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NASA NTRS2001

Quantitative risk assessment system (QRAS)

A quantitative risk assessment system (QRAS) builds a risk model of a system for which risk of failure is being assessed, then analyzes the risk of the system corresponding to the risk model. The QRAS performs sensitivity analysis of the risk model by altering fundamental components and quantifications built into the risk model, then re-analyzes the risk of the system using the modifications. More particularly, the risk model is built by building a hierarchy, creating a mission timeline, quantifying failure modes, and building/editing event sequence diagrams. Multiplicities, dependencies, and redundancies of the system are included in the risk model. For analysis runs, a fixed baseline is first constructed and stored. This baseline contains the lowest level scenarios, preserved in event tree structure. The analysis runs, at any level of the hierarchy and below, access this baseline for risk quantitative computation as well as ranking of particular risks. A standalone Tool Box capability exists, allowing the user to store application programs within QRAS.

Weinstock, Robert M↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Soyuz Landing Risk Characterization

INTRODUCTION United States On-orbit Segment (USOS) astronauts have been returning to Earth from the International Space Station (ISS) aboard the Russian Soyuz vehicle since 2003. The energetics associated with Soyuz landings are comparable to our next generation of US space vehicles (Orion, Crew Dragon, and Starliner). Soyuz also lands crew in a similar state of spaceflight deconditioning that is anticipated using the future vehicles. A number of injuries have now been observed during these Soyuz landings. Currently it is unknown how Soyuz landing accelerations and the numbers and types of associated injuries relate to the new occupant protection requirements levied upon future space vehicles. Understanding this relationship will allow better quantification of the risk of injury for future spacecraft designs. METHODS An estimate of the occurrences of injury during Soyuz landings has been determined using data contained in NASA flight medicine databases and supplemented with data collected from crewmembers and flight surgeons. At the time of this abstract, 96 USOS astronauts have returned to Earth in the Soyuz (59 US, 31 International Partner, and 6 spaceflight participants). Of that total, data from 80 individual crew landings has been collected through this study. Injuries are classified as either contusions/abrasions, Class I (minor, no medical follow-up), Class II (moderate, medical follow-up necessary), Class III (severe), and Class IV (life threatening). Current NASA occupant protection standards are primarily based on the Multi-axial Dynamic Response Index (MDRI), which is a simple lumped-parameter spring, mass, damper model tuned to human impact responses in three orthogonal axes. RESULTS Using what is known about Soyuz landing dynamics from airborne and drop test data, the MDRI predicts essentially no Class IV or III injuries, < 1% Class II injuries, and < 5% Class I injuries. Approximately one-third of all USOS crewmembers for whom data has been gathered have suffered some sort of injury related to landing in the Soyuz vehicle. Most of these injuries fall into the contusion/abrasion category (21.3 %). Class I injuries have been sustained by 5.0% of all crew, and Class II injuries have been observed in 3.8%. No Class III or IV injuries have been sustained to date. Forty-three injuries have been documented, with some crewmembers sustaining more than one injury in a single landing. The knee was the most likely area of injury (n=9), followed by the back (n=8), and then the arm (n=7). CONCLUSION Soyuz landing dynamics are the most comparable analog environment for the anticipated loads associated with Orion and commercial crew vehicle landings. The MDRI under predicts the percentage of Class II injuries experienced during Soyuz landings. The MDRI is better at predicting Class I injury occurrences. However, if contusions/abrasions are included in the minor injury Class I category, then the MDRI also vastly under predicts those injuries as well. Given this data, it will be important to re-evaluate the expected injury rates for future vehicles, and work toward improving the predictive tools for spaceflight use. Spaceflight deconditioning may account for some of the under prediction, and work is ongoing to assess the relationship between landing injuries and impact tolerance changes due to spaceflight deconditioning.

N Newby↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Soyuz Landing Risk Characterization

