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NASA NTRS2024

Evaluating Liftoff Debris for NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) Prior to the Artemis I Launch

The SLS Artemis I launch vehicle is the first of several planned Artemis launch vehicles, with a number of design differences from earlier NASA missions that incur liftoff debris risk to the mission. As a test vehicle, the Artemis I hardware also endured environments and tests not planned for future missions, which led to several additional factors contributing to an evolving liftoff debris risk to the SLS vehicle. This paper will summarize these risk factors and address the processes used to evaluate and communicate the risks to support a successful Artemis I launch. It will discuss how the evolving risks that were quantified and evaluated by a Cross-Program team of debris Subject Matter Experts to mitigate liftoff debris hazards and communicate updated risk to the SLS vehicle. This process was performed through the inaugural use of an SLS debris day-of-launch (DOL) standard operating procedure that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions. This paper addresses the risk of liftoff debris, debris released by the vehicle or from the launch pad during liftoff through vehicle tower clear. Expected liftoff debris is well understood from previous NASA programs’ experience and from tests of materials, processes and functions that are known to release liftoff debris. These expected sources were assessed and cleared well ahead of launch day. However, given the ever-changing schedules and environments, processes were in place to evaluate any additional potential liftoff debris risks identified during launch countdown. Although many of the Artemis vehicle hardware components are similar to those on the NASA Shuttle Program, there are important differences in the architecture of the Artemis I vehicle which require new assessments of liftoff debris risk for the Artemis missions. The more favorable Artemis crew module location and surfaces are far less vulnerable to debris impacts; however, the longer vehicle can result in higher liftoff debris impact energies to those components on the aft end of the vehicle. Additionally, the positional change of the RS-25 liquid engines to nearer the Booster nozzle exit plane along with the change in Booster throat plug design is a disadvantage to the overall liftoff debris risk which resulted in additional test and analysis efforts for evaluating the integrated vehicle debris risk. In spite of the comprehensive tests and analyses of Artemis I expected liftoff debris, a number of additional tests/processes were completed prior to the Artemis I mission that were required to support a complete understanding of a new launch vehicle, but increased the risk of releasing liftoff debris. The hardware endured several additional cryogenic loading cycles, including the Green Run tests at Stennis Space Center, Wet Dress Rehearsals at Kennedy Space Center, and multiple launch attempts. Each of these cycles induced stresses in the thermal protection system (TPS) materials, increasing the risk of damage to and release of the TPS. Additionally, induced and weather environmental factors that could increase the likelihood of debris release were significant. Vibrations and stresses in the TPS were induced by a required roll-back to the Vehicle Assembly Building before Hurricane Ian to protect the vehicle from damage by high winds. Wind damage and potential internal stresses to several outer mold line materials on the integrated SLS vehicle and mobile launcher were caused by weathering Hurricane Nicole at Pad 39B the week before launch. A thorough imagery scan of the vehicle was performed after each event and the damage observed was repaired, removed, or assessed and the risk to the mission evaluated. Mitigation of debris risk can occur by tests and analyses to show debris impacted components as damage tolerant, by new/improved processes for prevention of debris availability, or redesign. Risk mitigation processes for Artemis I-specific liftoff debris events and the development and use of the SLS debris day of launch (DOL) procedures that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions will be described.

Space Launch System↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Evaluating Liftoff Debris for NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) Prior to the Artemis I Launch

