identical) to 'match probabilities' in DNA forensics. (2) A basic theoretical framework for calculating likelihood ratios or posterior probabilities for forensic hypotheses based on microbial genetic comparisons has been formulated. This 'inference-on-networks' framework has deep but simple connections to the population genetics of mtDNA and Y-STRs in human DNA forensics. (3) The 'phylogeographic' approach to identifying microbial sources is not an adequate basis for understanding bacterial population genetics in a forensic context, and has limited utility, even for generating 'leads' with respect to strain origin. (4) A collection of genotyped isolates obtained opportunistically from international locations augmented by phylogenetic representations of relatedness will not and enzootic outbreaks noted through international outbreak surveillance systems, and 'representative' genetic sequences from each outbreak. (5) Interpretation of genetic comparisons between an attack strain and reference strains requires a model for the network structure of maintenance foci, enzootic outbreaks, and human outbreaks of that disease, coupled with estimates of mutational rate constants. Validation of the model requires a set of sequences from exemplary outbreaks and laboratory data on mutation rates during animal passage. The necessary number of isolates in each validation set is determined by disease transmission network theory, and is based on the 'network diameter' of the outbreak. (6) The 8 bacteria in this study can be classified into 4 categories based on the complexity of the transmission network structure of their natural maintenance foci and their outbreaks, both enzootic and zoonotic. (7) For B. anthracis, Y. pestis, E. coli O157, and Brucella melitensis, and their primary natural animal hosts, most of the fundamental parameters needed for modeling genetic change within natural host or human transmission networks have been determined or can be estimated from existing field and laboratory studies. (8) For Burkholderia mallei, plausible approaches to transmission network models exist, but much of the fundamental parameterization does not. In addition, a validated high-resolution typing system for characterizing genetic change within outbreaks or foci has not yet been demonstrated, although a candidate system exists. (9) For Francisella tularensis, the increased complexity of the transmission network and unresolved questions about maintenance and transmission suggest that it will be more complex and difficult to develop useful models based on currently available data. (10) For Burkholderia pseudomallei and Clostridium botulinum, the transmission and maintenance networks involve complex soil communities and metapopulations about which very little is known. It is not clear that these pathogens can be brought into the inference-on-networks framework without additional conceptual advances. (11) For all 8 bacteria some combination of field studies, computational modeling, and laboratory experiments are needed to provide a useful forensic capability for bacterial genetic inference.
Nuclear forensics assessments to determine material process history requires careful comparison of sample data to both measured and modeled nuclear material characteristics. Developing centralized databases, or nuclear forensics libraries, to house this information is an important step to ensure all relevant data will be available for comparison during a nuclear forensics analysis and help expedite the assessment of material history. The approach most widely accepted by the international community at this time is the implementation of National Nuclear Forensics libraries, which would be developed and maintained by individual nations. This is an attractive alternative toan international database since it provides an understanding that each country has data on materials produced and stored within their borders, but eliminates the need to reveal any proprietary or sensitive information to other nations. To support the concept of National Nuclear Forensics libraries, the United States Department of Energy has developed a model library, based on a data dictionary, or set of parameters designed to capture all nuclear forensic relevant information about a nuclear material. Specifically, information includes material identification, collection background and current location, analytical laboratories where measurements were made, material packaging and container descriptions, physical characteristics including mass and dimensions, chemical and isotopic characteristics, particle morphology or metallurgical properties, process history including facilities, and measurement quality assurance information. While not necessarily required, it may also be valuable to store modeled data sets including reactor burn-up or enrichment cascade data for comparison. It is fully expected that only a subset of this information is available or relevant to many materials, and much of the data populating a National Nuclear Forensics library would be process analytical or material accountability measurement data as opposed to a complete forensic analysis of each material in the library.
