Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “insider threat”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 37 records · Page 2
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2023

Analyzing Insider Risk Threat to the Internet of Things (IoT)

Recent technological advancement has created a growing convergence of innovation. From machine learning to ubiquitous computing to wireless networks and automation, the world is seeing new technology increasingly capable of connecting with each other. Devices and systems use open communications networks to interact, process information, and react. This is called the Internet of Things (IoT) and is comprised of physical devices that exchange data over networks, creating revolutionary possibilities. The most common way most people interact with an IoT is through ‘smart home’ products like Amazon’s Alexa, which use microphones, speakers, and phones to control a variety of devices, from lights and thermostats, to cameras, to appliances and vacuum cleaners. But the open nature of IoT networks—necessary for their ability to communicate and operate—also introduces privacy and security concerns. At a personal level, this might mean a hack into a home to steal private information, but when applied in broader industries like healthcare, transportation, manufacturing, or the military, this vulnerability can have serious consequences. As IoT usage and interconnectivity increases, so too does the susceptibility to malicious actors. And the entire system is only as secure as its least secure member. This creates particular risk and vulnerability to radiological material industries, as a competent insider adversary could utilize the IoT to potentially steal or access classified or sensitive information about employees, sites, or systems; or simply sabotage security or maintenance from a more remote—and less secure—device. The IoT relies on a secure network across the entire system, especially in transport which may lack the security of more permanent locations; if one device fails, it can create a ripple effect and an insider threat may seek to exploit that connectivity. While IoT benefits drive increased innovation and usage, there are also vulnerabilities an insider threat could exploit; this risk of an IoT to radiological material must be addressed in any mitigation effort.

Kinney, Justin↗
DOE OSTI2025

Hungary 908 Event - Risk Based Graded Approach to ITM

This presentation, Risk-Based, Graded Approach to Insider Threat Mitigation: Human Measures, introduces a structured framework for managing insider threat risk using internationally recognized guidance from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Security Series No. 8-G (Rev. 1) and the Joint Statement on Mitigating Insider Threats (INFCIRC/908). The presentation emphasizes that effective insider threat mitigation (ITM) depends on both positional controls, which manage inherent risk based on access, authority, and knowledge, and human measures, which address residual risk reflected in behavior, motivation, and reliability. Using a risk-informed and graded approach, the presentation outlines methods for identifying and prioritizing high-risk positions, applying layered organizational controls, and integrating human reliability mechanisms such as the Behavior Observation Program (BOP), Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) evaluations, Employee Assistance Programs (EAP), and Nuclear Security Culture (NSC). The human-focused portion examines behavioral and organizational indicators of opportunity, vulnerability, motivation, and crisis, demonstrating how early detection, deterrence, and response can prevent insider events. The session concludes with a case review of the Millstone Nuclear Power Station incident involving engineer George Galatis. The case illustrates how weak leadership and a poor safety culture can create conditions for failure and how a comprehensive ITM framework could have altered the outcome. The objective of this presentation is to help practitioners apply a risk-based, graded philosophy to human factors and promote a culture of accountability, communication, and resilience within nuclear organizations.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2024

C.9 Scribe NMAC Layer Video Development

This task incorporates NMAC insider threat principles and good practices into video format for aiding in training activities. It was labeled as Task C.9 under the FY24 Annex 1 for NA-211 SSM A&I Pillar. For activity development, the setting of a research and test reactor, RTR, was selected as the focus of this fiscal year. More specifically, a TRIGA reactor was selected for facility and reactor inspiration. FY 23/24 developed materials Research Reactor Facility Measures against the Insider Threat, LLNL-MI-839144, was used as a reference for selecting relevant, suggested mitigation measures to incorporate into the script and subsequent videos. Throughout the initial phases of development, discipline SMEs met with Scribe SMEs from Sandia National Laboratory to create the initial story arc and assess the limits of Scribe/Odin technologies available for the project. As a result, the decision for a two-fold deliverable was developed and utilized as the basis for script development efforts over the first half of the fiscal year.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Data Centers and Digital Assurance Introduction to Supply Chain and Cybersecurity for Data Centers, Session 1

