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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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31 records · Page 2
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2022

Data recovery via covert cognizance for unattended operational resilience

One of the important premises of unattended operation, a highly promoted characteristic of fission batteries and advanced microreactors, is the ability to automate the analysis of sensors data used in support of operational monitoring and control. Here, to meet this vision, this work proposes a new monitoring and data recovery paradigm to ensure resilience against data corruption which may be the result of malicious intrusion into the reactor operational network. This is paramount to ensure 100% availability under contingency scenarios such as cyberattacks. In support of this vision, earlier work has presented the concept of covert cognizance and demonstrated its mathematical ability to identify and embed cognizance parameters under the noise-dominated null space of the sensors data. This work extends this concept and applies it in real-time to demonstrate three key characteristics: zero-impact, zero-observability, and data recovery, where the first characteristic is to ensure no impact on operation, the second is immunity to discovery by pattern recognition techniques, and the third is to allow recovery of corrupt or falsified data. Recognizing that fission batteries are designed to operate under steady state most of the time, we elect to employ a small modular reactor model under transient operational conditions to demonstrate the operational resilience enabled by the covert cognizance paradigm. Specifically, the PI controller is augmented with the covert cognizance modules to develop self-awareness and enable automatic data recovery. The developed modules are expected to be equally applicable to a wide range of advanced reactor technologies relying on full or partial unattended control.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2023

Strengthening Cybersecurity for Industrial Control Systems: Innovations in Protecting PLC-Based Infrastructure

In this paper, we propose two new approaches aimed at enhancing the security of industrial control systems (ICS) that utilize programmable logic controllers (PLCs) for the control of critical processes. The first approach involves the addition of a unique digital watermark to the PWM control that adjusts the motor speed to control the critical process. This enables efficient detection and identification of any unauthorized modifications to the sensor signals responsible for controlling the plant. The second approach focuses on monitoring the input current (i.e power) drawn by the PLC during the execution of critical process control tasks. Malicious intrusions to change the PLC parameters and/or unauthorized firmware updates can be rapidly detected. Both approaches demonstrate a substantial improvement in the security of ICS, effectively safeguarding against potential cyber-attacks. Experimental results from a laboratory scale water tank level controlled via PLC showcases rapid intrusion detection capabilities.

Huang, Peng-Hao↗
DOE OSTI2020

System and method for monitoring power consumption to detect malware

A system and method (referred to as the system) detects malware, viruses, and/or malicious activity by generating a direct current source power consumption profile by causing a monitored device to execute a fully automated recurrent software operation. The system receives by an automated detection system, the direct current source power consumption profile generated by an intelligent power sensor and generates by a detection engine, a power security profile that identifies suspicious code by profiling direct current consumed by monitored type devices. The system executes a detection engine remote from the monitored device that identifies an infected device.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2024

The Cryptographic Obfuscation Sensor System Guarding Restricted Data (CrOSSGRD): Prototype Detailed Design Document

A prototype has been developed at Sandia National Laboratories to collect nominally sensitive data from a mock treaty accountable item, record that information as non-sensitive encrypted outputs, and allow inspectors to subsequently evaluate that information at a time and location of their choice without any risk of the host party’s data being inadvertently (or maliciously) revealed.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Estimation of the time for steam generator trip due to cyber intrusions