Founded in 1996 upon the initiative of the “Group of 8” governments (G8), the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG) is an ad hoc organization of official Nuclear Forensics practitioners (scientists, law enforcement, and regulators) that can be called upon to provide technical assistance to the global community in the event of a seizure of nuclear or radiological materials. The ITWG is supported by and is affiliated with nearly 40 countries and international partner organizations including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), EURATOM, INTERPOL, EUROPOL, and the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) (Figure 1). Besides providing a network of nuclear forensics laboratories that are able to assist the global community during a nuclear smuggling event, the ITWG is also committed to the advancement of the science of nuclear forensic analysis, largely through participation in periodic table top and Collaborative Materials Exercises (CMXs). Exercise scenarios use “real world” samples with realistic forensics investigation time constraints and reporting requirements. These exercises are designed to promote best practices in the field and test, evaluate, and improve new technical capabilities, methods and techniques in order to advance the science of nuclear forensics. Past efforts to advance nuclear forensic science have also included scenarios that asked laboratories to adapt conventional forensics methods (e.g. DNA, fingerprints, tool marks, and document comparisons) for collecting and preserving evidence comingled with radioactive materials.
Cross-layer forensic investigation is addressed for Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) device attacks in Critical Infrastructure (CI) applications. The operational motivation for cross-layer investigation is provided by the desire to directly correlate bit-level network anomaly detection with physical layer (PHY) device connectivity and/or status (normal, defective, attacked, etc.) at the time of attack. The technical motivation for developing cross-layer techniques is motivated by (a) having considerable capability in place for Higher-Layer Digital Forensic Information exploitation—real-time network cyberattack and postattack analysis, (b) having considerably less capability in place for Lowest-Layer PHY Forensic Information exploitation—the PHY domain remains largely under exploited, and (c) considering cyber-physical integration as a means to jointly exploit higher-layer digital and lowest-layer PHY forensic information to maximize investigative benefit in IIoT cyber forensics. A delineation of higher-layer digital and lowest-layer PHY elements is provided for the standard network Open Systems Interconnection model and the specific Perdue Enterprise Reference Architecture commonly used in IIoT Industrial Control System/Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition applications. Finally, a forensics work summary is provided for each delineated area based on selected representative publications and provides the basis for presenting the envisioned cross-layer forensic investigation.
Forensic science is an applied science that helps investigators answer questions at the heart of a crime: Who, What, When, Where, and How. As part of that process, forensic practitioners use basic laws of chemistry and physics to examine evidence and theories of origin to interpret said evidence. Ecological research has had an extraordinary impact on forensic science through the development and application of a specialized measurement technique useful for examining evidence that appears chemically and physically identical: stable isotope analysis. In this review, we examine the proven utility of stable isotope analysis in forensic settings from an ecological perspective, concentrating on work from the Americas completed within the last three decades. Our primary focus is on the interpretation of stable isotope ratios using plant and animal physiological models for “source inference,” although we also recognize that sample-to-sample comparison of stable isotope ratios can be useful in many forensic settings. Examples of the forensic application of stable isotope analysis cover the gamut, from cotton used in counterfeit bills to anthrax shipped through the U.S. Postal Service, from beer adulterated with cheap adjuncts to human remains discovered in shallow graves and never identified. Recent methodological developments—including isotope analysis of specific compounds, multiple elements, and radioisotopes—and the generation of isotope landscapes, or isoscapes, approaches for data interpretation promises that stable isotope analysis will continue to be used in forensic settings for another three decades… and beyond.
Relational Database Management Systems are the backbone of modern enterprises and public-sector services, and are thus frequent targets of security incidents, insider threats, and thorough regulatory audits. Consequently, databases have become key sources of digital evidence, requiring investigators to reconstruct past activity from audit logs, transaction logs, and backups. Although benchmarking frameworks such as those developed by the Transaction Processing Performance Council (TPC) are widely used to evaluate database performance, they do not capture forensic requirements such as evidentiary completeness, tamper-evidence, chain of custody, or regulatory compliance under GDPR and CCPA. This survey examines the emerging domain of forensic database benchmarking. We gathered prior research on database forensics, secure logging, and tamper-evident data structures; we analyze modern forensic-ready features in commercial and open-source systems (SQL Server Ledger, Oracle Blockchain Tables, PostgreSQL pgAudit, Db2 Audit, Aurora Database Activity Streams, Oracle Real Application Security and IBM Guardium) and assess why existing benchmarks are insufficient. We propose forensic workloads, metrics, and methodologies that incorporate adversarial stressors, deleted-record recovery, and backup analysis. We also identify open research problems and call for a community-driven forensic benchmark suite. The result is an idea for evaluating not only database performance but also forensic soundness, bridging the gap between system engineering, compliance, and digital investigations.
