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At least 37 records · Page 2

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NASA NTRS2023

Psychophysiological Research Methods to Assess Airline Flight Crew Resilient Performance in High-Fidelity Flight Simulation Scenarios

New concepts in aviation system safety thinking have emerged to consider not only what may go wrong, but also what can be learned when things go right. This approach forms a more comprehensive approach to system safety thinking. A need exists for methods to enable a better understanding of human contributions to aviation safety and how they may inform Safety Management Systems (SMS). A high-fidelity 737-800 simulation study was conducted to study how current type-rated commercial airline flight crews anticipate, monitor, respond to, and learn from expected and unexpected disturbances during line operations. A number of dependent measures were collected that included traditional SMS data types, but also non-traditional safety data to include multiple psychophysiological metrics. This paper describes the psychophysiological measures results that evinced the capability of measures to help identify resilient flight crews. Implications for future research and design of future In-time Aviation Safety Management Systems are discussed.

Psychophysiology↗

NASA NTRS2023

Psychophysiological Research Methods to Assess Airline Flight Crew Resilient Performance in High-Fidelity Flight Simulation Scenarios

Psychophysiology↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

People are the Weak Link in the System.

People are often considered the "weak link" in every system. It is assumed that there is a causal "chain" of events, and each link in the chain provides some protection against failure. In this notion, the chain is only as strong as its weakest link and people are often blamed for failures. It's true that failures can be traced to human limitation, but what's more important is that all successes, all safe operations are the result of human capabilities. This talk highlights the resilience people bring to aviation operations and discusses ways to change the common narrative that people are only the source of error and failure.

operations↗

NASA NTRS2017

Quantifying Pilot Contribution to Flight Safety during Drive Shaft Failure

Accident statistics cite the flight crew as a causal factor in over 60% of large transport aircraft fatal accidents. Yet, a well-trained and well-qualified pilot is acknowledged as the critical center point of aircraft systems safety and an integral safety component of the entire commercial aviation system. The latter statement, while generally accepted, cannot be verified because little or no quantitative data exists on how and how many accidents/incidents are averted by crew actions. A joint NASA/FAA high-fidelity motion-base simulation experiment specifically addressed this void by collecting data to quantify the human (pilot) contribution to safety-of-flight and the methods they use in today's National Airspace System. A human-in-the-loop test was conducted using the FAA's Oklahoma City Flight Simulation Branch Level D-certified B-737-800 simulator to evaluate the pilot's contribution to safety-of-flight during routine air carrier flight operations and in response to aircraft system failures. These data are fundamental to and critical for the design and development of future increasingly autonomous systems that can better support the human in the cockpit. Eighteen U.S. airline crews flew various normal and non-normal procedures over a two-day period and their actions were recorded in response to failures. To quantify the human's contribution to safety of flight, crew complement was used as the experiment independent variable in a between-subjects design. Pilot actions and performance during single pilot and reduced crew operations were measured for comparison against the normal two-crew complement during normal and non-normal situations. This paper details the crew's actions, including decision-making, and responses while dealing with a drive shaft failure - one of 6 non-normal events that were simulated in this experiment.

Kramer, Lynda J.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Evaluating the Use of High-Fidelity Simulator Research Methods to Study Airline Flight Crew Resilience

As it evolves, aviation will continue to require integration of a wide range of safety systems and practices, some of which are already in place and others that are yet to be developed. New concepts in system safety thinking have emerged to consider not only what may go wrong, but also what can be learned when things go right during commercial flight operations. Taken together, these complementary perspectives form a more comprehensive approach to systemsafety thinking that can help to recognize and preserve the resilient performance capabilities currently provided by humans. A need exists, however, for research methods to enable better understanding of the human contributions to aviation safety. NASA’s System-Wide Safety Project supports research on using flight simulation methods to study operator resilience and safety-producing behaviors. Building on prior NASA efforts investigating procedural non-adherences during area navigation standard terminal route arrivals, a high-fidelity commercial aviation line operational simulation (LOS) experiment has been designed to study how flight crews anticipate, monitor for, respond to, and learn from expected and unexpected disturbances during these operations. A diverse set of LOS scenarios were developed to simulate highly realistic, complex, but routinely encountered operational situations. Each scenario provided multiple opportunities to collect data on how flight crews manage threats and errors, as well as novel opportunities to observe resilient and safety-producing behaviors. The experimental design, implications for the study of safety-producing behaviors using simulation, and considerations for airline pilot training will be discussed.