The time required to trip a pressurized water reactor (PWR) by inserting malicious signals into its steam generator (SG) control system has been studied using the Generic PWR (GPWR) Simulator. A semi-analytical model is developed to approximately reproduce the simulator response and understand the dynamics of the control unit. A series of two proportional-integral controllers determines control action according to preset constants, the readings from the feedwater level sensor, and those from feedwater and steam flowrate transmitters. It is observed that the most important factor that determines whether a trip will occur is how much additional water is added to or withheld from the SG over time compared to normal operating conditions. In order to determine the effects of control action on the SG, changes in mass inventory are considered. This approach models the SG water level as a function of mass inventory and has a backward temporal memory. A Python interface is developed for the GPWR framework to automatically simulate different spoofing scenarios and post-process the related data. We observe that the trip times predominantly depend on flow mismatch and/or level errors. Controller parameters, including the integral time and gain constants, either speed up or slow down the rate of progression to a trip setpoint but do not cause a trip by themselves. The reactor can trip on a high-level signal when the reading crosses above 78%, increased from its reference level of 57%, or a low-level reading when it is below 25%. The present results show roughly how long the operators would have to respond to an attack, given a specific set of spoofing signals within the issue space analyzed. Furthermore, we have generated a simple surface by fitting a combination of exponential functions to the data obtained from the GPWR Simulator. In general, trips on a low level have been observed to occur faster than those on a high level.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Targeted Energy Management System Toolset

TEMST integrates advanced sensor systems with advanced computational intelligence, e.g. neural networks and fuzzy arithmetic, to enable effective energy management while minimizing negative human comfort consequences and promoting improved occupant satisfaction. Preliminary work suggests that energy cost reductions above ten percent are easily achievable. In addition to optimizing existing Energy Management Systems (EMS), the proposed toolset will be both resilient and secure in order to proactively maintain a safe level of operational normalcy in response to anomalies and malicious actions.

Rieger, CraigG.↗
DOE OSTI2022

Use of Machine Learning for Signature Development in a Multi-Sensor Environment for Safeguard Applications of Solvent Extraction Processes

Idaho National Laboratory is constructing the Special Nuclear Material test bed (Beartooth) for research and development pertaining to nuclear fuel processing operations using centrifugal contactors. Beartooth will enable give researchers the opportunity to study the dissolution, separation, and conversion of special nuclear materials (e.g., plutonium, enriched uranium, and thorium). As a lead-in to Beartooth, this project constructed a test bed to study the process and equipment behavior with real time series data collection using a variety of non-traditional sensors, in order to identify process failures and label them as either accidental or purposeful, thus enhancing nuclear nonproliferation stewardship. The measurement sources in this test bed include vibration, acoustic, current, flow, colorimetric, and thermal data. These measurements vary in terms of magnitude, frequency, and location. This information will be combined and used within data-driven machine-learning methods to detect operation condition changes that are either intentional (i.e., changes in operating set points) or malicious (i.e., flow diversion) in nature. This presentation covers the data processing and signature development activities necessary for utilizing this heterogeneous dataset to classify process anomalies.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2025

A Taxonomy and Feature set for Server-Side Identification of Proxies

Malicious actors frequently use proxies and VPNs to evade detection and hide their origin. Current challenges to information security include the use of residential proxies to blend in with normal traffic and Man-in-the-Middle phishing proxies that are used to compromise accounts protected with mult-factor authentication. We advance a taxonomy and feature set for the identification of proxied traffic based on the network layer where proxying occurs. We describe how these features apply to common proxy types and how to use these features in the classification of the proxied traffic. Collection of these additional features is feasible using existing network sensors and web servers, while only adding about 30% volume to commonly deployed network sensor logs.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Bayesian Estimation of Oscillator Parameters: Toward Anomaly Detection and Cyber-Physical System Security

Cyber-physical system security presents unique challenges to conventional measurement science and technology. Anomaly detection in software-assisted physical systems, such as those employed in additive manufacturing or in DNA synthesis, is often hampered by the limited available parameter space of the underlying mechanism that is transducing the anomaly. As a result, the formulation of anomaly detection for such systems often leads to inverse or ill-posed problems, requiring statistical treatments. Here, we present Bayesian inference of unknown parameters associated with a generic actuator considered as a representative vital element of a cyber-physical system. Via a series of experimental input-output measurements, a transfer function for the actuator is obtained numerically, which serves as our model for the proposed method. Linear, nonlinear, and delayed dynamics may be assumed for the actuator response. By devising a code-based malicious signal, we study the efficacy of Bayesian inference for its potential to produce a detection, including uncertainty quantification, with a remarkably small number of input data points. Our approach should be adaptable to a variety of real-time cyber-physical anomaly detection scenarios.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗
DOE OSTI2022

