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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2017

Milli-Watt Radioisotope Power to Enable Small, Long-Term Robotic “Probe” Space Exploration

Milli-watt Radioisotope Power Systems (RPS) based on Radioisotope Heater Units (RHUs) could be an ideal power source for certain spacecraft that cannot use solar power due to large distances from the sun, or other environmental constraints, and where they enable or significantly enhance the ability of a mission to meet its scientific or operational goals. Various modular, compact RHU-based thermoelectric (TE) generator concepts developed or derived from current NASA Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) projects satisfying this need have been investigated. These modular, compact and low mass power systems could support small, highly-mobile robotic exploration packages, and could be incorporated into different robotic package concepts, spacecraft or satellites. Current modular RPS design concepts with 40mW, 80mW and 120mW power levels use RHUs and Bi2Te3 TE converters. Skutterudites materials could be used in the future if new higher thermal energy output and higher temperature miniature heat sources were developed, for example, using technologies currently in the General Purpose Heat Source (GPHS) used in higher electric power output RTGs. Small (a.k.a., “mice-like”) robotic packages could effectively utilize these RHU-driven power levels to accommodate crawling, climbing, monitoring, taking measurements, and communicating during long-term planetary missions aimed at gathering environmental and geologic data (i.e., over multiple decades). Waste heat from the cold side of the TE converter could also be directed toward the electronics and / or energy storage (e.g. batteries) to keep them within design temperature ranges. In addition to power generation and electronics / battery heating, the RHU / TE configuration could be designed to survive an external 500°C bake out procedure for critical spacecraft sterilization, environmental certification and planetary protection. Analytical studies have been performed to optimize various design configurations for power, mass, volume and robotic mobility. Specific power (mW/kg) and volumetric specific power (mW/cm3) characteristics of various design configurations will be presented and key conceptual design tradeoffs will be discussed. Hot- and cold-side thermal interfaces required to meet power and mass goals and associated design sensitivities will also be discussed. RHU / TE systems must overcome critical design challenges to survive high-g loadings in some robotic applications and we will examine the mass impacts required to satisfy various dynamic loading environments up to 10,000 g’s. Power can be generated for a minimum of 30 years or more using plutonium-238 dioxide heat sources (given that Pu-238 has an 87.7 year half-life) with some reduction in power as the heat source naturally degrades.

Bahrami, Poyan↗
NASA NTRS2003

Planetary Protection Considerations for JIMO

Europa is the only body in the solar system besides Mars that is currently viewed as a body of significant interest relative to the process of chemical evolution and/or the origin of life or for which scientific opinion provides a significant chance of contamination which could jeopardize a future biological experiment. Thus, both NASA and COSPAR policy require that Europa be protected from biological contamination that could result from scientific exploration conducted by robotic spacecraft. In 2000, the Task Group on the Forward Contamination of Europa (Space Studies Board) published its report on Preventing the Forward Contamination of Europa recommending a limit of 10(exp -4) probability of contamination of Europa's ocean per mission (at any time in the future) by a single viable terrestrial microbe. While NASA guidelines do not yet explicitly reflect this new recommendation, it is likely that the SSB recommendation will be adopted by NASA planetary protection in the form of a sterility requirement or at least a stringent total microbial burden requirement. In our presentation, we will present an overview of the anticipated planetary protection requirements for both orbiters and landers destined for Europa and some of the challenges these requirements will present.

Koukol, R. C.↗
NASA NTRS2001

Mars Sample Handling Protocol Workshop Series: Workshop 2a (Sterilization)

