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NASA NTRS1994

Autogenic-feedback training improves pilot performance during emergency flying conditions

Studies have shown that autonomous mode behavior is one cause of aircraft fatalities due to pilot error. In such cases, the pilot is in a high state of psychological and physiological arousal and tends to focus on one problem, while ignoring more critical information. This study examined the effect of training in physiological self-recognition and regulation, as a means of improving crew cockpit performance. Seventeen pilots were assigned to the treatment and control groups matched for accumulated flight hours. The treatment group comprised three pilots of HC-130 Hercules aircraft and four HH-65 Dolphin helicopter pilots; the control group comprised three pilots of HC-130's and six Dolphin helicopter pilots. During an initial flight, physiological data were recorded for each crew member and individual crew performance was rated by an instructor pilot. Eight crewmembers were then taught to regulate their own physiological response levels using Autogenic-Feedback Training (AFT). The remaining subjects received no training. During a second flight, treatment subjects showed significant improvement in performance, while controls did not improve. The results indicate that AFT management of high states of physiological arousal may improve pilot performance during emergency flying conditions.

Kellar, Michael A.↗

NASA NTRS2001

Autogenic Feedback Training Exercise and pilot performance: enhanced functioning under search-and-rescue flying conditions

Studies have shown that autonomous mode behavior is one cause of aircraft fatalities due to pilot error. In such cases, the pilot is in a high state of psychological and physiological arousal and tends to focus on one problem, while ignoring more critical information. This study examined the effect of training in physiological self-recognition and regulation, as a means of improving crew cockpit performance. Seventeen pilots were assigned to the treatment and control groups matched for accumulated flight hours. The treatment group contained 4 pilots from HC-130 Hercules aircraft and 4 HH-65 Dolphin helicopter pilots; the control group contained 3 pilots of HC-130s and 6 helicopter pilots. During an initial flight, physiological data were recorded on each crewmember and an instructor pilot rated individual crew performance. Eight crewmembers were then taught to regulate their own physiological response levels using Autogenic-Feedback Training Exercise (AFTE). The remaining participants received no training. During a second flight, treatment participants showed significant improvement in performance (rated by the same instructor pilot as in pretests) while controls did not improve. The results indicate that AFTE management of high states of physiological arousal may improve pilot performance during emergency flying conditions.

NASA Discipline Neuroscience↗

NASA NTRS2010

Checklists and Monitoring in the Cockpit: Why Crucial Defenses Sometimes Fail

Checklists and monitoring are two essential defenses against equipment failures and pilot errors. Problems with checklist use and pilots failures to monitor adequately have a long history in aviation accidents. This study was conducted to explore why checklists and monitoring sometimes fail to catch errors and equipment malfunctions as intended. Flight crew procedures were observed from the cockpit jumpseat during normal airline operations in order to: 1) collect data on monitoring and checklist use in cockpit operations in typical flight conditions; 2) provide a plausible cognitive account of why deviations from formal checklist and monitoring procedures sometimes occur; 3) lay a foundation for identifying ways to reduce vulnerability to inadvertent checklist and monitoring errors; 4) compare checklist and monitoring execution in normal flights with performance issues uncovered in accident investigations; and 5) suggest ways to improve the effectiveness of checklists and monitoring. Cognitive explanations for deviations from prescribed procedures are provided, along with suggestions for countermeasures for vulnerability to error.

Dismukes, R. Key↗

NASA NTRS1997

Reduction of Maintenance Error Through Focused Interventions

It is well known that a significant proportion of aviation accidents and incidents are tied to human error. In flight operations, research of operational errors has shown that so-called "pilot error" often involves a variety of human factors issues and not a simple lack of individual technical skills. In aircraft maintenance operations, there is similar concern that maintenance errors which may lead to incidents and accidents are related to a large variety of human factors issues. Although maintenance error data and research are limited, industry initiatives involving human factors training in maintenance have become increasingly accepted as one type of maintenance error intervention. Conscientious efforts have been made in re-inventing the "team" concept for maintenance operations and in tailoring programs to fit the needs of technical operations. Nevertheless, there remains a dual challenge: to develop human factors interventions which are directly supported by reliable human error data, and to integrate human factors concepts into the procedures and practices of everyday technical tasks. In this paper, we describe several varieties of human factors interventions and focus on two specific alternatives which target problems related to procedures and practices; namely, 1) structured on-the-job training and 2) procedure re-design. We hope to demonstrate that the key to leveraging the impact of these solutions comes from focused interventions; that is, interventions which are derived from a clear understanding of specific maintenance errors, their operational context and human factors components.

