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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2024

Enhancing Nuclear and Radiological Security in Polarized Times: Safeguarding Against Extremist Insider Threats

Domestic violent extremism has been on the rise in recent years, fueled by growing political polarization, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the spread of misinformation online. This concerning trend raises an important question: has this increase in extremist violence manifested in more incidents involving radioactive or nuclear (RN) materials and a corresponding security concern? To explore this question, we analyzed existing data on events involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear materials over time. Specifically, we examined the rate of RN-related incidents, the targets of these events, and the ideologies motivating the perpetrators by using the Violent Non-State Actor Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Event Database from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Our analysis aimed to determine whether the broader rise of violent extremism has translated to an elevated risk of attacks involving RN materials. Results of the analysis revealed that there was no clear increase in events involving RN material in the dataset. However, given the rarity of these events, this conclusion does not indicate that such a trend might not appear in coming years if violent extremism continues to rise. To address the potential risk presented by violent extremism, in addition to quantifying the frequency of RN events, we also reviewed traits that could make organizations more susceptible to insider threats from radicalized employees. Focusing on the literature around counterproductive workplace behavior, we identified organizational characteristics that might increase the risk of malicious acts committed by radicalized insiders. These risk factors include abusive leadership, situational constraints, and organizational injustice. Finally, using these organizational risk characteristics, we discuss interventions that organizations with RN material can take to reduce their risk of attacks stemming from violent extremism while still protecting individual rights to privacy and civil liberties. Overall, this article provides an overview of the intersections between rising domestic extremism, insider threats, and risks posed by RN materials. We present current data on trends and patterns in this space as well as practical guidance for organizational resilience.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2025

SURVEILLANCE DETECTION FOR TRANSPORTATION OPERATIONS PERSONNEL TO PREVENT HIJACKING, THEFT, SABOTAGE, AND MALICIOUS SECURITY EVENTS DURING TRANSPORTING NUCLEAR MATERIAL

The secure transportation of high-consequence materials, including nuclear and radiological assets, is a critical global priority in the face of escalating terrorism, security threats, and violent protests targeting these operations. Effective surveillance detection—the ability to identify, assess, and respond to potential threats across a continuum of scenarios—is paramount in addressing these challenges. This paper outlines a phased, multi-tiered training program designed to strengthen the surveillance detection capabilities of organizations responsible for nuclear material transport. The proposed training program adopts a progressive approach, gradually increasing in technical complexity to provide participants with comprehensive knowledge and tools for implementing robust security strategies. It targets a wide spectrum of stakeholders, including competent authorities, regulators, inspectors, shippers, carriers, law enforcement, and emergency response personnel, equipping them to plan, evaluate, and safeguard nuclear material transportation effectively. Each phase of the program emphasizes distinct elements of the surveillance detection continuum and transport security, focusing on critical topics such as threat identification, adversary task timelines, protective methodologies, and attack mitigation strategies. The training framework is anchored in technical exchanges and scenario-driven courses that reflect real-world complexities and challenges. By addressing the surveillance detection continuum comprehensively—from early threat assessment to active countermeasures—the program reinforces global efforts to secure nuclear assets. It aligns with international security objectives and fosters a strong security culture within participating organizations, ensuring personnel are prepared to counter potential threats and maintain the safe, secure movement of these materials. Ultimately, this initiative aims to enhance preparedness, security, and response capabilities, supporting the global mission to safeguard high-consequence materials against evolving threats.

Zineddin, Dr. Z. [ORNL] (ORCID:0009000848740725)↗
DOE OSTI2020

CENC PSN VOID FY20 Report

Maritime trade accounts for approximately 80 percent of international commerce. The high volume of vessels traversing domestic and international ports makes port areas prime targets for terrorism as well as illegal trafficking of drugs and arms (conventional or nuclear). Port security is therefore a worldwide concern affecting global economies, freedom of movement, and national security. However, extensive port monitoring is inherently complex and time consuming — making it truly viable only via an automated framework that can detect potential illicit activity and alert authorities in a timely manner. The development of image processing algorithms for this purpose requires access to large, labeled datasets that cover the breadth of targets of interest as well as the environments that they are observed within. Curated and labeled datasets of this nature are of enormous value to Sandia's Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation and National Security Program portfolios, as well as to Sandia's machine learning/automatic target recognition (ML/ATR) algorithm development and R&D communities. The goal of this project is to create a commercial satellite imagery dataset of labeled maritime vessels in port areas to support the development of ML/ATR algorithms for port security nonproliferation purposes. This dataset — Port Security Nonproliferation Vessel Overhead Imagery Dataset (PSN VOID) — has the potential to support a variety of other ancillary missions, such as maritime domain awareness, domestic and international security, drug interdiction, and weapons trafficking.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

