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Habitability Assessments And Lessons-learned From 3-day And 11-day Enriched Oxygen Hypobaric Chamber Tests At NASA Johnson Space Center

INTRODUCTION: Decompression sickness (DCS) is a risk to the health and performance of astronauts and high-altitude aircrew. Tolerance to flammability, hypoxia, prebreathe duration, and DCS risk varies across different organizations, vehicles, suits, and destinations, necessitating a variety of DCS risk mitigation approaches. Existing models of altitude DCS risk are often insufficient to enable accurate risk-informed decisions during hardware development, mission planning, and flight operations. METHODS: NASA completed outfitting of a dedicated facility at Johnson Space Center to support testing of up to eight human subjects for multiple days in hypobaric and enriched oxygen atmospheres. The primary purpose of the testing capability is validation of DCS risk mitigation protocols for Artemis missions to the Moon; however, it will also support development and validation of a generalizable altitude DCS risk estimation tool. A 3-day and an 11-day prebreathe validation test were completed in 2022, each with 8 human subjects living at 56.5 kPa (8.2 psia), 34% O2, 66% N2, with 5 simulated EVAs performed on masks at 29.6 kPa (4.3 psi), 85% O2, 15% N2. Facility and organizational lessons-learned and process improvements were recorded during and following the tests, and subjective habitability ratings were recorded daily during the 11-day test. Hypoxia and DCS-related physiological and cognitive outcome measures were recorded during both tests and are reported in companion presentations. RESULTS & DISCUSSION: All subjects completed each of the tests. Primary habitability issues related to mask discomfort during simulated EVAs and poor sleep quality due to thin mattresses. Polybenzimidazole (PBI) clothing was worn by all subjects due to the increased fire risk and may be required for Artemis missions; clothing was found to be acceptable overall with the worst ratings being due to poor fit and inelasticity. Chamber O2 and CO2 sensor inconsistency was observed that did not result in test termination but required post-test follow-up. Forward plans include additional hypobaric testing and integration of existing and future physiological outcome data into an open-source Aerospace Estimation Tool for Hypobaric Exposure Risk (AETHER). NASA is also working to make the testing capability available to commercial companies.

Andrew Abercromby↗
NASA NTRS1994

Domain analysis for the reuse of software development experiences

We need to be able to learn from past experiences so we can improve our software processes and products. The Experience Factory is an organizational structure designed to support and encourage the effective reuse of software experiences. This structure consists of two organizations which separates project development concerns from organizational concerns of experience packaging and learning. The experience factory provides the processes and support for analyzing, packaging, and improving the organization's stored experience. The project organization is structured to reuse this stored experience in its development efforts. However, a number of questions arise: What past experiences are relevant? Can they all be used (reused) on our current project? How do we take advantage of what has been learned in other parts of the organization? How do we take advantage of experience in the world-at-large? Can someone else's best practices be used in our organization with confidence? This paper describes approaches to help answer these questions. We propose both quantitative and qualitative approaches for effectively reusing software development experiences.

Basili, V. R.↗
NASA NTRS2001

Lessons Learned and Technical Standards: A Logical Marriage

A comprehensive database of lessons learned that corresponds with relevant technical standards would be a boon to technical personnel and standards developers. The authors discuss the emergence of one such database within NASA, and show how and why the incorporation of lessons learned into technical standards databases can be an indispensable tool for government and industry. Passed down from parent to child, teacher to pupil, and from senior to junior employees, lessons learned have been the basis for our accomplishments throughout the ages. Government and industry, too, have long recognized the need to systematically document And utilize the knowledge gained from past experiences in order to avoid the repetition of failures and mishaps. The use of lessons learned is a principle component of any organizational culture committed to continuous improvement. They have formed the foundation for discoveries, inventions, improvements, textbooks, and technical standards. Technical standards are a very logical way to communicate these lessons. Using the time-honored tradition of passing on lessons learned while utilizing the newest in information technology, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has launched an intensive effort to link lessons learned with specific technical standards through various Internet databases. This article will discuss the importance of lessons learned to engineers, the difficulty in finding relevant lessons learned while engaged in an engineering project, and the new NASA project that can help alleviate this difficulty. The article will conclude with recommendations for more expanded cross-sectoral uses of lessons learned with reference to technical standards.

Gill, Paul↗
NASA NTRS2013

Lessons of History: Organizational Factors in Three Aviation Mishaps

This presentation examines organizational factors that contributed to three aircraft mishaps and provides analysis of lessons learned. Three historical aviation mishaps were studied from a human factors perspective, and organizational factors identified and analyzed. These case studies provide valuable lessons for understanding the interaction of people with aircraft systems and with each other during flight operations.