The Space Studies Board of the National Research Council provided a series of recommendations to NASA on planetary protection requirements for future Mars sample return missions. One of the Board's key findings suggested, although current evidence of the martian surface suggests that life as we know it would not tolerate the planet's harsh environment, there remain 'plausible scenarios for extant microbial life on Mars.' Based on this conclusion, all samples returned from Mars should be considered potentially hazardous until it has been demonstrated that they are not. In response to the National Research Council's findings and recommendations, NASA has undertaken a series of workshops to address issues regarding NASA's proposed sample return missions. Work was previously undertaken at the Mars Sample Handling and Protocol Workshop 1 (March 2000) to formulate recommendations on effective methods for life detection and/or biohazard testing on returned samples. The NASA Planetary Protection Officer convened the Mars Sample Sterilization Workshop, the third in the Mars Sample Handling Protocol Workshop Series, on November 28-30, 2000 at the Holiday Inn Rosslyn Westpark, Arlington, Virginia. Because of the short timeframe between this Workshop and the second Workshop in the Series, which was convened in October 2000 in Bethesda, Maryland, they were developed in parallel, so the Sterilization Workshop and its report have therefore been designated as '2a'). The focus of Workshop 2a was to make recommendations for effective sterilization procedures for all phases of Mars sample return missions, and to answer the question of whether we can sterilize samples in such a way that the geological characteristics of the samples are not significantly altered.

Rummel, John D.↗
NASA NTRS2004

Forward Contamination of the Moon and Mars: Implications for Future Life Detection Missions

NASA and ESA have outlined new visions for solar system exploration that will include a series of lunar robotic missions to prepare for, and support a human return to the Moon, and future human exploration of Mars and other destinations. One of the guiding principles for exploration is to pursue compelling scientific questions about the origin and evolution of life. The search for life on objects such as Mars will require that all spacecraft and instrumentation be sufficiently cleaned and sterilized prior to launch to ensure that the scientific integrity of extraterrestrial samples is not jeopardized by terrestrial organic contamination. Under COSPAR's current planetary protection policy for the Moon, no sterilization procedures are required for outbound lunar spacecraft. Nonetheless, future in situ investigations of a variety of locations on the Moon by highly sensitive instruments designed to search for biologically derived organic compounds would help assess the contamination of the Moon by lunar spacecraft. These studies could also provide valuable "ground truth" data for Mars sample return missions and help define planetary protection requirements for future Mars bound spacecraft carrying life detection experiments. In addition, studies of the impact of terrestrial contamination of the lunar surface by the Apollo astronauts could provide valuable data to help refine future Mars surface exploration plans for a human mission to Mars.

Glavin, Daniel P.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Mars Technology Program: Planetary Protection Technology Development

This slide presentation reviews the development of Planetary Protection Technology in the Mars Technology Program. The goal of the program is to develop technologies that will enable NASA to build, launch, and operate a mission that has subsystems with different Planetary Protection (PP) classifications, specifically for operating a Category IVb-equivalent subsystem from a Category IVa platform. The IVa category of planetary protection requires bioburden reduction (i.e., no sterilization is required) The IVb category in addition to IVa requirements: (i.e., terminal sterilization of spacecraft is required). The differences between the categories are further reviewed.

Mars Technology Program↗
NASA NTRS1983

U.S. planetary protection program - Implementation highlights

The implementation of the United States planetary protection program, intended to prevent the contamination of the celestial bodies in the solar system during their exploration, in recent interplanetary projects is reviewed. The shift in planetary protection policy from that of absolute sterilization to a probabilistic approach is noted. Attention is then given to the use of microbiological assay, organic materials inventory, microbial burden reduction, contamination control, trajectory biasing and the analysis and identification of contaminating processes for purposed of planetary protection for the Pioneer 10 and 11, Viking and Voyager projects. The success of these measures, as demonstrated by the prevention of accidental planetary impact and the failure to detect terrestrial organisms by the Viking life detection experiments, is pointed out.

Barengoltz, J.↗
NASA NTRS2012

Planetary Protection Concerns During Pre-Launch Radioisotope Power System Final Integration Activities

The Advanced Stirling Radioisotope Generator (ASRG) is a next-generation radioisotope-based power system that is currently being developed as an alternative to the Multi-Mission Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (MMRTG). Power sources such as these may be needed for proposed missions to solar system planets and bodies that have challenging Planetary Protection (PP) requirements (e.g. Mars, Europa, Enceladus) that may support NASA s search for life, remnants of past life, and the precursors of life. One concern is that the heat from the ASRG could potentially create a region in which liquid water may occur. As advised by the NASA Planetary Protection Officer, when deploying an ASRG to Mars, the current COSPAR/NASA PP policy should be followed for Category IVc mission. Thus, sterilization processing of the ASRG to achieve bioburden reduction would be essential to meet the Planetary Protection requirements. Due to thermal constraints and associated low temperature limits of elements of the ASRG, vapor hydrogen peroxide (VHP) was suggested as a candidate alternative sterilization process to complement dry heat microbial reduction (DHMR) for the assembled ASRG. The following proposed sterilization plan for the ASRG anticipates a mission Category IVc level of cleanliness. This plan provides a scenario in which VHP is used as the final sterilization process. Keywords: Advanced Stirling Radioisotope Generator (ASRG), Planetary Protection (PP), Vapor hydrogen peroxide (VHP) sterilization.