Kanki, Barbara G.↗

NASA NTRS1997

Operational Interventions to Maintenance Error

A significant proportion of aviation accidents and incidents are known to be tied to human error. However, research of flight operational errors has shown that so-called pilot error often involves a variety of human factors issues and not a simple lack of individual technical skills. In aircraft maintenance operations, there is similar concern that maintenance errors which may lead to incidents and accidents are related to a large variety of human factors issues. Although maintenance error data and research are limited, industry initiatives involving human factors training in maintenance have become increasingly accepted as one type of maintenance error intervention. Conscientious efforts have been made in re-inventing the team7 concept for maintenance operations and in tailoring programs to fit the needs of technical opeRAtions. Nevertheless, there remains a dual challenge: 1) to develop human factors interventions which are directly supported by reliable human error data, and 2) to integrate human factors concepts into the procedures and practices of everyday technical tasks. In this paper, we describe several varieties of human factors interventions and focus on two specific alternatives which target problems related to procedures and practices; namely, 1) structured on-the-job training and 2) procedure re-design. We hope to demonstrate that the key to leveraging the impact of these solutions comes from focused interventions; that is, interventions which are derived from a clear understanding of specific maintenance errors, their operational context and human factors components.

Kanki, Barbara G.↗

NASA NTRS1977

Helicopter sling load accident/incident survey: 1968 - 1974

During the period considered a mean of eleven accidents per year occurred and a mean of eleven persons were killed or seriously injured per year. Forty-one percent of the accidents occurred during hover, and 63 percent of the accidents had pilot error listed as a cause/factor. Many accidents involved pilots losing control of the helicopter or allowing a collision with obstructions to occur. There was a mean of 58 incidents each year and 51 percent of these occurred during cruise.

Shaughnessy, J. D.↗

NASA NTRS1990

BUBBLES: an Automated Decision Support System for Final Approach Controllers

With the assumptions that an explicit schedule exists for landings (and takeoffs) at each runway, that each aircraft has declared an IAS for final approach and will be obligated to fly it as accurately as possible, and that there is a continuous estimate of average windspeed on approach, the objective was to provide automated cues to assist controllers in the spacing of landing aircraft. The cues have two characteristics. First, they are adaptive to estimation errors in position and speed by the radar tracking process and piloting errors in the execution of turns and commanded speed reductions. Second, the cues are responsive to the desires of the human controller. Several diagrams are used to help explain the system.

Chi, Zhizang↗

NASA NTRS2000

Pilot Biofeedback Training in the Cognitive Awareness Training Study (CATS)

One of the ongoing problems that pilots face today is a diminished state of awareness such as boredom, sleepiness, or fatigue during cruise conditions that could result in various pilot errors. This study utilized a cognitive training exercise to sharpen the pilot's awareness during simulated flight thereby providing them with a means to overcome these diminished states of awareness. This study utilizes psychophysiological methods in an attempt to assess a pilot's state of awareness more directly. In turn, the pilots will be able to train themselves to recognize these states of awareness and be more mentally sharp during mundane tasks such as those experienced in cruise conditions. The use of these measurement tools may be beneficial for researchers working within the NASA Aviation Safety Program. This paper will provide the reader with some background information concerning the motivation for the study, a brief description of the experimental setup and design matrix, the dependent and independent variables that were employed, and some preliminary findings based on some of the subjective and objective data that was collected. These preliminary findings are of part of an ongoing study being conducted at the NASA Langley Research Center in Hampton, Virginia.

