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DOE OSTI2020

Flammable Gas Generation and Control at the Idaho Completion Project Legacy Combustible Gas Generation - 20191

On April 11, 2018, four drums containing transuranic waste at the Idaho National Laboratory underwent over-pressurization, ejecting their lids and spreading radiological waste within a facility. An investigation has found that waste in the drums generated methane gas, which contributed to the event. Subsequent to the investigation, the potential for drums to have methane and other flammable analytes whose concentrations could approach or exceed the lower flammability limit (LFL) and the adequacy of the controls to prevent or mitigate a possible deflagration was evaluated. An extensive review of the historical records was performed to determine how many drums exceed the LFL. The historical record identified a small quantity of drums that exceeded the LFL for xylene, hydrogen, and methane. The primary codified applicable code or standard for handling drums is 29 CFR 1910.120 (j) 'Handling Drums and Containers.' It is used throughout the commercial and government sector. This code is integrated throughout the Fluor Idaho safety management programs and procedures to control the Standard Industrial Hazards (SIHs) associated with drum and container handling. Example requirements include: - Drums and containers are inspected, and their integrity assured prior to being moved. - Site operations are organized to minimize the amount of drum or container movement. - When there is a reasonable possibility of flammable atmospheres being present, material handling equipment and hand tools are of the type to prevent sources of ignition. Drums and containers under pressure, as evidenced by bulging or swelling, are not moved until the cause for excess pressure is determined and appropriate containment procedures have been implemented to protect employees from explosive relief of the drum. Drums which exceed the WIPP FGA limit have NCRs associated with them. Once a drum fails flammable gas sampling, an NCR is initiated. The NCR drives placement into NCR dense pack rows. A standing order drives placement of the FGA failures to a single planer segregation location. These drums are not allowed for further processing or shipment until the NCR has been cleared. Once in the single planer rows, follow-up FGA testing is performed by CCP. The NCR is dispositioned by follow-up sampling occurring after adequate time has been provided for the gas to diffuse through the filter assembly, or, in some cases, the drums are repackaged into additional drums to reduce the source term. To date, the ICP project has performed approximately 1.5 million drums moves without a deflagration event due to combustible gas generation. Flammable gas generation in a transuranic waste drum is not unique to the ICP but is common across the DOE complex. Based on the experience at Idaho, application of industry standards is sufficient to control the risk of drum deflagration due to drum movements. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2023

Risk Analysis of Various Design Architectures for High Safety-significant Safety-related Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems of Nuclear Power Plants during Accident Scenarios

This report documents the plus-up activities performed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) during Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program, Risk Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway, digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) risk assessment project. In FY 2019, the RISA Pathway initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a strong technical basis to support effective, licensable, and secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades/designs. An integrated risk assessment technology for the DI&C systems was proposed for this strategy, which aims to (1) provide a best-estimate, risk-informed capability to quantitatively and accurately estimate the safety margin obtained from plant modernization, especially for the high safety-significant safety-related (HSSSR) DI&C systems, (2) support and supplement existing advanced risk-informed DI&C design guides by providing quantitative risk information and evidence, (3) offer a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems to support system design decisions and diversity and redundancy applications, (4) assure the long-term safety and reliability of HSSSR DI&C systems, and (5) reduce uncertainty in costs and support integration of DI&C systems in the plant. To achieve these technical goals and deal with the expensive licensing justifications from regulatory insights, the LWRS-developed framework instructs nuclear vendors and utilities on how to effectively lower the costs associated with digital compliance and speed industry advances by: (1) defining an integrated risk-informed analysis process for DI&C upgrade, including hazard analysis, reliability analysis, and consequence analysis, (2) applying systematic and risk-informed tools to address common cause failures (CCFs) and quantify corresponding failure probabilities for DI&C technologies, particularly software CCFs, (3) evaluating the impact of digital failures at the component level, system level, and plant level, and (4) providing insights and suggestions on designs to manage the risks, thus to support the development, licensing, and deployment of advanced DI&C technologies on nuclear power plant (NPPs). Adding diversity within system or components is the main means to eliminate and mitigate CCFs, but diversity also increases plant complexity and errors and may not address all sources of systematic failures. How to optimize the diversity and redundancy applications for the safety-critical DI&C systems remains a challenge. To deal with the technical issues in addressing potential software CCFs in HSSSR DI&C systems of NPPs and supporting relevant design optimization, the framework provides: ? An integrated best-estimate, risk-informed capability to address new technical digital issues quantitatively, accurately, and efficiently in plan modernization progress, such as software CCFs in HSSSR DI&C systems of NPPs ? A common and a modularized platform for DI&C designers, software developers, cybersecurity analysts, and plant engineers to efficiently predict and prevent risk in the early design stage of DI&C systems ? Technical bases and risk-informed insights to assist U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and industry to address and fulfill the risk-informed alternatives for evaluation of CCFs in HSSSR DI&C systems of NPPs ? An integrated risk-informed tool that offers a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems to support system design decisions in diversity and redundancy applications. The plus-up research and development efforts of this project in FY 2022 are focused on methodology improvement of software CCF modeling and estimation, prevention analysis, importance analysis and risk analysis of various design architectures of HSSSR DI&C systems. This work greatly enhances the capability of the LWRS-developed framework for the risk assessment and design optimization of safety-critical DI&C systems. It should be noted that all the analyses are performed for the demonstration of the LWRS-developed framework, not for the evaluation of relevant systems. Results are obtained based on very limited design information and testing data.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2022