Chen, Fei↗
NASA NTRS2006

The Validation of Vapor Phase Hydrogen Peroxide Microbial Reduction for Planetary Protection and a Proposed Vacuum Process Specification

The Jet Propulsion Laboratory, in conjunction with the NASA Planetary Protection Officer, has selected the vapor phase hydrogen peroxide sterilization process for continued development as a NASA approved sterilization technique for spacecraft subsystems and systems. The goal is to include this technique, with an appropriate specification, in NPR 8020.12C as a low temperature complementary technique to the dry heat sterilization process.To meet microbial reduction requirements for all Mars in-situ life detection and sample return missions, various planetary spacecraft subsystems will have to be exposed to a qualified sterilization process. This process could be the elevated temperature dry heat sterilization process (~115 C for 40 hours) which was used to sterilize the Viking lander spacecraft. However, with utilization of such elements as highly sophisticated electronics and sensors in modern spacecraft, this process presents significant materials challenges and is thus an undesirable bioburden reduction method to design engineers. The objective of this work is to introduce vapor hydrogen peroxide (VHP) as an alternative to dry heat microbial reduction to meet planetary protection requirements.The VHP process is widely used by the medical industry to sterilize surgical instruments and biomedical devices, but high doses of VHP may degrade the performance of flight hardware, or compromise material properties. Our goal for this study was to determine the minimum VHP process conditions to achieve microbial reduction levels acceptable for planetary protection.

planetary protection↗
NASA NTRS1996

Refinement of planetary protection policy for Mars missions

Under existing COSPAR policy adopted in 1984, missions to Mars (landers, probes, and some orbiters) are designated as Category IV missions. As such, the procedures for implementing planetary protection requirements could include trajectory biasing, cleanrooms, bioload reduction, sterilization of hardware, and bioshields. In 1992, a U.S. National Research Council study recommended that controls on forward contamination of Mars be tied to specific mission objectives. The report recommended that Mars landers with life detection instruments be subject to at least Viking-level sterilization procedures for bioload reduction, while spacecraft (including orbiters) without life detection instruments be subject to at least Viking-level pre-sterilization procedures for bioload reduction but need not be sterilized. In light of this, it is proposed that the current policy's Category IV and its planetary protection requirements be divided into two sub-categories as follows: Category IVa, for missions comprising landers and probes without life detection experiments, which will meet a specified bioburden limit for exposed surfaces, and Category IVb, for landers and probes with life detection experiments, which will require sterilization of landed systems. In addition, Category III orbiter mission specifications are expanded to be consistent with these recommendations.

NASA Discipline Exobiology↗
NASA NTRS1994

Revision to Planetary Protection Policy for Mars Missions

Under existing COSPAR policy adopted in 1984, missions to Mars (landers, probes, and some orbiters) are designated as Category IV missions. As such, the procedures for implementing planetary protection requirements could include trajectory biasing, cleanrooms, bioload reduction, sterilization of hardware, and bioshields, i. e. requirements could be similar to Viking. However, in 1992, a U. S. National Academy of Sciences study recommended that controls on forward contamination of Mars be tied to specific mission objectives. The report recommended that Mars landers with life detection instruments be subject to at least Viking-level sterilization procedures for bioload reduction, while spacecraft (including orbiters) without life detection instruments be subject to at least Viking-level pre sterilization procedures for bioload reduction but need not be sterilized. In light of this, it is proposed that the current policy's Category IV missions and their planetary protection requirements be divided into two subcategories as follows: Category IV A, for missions comprising landers and probes without life detection experiments and some orbiters, which will meet a specified bioburden limit for exposed surfaces; Category IV B, for landers and probes with life detection experiments, which will require complete system sterilization. For Category IV A missions, bioburden specifications will be proposed and implementing procedures discussed. A resolution will be proposed to modify the existing COSPAR policy to reflect these changes. Similar specifications, procedures, and resolution for Category IV B missions will be the subject of a later study.

