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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 37 records · Page 2
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1997

A Human Factors Analysis of EVA Time Requirements

Human Factors Engineering (HFE) is a discipline whose goal is to engineer a safer, more efficient interface between humans and machines. HFE makes use of a wide range of tools and techniques to fulfill this goal. One of these tools is known as motion and time study, a technique used to develop time standards for given tasks. During the summer of 1995, a human factors motion and time study was initiated with the goals of developing a database of EVA task times and developing a method of utilizing the database to predict how long an EVA should take. Initial development relied on the EVA activities performed during the STS-61 (Hubble) mission. The first step of the study was to become familiar with EVA's, the previous task-time studies, and documents produced on EVA's. After reviewing these documents, an initial set of task primitives and task-time modifiers was developed. Data was collected from videotaped footage of two entire STS-61 EVA missions and portions of several others, each with two EVA astronauts. Feedback from the analysis of the data was used to further refine the primitives and modifiers used. The project was continued during the summer of 1996, during which data on human errors was also collected and analyzed. Additional data from the STS-71 mission was also collected. Analysis of variance techniques for categorical data was used to determine which factors may affect the primitive times and how much of an effect they have. Probability distributions for the various task were also generated. Further analysis of the modifiers and interactions is planned.

Pate, Dennis W.↗
NASA NTRS2002

Human Factors Process Task Analysis: Liquid Oxygen Pump Acceptance Test Procedure at the Advanced Technology Development Center

This viewgraph presentation provides information on Human Factors Process Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (HF PFMEA). HF PFMEA includes the following 10 steps: Describe mission; Define System; Identify human-machine; List human actions; Identify potential errors; Identify factors that effect error; Determine likelihood of error; Determine potential effects of errors; Evaluate risk; Generate solutions (manage error). The presentation also describes how this analysis was applied to a liquid oxygen pump acceptance test.

Diorio, Kimberly A.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Artemis Flight Plan Evolution

Current capabilities and processes are insufficient to confidently meet mission objectives given the complexity of humans on the ground and on-orbit working with different automated vehicles. This research aims to reduce risk of human error by providing a consolidated, human-digestible, source of information that can be used in pre-mission through mission execution by all team members involved in spaceflight.

Mission Control↗
NASA NTRS2004

How Systems Engineering and Risk Management Defend Against Murphy's Law and Human Error

Systems Engineering and Risk Management processes can work synergistically to defend against the causes of many mission ending failures. Defending against mission ending failures is facilitated by fostering a team that has a healthy respect for Murphy's Law and a team with a of curiosity for how things work, how they can fail, and what they need to know. This curiosity is channeled into making the unknowns known or what is uncertain more certain. Efforts to assure mission success require the expenditure of energy in the following areas: 1. Understanding what defines Mission Success as guided by the customer's needs, objectives and constraints. 2. Understanding how the system is supposed to work and how the system is to be produced, fueled by the curiosity of how the system should work and how it should be produced. 3. Understanding how the system can fail and how the system might not be produced on time and within cost, fueled by the curiosity of how the system might fail and how production might be difficult. 4. Understanding what we need to know and what we need learn for proper completion of the above three items, fueled by the curiosity of what we might not know in order to make the best decisions.

Bay, Michael↗
NASA NTRS2017

Review of Significant Incidents and Close Calls in Human Spaceflight from a Human Factors Perspective

This project aims to identify poor human factors design decisions that led to error-prone systems, or did not facilitate the flight crew making the right choices; and to verify that NASA is effectively preventing similar incidents from occurring again. This analysis was performed by reviewing significant incidents and close calls in human spaceflight identified by the NASA Johnson Space Center Safety and Mission Assurance Flight Safety Office. The review of incidents shows whether the identified human errors were due to the operational phase (flight crew and ground control) or if they initiated at the design phase (includes manufacturing and test). This classification was performed with the aid of the NASA Human Systems Integration domains. This in-depth analysis resulted in a tool that helps with the human factors classification of significant incidents and close calls in human spaceflight, which can be used to identify human errors at the operational level, and how they were or should be minimized. Current governing documents on human systems integration for both government and commercial crew were reviewed to see if current requirements, processes, training, and standard operating procedures protect the crew and ground control against these issues occurring in the future. Based on the findings, recommendations to target those areas are provided.