Uenking, M.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Lander Lighting Solution to Reduce Pilot & Autonomous Approach Errors

The south pole lighting environment will have harsh low inclination sunlight, making overhead judgement of surface features difficult. Autonomous solutions are great, however, the need for visual monitoring and independent go/no-go decisions remain. Our project proposes that lunar landing systems will be better served by including a powerful landing light system that improves visibility of surfaces from overhead by illuminating the ground at critical distances for the crew to make last minute decisions regarding an approach. The project utilized computer-based optical modeling software to predict requirements for a potential landing light system. The analysis based the lamp prediction from commercially available LED chip sets and lamp optics. The goal was to illustrate a method to raise the surface contrast of a landing site within an acceptable contrast threshold for most camera systems and human observers to recognize hazards that would not be noticed with low inclination sunlight alone. The Apollo lunar landings benefitted from overhead sun or dark conditions. The surface lighting at the Lunar South Pole is a harsh environment where surfaces are lit from a low inclination angle by the sun (from the side). This change in lighting condition precipitates a need for updated lunar landing systems that facilitate improved recognition of landing sites, and thereby increase pilot awareness of landing hazards. The reliance on LIDAR and other autonomous mechanisms alone is risky given the known usage of visual monitoring for operator concurrence on current spacecraft programs and present-day autonomous land-based vehicles. Visual monitoring via cameras or windows requires the surface contrast to be within 3 orders of magnitude for reasonable recognition of objects. Artificial overhead illumination, when sufficiently sized, provides a means to even out contrast problems created by low inclination sunlight, potentially reducing piloting errors. Current vehicle requirements do not specify this type of guidance for the purpose of increasing mission success. An optical ray-trace simulation model was developed in Zemax Optics Studio to predict the best combination of LED power, LED optics, lamp quantity, and lamp location to raise the surface contrast to within 2 orders of magnitude from 3 orders required to further increased visibility and reduce risk. The project considered the following design constraints: potential base diameter of lander, approach distance(s) for a go-no-go decision point (200 meter), solar inclination angle (2-7), lunar surface reflectance (10%), LED chip sets, LED focusing optics, LED power, lamp quantity, lamp locations, and illumination diameter of lunar surface landing zone. The results can be used to establish minimum design constraints for vehicle landing light systems. With a solar inclination angle ranging from 2-7 degrees, the horizontal illumination of the lunar surface is attenuated by about 10% when compared to overhead illumination from the Sun. This modifies the sun's maximum of 130,000 lux to 13,000 lux horizontal illuminance. The artificial lighting system was designed to provide an 18-meter-wide illumination zone, to create viewing clearances around a 6-meter-wide lander. The system provides an average illuminance of 300 lux, meeting the 2 orders of magnitude criteria. The solution utilized modern Chip On Board LEDs, that each utilized 17 watts, with focusing Total Internal Reflection (TIR) lenses. A lighting system of 300 LEDs was arrayed along the "bottom" of a “lander”. With 17 watts per LED, the system is estimated to require 5100 watts. This is a large amount of power, but it would only be needed during critical phases during the landing. LED lighting systems can be dimmed, and it is assumed that as the lander arrives closer to the landing site, the lighting system power can be adjusted as needed to produce the necessary surface illuminance. The designed reduction of contrast improves reliability of safety assessments using real time visible light camera systems and out the window viewing by the crew.

T A Clark↗

NASA NTRS1974

Turbulence flight director analysis and preliminary simulation

A control column and trottle flight director display system is synthesized for use during flight through severe turbulence. The column system is designed to minimize airspeed excursions without overdriving attitude. The throttle system is designed to augment the airspeed regulation and provide an indication of the trim thrust required for any desired flight path angle. Together they form an energy management system to provide harmonious display indications of current aircraft motions and required corrective action, minimize gust upset tendencies, minimize unsafe aircraft excursions, and maintain satisfactory ride qualities. A preliminary fixed-base piloted simulation verified the analysis and provided a shakedown for a more sophisticated moving-base simulation to be accomplished next. This preliminary simulation utilized a flight scenario concept combining piloting tasks, random turbulence, and discrete gusts to create a high but realistic pilot workload conducive to pilot error and potential upset. The turbulence director (energy management) system significantly reduced pilot workload and minimized unsafe aircraft excursions.

