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This presentation will be shared at the "Securing Solar for the Grid (S2G)" workshop at RE+ 2023. It provides an overview of the work INL and Sandia have done to develop CyberStrike STORMCLOUD, a training program was designed to enhance the ability of renewable energy and operators to prepare for a cyber incident impacting industrial control systems with specific considerations of the architectures and limitations of renewable energy.
As more variable renewable energy sources are added to the grid, the role of hydropower as a reliable baseline and firming resource is growing more critical. However, the U.S hydropower fleet is not fully prepared to face modern issues such as cybersecurity threats. Hydropower accounts for 37% of U.S. utility-scale renewable electricity but is challenged by diverse infrastructure and legacy devices that predate modern security practices. While new cybersecurity solutions cannot simply be added to current hydropower generation and operation technologies, custom cybersecurity assessments can reveal system-specific threats and risk probabilities and identify mitigating enhancements.
The emergence of distributed energy resources (DERs) has transformed the electric power sector and will likely have even more profound impacts on the future evolution of the United States energy sector as it modernizes and becomes more reliant upon complex informatics programming and systems to ensure that our power grid remains safe from malicious interference. To mitigate risks associated with the increased and diversified use of DERs, the Distributed Energy Resource Cybersecurity Framework (DER-CF) was developed in 2019. The National Renewable Energy Laboratory extended the scope of the DER-CF to include the RMF. To address the challenges faced by federal energy managers and energy system stakeholders in applying the RMF to DER systems, the Distributed Energy Resource Risk Manager (DER-RM) is a six-step process to proactively manage cybersecurity risk in a methodical manner. The DER-RM is independent of the DER-CF's existing assessment, allowing users to focus specifically on the RMF steps. The tools are targeted to different processes - DER-CF enables organizations to perform self-assessments to improve their cybersecurity posture, while DER-RM assists organizations in achieving compliance with specific requirements. This document provides an overview of the DER-RM. The RMF process outlined in this report serves as a guide to diagnose information and operational system threats, gather required materials to comply with industry standards, and document plans for achieving Authority to Operate. Using the DER-RM, federal agencies and other organizations can easily and intuitively follow the RMF process, manage the risks to their grid-edge infrastructure through the integration of their on-site DERs, and comply with appropriate requirements.
Managing the digitalization of increasingly diversity energy resources is a complex challenge for energy systems planners and managers. As the penetration of solar photovoltaics (PV) and other distributed renewable energy resources (DERs) expands, distributed energy resource management systems (DERMS) will play an increasingly important role in managing, monitoring, and controlling DERs as electric systems before more distributed, interconnected, and networked. However, the cybersecurity implications of DERMS deployments are not well understood today. A lack of understanding around the cybersecurity implications of DERMS deployments and variability in the security posture of DERMS vendors, owners, and operators could introduce new security risks to evolving electric power systems. This paper describes cybersecurity attack scenarios on DERMS, identifies related cybersecurity standards and guidelines, reviews the security features of state-of-the-art DERMS solutions, and offers cybersecurity guidance for DERMS vendors, owners, and operators to protect DERMS' unique capabilities. Standardizing cybersecurity requirements for DERMS could help improve the security of DERMS integrations and improve innovations that are more secure by design. The cybersecurity guidance found in this paper is intended to offer a unified approach and lay the foundation for future standardization of DERMS cybersecurity to reduce risk to the solar industry and other renewable energy stakeholders when integrating these technologies with electric power systems.
As more variable renewable energy sources are added to the grid, the critical role of hydropower as a reliable baseline and firming resource is rapidly growing. However, the U.S hydropower fleet is not fully prepared to face modern issues such as cybersecurity threats. Hydropower accounts for 37% of U.S. utility-scale renewable electricity but is challenged by diverse infrastructure and legacy devices that predate modern security practices. While new cybersecurity solutions cannot simply be added to current hydropower generation and operation technologies, custom cybersecurity assessments can reveal system-specific threats and risk probabilities and identify mitigating enhancements.
The South Texas Industrial Assessment Center (ST-IAC) provides small to mid-size manufacturing companies and water treatment plants in the Rio Grande Valley of Texas, free energy assessments to help them reduce costs and stay competitive for sustainable development. The ST-IAC operates within the University of Texas Rio Grande Valley (UTRGV), and is the largest Hispanic-serving IAC in the U.S. Created in 2016, the ST-IAC, situated in the most economically disadvantaged region in the country, has been successful in training students and assessing local industries served by a predominantly Hispanic population. UTRGV, now the second largest Hispanic Serving Institution (HSI) of higher education in the U.S., has a student population of 32,000, of which 90% is Hispanic. While Covid-19 had a negative impact to our program during Budget Periods (BP) 4 and 5, the center still managed to provide opportunities for individuals, manufacturing and water industries in the local region. The program developed an energy engineering program in the region and further advanced national priorities. Those include resilience and sustainability of operations by implementing energy efficiency processes, renewable energy sources, decarbonization, battery storage, and cybersecurity in south Texas.