DeVincenzi, D. L.↗
NASA NTRS2007

Detecting Life and Biology-Related Parameters on Mars

An integrated, miniaturized, low-power instrument capable of the detection and early characterization of microbial life in the soil of Mars is proposed. Based on the detection apd monitoring of on-going metabolism as being the surest evidence for extant life, the experiments will probe for chirality in metabolism, for circadian rhythm, and for photosynthesis. However, the instrument package will also be able to detect biosignatures and a variety of other physical and chemical parameters of the Martian surface that have significance for life. These include the presence and the physical state of water, the existence of an oxidant, the pH and the penetrability of the soil. Using the legacy of the 1976 Viking Labeled Release (LR) life detection experiment in conjunction with state-of-the-art laser diode spectral analysis, the instrument can be flown stand-alone, with or without a rover, or as part of an MSL-type mission. Sterility for experiment integrity and for planetary protection is provided.

Levin, Gilbet V.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Vapor Hydrogen Peroxide as Alternative to Dry Heat Microbial Reduction

The Jet Propulsion Laboratory, in conjunction with the NASA Planetary Protection Officer, has selected vapor phase hydrogen peroxide (VHP) sterilization process for continued development as a NASA approved sterilization technique for spacecraft subsystems and systems. The goal is to include this technique, with appropriate specification, in NPG8020.12C as a low temperature complementary technique to the dry heat sterilization process. A series of experiments were conducted in vacuum to determine VHP process parameters that provided significant reductions in spore viability while allowing survival of sufficient spores for statistically significant enumeration. With this knowledge of D values, sensible margins can be applied in a planetary protection specification. The outcome of this study provided an optimization of test sterilizer process conditions: VHP concentration, process duration, a process temperature range for which the worst case D value may be imposed, a process humidity range for which the worst case D value may be imposed, and robustness to selected spacecraft material substrates.

vapor hydrogen peroxide↗
NASA NTRS2010

In Situ Biological Contamination Studies of the Moon: Implications for Future Planetary Protection and Life Detection Missions

NASA and ESA have outlined visions for solar system exploration that will include a series of lunar robotic precursor missions to prepare for, and support a human return to the Moon, and future human exploration of Mars and other destinations. One of the guiding principles for exploration is to pursue compelling scientific questions about the origin and evolution of life. The search for life on objects such as Mars will require that all spacecraft and instrumentation be sufficiently cleaned and sterilized prior to launch to ensure that the scientific integrity of extraterrestrial samples is not jeopardized by terrestrial organic contamination. Under the Committee on Space Research's (COSPAR's) current planetary protection policy for the Moon, no sterilization procedures are required for outbound lunar spacecraft, nor is there yet a planetary protection category for human missions. Future in situ investigations of a variety of locations on the Moon by highly sensitive instruments designed to search for biologically derived organic compounds would help assess the contamination of the Moon by lunar spacecraft. These studies could also provide valuable "ground truth" data for Mars sample return missions and help define planetary protection requirements for future Mars bound spacecraft carrying life detection experiments. In addition, studies of the impact of terrestrial contamination of the lunar surface by the Apollo astronauts could provide valuable data to help refine future Mars surface exploration plans for a human mission to Mars.

Glavin, Daniel P.↗
NASA NTRS2010

In Situ Biological Contamination Studies of the Moon: Implications for Planetary Protection and Life Detection Missions