Silva-Martinez, Jackelynne↗
NASA NTRS2018

Cassini Spacecraft Attitude Control System: Flight Performance and Lessons Learned, 1997-2017

A sophisticated interplanetary spacecraft, Cassini/Huygens was launched on October 15, 1997. Since achieving orbit at Saturn in 2004, Cassini has collected science data throughout its four-year prime mission (2004–08), and has since been approved for first and second extended missions through September 2017. The Cassini Attitude and Articulation Control Subsystem (AACS) is perhaps the spacecraft subsystem that must satisfy the most mission and science pointing requirements. Since launch, the performance of the Cassini AACS design has been superb. All key mission and science requirements are met with significant margins. An overview of the flight performance of the Cassini attitude control system as well as AACS mission operation-centric lessons learned, from launch to 2017, are described by topics. Many of these lessons learned should be applicable to the safe operations of other interplanetary missions. Processes taken by the AACS operation team to guard against “human” errors are also outlined in this paper.

Lee, Allan Y.↗
NASA NTRS2013

MPST Software: grl_suppdoc

Due to the nature of the GRAIL mission, the GRAIL Mission Planning and Sequence Team (MPST) is required to generate ground and uplink products faster than ever done before. The existing correct_transmitter_min_dur tool that provides a similar function to grl_suppdoc lacks the ability to operate accurately or quickly enough to support the rapid turnaround required of the GRAIL MPST. The GRAIL MPST was required to build this new tool to facilitate the ground and uplink generation processes to meet a tight sequence development timeline. The grl_suppdoc tool enables the GRAIL MPST to generate automatically Deep Space Network (DSN) transmitter suppressions based on short uplinks that are found in the ground/modeled Predicted Events File (PEF). The grl_suppdoc script automatically generates applicable DSN uplink suppressions in the form of a Spacecraft Activity Sequence File (SASF) to protect the GRAIL project from short DSN uplink windows, which can be cause for operator error at the DSN antennas. Currently, no software exists that provides this functionality at the efficiency required for GRAIL sequence team operations. Compared to a manual process, this script reduces human error and saves considerable man-hours by automating and streamlining the mission planning and sequencing task for the GRAIL mission.

Call, Jared A.↗
NASA NTRS2013

MPST Software: grl_pef_check

This innovation is a tool used to verify and validate spacecraft sequences at the predicted events file (PEF) level for the GRAIL (Gravity Recovery and Interior Laboratory, see http://www.nasa. gov/mission_pages/grail/main/index. html) mission as part of the Multi-Mission Planning and Sequencing Team (MPST) operations process to reduce the possibility for errors. This tool is used to catch any sequence related errors or issues immediately after the seqgen modeling to streamline downstream processes. This script verifies and validates the seqgen modeling for the GRAIL MPST process. A PEF is provided as input, and dozens of checks are performed on it to verify and validate the command products including command content, command ordering, flight-rule violations, modeling boundary consistency, resource limits, and ground commanding consistency. By performing as many checks as early in the process as possible, grl_pef_check streamlines the MPST task of generating GRAIL command and modeled products on an aggressive schedule. By enumerating each check being performed, and clearly stating the criteria and assumptions made at each step, grl_pef_check can be used as a manual checklist as well as an automated tool. This helper script was written with a focus on enabling the user with the information they need in order to evaluate a sequence quickly and efficiently, while still keeping them informed and active in the overall sequencing process. grl_pef_check verifies and validates the modeling and sequence content prior to investing any more effort into the build. There are dozens of various items in the modeling run that need to be checked, which is a time-consuming and errorprone task. Currently, no software exists that provides this functionality. Compared to a manual process, this script reduces human error and saves considerable man-hours by automating and streamlining the mission planning and sequencing task for the GRAIL mission.

Call, Jared A.↗
NASA NTRS2023

An Examination of Heavy Ion-Induced Persistent Visual Error Signatures in an Electronic Display Driver Integrated Circuit

Given the ubiquity of electronic displays integration in human-based systems, the impending mission critical, space-based applications of electronic displays will necessitate SEE assessment of components unique to electronic displays. A commercially available DDIC designed to drive a small form factor organic light emitting diode (OLED) was visually monitored during heavy ion irradiation to catalogue radiation induced persistent visual error signatures that require manual intervention (i.e., power cycling) to return to nominal function. These error signatures were able to be reproduced via modification of configuration register values utilizing the instruction set intended for interfacing a microcontroller with the DDIC. This approach to emulation of heavy-ion induced errors on a table-top assists with human perception-based criticality analysis as well as development of mitigation techniques.