The SLS Artemis I launch vehicle is the first of several planned Artemis launch vehicles, with a number of design differences from earlier NASA missions that incur liftoff debris risk to the mission. As a test vehicle, the Artemis I hardware also endured environments and tests not planned for future missions, which led to several additional factors contributing to an evolving liftoff debris risk to the SLS vehicle. This paper will summarize these risk factors and address the processes used to evaluate and communicate the risks to support a successful Artemis I launch. It will discuss how the evolving risks that were quantified and evaluated by a Cross-Program team of debris Subject Matter Experts to mitigate liftoff debris hazards and communicate updated risk to the SLS vehicle. This process was performed through the inaugural use of an SLS debris day-of-launch (DOL) standard operating procedure that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions. This paper addresses the risk of liftoff debris, debris released by the vehicle or from the launch pad during liftoff through vehicle tower clear. Expected liftoff debris is well understood from previous NASA programs’ experience and from tests of materials, processes and functions that are known to release liftoff debris. These expected sources were assessed and cleared well ahead of launch day. However, given the ever-changing schedules and environments, processes were in place to evaluate any additional potential liftoff debris risks identified during launch countdown. Although many of the Artemis vehicle hardware components are similar to those on the NASA Shuttle Program, there are important differences in the architecture of the Artemis I vehicle which require new assessments of liftoff debris risk for the Artemis missions. The more favorable Artemis crew module location and surfaces are far less vulnerable to debris impacts; however, the longer vehicle can result in higher liftoff debris impact energies to those components on the aft end of the vehicle. Additionally, the positional change of the RS-25 liquid engines to nearer the Booster nozzle exit plane along with the change in Booster throat plug design is a disadvantage to the overall liftoff debris risk which resulted in additional test and analysis efforts for evaluating the integrated vehicle debris risk. In spite of the comprehensive tests and analyses of Artemis I expected liftoff debris, a number of additional tests/processes were completed prior to the Artemis I mission that were required to support a complete understanding of a new launch vehicle, but increased the risk of releasing liftoff debris. The hardware endured several additional cryogenic loading cycles, including the Green Run tests at Stennis Space Center, Wet Dress Rehearsals at Kennedy Space Center, and multiple launch attempts. Each of these cycles induced stresses in the thermal protection system (TPS) materials, increasing the risk of damage to and release of the TPS. Additionally, induced and weather environmental factors that could increase the likelihood of debris release were significant. Vibrations and stresses in the TPS were induced by a required roll-back to the Vehicle Assembly Building before Hurricane Ian to protect the vehicle from damage by high winds. Wind damage and potential internal stresses to several outer mold line materials on the integrated SLS vehicle and mobile launcher were caused by weathering Hurricane Nicole at Pad 39B the week before launch. A thorough imagery scan of the vehicle was performed after each event and the damage observed was repaired, removed, or assessed and the risk to the mission evaluated. Mitigation of debris risk can occur by tests and analyses to show debris impacted components as damage tolerant, by new/improved processes for prevention of debris availability, or redesign. Risk mitigation processes for Artemis I-specific liftoff debris events and the development and use of the SLS debris day of launch (DOL) procedures that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions will be described.

Space Launch System↗
NASA NTRS2018

Engineering Trade-off Considerations Regarding Design-for-Security, Design-for-Verification, and Design-for-Test

The United States government has identified that application specific integrated circuit (ASIC) and field programmable gate array (FPGA) hardware are at risk from a variety of adversary attacks. This finding affects system security and trust. Consequently, processes are being developed for system mitigation and countermeasure application. The scope of this tutorial pertains to potential vulnerabilities and countermeasures within the ASIC/FPGA design cycle. The presentation demonstrates how design practices can affect the risk for the adversary to: change circuitry, steal intellectual property, and listen to data operations. An important portion of the design cycle is assuring the design is working as specified or as expected. This is accomplished by exhaustive testing of the target design. Alternatively, it has been shown that well established schemes for test coverage enhancement (design-for-verification (DFV) and design-for-test (DFT)) can create conduits for adversary accessibility. As a result, it is essential to perform a trade between robust test coverage versus reliable design implementation. The goal of this tutorial is to explain the evolution of design practices; review adversary accessibility points due to DFV and DFT circuitry insertion (back door circuitry); and to describe common engineering trade-off considerations for test versus adversary threats.