Developing solid-surface plasma facing components for pilot plants and reactors with replenishable wall claddings and continuous surface conditioning. Part A: concepts and questions

Abstract It is estimated that pilot plants and reactors may experience rates of net erosion and deposition of solid plasma facing component (PFC) material of 10 3 –10 5 kg yr −1 . Even if the net erosion (wear) problem can be solved, the redeposition of so much material has the potential for major interference with operation, including disruptions due to so-called ‘unidentified flying objects (UFOs)’ and unsafe dust levels. The potential implications appear to be no less serious than for plasma contact with the divertor target: a dust explosion or a major UFO-disruption could be as damaging for an actively-cooled deuterium-tritium (DT) tokamak as target failure. It will therefore be necessary to manage material deposits to prevent their fouling operation. This situation appears to require a fundamental paradigm shift with regard to meeting the challenge of taming the plasma–material interface: it appears that any acceptable solid PFC material will in effect be flow-through , like liquid–metal PFCs, although at far lower mass flow rates. Solid PFC material will have to be treated as a consumable , like brake pads in cars. ITER will use high-Z (tungsten) armor on the divertor targets and low-Z (beryllium) on the main walls. The ARIES-AT reactor design calls for a similar arrangement, but with SiC cladding on the main walls. Non-metallic low-Z refractory materials such as ceramics (graphite, SiC, etc) used as in situ replenishable, relatively thin—of order mm—claddings on a substrate which is resistant to neutron damage could provide a potential solution for the main walls, while reducing the risk of degrading the confined plasma. Separately, wall conditioning has proven essential for achieving high performance. For DT devices, however, standard methods appear to be unworkable, but recently powder droppers injecting low-Z material ∼continuously into discharges have been quite effective and may be usable in DT devices as well. The resulting massive generation of low-Z debris, however, has the same potential to seriously disrupt operation as noted above. Powder droppers provide a unique opportunity to carry out controlled studies on the management of low-Z slag in all current tokamaks, independent of whether their protection tiles use low-Z or high-Z material.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

DOE OSTI2020

Mechanical Properties of Permanent Foaming Fixatives for Deactivation and Decommissioning Activities

DOE-EM have identified an operational requirement for a fixative that can immobilize and/or encapsulate residual contamination in 3D void volumes (pipes, gloveboxes, waste containers, etc.) during D and D activities. Failure to safely and effectively immobilize residual contamination can: Put workers at risk, Contaminate the public and environment, Drive up operational costs. Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) polyurethane (PU) foams is one possible solution and is currently being investigated in collaboration with Savannah River National Lab (SRNL). Mechanical property testing will dictate how well PU foams can withstand physical stressors outlined in safety documents while immobilizing residual contamination. Results can provide a performance criteria for Section 5 of ASTM E3191: Standard Specification for Permanent Foaming Fixatives Used to Mitigate Spread of Radioactive Contamination. Polyurethanes consists of repeating units of urethanes which are produced from an exothermic reaction between a polyol (an alcohol with two or more hydroxyl groups in a molecule) and an isocyanate [2]. PUs consists of 3D cells that are formed by a blowing agent which is normally water. Water interacting with the isocyanate creates carbon dioxide and urea which contributes to cells' growth and expansion. The cross-linking between the polyol and isocyanate solidify the cell faces and walls. Micro scale properties that can influence mechanical properties include: Relative density (ratio between density of cellular material and density of the solid of which the cell walls are made of). Cells connectivity between edges and faces, and number of cells contact neighbors [3]. Whether a foam is open-celled or closed-celled. Closed-celled foams have a thin membrane that encloses each cell which can contribute to the stiffness of the foam. Incorporating fillers in the PU matrix like carbon-based nanoparticles in the form of expandable graphite (EG) can increase the thermal and mechanical performance [4]. When exposed to heat, EG produces a char layer that prevents heat and oxygen transfer which is known as intumescing. Mechanical performance is dependent on amount of EG loading since the cell sizes are linearly dependent on it. Overall, the rigid foams (I-R2) proved superior. SEM Analysis: I-R2 had the most consistent spherical sizes (average cell diameter: 489 μm), which enhance the relative density the most [5]. Tensile Testing Results: I-R2 experienced the largest breaking load (103.65 lbf) and stress (289.42 psi). I-R2 also had a higher Young's Modulus compared to R1 (2.99 ksi to 2.09 ksi). Compression Testing Results: I-R2 had the highest stress at 80% deflection (360.67 psi), load (1387.48 lbf) and modulus (3.92 ksi)

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