Merlin, Peter William↗
NASA NTRS2002

NASA Materials Related Lessons Learned

Lessons Learned have been the basis for our accomplishments throughout the ages. They have been passed down from father to son, mother to daughter, teacher to pupil, and older to younger worker. Lessons Learned have also been the basis for the nation's accomplishments for more than 200 years. Both government and industry have long recognized the need to systematically document and utilize the knowledge gained from past experiences in order to avoid the repetition of failures and mishaps. Through the knowledge captured and recorded in Lessons Learned from more than 80 years of flight in the Earth's atmosphere, NASA's materials researchers are constantly working to develop stronger, lighter, and more durable materials that can withstand the challenges of space. The Agency's talented materials engineers and scientists continue to build on that rich tradition by using the knowledge and wisdom gained from past experiences to create futurist materials and technologies that will be used in the next generation of advanced spacecraft and satellites that may one day enable mankind to land men on another planet or explore our nearest star. These same materials may also have application here on Earth to make commercial aircraft more economical to build and fly. With the explosion in technical accomplishments over the last decade, the ability to capture knowledge and have the capability to rapidly communicate this knowledge at lightning speed throughout an organization like NASA has become critical. Use of Lessons Learned is a principal component of an organizational culture committed to continuous improvement.

Garcia, Danny↗
NASA NTRS2003

NASA Materials Related Lessons Learned

Lessons Learned have been the basis for our accomplishments throughout the ages. They have been passed down from father to son, mother to daughter, teacher to pupil, and older to younger worker. Lessons Learned have also been the basis for the nation s accomplishments for more than 200 years. Both government and industry have long recognized the need to systematically document and utilize the knowledge gained from past experiences in order to avoid the repetition of failures and mishaps. Through the knowledge captured and recorded in Lessons Learned from more than 80 years of flight in the Earth s atmosphere, NASA s materials researchers are constantly working to develop stronger, lighter, and more durable materials that can withstand the challenges of space. The Agency s talented materials engineers and scientists continue to build on that rich tradition by using the knowledge and wisdom gained from past experiences to create futuristic materials and technologies that will be used in the next generation of advanced spacecraft and satellites that may one day enable mankind to land men on another planet or explore our nearest star. These same materials may also have application here on Earth to make commercial aircraft more economical to build and fly. With the explosion in technical accomplishments over the last decade, the ability to capture knowledge and have the capability to rapidly communicate this knowledge at lightning speed throughout an organization like NASA has become critical. Use of Lessons Learned is a principal component of an organizational culture committed to continuous improvement.

Garcia, Danny↗
NASA NTRS2007

Lessons Learned from Seven Space Shuttle Missions

Much can be learned from well-written descriptions of the technical and organizational factors that lead to an accident. Subsequent analysis by third parties of investigation reports and associated evidence collected during the investigations can lead to additional insight. Much can also be learned from documented close calls that do not result in loss of life or a spacecraft, such as the Mars Exploration Rover Spirit software anomaly, the SOHO mission interruption, and the NEAR burn anomaly. Seven space shuttle incidents fall into the latter category: Rendezvous Target Failure On STS-41B; Rendezvous Radar Anomaly and Trajectory Dispersion-STS-32 ;Rendezvous Lambert Targeting Anomaly-STS-49; Rendezvous Lambert Targeting Anomaly-STS-51; Zero Doppler Steering Maneuver Anomaly-STS-59; Excessive Propellant Consumption During Rendezvous-STS-69; Global Positioning System Receiver and Associated Shuttle Flight Software Anomalies-STS-91 Procedural work-arounds or software changes prevented them from threatening mission success. Extensive investigations, which included the independent recreation of the anomalies by multiple Shuttle Program organizations, were the key to determining the cause, accurately assessing risk, and identifying software and software process improvements. Lessons learned from these incidents not only validated long-standing operational best practices, but serve to promote discussion and mentoring among Program personnel and are applicable to future space flight programs.

Goodman, John↗
NASA NTRS2001

Training to Enhance Design Team Performance: A Cure for Tunnel Vision

Design Team performance is a function of the quality and degree of academic training and the cumulative, learned experience of the individual members of the team. Teamwork, leadership, and communications certainly are factors that affect the measure of the performance of the team, but they are not addressed here. This paper focuses on accelerating the learned experience of team members and describes an organizational approach that can significantly increase the effective experience level for any engineering design team. The performance measure of the whole team can be increased by increasing the engineering disciplines' cross awareness of each other and by familiarizing them with their affect at the system level. Discipline engineers know their own discipline well, but typically are not intimately familiar with their technical interaction with and dependencies on all the other disciplines of engineering. These dependencies are design integration functions and are worked out well by the discipline engineers as long as they are involved in the design of types of systems that they have experience with.