Chad L Stephens↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Gathering Safety Intelligence from Relevant Safety Events

The notion of Safety II grew out of the realization that people are the source of resilience in any given socio-technical system and that people, in fact, produce safety far more often than reduce safety. The talk will highlight some of the key differences between Safety I and Safety II in their assumptions about the nature of operations and the nature of safety as well as some of the limitations of each approach and the ways in which they complement each other. Because we all want to make data-informed decisions and because we already collect a lot of Safety I-type data, the talk will also describe the Flight Safety Foundation’s Learning from All Operations effort which is designed to collect Safety II-type data.

resilience↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Leveraging Human Performance Data to Change the Narrative that People are the Safety Problem

The study of errors and failure has a long and productive history in the behavioral sciences. By studying how systems fail, we rule out various mechanisms for how those systems might work, thereby refining our theories of how they actually work. Human performance, however, includes more than errors; human performance comprises both failures and successes. A systematic bias to collect and analyze data only on error affects the decisions we make as a community by promoting the narrative that “people are the safety problem.” This narrative manifests in both obvious and subtle ways in the design of systems intended for human use. When the only safety data that are available are about human failure, then “data-driven” designs can only consider that humans fail. Changing this narrative will depend on new data and new ways to examine data – specifically, data on the processes by which human create and contribute to safety. An alternate narrative is that people represent a primary source of safety, through their capability to anticipate, monitor for, respond to, and learn from expected and unexpected change. This presentation will describe research efforts to expand the range of safety-relevant events to include not just rare safety failures but frequent safety successes. These efforts include use of data from both operations and simulations to develop methods and metrics for learning from structured observation, self-report, and system data.

Jon Holbrook↗

NASA NTRS2017

Quantifying Pilot Contribution to Flight Safety During an In-Flight Airspeed Failure

Accident statistics cite the flight crew as a causal factor in over 60% of large transport fatal accidents. Yet a well-trained and well-qualified crew is acknowledged as the critical center point of aircraft systems safety and an integral component of the entire commercial aviation system. A human-in-the-loop test was conducted using a Level D certified Boeing 737-800 simulator to evaluate the pilot's contribution to safety-of-flight during routine air carrier flight operations and in response to system failures. To quantify the human's contribution, crew complement was used as an independent variable in a between-subjects design. This paper details the crew's actions and responses while dealing with an in-flight airspeed failure. Accident statistics often cite flight crew error (Baker, 2001) as the primary contributor in accidents and incidents in transport category aircraft. However, the Air Line Pilots Association (2011) suggests "a well-trained and well-qualified pilot is acknowledged as the critical center point of the aircraft systems safety and an integral safety component of the entire commercial aviation system." This is generally acknowledged but cannot be verified because little or no quantitative data exists on how or how many accidents/incidents are averted by crew actions. Anecdotal evidence suggest crews handle failures on a daily basis and Aviation Safety Action Program data generally supports this assertion, even if the data is not released to the public. However without hard evidence, the contribution and means by which pilots achieve safety of flight is difficult to define. Thus, ways to improve the human ability to contribute or overcome deficiencies are ill-defined.

Etherington, Timothy J.↗

NASA NTRS2003

Associations between errors and contributing factors in aircraft maintenance

In recent years cognitive error models have provided insights into the unsafe acts that lead to many accidents in safety-critical environments. Most models of accident causation are based on the notion that human errors occur in the context of contributing factors. However, there is a lack of published information on possible links between specific errors and contributing factors. A total of 619 safety occurrences involving aircraft maintenance were reported using a self-completed questionnaire. Of these occurrences, 96% were related to the actions of maintenance personnel. The types of errors that were involved, and the contributing factors associated with those actions, were determined. Each type of error was associated with a particular set of contributing factors and with specific occurrence outcomes. Among the associations were links between memory lapses and fatigue and between rule violations and time pressure. Potential applications of this research include assisting with the design of accident prevention strategies, the estimation of human error probabilities, and the monitoring of organizational safety performance.