Forensic science and chemistry curricula often lack hands-on experimental designs that effectively simulate the impact of environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) or other common elements found at crime scenes, such as marijuana, on trace forensic evidence. Hair, a critical form of trace evidence, offers unique advantages for assessing long-term exposure to environmental pollutants, including ETS. This study presents a novel, noninvasive forensic laboratory module designed to evaluate ETS exposure on various human hair types (untreated, dyed, and bleached). The experimental procedure involved controlled cigarette smoke exposure, followed by analysis using UV−visible spectroscopy, FTIR spectroscopy, and zeta potential measurements. Thirteen students participated in the three-week lab module (three sessions per week). Pre- and postlab assessments were conducted to evaluate learning outcomes. The prelab assessment focused on baseline knowledge of forensic hair analysis, as well as student expectations and confidence. The postlab assessment evaluated knowledge gained, technical insights, application of techniques, self-reflection, conceptual understanding, and practical skill development. This design helped students comprehend the effects of chemical treatments that significantly influence hair’s capacity to adsorb ETS residues by altering its physical and chemical properties. Integration of this experiment into the forensic chemistry curriculum led to measurable gains in student understanding, technical competency, and appreciation for realworld forensic applications. This method offers a valuable teaching and investigative tool for assessing individual ETS exposure in forensic contexts.
In 2009, the U.S. Department of Energy / National Nuclear Security Administration’s (DOE/NNSA) Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) Program initiated a new nuclear forensics outreach effort under its Confidence Building Measures Program. Little did they know that the timing could not have been better. This article focuses on the early years (2009-2015) of the NNSA’s international nuclear forensics outreach, specifically the efforts and experiences of the women who helped establish this program, building it from a fledgling bilateral effort into an enduring technical capacity provider engaging with dozens of countries and multilateral organizations. At the onset of the program, nuclear forensics was an emerging priority within the U.S. Government and receiving increased focus from international organizations through high-level diplomatic efforts such as the Nuclear Security Summit and Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Additionally, working-level initiatives were gaining traction through the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group. Over the next six years, a small team comprised of a uniquely large number of women NNSA federal, contract, and national laboratory staff served as key leaders engaging with the international community to strengthen global technical nuclear forensics capacity and best practices. The program continues today under the Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence Program as Investigation Support. The experiences shared here detail a unique time period when the new technical discipline of nuclear forensics was beginning to mature and gain international traction. The authors have made every effort to remember history correctly and be as inclusive as possible. A wealth of training, guidance, and exercises documentation was developed in the 2009-2015 timeframe, much of which still serves as the foundation for today’s even more extensive program and community of dedicated technical and diplomatic practitioners.
In 2009, the US Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA’s) Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Program initiated a new nuclear forensics outreach effort under its Confidence Building Measures Program. Little did they know that the timing could not have been better. This article focuses on the early years (2009–2015) of the NNSA’s international nuclear forensics outreach, specifically the efforts and experiences of the women who helped establish this program, building it from a fledgling, bilateral effort into an enduring technical capacity provider engaging with dozens of countries and multilateral organizations. At the onset of the program, nuclear forensics was an emerging priority within the US Government and receiving increased focus from international organizations through high-level diplomatic efforts such as the Nuclear Security Summit and Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Additionally, working-level initiatives were gaining traction through the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group. Over the next 6 years, a small team comprising a uniquely large number of women NNSA federal, contract, and national laboratory staff served as key leaders engaging with the international community to strengthen global technical nuclear forensics capacity and best practices. The program continues today under the Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence Program as Investigation Support. The experiences shared here detail a unique time period when the new technical discipline of nuclear forensics was beginning to mature and gain international traction. The authors have made every effort to remember history correctly and be as inclusive as possible. A wealth of training, guidance, and exercise documentation was developed in the 2009–2015 time frame, much of which still serves as the foundation for today’s even more extensive program and community of dedicated technical and diplomatic practitioners.