NASA and ESA have outlined visions for solar system exploration that will include a series of lunar robotic precursor missions to prepare for, and support a human return to the Moan, and future human exploration of Mars and other destinations, including possibly asteroids. One of the guiding principles for exploration is to pursue compelling scientific questions about the origin and evolution of life. The search for life on objects such as Mars will require careful operations, and that all systems be sufficiently cleaned and sterilized prior to launch to ensure that the scientific integrity of extraterrestrial samples is not jeopardized by terrestrial organic contamination. Under the Committee on Space Research's (COSPAR's) current planetary protection policy for the Moon, no sterilization procedures are required for outbound lunar spacecraft, nor is there a different planetary protection category for human missions, although preliminary C SPAR policy guidelines for human missions to Mars have been developed. Future in situ investigations of a variety of locations on the Moon by highly sensitive instruments designed to search for biologically derived organic compounds would help assess the contamination of the Moon by lunar spacecraft. These studies could also provide valuable "ground truth" data for Mars sample return missions and help define planetary protection requirements for future Mars bound spacecraft carrying life detection experiments. In addition, studies of the impact of terrestrial contamination of the lunar surface by the Apollo astronauts could provide valuable data to help refine future: Mars surface exploration plans for a human mission to Mars.

Glavin, Daniel P.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Electronic Parts and Spacecraft Reliability : Considerations for Planetary Protection

If considered from the beginning of design, its easier to incorporate approaches to meet planetary protection requirements Parts, materials and approaches are available to meet sterilization requirements. Cost impact is highly dependent on: (1) Level of PP requirements imposed, (2) Design (a) New or existing (b) Parts classification (c) Number of sensors (d) Calibration/alignment requirements

design process↗
NASA NTRS2005

Keeping the Air Clean and Safe: An Anthrax Smoke Detector

Scientists at work in the Planetary Protection division at NASA s Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) sterilize everything before blasting it to the Red Planet. They take great pains to ensure that all spacecraft are void of bacterial life, especially the microscopic bacteria that can live hundreds of years in their spore states. No one is quite sure what Earthly germs would do on Mars, but scientists agree that it is safest to keep the Martian terrain as undisturbed as possible. Errant Earth germs would also render useless the instruments placed on exploration rovers to look for signs of life, as the life that they registered would be life that came with them from Earth. A team at JPL, headed by Dr. Adrian Ponce, developed a bacterial spore-detection system that uses a simple and robust chemical reaction that visually alerts Planetary Protection crews. It is a simple air filter that traps micron-sized bacterial spores and then submits them to the chemical reaction. When the solution is then viewed under an ultraviolet light, the mixture will glow green if it is contaminated by bacteria. Scientists can then return to the scrubbing and cleaning stages of the sterilization process to remove these harmful bacteria. The detection system is the space-bound equivalent of having your hands checked for cleanliness before being allowed to the table; and although intended to keep terrestrial germs from space, this technology has awesome applications here on Mother Earth. The bacterial spore-detection unit can recognize anthrax and other harmful, spore-forming bacteria and alert people of the impending danger. As evidenced in the anthrax mailings of fall 2001 in the United States, the first sign of anthrax exposure was when people experienced flu-like symptoms, which unfortunately, can take as much as a week to develop after contamination. Anthrax cost 5 people their lives and infected 19 others; and the threat of bioterrorism became a routine concern, with new threats popping up nearly everyday. The attacks threatened the safety that so many Americans took for granted, as the very air that people breathed became suspect. Any building with a circulation system, where large groups congregate, was now a potential target.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2010

Planetary Protection Considerations for Life Support and Habitation Systems

Life support systems for future human missions beyond low Earth orbit may include a combination of existing hardware components and advanced technologies. Discipline areas for technology development include atmosphere revitalization, water recovery, solid waste management, crew accommodations, food production, thermal systems, environmental monitoring, fire protection and radiation protection. Life support systems will be influenced by in situ resource utilization (ISRU), crew mobility and the degree of extravehicular activity. Planetary protection represents an additional set of requirements that technology developers have generally not considered. Planetary protection guidelines will affect the kind of operations, processes, and functions that can take place during future exploration missions, including venting and discharge of liquids and solids, ejection of wastes, use of ISRU, requirements for cabin atmospheric trace contaminant concentrations, cabin leakage and restrictions on what materials, organisms, and technologies that may be brought on missions. Compliance with planetary protection requirements may drive development of new capabilities or processes (e.g. in situ sterilization, waste containment, contaminant measurement) and limit or prohibit certain kinds of operations or processes (e.g. unfiltered venting). Ultimately, there will be an effect on mission costs, including the mission trade space. Planetary protection requirements need to be considered early in technology development programs. It is expected that planetary protection will have a major impact on technology selection for future missions.

Barta, Daniel J.↗