Resilient Operating Constraints for Power Distribution Systems under Setpoint Attacks

Integration and operation of distributed generation (DG) and energy storage (ES) in power distribution systems are enabled by communication networks and embedded sensor and control devices that increase the vulnerability of the systems to cyber-threats, broadening the attack surface and making adversary actions more unpredictable. This paper proposes a methodology that uses ellipsoidal approximations to quantify the potential damage caused by successful attacks that affect, directly or indirectly, the desired operation setpoints and may drive the power distribution operation to unsafe states by violating the limits of voltage or line flows. More specifically, a new methodology is introduced to find the optimal non-symmetric operating constraints that can be imposed to each DG and ES in order to guarantee that the power distribution system is resilient to any malicious setpoints. The proposed method takes as inputs the system topology, DG and ES capabilities, and load limits to solve a convex optimization problem formulated using linear matrix inequalities (LMIs) and the power flow equations. The proposed solution is agnostic to the attacker's action or load profile and it does not require any assumption about the location or means of the attack. The numerical results on a test distribution feeder with several DG and ES illustrate how the proposed resilient operating constraints guarantee the security of the power distribution system under setpoint attacks.

Giraldo, Jairo↗
DOE OSTI2023

Distributed Ledger Technology for Fault Tolerant Distribution Grid Operations

This paper explores the potential of distributed ledger technology (DLT) to improve fault-tolerant grid operations by leveraging its core features as an immutable, decentralized ledger, a distributed, consensus-based agreement process, and a distributed state-replication engine. Distribution power systems deliver electricity to millions of customers; however, they are susceptible to various threats that can result in customer interruptions. These include faults caused by adverse weather conditions, natural disasters, vegetation growth, equipment failure, and malicious attacks. To minimize the effects of these faults, fault-handling approaches rely on network knowledge to isolate affected areas and reconnect unaffected areas, reducing the number of affected customers while maintaining safety. Here, we present a trusted data-sharing architecture that enables independent, distributed actors to reconstruct the pre-fault system state by enabling distributed resources to make appropriate decisions with limited network/system information. Although the process requires some data sharing between switch-delimited areas, the approach limits the amount of private information shared, preserving customers' privacy and business-sensitive information. We include three use cases that form a foundation for third parties to develop functional solutions that can eventually be deployed in the field. The gross error detection method used within switch-delimited areas can identify sensor errors and accurately detect circuit breaker states. The evaluation of possible reconnection while preserving data ownership resulted in a voltage magnitude difference smaller than 0.001% from the OpenDSS power flow solution that has full system knowledge, which is below the expected power flow tolerance. The approach offers a promising opportunity for improving fault-tolerant distribution grid operations.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2022

Results From Invoking Artificial Neural Networks to Measure Insider Threat Detection & Mitigation

Advances on differentiating between malicious intent and natural “organizational evolution” to explain observed anomalies in operational workplace patterns suggest benefit from evaluating collective behaviors observed in the facilities to improve insider threat detection and mitigation (ITDM). Advances in artificial neural networks (ANN) provide more robust pathways for capturing, analyzing, and collating disparate data signals into quantitative descriptions of operational workplace patterns. In response, a joint study by Sandia National Laboratories and the University of Texas at Austin explored the effectiveness of commercial artificial neural network (ANN) software to improve ITDM. Overall, this research demonstrates the benefit of learning patterns of organizational behaviors, detecting off-normal (or anomalous) deviations from these patterns, and alerting when certain types, frequencies, or quantities of deviations emerge for improving ITDM. Evaluating nearly 33,000 access control data points and over 1,600 intrusion sensor data points collected over a nearly twelve-month period, this study's results demonstrated the ANN could recognize operational patterns at the Nuclear Engineering Teaching Laboratory (NETL) and detect off-normal behaviors—suggesting that ANNs can be used to support a data-analytic approach to ITDM. Several representative experiments were conducted to further evaluate these conclusions, with the resultant insights supporting collective behavior-based analytical approaches to quantitatively describe insider threat detection and mitigation.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2022