Parker, James W.↗
NASA NTRS2008

The Development of the Ares I-X Flight Test

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Constellation Program (CxP) has identified a series of tests to provide insight into the design and development of the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) and the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV). Ares I-X was created as the first suborbital development flight test to help meet CxP objectives. The Ares I-X flight vehicle is an early operational model of Ares, with specific emphasis on Ares I and ground operation characteristics necessary to meet Ares I-X flight test objectives. Ares I-X will encompass the design and construction of an entire system that includes the Flight Test Vehicle (FTV) and associated operations. The FTV will be a test model based on the Ares I design. Select design features will be incorporated in the FTV design to emulate the operation of the CLV in order to meet the flight test objectives. The operations infrastructure and processes will be customized for Ares I-X, while still providing data to inform the developers of the launch processing system for Ares/Orion. The FTV is comprised of multiple elements and components that will be developed at different locations. The components will be delivered to the launch/assembly site, Kennedy Space Center (KSC), for assembly of the elements and components into an integrated, flight-ready, launch vehicle. The FTV will fly a prescribed trajectory in order to obtain the necessary data to meet the objectives. Ares I-X will not be commanded or controlled from the ground during flight, but the FTV will be equipped with telemetry systems, a data recording capability and a flight termination system (FTS). The in-flight part of the test includes a trajectory to simulate maximum dynamic pressure during flight and perform a stage separation representative of the CLV. The in-flight test also includes separation of the Upper Stage Simulator (USS) from the First Stage and recovery of the First Stage. The data retrieved from the flight test will be analyzed and used in the design and development of the Ares I vehicle. This paper will discuss the challenges in developing a new launch vehicle in a very short timeframe. The duration from formal Authority to Proceed to launch is 32 months with launch scheduled for April, 2009. The discussion will include changes to organizational structure, system engineering approaches, and early lessons learned for a fast tracked and highly visible project.

Ess, Robert H.↗
NASA NTRS1993

Profile of NASA software engineering: Lessons learned from building the baseline

It is critically important in any improvement activity to first understand the organization's current status, strengths, and weaknesses and, only after that understanding is achieved, examine and implement promising improvements. This fundamental rule is certainly true for an organization seeking to further its software viability and effectiveness. This paper addresses the role of the organizational process baseline in a software improvement effort and the lessons we learned assembling such an understanding for NASA overall and for the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center in particular. We discuss important, core data that must be captured and contrast that with our experience in actually finding such information. Our baselining efforts have evolved into a set of data gathering, analysis, and crosschecking techniques and information presentation formats that may prove useful to others seeking to establish similar baselines for their organization.

Hall, Dana↗
NASA NTRS2024

X-Plane Knowledge Capture Workshop Summary Report

The history of experimental aircraft research and development at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) provides a large body of work for current and future team members to learn from and apply. NASA values the knowledge it gains from all the research it performs and desires to have that knowledge grow with each new project, incrementally adding to the collective knowledge base. To support this knowledge growth and sharing, in May 2019, NASA convened over 60 engineers; researchers; and other personnel (internal and external to NASA) for the X-plane1 Knowledge Capture Workshop to discuss their over 50-years’ worth of experiences in developing, operating, and managing experimental aircraft. Over the course of a two-day workshop, the group not only focused, primarily, on current X-plane development but also discussed a wide range of topics about experimental aircraft and flight research. In addition to the discussions, senior NASA aeronautics leaders shared their personal lessons learned with the workshop audience. Broadly, these discussions centered around the topics of organizational and cultural practices, the project lifecycle, flight, and risk and safety. Many of the observations offered by participants are applicable to other NASA team-based projects, demonstrating the value in sharing lessons learned and best practices across projects regardless of their research focus. To share the most valuable lessons learned as broadly as possible, a summary of these discussions has been compiled into the following report. These discussions are mostly included in their entirety, with some light editing for clarity and privacy. NASA is sharing this knowledge internally and making it available to the public in hopes that others can learn from the experimental aircraft challenges and successes at NASA. Note: this document represents the perspectives, experiences, and opinions of others but does not necessarily represent the official view of NASA.

Steven R Hirshorn↗
NASA NTRS1996

Project Management Framework to Organizational Transitions

This paper describes a project management framework and associated models for organizational transitions. The framework contains an integrated set of steps an organization can take to lead an organizational transition such as downsizing and change in mission or role. The framework is designed to help an organization do the right work the right way with the right people at the right time. The underlying rationale for the steps in the framework is based on a set of findings which include: defining a transition as containing both near-term and long-term actions, designing actions which respond to drivers and achieve desired results, aligning the organization with the external environment, and aligning the internal components of the organization. The framework was developed based on best practices found in the literature, lessons learned from heads of organizations who have completed large-scale organizational changes, and concerns from employees at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC). The framework is described using KSC.