Multi-Game Modeling for Counter-Smuggling

International trade provides an avenue for terrorists to smuggle illicit materials into a target country. Policymakers need models and decision support tools that are both reliable and germane to inform their responses to this. Game theoretic approaches have been used in the analysis of counterterrorism strategies, but the models involved have often been small and abstracted. To address this need, we have developed a multi-game model to account for both security-related and economic aspects of counter-smuggling interdiction efforts. Additionally, we use different games to represent different types of interactions, and these games are then coupled to each other to form an integrated model. In this paper, we demonstrate the model's capabilities on a representative system of ports (both foreign and domestic), trade routes, and commodities. We specifically investigate the impacts of changes in screening policies at domestic ports, detection device capabilities, shipping subsidies, and worldwide corruption levels. In these studies, we find that economic factors play a large role in the interdiction task and provide correspondingly important tools for deterrence.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2025

On the Necessity of Adopting Irradiation Protocols Recommended by the Compatibility in Irradiation Research Protocols Expert Roundtable (CIRPER) in Published Research and Why It Matters to Health Physicists

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) seeks to assist and support all partners in the fields of radiobiology, health physics, radiation physics, and related areas to transition from cesium-137 chloride-based technologies that can potentially be used in an act of terrorism to X-ray technologies. The absence of information on experimental procedures, equipment, and irradiation parameters directly and negatively impacts the reproducibility and translatability of a sizable portion of radiation biology studies. It also discourages researchers from adopting new tools that eliminate the risks of a radiological dispersal device.

Stern, Warren [Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL↗
NASA NTRS2019

The Dragonfly Entry and Descent System

Dragonfly is a proposed New Frontiers class mission that will send a nuclear powered octocopter to the surface of Titan for an extended science mission. This presentation will provide an overview of the Entry and Descent system that is under development to ensure the save delivery of this unique "relocatable lander" to Titan. Titan's dense atmosphere, large atmospheric scale height, and low gravity allows for a slow-paced entry and descent sequence that lasts more than 100 minutes, as opposed to the "7 minutes of terror" that is charac-teristic of landed Mars missions. This slow pace al-lows for sufficient temporal separation between critical events of the EDL sequence to minimize overall risk.The Dragonfly entry and descent system is composed of high-heritage components, minimizing overall risk. The aeroshell will be a scaled Genesis Sample Return capsule with a diameter of 3.75 meters, built by Lock-heed Martin. The thermal protection system (TPS) is made up of Phenolic Impregnated Carbon Ablator-Domestic (PICA-D) on the heatshield, SLA-561V on the backshell, and SLA-220M on the aft cover and low gain antenna. Each material has extensive heritage for the chosen application. The spacecraft will enter Titan at a velocity of 7.3 km/s, resulting in a predicted fully margined stagnation point heating environment of 254 W/cm2 heat rate and 13 kJ/cm2 heat load, well within the tested limits of the chosen materials. The aeroheat-ing environments, including the significant contribu-tion of shock layer radiation from CN on both the heatshield and backshell, are evaluated using state of the art models and codes that have been validated with appropriate ground testing.Once the deceleration pulse is complete, a disk-gap-band (DGB) drogue parachute will be deployed at ap-proximately Mach 1.5 to stabilize and further deceler-ate the spacecraft. Due to the dense atmosphere, the spacecraft will spend more than 80 minutes on this parachute, until reaching an appropriate altitude to de-ploy the subsonic main parachute. The lander is re-leased after approximately 17 minutes on the main chute before releasing and transitioning to powered flight in order to navigate to its first landing site. The release of the lander from the backshell effectively ends the entry and descent portion of the mission.The full presentation will provide additional details about the design of the EDL system hardware, engi-neering design, and overall con-ops. Preliminary aero-thermal and TPS sizing analyses will be presented, and the parachute system will be described in greater detail. In addition, the Dragonfly spacecraft will carry an En-gineering Science Investigation (ESI) package designed to obtain engineering data during EDL that will be used to validate the design methodology for future missions. An overview of the proposed ESI package will also be presented.