Design for reliability (DFR)↗
NASA NTRS2005

Optimal Configuration of Human Motion Tracking Systems: A Systems Engineering Approach

Human motion tracking systems represent a crucial technology in the area of modeling and simulation. These systems, which allow engineers to capture human motion for study or replication in virtual environments, have broad applications in several research disciplines including human engineering, robotics, and psychology. These systems are based on several sensing paradigms, including electro-magnetic, infrared, and visual recognition. Each of these paradigms requires specialized environments and hardware configurations to optimize performance of the human motion tracking system. Ideally, these systems are used in a laboratory or other facility that was designed to accommodate the particular sensing technology. For example, electromagnetic systems are highly vulnerable to interference from metallic objects, and should be used in a specialized lab free of metal components.

Henderson, Steve↗
NASA NTRS1993

Multiscale Morphological Filtering for Analysis of Noisy and Complex Images

Images acquired with passive sensing techniques suffer from illumination variations and poor local contrasts that create major difficulties in interpretation and identification tasks. On the other hand, images acquired with active sensing techniques based on monochromatic illumination are degraded with speckle noise. Mathematical morphology offers elegant techniques to handle a wide range of image degradation problems. Unlike linear filters, morphological filters do not blur the edges and hence maintain higher image resolution. Their rich mathematical framework facilitates the design and analysis of these filters as well as their hardware implementation. Morphological filters are easier to implement and are more cost effective and efficient than several conventional linear filters. Morphological filters to remove speckle noise while maintaining high resolution and preserving thin image regions that are particularly vulnerable to speckle noise were developed and applied to SAR imagery. These filters used combination of linear (one-dimensional) structuring elements in different (typically four) orientations. Although this approach preserves more details than the simple morphological filters using two-dimensional structuring elements, the limited orientations of one-dimensional elements approximate the fine details of the region boundaries. A more robust filter designed recently overcomes the limitation of the fixed orientations. This filter uses a combination of concave and convex structuring elements. Morphological operators are also useful in extracting features from visible and infrared imagery. A multiresolution image pyramid obtained with successive filtering and a subsampling process aids in the removal of the illumination variations and enhances local contrasts. A morphology-based interpolation scheme was also introduced to reduce intensity discontinuities created in any morphological filtering task. The generality of morphological filtering techniques in extracting information from a wide variety of images obtained with active and passive sensing techniques is discussed. Such techniques are particularly useful in obtaining more information from fusion of complex images by different sensors such as SAR, visible, and infrared.

Kher, A.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Experiments for Securing Air Traffic Against Cyber-Physical System Attacks

This presentation describes experiments conducted with single board computers to investigate methods for creating trust for enabling the development of cyber-resilient air transportation systems. Methods included secure communication to prevent unauthorized access to data, consistency of data obtained via sensors and by processing, and built-in safeguards to prevent mission failure. The motivation for this work are the following. The future air transportation system needs to ensure availability, integrity, confidentiality and safety of operations. Safety of vehicles and operations is paramount for successful integration of Urban Air Mobility (UAM), Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), supersonic aircraft and launch vehicles with conventional aviation operations in the National Airspace System. Security is becoming critical because the sensors, networks and computers are far more vulnerable to bad actors than their mechanical or human predecessors. The goal therefore is to design and develop cyber-resilient systems that continue to function even in degraded states. The main findings are (1) off-the-shelf hardware can support development of cyber-resilient onboard flight computers and (2) trust in system design and implementation can be accomplished by integrating layers in depth (detail) and in breadth (scope).

cyber-resilient autonomy, trust, secure communicat↗
NASA NTRS2007

Using Space Weather Variability in Evaluating the Radiation Environment Design Specifications for NASA's Constellation Program

NASA's Constellation program, initiated to fulfill the Vision for Space Exploration, will create a new generation of vehicles for servicing low Earth orbit, the Moon, and beyond. Space radiation specifications for space system hardware are necessarily conservative to assure system robustness for a wide range of space environments. Spectral models of solar particle events and trapped radiation belt environments are used to develop the design requirements for estimating total ionizing radiation dose, displacement damage, and single event effects for Constellation hardware. We first describe the rationale using the spectra chosen to establish the total dose and single event design environmental specifications for Constellation systems. We then compare variability of the space environment to the spectral design models to evaluate their applicability as conservative design environments and potential vulnerabilities to extreme space weather events