Johnson, D. E.↗

NASA NTRS1978

Single pilot IFR operating problems determined from accidental data analysis

The accident reports examined were restricted to instrument rated pilots flying in IFR weather. A brief examination was made of accidents which occurred during all phases of flight and which were due to all causes. A detailed examination was made of those accidents which involved a single pilot which occurred during the landing phases of flight, and were due to pilot error. Problem areas found include: (1) landing phase operations especially final approach, (2) pilot weather briefings, (3) night approaches in low IFR weather, (4) below minimum approaches, (5) aircraft icing, (6) imprecise navigation, (7) descending below minimum IFR altitudes, (8) fuel mismanagement, (9) pilot overconfidence, and (10) high pilot workload especially in twins. Some suggested areas of research included: (1) low cost deicing systems, (2) standardized navigation displays, (3) low cost low-altitude warning systems, (4) improved fuel management systems, (5) improved ATC communications, (6) more effective pilot training and experience acquisition methods, and (7) better weather data dissemination techniques.

Forsyth, D. L.↗

NASA NTRS1998

Flight Evaluation of Center-TRACON Automation System Trajectory Prediction Process

Two flight experiments (Phase 1 in October 1992 and Phase 2 in September 1994) were conducted to evaluate the accuracy of the Center-TRACON Automation System (CTAS) trajectory prediction process. The Transport Systems Research Vehicle (TSRV) Boeing 737 based at Langley Research Center flew 57 arrival trajectories that included cruise and descent segments; at the same time, descent clearance advisories from CTAS were followed. Actual trajectories of the airplane were compared with the trajectories predicted by the CTAS trajectory synthesis algorithms and airplane Flight Management System (FMS). Trajectory prediction accuracy was evaluated over several levels of cockpit automation that ranged from a conventional cockpit to performance-based FMS vertical navigation (VNAV). Error sources and their magnitudes were identified and measured from the flight data. The major source of error during these tests was found to be the predicted winds aloft used by CTAS. The most significant effect related to flight guidance was the cross-track and turn-overshoot errors associated with conventional VOR guidance. FMS lateral navigation (LNAV) guidance significantly reduced both the cross-track and turn-overshoot error. Pilot procedures and VNAV guidance were found to significantly reduce the vertical profile errors associated with atmospheric and airplane performance model errors.

Williams, David H.↗

NASA NTRS1999

Flight Test Results: CTAS Cruise/Descent Trajectory Prediction Accuracy for En route ATC Advisories

The Center/TRACON Automation System (CTAS), under development at NASA Ames Research Center, is designed to assist controllers with the management and control of air traffic transitioning to/from congested airspace. This paper focuses on the transition from the en route environment, to high-density terminal airspace, under a time-based arrival-metering constraint. Two flight tests were conducted at the Denver Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) to study trajectory-prediction accuracy, the key to accurate Decision Support Tool advisories such as conflict detection/resolution and fuel-efficient metering conformance. In collaboration with NASA Langley Research Center, these test were part of an overall effort to research systems and procedures for the integration of CTAS and flight management systems (FMS). The Langley Transport Systems Research Vehicle Boeing 737 airplane flew a combined total of 58 cruise-arrival trajectory runs while following CTAS clearance advisories. Actual trajectories of the airplane were compared to CTAS and FMS predictions to measure trajectory-prediction accuracy and identify the primary sources of error for both. The research airplane was used to evaluate several levels of cockpit automation ranging from conventional avionics to a performance-based vertical navigation (VNAV) FMS. Trajectory prediction accuracy was analyzed with respect to both ARTCC radar tracking and GPS-based aircraft measurements. This paper presents detailed results describing the trajectory accuracy and error sources. Although differences were found in both accuracy and error sources, CTAS accuracy was comparable to the FMS in terms of both meter-fix arrival-time performance (in support of metering) and 4D-trajectory prediction (key to conflict prediction). Overall arrival time errors (mean plus standard deviation) were measured to be approximately 24 seconds during the first flight test (23 runs) and 15 seconds during the second flight test (25 runs). The major source of error during these tests was found to be the predicted winds aloft used by CTAS. Position and velocity estimates of the airplane provided to CTAS by the ATC Host radar tracker were found to be a relatively insignificant error source for the trajectory conditions evaluated. Airplane performance modeling errors within CTAS were found to not significantly affect arrival time errors when the constrained descent procedures were used. The most significant effect related to the flight guidance was observed to be the cross-track and turn-overshoot errors associated with conventional VOR guidance. Lateral navigation (LNAV) guidance significantly reduced both the cross-track and turn-overshoot error. Pilot procedures and VNAV guidance were found to significantly reduce the vertical profile errors associated with atmospheric and aircraft performance model errors.