Electronic Displays↗
NASA NTRS2019

Generalizable Skills and Knowledge for Exploration Missions

This report describes research conducted under Cooperative Agreement 80NSSC18K0042 for the Human Factors and Behavioral Performance Element, Human Research Program, located at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) Johnson Space Center. The research addresses the Risk of Inadequate Mission, Process, and Task Design and the Risk of Performance Errors Due to Training Deficiencies during exploration-class space missions by identifying the tasks that will be conducted by human crew during an expedition to Mars and the abilities, skills, and knowledge that will be required of crew members. By focusing on an expedition to Mars, we have considered the extremes of what is possible for human space exploration during the first half of the 21st Century and accommodated the human requirements for missions to asteroids, Cis-Lunar orbit, and a return to the Moon.

Stuster, Jack↗
NASA NTRS2005

Cognition in Space Workshop: Metrics and Models - 1

"Cognition in Space Workshop I: Metrics and Models" was the first in a series of workshops sponsored by NASA to develop an integrated research and development plan supporting human cognition in space exploration. The workshop was held in Chandler, Arizona, October 25-27, 2004. The participants represented academia, government agencies, and medical centers. This workshop addressed the following goal of the NASA Human System Integration Program for Exploration: to develop a program to manage risks due to human performance and human error, specifically ones tied to cognition. Risks range from catastrophic error to degradation of efficiency and failure to accomplish mission goals. Cognition itself includes memory, decision making, initiation of motor responses, sensation, and perception. Four subgoals were also defined at the workshop as follows: (1) NASA needs to develop a human-centered design process that incorporates standards for human cognition, human performance, and assessment of human interfaces; (2) NASA needs to identify and assess factors that increase risks associated with cognition; (3) NASA needs to predict risks associated with cognition; and (4) NASA needs to mitigate risk, both prior to actual missions and in real time. This report develops the material relating to these four subgoals.

Woolford, Barbara↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Planned Investigations to Address Acute Central Nervous System Effects of Space Radiation Exposure with Human Performance Data

This work intends to generate evidence of acute, incremental human performance decrement similar to that due to space radiation and its impacts on the brain, to accompany ongoing human performance modeling work. The planned work will explore the boundaries of human behavioral and performance decrement after expo-sure to stress, which may be expected based in part on rodent responses found after exposure to ionizing radiation. The collection of evidence via simulation studies can characterize real human errors toward determining what stress levels lead to significantly-low levels of performance (below permissible outcome limits) which would imperil mission accomplishment. If mission-relevant yet animal-study-linked tasks are used, human and animal performance levels may be aligned to enable quantitative assignment of permissible exposure limits based on animal exposure studies. Ultimately, a transfer function between the performances of exposed rodents and humans under stress can be developed using shared impairment mechanisms.

human performance↗
NASA NTRS2018

Considerations in Assuring Safety of Increasingly Autonomous Systems

Recent technological advances have accelerated the development and application of increasingly autonomous (IA) systems in civil and military aviation. IA systems can provide automation of complex mission tasks-ranging across reduced crew operations, air-traffic management, and unmanned, autonomous aircraft-with most applications calling for collaboration and teaming among humans and IA agents. IA systems are expected to provide benefits in terms of safety, reliability, efficiency, affordability, and previously unattainable mission capability. There is also a potential for improving safety by removal of human errors. There are, however, several challenges in the safety assurance of these systems due to the highly adaptive and non-deterministic behavior of these systems, and vulnerabilities due to potential divergence of airplane state awareness between the IA system and humans. These systems must deal with external sensors and actuators, and they must respond in time commensurate with the activities of the system in its environment. One of the main challenges is that safety assurance, currently relying upon authority transfer from an autonomous function to a human to mitigate safety concerns, will need to address their mitigation by automation in a collaborative dynamic context. These challenges have a fundamental, multidimensional impact on the safety assurance methods, system architecture, and V&V capabilities to be employed. The goal of this report is to identify relevant issues to be addressed in these areas, the potential gaps in the current safety assurance techniques, and critical questions that would need to be answered to assure safety of IA systems. We focus on a scenario of reduced crew operation when an IA system is employed which reduces, changes or eliminates a human's role in transition from two-pilot operations.