Professional Competence↗

NASA NTRS2017

Quantifying Pilot Contribution to Flight Safety during Hydraulic Systems Failure

Kramer, Lynda J.↗

DOE OSTI2024

The role of driver head pose dynamics and instantaneous driving in safety critical events: Application of computer vision in naturalistic driving

This paper investigates the role of driver behavior especially head pose dynamics in safety–critical events (SCEs). Using a large dataset collected in a naturalistic driving study, this paper analyzes the head pose dynamics and driving behavior in moments leading up to crashes or near-crashes. The study uses advanced computer vision and mixed logit modeling techniques to identify patterns and relationships between drivers’ head pose dynamics and crash involvement. The results suggest that driver-head pose dynamics, especially poses that indicate distraction and movement volatility, are important factors that can contribute to undesirable safety outcomes. Marginal effects show that angular deviation for head pose dynamics indicated by yaw, pitch and roll increase the likelihood of crash intensity by 4.56%, 4.92% and 8.26% respectively. Furthermore, traffic flow and lane changing also contribute to increase in likelihood of crash intensity. These findings provide new insights into pre-crash factors, especially human factors and safety–critical events. The study highlights the importance of considering human factors in designing driver assistance systems and developing safer vehicles. This research contributes by examining naturalistic driving data at the microscopic level with early detection of behaviors that lead to SCEs and provides a basis for future research on automation.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

NASA NTRS1992

NASA human factors programmatic overview

Human factors addresses humans in their active and interactive capacities, i.e., in the mental and physical activities that they perform and in the contributions they make to achieving the goals of the mission. The overall goal of space human factors in NASA is to support the safety, productivity, and reliability of both the on-board crew and the ground support staff. Safety and reliability are fundamental requirements that human factors shares with other disciplines, while productivity represents the defining contribution of the human factors discipline.

Connors, Mary M.↗

NASA NTRS1992

Automation of closed environments in space for human comfort and safety

This report culminates the work accomplished during a three year design project on the automation of an Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS) suitable for space travel and colonization. The system would provide a comfortable living environment in space that is fully functional with limited human supervision. A completely automated ECLSS would increase astronaut productivity while contributing to their safety and comfort. The first section of this report, section 1.0, briefly explains the project, its goals, and the scheduling used by the team in meeting these goals. Section 2.0 presents an in-depth look at each of the component subsystems. Each subsection describes the mathematical modeling and computer simulation used to represent that portion of the system. The individual models have been integrated into a complete computer simulation of the CO2 removal process. In section 3.0, the two simulation control schemes are described. The classical control approach uses traditional methods to control the mechanical equipment. The expert control system uses fuzzy logic and artificial intelligence to control the system. By integrating the two control systems with the mathematical computer simulation, the effectiveness of the two schemes can be compared. The results are then used as proof of concept in considering new control schemes for the entire ECLSS. Section 4.0 covers the results and trends observed when the model was subjected to different test situations. These results provide insight into the operating procedures of the model and the different control schemes. The appendix, section 5.0, contains summaries of lectures presented during the past year, homework assignments, and the completed source code used for the computer simulation and control system.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2012

The Analysis of the Contribution of Human Factors to the In-Flight Loss of Control Accidents

In-flight loss of control (LOC) is currently the leading cause of fatal accidents based on various commercial aircraft accident statistics. As the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) emerges, new contributing factors leading to LOC are anticipated. The NASA Aviation Safety Program (AvSP), along with other aviation agencies and communities are actively developing safety products to mitigate the LOC risk. This paper discusses the approach used to construct a generic integrated LOC accident framework (LOCAF) model based on a detailed review of LOC accidents over the past two decades. The LOCAF model is comprised of causal factors from the domain of human factors, aircraft system component failures, and atmospheric environment. The multiple interdependent causal factors are expressed in an Object-Oriented Bayesian belief network. In addition to predicting the likelihood of LOC accident occurrence, the system-level integrated LOCAF model is able to evaluate the impact of new safety technology products developed in AvSP. This provides valuable information to decision makers in strategizing NASA's aviation safety technology portfolio. The focus of this paper is on the analysis of human causal factors in the model, including the contributions from flight crew and maintenance workers. The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) taxonomy was used to develop human related causal factors. The preliminary results from the baseline LOCAF model are also presented.