The first session of the TADA (Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance) Data Centers Cohort Workshop, held on October 30, 2025, introduced foundational concepts of Digital Assurance in the context of data center and grid integration. Sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy, the workshop brought together utilities, data center operators, developers, and vendors to address cybersecurity and supply chain vulnerabilities. The session emphasized the growing criticality of data centers within the electric grid and the need for secure, real-time, bidirectional communication. Participants explored the principles of Digital Assurance, including cybersecurity, cyber-informed engineering (CIE), and lifecycle security, and applied a threat-vulnerability-consequence framework to identify and mitigate risks at the data center–grid interface. Discussions covered a range of threats such as spoofed dispatch signals and insider threats, architectural vulnerabilities like SCADA interfaces and insecure protocols, and potential consequences including cascading grid failures. The session also raised strategic questions about business value, vendor assurance, and defining cyber boundaries and responsibilities. This foundational workshop set the stage for deeper technical analysis and the development of actionable frameworks in subsequent sessions. Session 1 of 3.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2025

Driver Identification Midyear Report

First, we create a profile for each authorized driver based on their existing driving data. We then train a machine learning model on the driving data from this profile, yielding an individualized model for each driver. Finally during a drive, we pass the Controller Area Network (CAN) data to the model and authen ticate the driver’s identity in real-time. This verification or lack thereof could be used to alert supervisors of threats to their drivers or transported materials. Deviations from their normal driving behavior could indicate high-risk situations, medical events, or even insider threats.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2025

Hands-On, Heads-Up: Blending Cyber T&E with Data Science-Driven Training in Jupyter Notebooks

In an era of increasingly sophisticated threats to critical infrastructure, cybersecurity professionals must be more than just aware; they must be immersed, agile, and equipped to operate in environments where failure is not an option. Nowhere is this truer than in the nuclear sector, where cyber-physical systems, regulatory scrutiny, and insider threat potential demand a new generation of hands-on, technically fluent defenders. This paper presents a unified training approach that integrates Cybersecurity Test and Evaluation (T&E) with data science techniques using Jupyter Notebooks as the interactive lab environment. The program centers on a modular, scenario-driven curriculum designed to build not just knowledge but practical capability in the assessment and defense of radiation detection systems, firmware interfaces, and operational security postures.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗
DOE OSTI2023

Mitigating Extremist Maritime Threats to Radiological Material Transport Vessels

The 21st century has experienced a rise in the threat of global radicalism and extremist organizations, and there has been oft-reported interest from these groups in obtaining or exploiting radiological materials. The threat of extremists acquiring radiological materials while in transit or sabotaging a transport vessel carrying materials at sea is one that requires increased attention. Transport is already one of the most vulnerable times for any cargo but including the difficulties in securing a large ship on the open ocean makes oceanic transport of radiological materials a space of elevated vulnerability for sabotage, theft, or other attacks. The risks of violent extremist attacks on trade ships and trading routes are serious, as shipping routes sustain the global economy, but an attack on a radiological transport vessel could be a magnitude worse, impacting national and international security. While radicalists have largely remained on land in the past due to minimal maritime expertise or inability to project power out of their immediate vicinity, the world has witnessed past attacks on ships such as the USS Cole and the MV Limburg and it is likely only a matter of time before groups extend further into the sea and engage in more maritime campaigns against material transport vessels. This paper suggests methods for increasing safety and security on oceanic transport voyages through behavioral science principles and insider threat recognition training, as well as a better understanding of adversarial and extremist psychology. By providing transport personnel with the knowledge and support to identify and respond to unique maritime threats by extremists, these principles and training suggestions should advance and increase security on the high seas.

Kinney, Justin↗