Coffey, Victoria N.↗
NASA NTRS1980

Contamination control of the Infrared Astronomical Satellite

The Infrared Astronomical Satellite, to be launched in August 1981, will perform an all-sky survey in the 8-120 micron wavelength region. High sensitivity to thermal radiation and the low operating temperature of optics and thermal control surfaces make the IRAS telescope extremely vulnerable to contamination. Four special topics of importance are discussed in this paper: (1) deposition of atmospheric gases; (2) sighting of particles released from the satellite; (3) functions of a deployable aperture cover; and (4) degradation of a radiatively cooled sunshade from spacecraft outgassing. These topics demonstrate how mission strategy, ground cleaning and handling, and hardware design are used to avoid contamination which would degrade telescope performance.

Andreozzi, L. C.↗
NASA NTRS2002

The Effect of Microgravity on the Smallest Space Travelers: Bacterial Physiology and Virulence on Earth and in Microgravity

Since the first human flights outside of Earth's gravity, crew health and well-being have been major concerns. Exposure to microgravity during spaceflight is known to affect the human immune response, possibly making the crew members more vulnerable to infectious disease. In addition, biological experiments previously flown in space have shown that bacteria grow faster in microgravity than they do on Earth. The ability of certain antibiotics to control bacterial infections may also differ greatly in microgravity. It is therefore critical to understand how spaceflight and microgravity affect bacterial virulence, which is their ability to cause disease. By utilizing spaceflight hardware provided by the European Space Agency (ESA), Dr. Barry Pyle and his team at Montana State University, Bozeman, will be performing an experiment to study the effects of microgravity on the virulence of a common soil and water bacterium, Pseudomonas aeruginosa. Importantly, these bacteria have been detected in the water supplies of previous Space Shuttle flights. The experiment will examine the effects of microgravity exposure on bacterial growth and on the bacterium's ability to form a toxin called Exotoxin A. Another goal is to evaluate the effects of microgravity on the physiology of the bacteria by analyzing their ability to respire (produce energy), by studying the condition of the plasma membrane surrounding the cell, and by determining if specific enzymes remain active. Proteins produced by the bacteria will also be assayed to see if the normal functions of the bacteria are affected. In the context of human life support in spaceflight, the results of this experiment will offer guidance in providing the highest possible water quality for the Shuttle in order to limit the risk of infection to human occupants and to minimize water system and spacecraft deterioration.

Pyle, Barry↗
NASA NTRS2008

Using Space Weather Variability in Evaluation the Radiation Environment Specifications for NASA's Constellation Program

Hardware design environments for NASA's Constellation Program-the Vision for Space Exploration program to design and build new vehicles for servicing low Earth orbit and the Moon and beyond-have been developed that are necessarily conservative in nature to assure robust hardware design and development required to build space systems which will meet operational goals in a wide range of space environments, This presentation will describe the rationale used to establish the space radiation and plasma design environments specified for a variety of applications including total ionizing radiation dose, dose rate effects, and spacecraft charging and will compare the design environments with "space weather" variability to evaluate the applicability of the design environments and potential vulnerabilities of the system to extreme space weather events.

Coffey, Victoria N.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Verification Challenges of Dynamic Testing of Space Flight Hardware