EDL↗
NASA NTRS2023

New Retropropulsion Concept with NTAC Power for Mars Entry

Since the initial deployments of probes, orbiters, and rovers on Mars, there have been many ideas and concepts on how to perform an entry, descent, and landing (EDL) process efficiently and safely through the Martian atmosphere to place payloads onto the surface of Mars. Among the missions sent to perform EDL on Mars, only roughly sixty percent of the missions have been successful. The 5 minutes to 20 minutes of communication gap due to long-range telecommunications to Earth, described as seven minutes of terror, add to the complexity of EDL missions to Mars. As the payloads have become larger, the method of EDL has become more complex. To place an automobile-size science rover on the Martian surface requires the use of retrorockets mounted on a Sky Crane during the final subsonic stage of EDL. Larger payloads will require more propellant and more and/or larger retropropulsion engines during the earlier supersonic stage of EDL. The Sky Crane concept may not be scalable for these larger payloads and during supersonic flight; hence, new approaches are sought. A new power technology invented at NASA called Nuclear Thermionic Avalanche Cell (NTAC) may offer an additional solution. Powered by NTAC, the newly invented retropropulsion concept would ingest carbon dioxide gas, heat it up and blast it out as a new feature of the EDL process. NTAC would be reusable as a primary power source for payloads such as excavators, three-dimensional (3D) printers, or mobile equipment for mining, construction, and additive manufacturing tasks. Since NTAC would need to be landed with its host payload or as a standalone power package, assessing its ability to assist in its own EDL seems reasonable. The purpose of this Technical Memorandum (TM) is to examine the performance of NTAC in the context of EDL at Mars for motivating studies for integrating NTAC into future Mars mission architectures.

Mars entry↗
DOE OSTI2020

Expedited Walkdowns and Preparation of Cost Estimates for Decontamination and Demolition of Excess Facilities - 20335

Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC (LLNS) is the prime contractor responsible for managing and operating Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The mission of the LLNL is to strengthen security of the United States through development and application of world-class science and technology to enhance the nation's defense, reduce the global threat from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, and respond with vision, quality, integrity, and technical excellence to scientific issues of national importance. To accomplish its mission, LLNL must plan and manage its campus space and facilities to optimize use of its relatively small one-square-mile footprint. LLNL currently has numerous excess facilities that require decontamination and demolition (D and D). The LLNL Legacy Facility Program is responsible for stewardship and risk reduction programs to effectively manage these excess assets at LLNL. The Legacy Facility Program identified 10 excess facilities at LLNL that were candidates for demolition based on risks from further degradation of the facilities, potential exposure to hazardous materials, or need for removal to make way for new program facilities. The buildings range from a structure built in 1943 to serve as a US Navy drill hall during World War II, to a facility that provided neutrons to study material properties for the fusion energy program. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) appropriated FY19 funding for the development of Class 3 estimates for these 10 excess facilities that would be used to develop a Program Management Plan for funding consideration. Class 3 estimates are not conceptual, nor overly detailed, but adequate to be used for budget and appropriation purposes. Using existing strategic sourcing agreements, LLNL was able to organize a team of senior subject matter experts (SMEs) with diverse technical backgrounds across the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex to complete extensive process knowledge (PK) reviews and walk-downs of each excess facility and to deliver accurate and complete estimates under an expedited schedule (i.e., within eight weeks). To facilitate the expedited schedule, LLNL was fully prepared for the arrival of the JGMS team, which consisted of the following companies: J.G. Management Systems, Inc. (JGMS); Strata-G, LLC; and Michael Baker International. LLNL provided background and PK information on the excess facilities, pictures, supporting historical documentation, and radiological survey history as well as escorted access to the facilities. The JGMS team has previous experience supporting Program Management Plans for excess facilities at the Y-12 National Security Complex. The team mobilized to LLNL and performed the facility walk-downs from January 22-25, 2019. Using a methodical evaluation process, expertise, and experience, the team was able to deliver walk-down draft reports and estimates to LLNL before their February 8, 2019 deadline. LLNL then in turn reviewed, completed the estimates by adding waste management costs and other LLNL costs, and delivered the estimates to NNSA by February 15, 2019. The completed final reports, including draft D and D estimates, were delivered to LLNL before their March 6, 2019 deadline. The work was successfully completed ahead of the expedited schedule required by LLNL, resulting in a commendation from the client. This paper describes how the partnership and collaboration as a fully integrated team comprised of the prime contractor, LLNS, and the JGMS team successfully met the needs of the US government, resulting in the performance of expedited site walk-downs, the development of summary evaluation reports, and the preparation of draft Class 3 estimates and preliminary schedules for the D and D of 10 excess facilities at LLNL. The efforts of the team will enable the D and D of the first excess facility in the 2020-2021 time frame. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
NASA NTRS2010