In an effort to strengthen the cybersecurity posture for federal agencies and reduce the time and complexities of following the Risk Management Framework (RMF) six-step process, the National Renewable Energy Laboratory has dedicated research into expanding the existing Distributed Energy Resources Cybersecurity Framework to provide functionality that aids in the RMF steps. Users will have the opportunity to learn, document, and review the framework, saving time and resources. Existing functionality within the web application will continue to be available with added features for usability.
The secure integration and management of distributed energy resources (DER) and power aggregators in the electric grid requires secure communications and a physics-aware Command and Control (C2) strategy. A Blockchain (BC)-based overlay network was developed to provide a security layer for the existing power grid network that mitigates risks in current and legacy network and C2 protocols. By integrating a Model-Assisted Machine Learning (MAML) framework with a Secure Blockchain Overlay Network (SBON) a defense-in-depth strategy was achieved. In our approach, the MAML framework leveraged a smart contract framework to gather network data and learn the dynamics of DER to develop detection strategies for attacks targeting sensors and actuators used by DER. The MAML framework learned dynamical systems models for individual DERs to detect sensor attacks. For DER we utilized a Digital Twin (DT) to accelerate the learning process for a model resistant to stealthy attacks. The project created DT for PV inverters and BESS. The DTs were coupled with a model-assisted, data-driven learning of DER behavior. Specifically, we evaluated architectures for model-based learning with model-free fine-tuning. Additionally, differential privacy techniques were used to obfuscate data, while still allowing the computation of attack detection results based on obfuscated data. The SBON developed leverages a private permissioned blockchain network orchestrated with the Hyperledger Fabric framework. To connect the cyber world, which orchestrates the blockchain fabric, and the physical world where the power network resides, we developed a system implementation to enable the secure interaction of the physical world and the abstracted blockchain.
Presentation assessing the DER Cybersecurity Standards Landscape.
This presentation on Modernizing and Securing the Grid brought together regional and NREL cybersecurity expertise for USAID's Caribbean Energy Sector Cybersecurity Forum. The presentation's overall purpose was to provide a deep dive into the changes underway in the electric grid, including the greater integration of renewables and distributed energy resources. The presentation also reviewed best practices for building cybersecurity into modern energy systems, including in the areas of vendor assessment and supply chain cybersecurity.
This analysis compares how the existing critical infrastructure continues to be vulnerable and with smart grid technologies being implemented exposes IES, power systems, the grid, and renewable energy in new ways. Continued work in cybersecurity will thwart efforts against adversaries having an opportunity to penetrate these systems.
Hydropower remains one of the strongest forms of renewable energy generation methods. It is crucial to address the increasing risks associated with the rapid digitization. The push towards decarbonization also factors in the need to ensure security and resilience for grid-connected renewable energy resources. This report summarizes the U.S. Department of Energy's Water Power Technologies Office's effort to develop a cybersecurity valuation methodology that assists hydropower stakeholders in assessing risks associated with plan operations and gathers valuation guidance through a web-based application. The Hydropower Cybersecurity Value-at-Risk Framework delivers a platform for industry members to perform self-assessments and make informed decisions on their cybersecurity investments.
Hydropower remains one of the strongest forms of renewable energy generation methods. It is crucial to address the increasing risks associated with the rapid digitization. The push towards decarbonization also factors in the need to ensure security and resilience for grid-connected renewable energy resources. This report summarizes the U.S. Department of Energy's Water Power Technologies Office's effort to develop a cybersecurity valuation methodology that assists hydropower stakeholders in assessing risks associated with plan operations and gathers valuation guidance through a web-based applicaiton. The Hydropower Cybersecurity Value-at-Risk Framework delivers a platform for industry members to perform self assessments and make informed decisions on their cybersecurity investments.
For facilities with distributed energy resources (DERs), cybersecurity must be considered holistically, across system architectures and down to individual components. It's hard to know where to start. That's why the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) has developed an assessment tool for organizations with DERs to understand and improve their cybersecurity. With support from the U.S. Department of Energy's Federal Energy Management Program, the Distributed Energy Resource Cybersecurity Framework (DER-CF) provides a holistic evaluation of a facility's DER cybersecurity and makes customized recommendations that follow widely recognized best practices for cybersecurity. The DER-CF is available at no cost as an interactive web tool (dercf.nrel.gov).