Kotnour, Tim↗
NASA NTRS1984

Action Information Management System (AIMS): a User's View

The initial approach used in establishing a user-defined information system to fulfill the needs of users at NASA Headquarters was unsuccessful in bringing this pilot endeaveor to full project status. The persistence of several users and the full involvement of the Ames Research Center were the ingredients needed to make the AIMS project a success. The lesson learned from this effort is that NASA should always work from its organizational strengths as a Headquarters-Center partnership.

Wiskerchen, M.↗
NASA NTRS1999

Phase 1 Program Joint Report

This report consists of inputs from each of the Phase I Program Joint Working Groups. The Working Groups were tasked to describe the organizational structure and work processes that they used during the program, joint accomplishments, lessons learned, and applications to the International Space Station Program. This report is a top-level joint reference document that contains information of interest to both countries.

Nield, George C.↗
NASA NTRS2012

JPL Innovation Foundry

Space science missions are increasingly challenged today: in ambition, by increasingly sophisticated hypotheses tested; in development, by the increasing complexity of advanced technologies; in budgeting, by the decline of flagship-class mission opportunities; in management, by expectations for breakthrough science despite a risk-averse programmatic climate; and in planning, by increasing competition for scarce resources. How are the space-science missions of tomorrow being formulated? The paper describes the JPL Innovation Foundry, created in 2011, to respond to this evolving context. The Foundry integrates methods, tools, and experts that span the mission concept lifecycle. Grounded in JPL's heritage of missions, flight instruments, mission proposals, and concept innovation, the Foundry seeks to provide continuity of support and cost-effective, on-call access to the right domain experts at the right time, as science definition teams and Principal Investigators mature mission ideas from "cocktail napkin" to PDR. The Foundry blends JPL capabilities in proposal development and concurrent engineering, including Team X, with new approaches for open-ended concept exploration in earlier, cost-constrained phases, and with ongoing research and technology projects. It applies complexity and cost models, projectformulation lessons learned, and strategy analyses appropriate to each level of concept maturity. The Foundry is organizationally integrated with JPL formulation program offices; staffed by JPL's line organizations for engineering, science, and costing; and overseen by senior Laboratory leaders to assure experienced coordination and review. Incubation of each concept is tailored depending on its maturity and proposal history, and its highest leverage modeling and analysis needs.

mission development↗
NASA NTRS2020

Enabling Assurance in the MBSE Environment

A number of specific benefits that fit within the hallmarks of effective development are realized with implementation of model-based approaches to systems and assurance. Model Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) enabled by standardized modeling languages (e.g., SysML®) is at the core. These benefits in the context of spaceflight system challenges can include [1]: • Improved management of complex development • Reduced risk in the development process • Improved cost management • Improved design decisions With appropriate modeling techniques the assurance community also can improve early oversight and insight into project development. NASA has shown the basic constructs of SysML in an MBSE environment offer several key advantages, within a Model Based Mission Assurance (MBMA) initiative [2, 3]. These include the following: • Model viewpoints that promote rapid and systematic assessment of requirements coverage, hazard tagging and risk management • Embedded safety assessments for launch vehicles • Deployment of model assisted development of reliability products - Failure Modes and Effects Analyses (FMEAs) and Fault Trees • Test Planning • Validation and Verification of complex functions • Support of Assurance Case development for complex systems In addition, while there are benefits to be harvested, there is a realization that these do not come without effort and cost. Enabling model-based approaches requires structure, not only in an organizational context, but in a modeling context as well. There can be a steep learning curve and costs associated to train skilled modelers. But, on the other hand, not all of the assurance community need to be modelers. Models themselves must conform to ontologies that enable assurance. This places constraints upon the models and modelers. Optimums have yet to be developed where resources and constraints on modeling must be traded off in the organization and modeling efforts for projects. A number of barriers need to be overcome, as well, which pose challenges to the developers of the software that supports MBSE/MBMA. Information and data must be made to flow seamlessly through the life cycle. Because there is a wide variety of tools used in the community, to avoid the problems of the past of silos, delays, and diverging interests, information should flow among these tools to support the “single source of truth” paradigm of MBSE. This will greatly facilitate MBMA and advancement of assurance functions.

Evans, John W.↗
NASA NTRS2001

Demonstrating and Evaluating an Action Learning Approach to Building Project Management Competence

This paper contributes a description of an action-learning approach to building project management competence. This approach was designed, implemented, and evaluated for use with the Dynacs Engineering Development Contract at the Kennedy Space Center. The aim of the approach was to improve three levels of competence within the organization: individual project management skills, project team performance. and organizational capabilities such as the project management process and tools. The overall steps to the approach, evaluation results, and lessons learned are presented. Managers can use this paper to design a specific action-learning approach for their organization.

Kotnour, Tim↗