Ancel, Ersin↗

DOE OSTI2022

Human reliability analysis studies from simulator experiments using Bayesian inference

Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) of complex facilities is performed to arrive at the risk posed by them. PSA also accounts for the contribution of the human errors towards the overall risk through Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) in terms of Human Error Probability (HEP). Human operators are part of the system and do not work in isolation. Their performance is influenced by the context in which the actions are performed. As a result, quantification of HEP requires operator performance data under the given context. Some good sources of operator performance data are plant‘s operation data, simulator data and expert judgement. The plant operation data pertaining to HRA is generally sparse. In this situation, a full scope plant simulator provides a good alternative for operator performance data generation. Many of the currently practiced HRA methods have been developed by combining the empirical evidence with expert judgement and contain a lot of uncertainty in their estimates. Bayesian inference is suitable for updating the prior HRA estimates with the simulator evidence to obtain the posterior HEP. Here, posterior HEP has been calculated for postulated accident scenarios in advanced reactor (first of its kind) at design stage, using plant simulator.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

NASA NTRS1985

Pilots of the future - Human or computer?

In connection with the occurrence of aircraft accidents and the evolution of the air-travel system, questions arise regarding the computer's potential for making fundamental contributions to improving the safety and reliability of air travel. An important result of an analysis of the causes of aircraft accidents is the conclusion that humans - 'pilots and other personnel' - are implicated in well over half of the accidents which occur. Over 70 percent of the incident reports contain evidence of human error. In addition, almost 75 percent show evidence of an 'information-transfer' problem. Thus, the question arises whether improvements in air safety could be achieved by removing humans from control situations. In an attempt to answer this question, it is important to take into account also certain advantages which humans have in comparison to computers. Attention is given to human error and the effects of technology, the motivation to automate, aircraft automation at the crossroads, the evolution of cockpit automation, and pilot factors.

Chambers, A. B.↗

NASA NTRS1973

Program for transfer research and impact studies

Research activities conducted under the Program for Transfer Research and Impact Studies (TRIS) during 1972 included: (1) preparation of 10,196 TSP requests for TRIS application analysis; (2) interviews with over 500 individuals concerning the technical, economic, and social impacts of NASA-generated technology; (3) preparation of 38 new technology transfer example files and 101 new transfer cases; and (4) maintenance of a technology transfer library containing more than 2,900 titles. Six different modes of technology utilization are used to illustrate the pervasiveness of the transfer and diffusion of aerospace innovations. These modes also provide a basis for distinguishing the unique characteristics of the NASA Technology Utilization Program. An examination is reported of the ways in which NASA-generated technology is contributing to beneficial social change in five major areas of human concern: health, environment, safety, transportation, and communication.

Rusnak, J. J.↗

NASA NTRS2016

The Human Challenges of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems

Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) range from small electric quadcopters that are flown close to the ground within visual range of the operator, to larger systems capable of extended flight in airspace shared with conventional aircraft. Before RPA can operate routinely and safely in civilian airspace, we need to understand the unique human factors associated with these aircraft. RPA pilots participated in focus groups where they were asked to recall critical incidents that either presented a threat to safety, or highlighted a case where the pilot contributed to system resilience or mission success. Ninety incidents were gathered from focus-groups. Human factor issues included the impact of reduced sensory cues, traffic separation in the absence of an out-the-window view, control latencies, vigilance during monotonous and ultra-long endurance flights, control station design considerations, transfer of control between control stations, the management of lost link procedures, and decision-making during emergencies. Some of these concerns have received significant attention in the literature, or are analogous to human factors of manned aircraft. Although many of the reported incidents were related to pilot error, the participants also provided examples of the positive contribution that humans make to the operation of highly-automated systems.

Hobbs, Alan↗