The Six Degree-of-Freedom Dynamic Test System (SDTS) is a test facility at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas for performing dynamic verification of space structures and hardware. Some examples of past and current tests include the verification of on-orbit robotic inspection systems, space vehicle assembly procedures and docking/berthing systems. The facility is able to integrate a dynamic simulation of on-orbit spacecraft mating or demating using flight-like mechanical interface hardware. A force moment sensor is utilized for input to the simulation during the contact phase, thus simulating the contact dynamics. While the verification of flight hardware presents many unique challenges, one particular area of interest is with respect to the use of external measurement systems to ensure accurate feedback of dynamic contact. There are many commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) measurement systems available on the market, and the test facility measurement systems have evolved over time to include two separate COTS systems. The first system incorporates infra-red sensing cameras, while the second system employs a laser interferometer to determine position and orientation data. The specific technical challenges with the measurement systems in a large dynamic environment include changing thermal and humidity levels, operational area and measurement volume, dynamic tracking, and data synchronization. The facility is located in an expansive high-bay area that is occasionally exposed to outside temperature when large retractable doors at each end of the building are opened. The laser interferometer system, in particular, is vulnerable to the environmental changes in the building. The operational area of the test facility itself is sizeable, ranging from seven meters wide and five meters deep to as much as seven meters high. Both facility measurement systems have desirable measurement volumes and the accuracies vary within the respective volumes. In addition, because this is a dynamic facility with a moving test bed, direct line-of-sight may not be available at all times between the measurement sensors and the tracking targets. Finally, the feedback data from the active test bed along with the two external measurement systems must be synchronized to allow for data correlation. To ensure the desired accuracy and resolution of these systems, calibration of the systems must be performed regularly. New innovations in sensor technology itself are periodically incorporated into the facility s overall measurement scheme. In addressing the challenges of the measurement systems, the facility is able to provide essential position and orientation data to verify the dynamic performance of space flight hardware.

Winnitoy, Susan↗
NASA NTRS2017

Preliminary Investigation of Impact of Technological Impairment on Trajectory-Based Operations

The Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) incorporates collaborative air traffic management and Trajectory-Based Operations (TBO) in order to significantly increase the capacity, efficiency, and predictability of operations in the National Airspace System (NAS), without decreasing safety. This is enabled by airspace users and service providers sharing knowledge about operations that allows prediction of the complete 4D flight trajectory with as little uncertainty as possible. Additionally, new software and hardware technology is critical to reaching NextGen goals, especially with regard to TBO. What if the technologies that are critical for TBO were to be impaired or fail completely? Should there be a malfunction of a piece of the technology, it must be ensured that the whole system does not break down completely or suffer severe impairment. Instead, operations need to be maintained proportionally to the problem and safety needs to be ensured (graceful degradation). This paper proposes a systematic framework to investigate the vulnerability of TBO to technology disruption, and determine the impact of technological impairment on TBO. Two representative technologies are chosen for detailed investigation and the impact of their impairment on the degradation of TBO is illustrated using a weather-related scenario. XXXX There are several possible directions of future work. We believe it is desirable to develop methods to quantitatively assess the impact of technological disruption on TBO and to have the simulation tools to validate the impact. The availability of prognostics and health management methods could be leveraged to predict technological failure/disruption, thus predicting how TBO will be a ected, and possibly pro-actively mitigating the impact. It is important to develop large-scale scenarios where the e ect of technological impairment is prominent, and identify methods to quantitatively assess the extent of TBO degradation. An important goal of such an investigation is the development of failure-resistant resilient trajectory-based oper- ations. Resilience14, 15 is the property of a system to \bounce back" and resume at least a signi cant portion of its functionalities after degradation due to technological impairment(s). A systems resilience includes properties such as \bu ering capacity" (quantifying disruptions the system can absorb or adapt to without a fundamental breakdown in performance or in the systems structure), \ exibility" (ability to restructure itself in response to external changes or pressures), "margin" (how closely the system is currently operating rela- tive to one or another kind of performance boundary), \tolerance" (whether the system gracefully degrades as stress/pressure increase, or collapses quickly when pressure exceeds adaptive capacity), etc. Future work needs to focus on quantifying and improving the resilience of TBO, and identifying resilient design solutions for aviation.