Oak Ridge National Laboratory Pilot Demonstration of an Attestation and Anomaly Detection Framework using Distributed Ledger Technology for Power Grid Infrastructure

This report summarizes the design and pilot demonstration of a framework called Grid Guard that was created to provide increased data and device trustworthiness to electric grid devices by leveraging distributed ledger technology (DLT), specifically blockchain. Grid Guard contains a combination of core cryptographic methods such as the secure hash algorithm (SHA), and asymmetric cryptography, private permissioned blockchain, baselining configuration data, consensus algorithm (Raft) and the Hyperledger Fabric (HLF) framework. The system implements a low energy, fast, and robust enhancement to system trustworthiness within and across electric grid systems such as substations, control centers and metering infrastructures. Blockchain is a distributed database structured that provides a practically unalterable (immutable) timeline of stored transactions. By relying on hashing and the Raft consensus algorithm, if an entity tries to illegitimately alter a record at one instance of the database the other ledger nodes are not altered. They work to cross-reference each other and easily locate any incorrectly added data and remove it. The bulk raw data is stored in an off-chain storage (outside of the blockchain ledger) and a hash of this baseline data is stored in the Blockchain ledger via hashing windows of time-series and configuration data, after aggregation and filtering. The bulk off-chain data repository is then considered to be trust-anchored using the hashes stored in the blockchain. To secure the electric grid testbed devices and data, device configuration baselines were compared to those baselines that had been previously stored in the ledger. Statistical baselines for device configurations, network communication patterns, and high-speed sensor data are calculated and then stored off-chain and hashes stored in the ledger. Measurements such as three-phase voltage and current, frequency, breaker status, protection scheme settings, network configuration settings (and other device configuration artifacts) and network traffic features (packet interarrival times) are compared every minute or other selected time windows. During phase 1 of the Grid Guard DLT project different DLT technologies were studies, and an assessment was performed on DLT technology vulnerabilities, uses, and key characteristics. DLT consensus protocols were studies (e.g., RAFT, named after Reliable, Replicated, Redundant, And Fault-Tolerant). Also, cryptography, public, private and permissioned or permissionless systems were assessed. Grid Guard implements a permissioned private DLT. Consensus algorithm selection and choice of DLT implementation depended heavily on the use-case. For this use-case, parameters were selected to measure performance and existing tools for assessment. Benchmarking was performed theoretically and practically. During phase 2 hashed transactions/blocks were inserted into the ledger every second. During phase 2 of the Grid Guard DLT project, a prototype framework was developed and demonstrated for attestation of critical substation devices and data using precision timing systems that use PTP and IRIG-B protocols) on a testbed of operational devices that emulated a distribution substation, control center, and power metering infrastructure using real Operational Technology (OT). The testbed includes OT devices such as protective relays, human machine interfaces (HMI), and power meters. To determine when to collect and compare system and network baselines, an initial examination of an anomaly detection capability to identify malicious manipulation of data streams was conducted. The resulting anomaly detection was demonstrated in a set of experiments and leveraged to trigger device artifact attestation checks. Attestation checks occur against device configuration baselines when compared with the immutable blockchain-stored baselines, which provided a cryptographically supported means by which to store baselines. The electrical substation-grid testbed was created to test the Grid Guard framework. The testbed emulates the operations of a portion of a power grid and SCADA systems as closely as possible. The testbed integrates real protocols, mainly IEC 61850 standard protocols, such as the Sampled Value (SV) and the GOOSE protocols. The testbed also supports DNP3 and other layer 2 and layer 3 protocols such as Telnet, SSH, SFTP/FTP and other proprietary protocols needed to connect to industrial control system equipment. The testbed emulates real power conditions using the OpalRT hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) device which can create fault situations that cannot be easily tested on real systems. The electrical substation-grid testbed was created using real measurement, communication, and protection devices that electrical utilities commonly use.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