Curtailment, or blanket curtailment, is a leading method to mitigate the impacts to bats from operating wind turbines. Although this strategy results in considerable decreases in bat fatalities, it also results in decreased energy production. In 2019, Natural Power was awarded funding by the Department of Energy to assess the readiness of the informed smart curtailment technology, EchoSense (formerly referred to as Detection and Active Response Curtailment, [DARC]). The research undertaken by this project expands the understanding of alternative methods, known as smart curtailment, to maintain a reduction in bat fatalities while simultaneously recovering lost energy associated with blanket curtailment. The overall project was composed of three major tasks; Task 1 was focused on cybersecurity compliance of the EchoSense system in accordance with the North American Electric Reliability Corporation Critical Infrastructure Protection (“NERC CIP”) standards, Task 2 assessed the mechanical loads exerted on turbines when operating under a smart curtailment regime, and Task 3 assessed the efficacy of the EchoSense system at an operational wind farm. Regarding Task 1, an external review by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory determined that the EchoSense system did not create any new cybersecurity weaknesses and was compliant with the NERC CIP standards. As a result of this process, Natural Power developed some best practices (10.1) for wind- wildlife technology developers. In conjunction with the National Renewable Energy Laboratory, the results (10.2) of the loads testing demonstrated that the periodic curtailment and release of turbines by the EchoSense system did not have any detrimental impact on the mechanical components of a wind turbine (Task 2). During the late summer to fall of 2020 and 2021, Natural Power demonstrated that the use of the EchoSense smart curtailment system resulted in no significant difference in bat fatalities compared to blanket curtailment with cut-in speeds at 6.9 m/s (2020) and 5.0 m/s (2021) while resulting in a significant difference in decreased lost energy (Task 3). This translates to an average of 41% (2020) and 56% (2021) reduction in per turbine energy loss compared to blanket curtailment. The reduction in energy loss that would have been achieved by EchoSense curtailment compared to blanket curtailment, if applied across all 69 turbines, is roughly equivalent to having an additional turbine on site. These results are notable for finding a balance between the environmental impact of wind energy and the economic feasibility in energy production associated with mitigating that impact. https://www.naturalpower.com/us/expertise/service/engineering-operations/echosense
During the next three years, wind power generation is expected to add more generation capacity to the national electrical grid than any other energy sector. With new wind turbine designs rated power over 10 MW and wind farms reaching over 1 GW capacities, the consequences of cyber-attacks on wind power generation are becoming increasingly more critical. Moreover, the known vulnerabilities of wind turbine control systems and the potential damaging effects of intrusions, motivate an urgent protection improvement for the wind power generation sector. This program has developed a variety of new adaptive defense technologies that enable wind power generation systems to survive sophisticated cyberattacks by enhancing the control systems capabilities of detection, localization, and accommodation. The introduction of these technologies in the on-shore and the emerging off-shore market will result in a significantly more reliable and secure wind power infrastructure.
This is the final technical report for the SETO-funded project Securing Solar for the Grid (S2G) from FY22-24. The project scope included development and dissemination of standards' requirements, best practices, equipment testing procedures, assessment tools, as well as education and training materials for cyber defense, posture and maturity tailored to solar technologies. The outcomes for this work include: co-led the development of cybersecurity certification standard (UL2941), co-led the development of cybersecurity guide (IEEE1547.3), development of recommendations for supply chain cybersecurity, and development of cybersecurity risk profiles and recommendations for DERMS.
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER), and Office of Electricity (OE) commissioned the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) to develop a method and tool to enable electric utilities to understand and manage the risk of cybersecurity events that can lead to physical effects like blackouts. This tool, called Cyber100 Compass, uses cybersecurity data elicited from cybersecurity experts, then incorporates that data into a tool designed to be usable by cybersecurity non-experts who understand the system itself. The tool estimates dollar-valued risks for a current or postulated future electric power digital control configuration, in order to enable utility risk planners to prioritize among proposed cybersecurity risk mitigation options. With the development of the Cyber100 Compass tool for quantification of future cyber-physical security risks, NREL has taken an initial bold step in the direction of enabling and indeed encouraging electric utilities to address the potential for cybersecurity incidents to produce detrimental physical effects related to electric power delivery. As part of the Cyber100 Compass development process, DOE funded NREL to seek out an independent technical review of the risk methodology embodied in the tool. NREL requested this review from Sandia National Laboratories, and made available to Sandia a very late version of the project report, as well as NREL personnel to provide clarification and to respond to questions. This paper provides the result of the independent review activity.