TBO↗
NASA NTRS2018

The Probability of False Go/No-Go Determined by GOES Proton Flux: Proposed Launch Constraints for Avoiding Damaging Solar Energetic Particle Events

Most space-bound hardware needs to be designed to withstand space weather events to some degree. Long-term predictability of space weather events, such as solar flares or coronal mass ejections, are still a matter of theory so designers should assume a worst case event for their specific environment. In our analysis, we show preliminary results of the probability of encountering a false/true go/no-go based on a threshold launch and design proton environment. The goal in choosing a threshold launch environment is to avoid the chance of exceeding the design environment during vulnerable parts of the mission. Operationally, this method cannot predict damaging space weather but can aid in avoiding space weather events that are already occurring. The GOES (Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite) proton flux database is used as a proxy for the heavy ion fluxes, which impart a greater threat because of larger single event upsets and effects. Our use of protons as a proxy for heavy ions is justified on the basis of the correlation between their fluxes shown by a qualitative comparison of GOES proton integral fluxes at greater than 10 megaelectronvolts and ACE/SIS (Advanced Composition Explorer / Solar Isotope Spectrometer) heavy ion integral fluxes.

DeStefano, Anthony M.↗
NASA NTRS2014

IT Security Support for the Spaceport Command Control System Development

My job title is IT Security support for the Spaceport Command & Control System Development. As a cyber‐security analyst it is my job to ensure NASA's information stays safe from cyber threats, such as, viruses, malware and denial-of-service attacks by establishing and enforcing system access controls. Security is very important in the world of technology and it is used everywhere from personal computers to giant networks ran by Government agencies worldwide. Without constant monitoring analysis, businesses, public organizations and government agencies are vulnerable to potential harmful infiltration of their computer information system. It is my responsibility to ensure authorized access by examining improper access, reporting violations, revoke access, monitor information request by new programming and recommend improvements. My department oversees the Launch Control System and networks. An audit will be conducted for the LCS based on compliance with the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) and The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). I recently finished analyzing the SANS top 20 critical controls to give cost effective recommendations on various software and hardware products for compliance. Upon my completion of this internship, I will have successfully completed my duties as well as gain knowledge that will be helpful to my career in the future as a Cyber Security Analyst.

IT Security↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Advancing Dust Tolerant Mechanisms for a Sustained Exploration of the Moon