A Biomathematical Model of Lymphopoiesis and Its Application to Acute and Chronic Irradiation Assessment

After the events of September 11, 2001, there is an increasing concern of the occurrence of radiological terrorism that may result in significant casualties in densely populated areas. Much effort has been made to establish various biomarkers to rapidly assess radiation dose in mass-casualty and population-monitoring scenarios, which are demanded for effective medical management and treatment of the exposed victims. Among these the count of lymphocytes in peripheral blood and their depletion kinetics are the most important early indicators of the severity of the radiation injury. In this study, we examine a biomathematical model of lymphopoiesis which has been successfully utilized to simulate and interpret experimental data of acute and chronic irradiations on rodents [1]. With revised parameters for humans, we find this model can reproduce several sets of clinical lymphocyte data of accident victims over a wide range of absorbed doses. In addition, the absolute lymphocyte counts and the depletion rate constants calculated by this model also show good correlation with the Guskova formula and the Goans model, the two empirical tools which have been widely recognized for early estimation of the exposed dose after radiation accidents [2]. We also use the model to analyze the hematological data of the Techa River residents which were exposed to chronic low-dose irradiation during 1950-1956 [3]. This model can serve as a computational tool in radiation accident management, military operations involving nuclear warfare, radiation therapy, and space radiation risk assessment.

Hu, Shaowen↗
DOE OSTI2020

Investigation of Radiological Contamination at Parks in the Gateway National Recreation Area - 20350

In 2005, the National Park Service was notified that elevated radiation levels were detected at Great Kills Park during a baseline radiological mapping effort conducted by the Counter Terrorism Bureau of the New York City Police Department and the United States Department of Energy. Great Kills Park is in the Staten Island Unit of the Gateway National Recreation Area. A records search determined that approximately 280 acres of the park was established over an area in which the New York City Department of Sanitation placed approximately 15.1 million cubic yards of waste fill from 1944 to 1948. Since 2005, a series of response actions and investigations were conducted on behalf of the National Park Service to mitigate risk to human health and the environment and to determine the nature of radiological contamination at Great Kills Park. The findings support that radiological contamination is related to certain components of waste fill, including incinerator residue from both on and offsite incinerators, coal ash from the historical use of coal-fired boilers for heating, and incidental radiological artifacts in the waste fill due to their historical use and subsequent disposal. A majority of the radiological artifacts were determined to contain radium-226 and included radioluminescent markers, radium impregnated switch board buttons, radium paint containers, and brachytherapy devices. The National Park Service has several other Parks in the Gateway National Recreation Area that were established in areas with a similar history to Great Kills Park, and overlie waste fill historically placed during landfilling operations, including Spring Creek Park and Dead Horse Bay. Over the last year, the National Park Service has performed additional radiological investigations at Great Kills Park as part of the ongoing Remedial Investigation under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act. In addition, preliminary radiological investigations were performed at Spring Creek Park and Dead Horse Bay Park in the Jamaica Bay Unit of Gateway National Recreation Area. These investigation activities identified gamma radiation levels above the ambient level, several of which were attributable to radiological artifacts similar in nature to those recovered at Great Kills Park. Ongoing investigations at Parks in the Gateway National Recreation Area support an association between radiological contamination and historical landfilling practices that were common prior to the regulation and control of radioactive materials. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