Green, S.↗

NASA NTRS1992

Lessons learned from an historical look at flight testing

A brief historical review of accidents was made to examine lessons learned in flight testing with major emphasis on human factors limitations. The results of this survey show undeniably that new aircraft and new pilots are not immune to old problems. Of three related human factors limitations, pilot skill frequently showed up as the primary factor responsible for accidents due to inadequate training (or proficiency) to handle an unexpected situation. A primary contributing factor was unsatisfactory aircraft handling qualities which increased pilot work load and therefore were less forgiving to 'pilot error,' particularly when flown in a stressful situation at the extremes of the flight envelope. Historically, pilot induced oscillation (PIO) has persisted as a major control problem particularly in first-flight operation. Deliberate errors involving a conscious decision to 'take a chance' by flying an aircraft with known deficiencies occurred more frequently in early times. Finally, inadvertent errors involving forgetfulness, indecision, and confusion are occurring more frequently with the current trend toward automated computerized controlled cockpits.

Seth B. Anderson↗

NASA NTRS1983

Single pilot IFR accident data analysis

The aircraft accident data recorded by the National Transportation and Safety Board (NTSR) for 1964-1979 were analyzed to determine what problems exist in the general aviation (GA) single pilot instrument flight rule (SPIFR) environment. A previous study conducted in 1978 for the years 1964-1975 provided a basis for comparison. This effort was generally limited to SPIFR pilot error landing phase accidents but includes some SPIFR takeoff and enroute accident analysis as well as some dual pilot IFR accident analysis for comparison. Analysis was performed for 554 accidents of which 39% (216) occurred during the years 1976-1979.

Harris, D. F.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Sitting in the Pilot's Seat; Optimizing Human-Systems Interfaces for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

One of the pilot-machine interfaces (the forward viewing camera display) for an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle called the DROID (Dryden Remotely Operated Integrated Drone) will be analyzed for optimization. The goal is to create a visual display for the pilot that as closely resembles an out-the-window view as possible. There are currently no standard guidelines for designing pilot-machine interfaces for UAVs. Typically, UAV camera views have a narrow field, which limits the situational awareness (SA) of the pilot. Also, at this time, pilot-UAV interfaces often use displays that have a diagonal length of around 20". Using a small display may result in a distorted and disproportional view for UAV pilots. Making use of a larger display and a camera lens with a wider field of view may minimize the occurrences of pilot error associated with the inability to see "out the window" as in a manned airplane. It is predicted that the pilot will have a less distorted view of the DROID s surroundings, quicker response times and more stable vehicle control. If the experimental results validate this concept, other UAV pilot-machine interfaces will be improved with this design methodology.

Queen, Steven M.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Chronic stress as a factor in aircraft mishaps

Naval aviation is an unusually stressful career because of the inherent demands of the work. Stress is recognized as a cause of mishaps which involve pilot error. A questionnaire was adapted from Rahe and Homes' list of stressful life events in order to determine the relationship between pilot behavioral, personality, and life change factors on the one hand and responsibility for accidents on the other. A number of factors regarding interpersonal relationships, changes in personal behavior, personality factors, and life changes were found to discriminate between pilots who were and were not at fault in accidents.

Alkov, Robert A.↗

NASA NTRS1995

"Oops, It didn't arm." - A Case Study of Two Automation Assisted Altitude Deviations

Altitude deviations are the most common pilot error reported to the Aviation Safety Reporting System. Last year, altitude deviations were reported to the ASRS at the rate of about one per hour. The reporting pilot's narrative is usually our only source of information about what happened in these incidents. In a recent line-oriented, simulator study, twenty-two airline crews flew a realistic, two-hour mission in a DC-9 and an MD-88 aircraft. This paper will describe and analyze two of the five altitude deviations that were observed during this study. The paper focuses on the flight crews' use (or misuse) of the autopilot and autothrottle during these incidents.

Plamer, Everett↗