Introduction: “I think dust is probably one of our greatest inhibitors to a nominal operation on the Moon. I think we can overcome other physio-logical or physical or mechanical problems except dust.”– Gene Cernan, Apollo 17 Technical Debrief The Apollo missions revealed the impact of lu-nar dust on mechanisms. Lunar dust particles are jagged and electrostatically charged, giving them the ability to bind or damage mechanisms and alter thermal properties. Reports documented clogged equipment and jammed mechanisms in every mission, regardless of surface duration, as well as clogged mechanisms in the Extravehicular Mobility Suit (EMS), including zippers, wrist and hose locks, faceplates, and sunshades [1-2]. Several astronauts remarked they could not have sustained surface activity much longer because clogged joints would have frozen up completely [2]. Effective dust mitigation strategies are need-ed to support longer duration stays on the lunar surface [3-4]. State of the Art: Technology for mechanisms able to operate in dusty enviroments is advancing rapidly due to the needs of both Mars rovers and the Artemis program. Vacuum-tight connectors are essential for spacesuits and habitats, and their performance can be dependent on cleaning technologies, which have proven difficult on the lunar surface. Several TRL 3-5 technologies are undergoing tests with the expectation to reach TRL 6 within 1-2 years. Some mechanisms will be infused and tested on the VIPER (Volatiles Inves-tigating Polar Exploration Rover) mission planned for mid-2020s. NASA Funded Efforts: NASA has recognized the need for dust tolerant mechanisms, and has partnered with industry to advance the state-of-the-art. At NASA GRC, KSC, and JSC, the Dust Tolerant Mechanisms Project is working to devel-op advanced actuator seals for rotary joints and rotary bearing technologies for long-term sus-tained operation in lunar dust environments. An-other NASA project at NASA GRC, partnered with GSFC, JPL, and KSC is Motors for Dusty & Ex-treme Cold Environments (MDECE). MDECE is developing an unheated magnetically-geared mo-tor that can operate continuously for a long dura-tion at an ambient temperature of -243 ºC (33 K). NASA GRC has the capability to characterize the effects of dust on seals, mechanisms, and other mating surfaces and components under lunar conditions [5]. Through the SBIR/STTR program, NASA has funded several companies to advance dust toler-ant mechanisms via the Dust Tolerant Mecha-nisms sub-topic with applications in surface mobil-ity, spacesuits, connectors, joints, and more. LSIC and Community Efforts: The Lunar Surface Innovation Consortium (LSIC) Dust Miti-gation focus group has fostered collaborations across NASA, industry, and academia to develop solutions that minimizes the impact of lunar dust on robotic and human systems. Community ef-forts have included topical meetings on dust tol-erant mechanisms, featured technology presenta-tions, and feedback to NASA on potential gaps and needs. Testing: In 2021, NASA released NASA-STD-1008 [6]. This NASA Technical Standard estab-lishes minimum requirements and provides guid-ance for testing systems and hardware to be ex-posed to dust in planetary environments. The standard has specific sections dedicated to Mechanisms Testing (e.g. bearings, gears) as well as Seals and Mating Surfaces Testing (e.g. hatches, docking systems). Gaps and Needs: NASA is tracking dust tol-erant mechanisms as a gap in a cross-directorate analysis of capability areas needed to enable fu-ture human space-flight architectures. Two high-priority gap areas include additional facilities for testing mechanisms in lunar-surface conditions, and a better understanding of vulnerabilities to the smallest, nanometer-scale dust particles. Conclusion: Understanding and mitigating lu-nar dust is critical to successful, sustained opera-tions on the lunar surface – whether autonomous or otherwise. This presentation will discuss both the state-of-the-art and open needs in lunar dust tolerant mechanisms, technology impacts, mitiga-tion approaches, testing, LSIC community efforts, and more. References: [1] Gaier, J. R. (2020). The Im-pact of Dust on Lunar Surface Equipment During Apollo. Lunar Dust 2020. [2] GRC, & Gaier, J. R. (2005). The Effects of Lunar Dust on EVA Sys-tems During the Apollo Missions. [3] Johansen, M. R. (2020). An Update on NASA’s Lunar Dust Mitigation Strategy. Lunar Dust 2020. [4] ASI, CSA, ESA, JAXA, & NASA. (2016). Dust Mitiga-tion Gap Assessment Report. [5] Jimenez, N. et al (2022), LPSC Abstract 2572. [6] NASA-STD-1008, 2021.

J I Nunez↗
NASA NTRS2014

Scalable Asset Discovery, Vulnerability Scanning, and Penetration Testing for Remote Sites and Wireless Spectrums Utilizing an Embedded Linux Plug - PwniPlug and the Raspberry Pi B+ as a Sample Pen Test

All devices attached to the NASA KSC network are subject to security vulnerability scanning and/or penetration testing. In today's changing environment, vulnerable and/or unprotected systems can easily be overlooked. Systems that are not properly managed can become a potential threat to the operational integrity of our systems and networks. This includes all NASA (internal and external) information systems within NASA KSC Internet Protocol (IP) address space, and NASA KSC facilities. The Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO) recommends that all NASA Centers and information systems be subject to penetration testing on a regular interval in accordance with the guidelines identified by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). (ITS-HBK-2810.04-02A) Protecting information and equipment at NASA is an area of increasing concern. In addition to the CPU's on the network; Supervisory, Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are especially vulnerable because these systems have lacked standards, use embedded controllers with little computational power and informal software, are connected to physical processes, have few operators, and are increasingly also being connected to corporate networks. The scope of work is comprised of several individual components which together build upon previous work by Drew Branch, NASA KSC Intern. The Pwn Plug is the selected COTS (Commercial-Off-The-Shelf) device chosen to test simplification of mandatory IT Security tasks. The device will be utilized to provide services to NASA KSC and enable an assessment of infrastructure soundness and regulatory compliance in an efficient, economical, and business responsive manner. The Pwn Plug is designed as a pen testing appliance which provides a hardware platform that can support commercial penetration testing efforts at significantly reduced costs. The expected outcomes are: 1) External Penetration Testing, 2) Social Engineering, 3) Procedural Documentation, 4) Recommended Remediation Action Plan, 5) System Retest & Remediation Attestation and 6) Final Reports, out briefing and Presentation. Due to physical and material constraints beyond intern and mentor control, the project was redefined as a working pen-test scenario. Limitations of lab availability and tools dictated an academic exercise. This report was developed within the scenario guidelines suggested by the project mentor. The guidelines were to be creative in developing a Pen Test program for a client.