Alves, Erin E.↗
NASA NTRS1980

Technical approaches for measurement of human errors

Human error is a significant contributing factor in a very high proportion of civil transport, general aviation, and rotorcraft accidents. The technical details of a variety of proven approaches for the measurement of human errors in the context of the national airspace system are presented. Unobtrusive measurements suitable for cockpit operations and procedures in part of full mission simulation are emphasized. Procedure, system performance, and human operator centered measurements are discussed as they apply to the manual control, communication, supervisory, and monitoring tasks which are relevant to aviation operations.

Clement, W. F.↗
NASA NTRS1990

Preliminary error budget for an optical ranging system: Range, range rate, and differenced range observables

Future missions to the outer solar system or human exploration of Mars may use telemetry systems based on optical rather than radio transmitters. Pulsed laser transmission can be used to deliver telemetry rates of about 100 kbits/sec with an efficiency of several bits for each detected photon. Navigational observables that can be derived from timing pulsed laser signals are discussed. Error budgets are presented based on nominal ground stations and spacecraft-transceiver designs. Assuming a pulsed optical uplink signal, two-way range accuracy may approach the few centimeter level imposed by the troposphere uncertainty. Angular information can be achieved from differenced one-way range using two ground stations with the accuracy limited by the length of the available baseline and by clock synchronization and troposphere errors. A method of synchronizing the ground station clocks using optical ranging measurements is presented. This could allow differenced range accuracy to reach the few centimeter troposphere limit.

Folkner, W. M.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Enhancing the Cassini Mission Through FP Applications After Launch

Although rigorous pre-emptive measures are taken to preclude failures and anomalous conditions from occurring in JPL spacecraft missions prior to launch, unforeseeable problems can still surface after liftoff. In the case of the Cassini/Huygens Mission-to-Saturn spacecraft, several problems were observed post-launch: 1) immediately after takeoff, the collected engineering/science data stored on the Solid State Recorders (SSR) contained a significantly higher number of corrupted bits than was expected (considerably over spec) due to human error in the memory mapping of these devices, 2) numerous Solid State Power Switches (SSPS) sporadically tripped off throughout the mission due to cosmic ray bombardment from the unique space environment, and 3) false assumptions in the pressure regulator design in combination with missing heritage test data led to inaccurate design conclusions, causing the issuance of two waivers for the regulator to close properly (a potentially mission catastrophic single-point failure which occurred 24 days after launch) - amongst other problems. For Cassini, some of these anomalies led to arduous work-arounds or required continuous monitoring of telemetry variables by the ground-based Spacecraft Operations Flight Support (SOFS) team in order to detect and fix fault occurrences as they happened. Fortunately, sufficient funding and schedule margin allowed several Fault Protection (FP) solutions to be implemented into post-launch Flight Software (FSW) uploads to help resolve these issues autonomously, reducing SOFS ground support efforts while improving anomaly recovery time in order to preserve maximum science capture. This paper details the FP applications used to resolve the above issues as well as to optimize solutions for several other problems experienced by the Cassini spacecraft during its fight, in order to enhance the spacecraft's overall mission success throughout the 18 years of its 20 year expedition to and within the Saturnian system.

fault protection↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Planned Investigations to Address Acute Central Nervous System Effects of Space Radiation Exposure with Human Performance Data

This work intends to generate evidence of acute, incremental human performance decrement similar to that due to space radiation andits impacts on the brain, to accompany ongoing human performance modeling work. The planned work will explore the boundaries of human behavioral and performance decrement after exposure to stress, which may be expected based in part on rodent responses found afterexposure to ionizing radiation. The collection of evidence via simulation studies can characterize real human errors toward determining what stress levels lead to significantly-low levels of performance (below permissible outcome limits) which would imperilmission accomplishment. If mission-relevant animal-study-linked tasks are used, human and animal performance levels may be aligned to enable quantitative assignment of permissible exposure limits based on animal exposure studies. Ultimately, a transfer function between the performances of exposed rodents and humans under stress can be developed using shared impairment mechanisms.

human performance↗
NASA NTRS1997

Human Factors Research Under Ground-Based and Space Conditions

Session TP2 includes short reports concerning: (1) Human Factors Engineering of the International space Station Human Research Facility; (2) Structured Methods for Identifying and Correcting Potential Human Errors in Space operation; (3) An Improved Procedure for Selecting Astronauts for Extended Space Missions; (4) The NASA Performance Assessment Workstation: Cognitive Performance During Head-Down Bedrest; (5) Cognitive Performance Aboard the Life and Microgravity Spacelab; and (6) Psychophysiological Reactivity Under MIR-Simulation and Real Micro-G.

Source record↗