The ultimate purpose of nuclear forensics is to locate the origin of nuclear and other radioactive materials out of regulatory control used in nuclear security events such as classical forensics. For this purpose, some specific characteristics of interdicted materials (referred to as 'signatures') should be defined to compare the known sample database. In some cases, involved with irradiated material, the signatures could be specific amount of fission product inventory depending on reactor operational histories such as reactor type, initial enrichment, burn up rate of nuclear fuel and cooling period after irradiation in the reactor. In order to make inference model for irradiated material for nuclear forensics, we suggested 3 ways as follows; (i) analyzing ORIGEN produced nuclear substances for the fission product inventory, (ii) classifying the range of reactor type, (iii) predicting the operational history from the fission product inventory. In terms of nuclear substance analysis, the construction of spent fuel database has been internationally carried out since ITWG (Nuclear Smuggling International Technical Working Group) was established in 1995. However, enough sample data cannot be obtained in Korea to determine reactor type and operational histories because analyzing nuclear substances have been limited due to the international regulation. Thus, this study does not mention how to obtain mass or ratios of nuclides for the spent fuel. We just have generated simulation sample data as a fission product inventory using ORIGEN to construct spent fuel database. When unidentified radioactive materials are discovered, it is assumed that mass or ratios of the nuclides are analyzed by certain methods which are available in Korea as well as other countries. Then, a reactor type is determined, and finally, regression model can locate the origin or source of the radioactive materials by inferring operational histories using the fission product inventory. There are some studies on the classification of reactor type using statistical methods. As a part of predicting the operational history, this paper focuses on the development of spent fuel inference algorithm for nuclear forensics to estimate reactor operational histories that reflect characteristics of a reactor from the fission product inventory. The spent fuel inference algorithm for nuclear forensics has been developed on the basis of Kernel Regression (KR) which can conditionally generate the estimated output data by giving weight depending on geometric distance between sample data and input data. Also the KR which comprises Auto-Associative KR and Inferential KR have some benefits that can estimate only using data without assumption for specific physical model and re-learning process. Auto-associative KR (AAKR) was used to sort out outliers of input data and Inferential KR (IKR) was carried out to predict the operational histories for spent fuel. All of regression algorithms were performed in R programming tool. From the validation of both AAKR and IKR, it is expected that kernel regression has enough accuracy to be applied to nuclear forensics for spent fuel. Once the nuclear substance is measured to fill the fission product inventory with a certain reactor type, this kernel regression algorithm would predict the operational histories of spent fuel with high accuracy. Finally, this information is expected to be useful to find the origin of irradiated materials. (authors)
In industrial control systems (ICS), programmable logic controllers (PLCs) are used to automate physical processes such as nuclear plants and power grid stations, and are often subject to cyber attacks. As in conventional IT domain, the memory analysis of the PLCs can help answer important forensic questions about the attack, such as the presence of malicious firmware, injection of modified control logic (the program running on the PLC), and manipulation of I/O devices (e.g., sensors and actuators). Unlike conventional IT domain, PLCs have heterogeneous hardware architecture, proprietary firmware and control software, making it challenging to employ a unified framework for their memory forensics. For merely extracting artifacts of forensic importance, reverse-engineering the firmware is a tedious task, and the effort needs to be repeated for every PLC model. As a community, a step-wise approach to tackle this challenge is to analyze the memory of specific PLCs, and subsequently find a generic framework applicable to all PLCs. Our work is a step forward in this direction. By following a methodology that focuses on the functional layer of PLCs instead of reverse engineering the firmware, we analyze the digital forensic artifacts available in a common PLC, Allen-Bradley ControlLogix 1756-L61. Before diving into the memory dump, we analyze the PLC control software to create a list of important artifacts that are sure to exist in the PLC memory dump. The approach employs a setup where PLC control software RSLogix-5000 is connected to the PLC, and the memory dump can be obtained as and when needed. We create test cases that sequentially highlight each category of artifacts, followed by an examination of the resultant impact on memory. After attaining the listed artifacts, we employ conventional string and known data searches to extract interesting information present in this PLC's memory. The memory analysis profile, presented as a Python library and shared with the community, can help a forensic investigator to readily extract forensic artifacts from the same model's controller. The adopted approach may help researchers in creating memory profile of other PLCs, and ultimately formulating a generic PLC memory analysis framework.