Penetration Testing↗
NASA NTRS2018

Update - Body of Knowledge (BOK) for Copper Wire Bonds

Copper wire bond technology developments continue to be a subject of technical interest to the NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) NEPP (NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging Program) which funded this update. Based on this new research, additional copper bond wire vulnerabilities were found in the literature - Crevice corrosion, intrinsic degradation of palladium coated copper wire, congregation of palladium near ball bond interface leading to failure, residual aluminum pad metallization impact on device lifetimes, stitch cracking phenomena, package delamination's that have resulted in wire bond failures and device failure due to elemental sulfur. A search of the U.S.A. patent web site found 3 noteworthy patents on the following developments: claim of a certain IMC (Intermetallic Compound) thickness as a mitigation solution to chlorine corrosion; claim of using materials with different pHs to neutralize contaminants in a package containing copper wire bonds; and a discussion on ball shear test threshold values for different applications. In addition, an aerospace contractor of military hardware had a presentation on copper bond wires where it was reported that there was a parametric shift and noise susceptibility of devices with copper bond wires which affected legacy design performance. A review of silver bond wire (another emerging technology) technical papers found that an electromigration failure mechanism was evident in device applications that operate under high current conditions. More studies may need to be performed on a comprehensive basis. Research areas for consideration are suggested, however, these research and or qualification/standard test areas are not all inclusive and should not be construed as the element (s) that delivers any potential copper wire bond solution. A false sense of security may occur, whenever there is a reliance on passing any particular qualification, standard, or test protocol.

Rutkowski, E.↗
NASA NTRS2015

SmallSat Database

The SmallSat has an unrealized potential in both the private industry and in the federal government. Currently over 70 companies, 50 universities and 17 governmental agencies are involved in SmallSat research and development. In 1994, the U.S. Army Missile and Defense mapped the moon using smallSat imagery. Since then Smart Phones have introduced this imagery to the people of the world as diverse industries watched this trend. The deployment cost of smallSats is also greatly reduced compared to traditional satellites due to the fact that multiple units can be deployed in a single mission. Imaging payloads have become more sophisticated, smaller and lighter. In addition, the growth of small technology obtained from private industries has led to the more widespread use of smallSats. This includes greater revisit rates in imagery, significantly lower costs, the ability to update technology more frequently and the ability to decrease vulnerability of enemy attacks. The popularity of smallSats show a changing mentality in this fast paced world of tomorrow. What impact has this created on the NASA communication networks now and in future years? In this project, we are developing the SmallSat Relational Database which can support a simulation of smallSats within the NASA SCaN Compatability Environment for Networks and Integrated Communications (SCENIC) Modeling and Simulation Lab. The NASA Space Communications and Networks (SCaN) Program can use this modeling to project required network support needs in the next 10 to 15 years. The SmallSat Rational Database could model smallSats just as the other SCaN databases model the more traditional larger satellites, with a few exceptions. One being that the smallSat Database is designed to be built-to-order. The SmallSat database holds various hardware configurations that can be used to model a smallSat. It will require significant effort to develop as the research material can only be populated by hand to obtain the unique data required. When completed it will interface with the SCENIC environment to allow modeling of smallSats. The SmallSat Relational Database can also be integrated with the SCENIC Simulation modeling system that is currently in development. The SmallSat Relational Database simulation will be of great significance in assisting the NASA SCaN group to understand the impact the smallSats have made which have populated the lower orbit around our mother earth. What I have created and worked on this summer session 2015, is the basis for a tool that will be of value to the NASA SCaN SCENIC Simulation Environment for years to come.

Small Satellites↗