INTRODUCTION United States On-orbit Segment (USOS) astronauts have been returning to Earth from the International Space Station (ISS) aboard the Russian Soyuz vehicle since 2003. The energetics associated with Soyuz landings are comparable to our next generation of US space vehicles (Orion, Crew Dragon, and Starliner). Soyuz also lands crew in a similar state of spaceflight deconditioning that is anticipated using the future vehicles. A number of injuries have now been observed during these Soyuz landings. Currently it is unknown how Soyuz landing accelerations and the numbers and types of associated injuries relate to the new occupant protection requirements levied upon future space vehicles. Understanding this relationship will allow better quantification of the risk of injury for future spacecraft designs. METHODS An estimate of injury occurrence during Soyuz landings has been determined using data contained in NASA flight medicine databases and supplemented with data collected from crewmembers and flight surgeons. At the time of this abstract, 96 USOS astronauts have returned to Earth in the Soyuz (59 US, 31 International Partner, and 6 spaceflight participants). Of that total, data from 80 individual crew landings has been collected through this study as of 2021. Injuries are classified either as contusions/abrasions, Class I (minor, no medical follow-up), Class II (moderate, medical follow-up necessary), Class III (severe), or Class IV (life threatening). Current NASA occupant protection standards are primarily based on the Multi-axial Dynamic Response Index (MDRI), which is a simple lumped-parameter spring, mass, damper model tuned to human impact responses in three orthogonal axes. RESULTS Using what is known about Soyuz landing dynamics from airborne and drop test data, the MDRI predicts essentially no Class IV or III injuries, < 1% Class II injuries, and < 5% Class I injuries. Approximately one-third of all USOS crewmembers for whom data has been gathered have suffered some sort of injury related to landing in the Soyuz vehicle. Most of these injuries fall into the contusion/abrasion category (21.3 %) (n.b. This is the percent for whom contusion/abrasion was the worst injury. Those with class I or II injuries typically also received contusions/abrasions). Class I injuries have been sustained by 5.0% of all crew, and Class II injuries have been observed in 3.8%. No Class III or IV injuries have been sustained to date. Forty-three injuries have been documented, with some crewmembers sustaining more than one injury in a single landing. The knee was the most likely area of injury (n=9), followed by the back (n=8), then the arm (n=7). CONCLUSION Soyuz landing dynamics are the most comparable analog environment for the anticipated loads associated with Orion and commercial crew vehicle landings. The MDRI under predicts the percentage of Class II injuries experienced during Soyuz landings, but it is better at predicting Class I injury occurrences. However, if contusions/abrasions are included in the minor injury Class I category, then the MDRI vastly under predicts those injuries as well. Given this data, it is important to re-evaluate the expected injury rates for future vehicles and work toward improving the predictive tools for spaceflight use. Spaceflight deconditioning may account for some of the under prediction, and work is ongoing to assess the relationship between landing injuries and impact tolerance changes due to spaceflight deconditioning. Future work includes expanding this study to involve private space missions on new vehicles to better characterize the effects of time in flight, suit and seat design, and vehicle dynamics.

N Newby↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Soyuz Landing Risk Characterization

INTRODUCTION United States On-orbit Segment (USOS) astronauts have been returning to Earth from the International Space Station (ISS) aboard the Russian Soyuz vehicle since 2003. The energetics associated with Soyuz landings are comparable to our next generation of US space vehicles (Orion, Crew Dragon, and Starliner). Soyuz also lands crew in a similar state of spaceflight deconditioning that is anticipated using the future vehicles. A number of injuries have now been observed during these Soyuz landings. Currently it is unknown how Soyuz landing accelerations and the numbers and types of associated injuries relate to the new occupant protection requirements levied upon future space vehicles. Understanding this relationship will allow better quantification of the risk of injury for future spacecraft designs. METHODS An estimate of injury occurrence during Soyuz landings has been determined using data contained in NASA flight medicine databases and supplemented with data collected from crew members and flight surgeons. At the time of this abstract, 96 USOS astronauts have returned to Earth in the Soyuz (59 US, 31 International Partner, and 6 spaceflight participants). Of that total, data from 80individual crew landings has been collected through this study as of September 2023. Injuries are classified either as contusions/abrasions, Class I (minor, no medical follow-up), Class II (moderate, medical follow-up necessary), Class III (severe), or Class IV (life threatening). Current NASA occupant protection standards are primarily based on the Multi-axial Dynamic Response Index (MDRI), which is a simple lumped-parameter spring, mass, damper model tuned to human impact responses in three orthogonal axes. RESULTS Using what is known about Soyuz landing dynamics from airborne and drop test data, the MDRI predicts essentially no Class IV or III injuries, < 1% Class II injuries, and < 5% Class I injuries. Approximately one-third of all USOS crewmembers for whom data has been gathered have suffered some sort of injury related to landing in the Soyuz vehicle. Most of these injuries fall into the contusion/abrasion category (21.3%) (n.b. This is the percent for whom contusion/abrasion was the worst injury. Those with class I or II injuries typically also received contusions/abrasions). Class I injuries have been sustained by 5.0% of all crew, and Class II injuries have been observed in 3.8%. No Class III or IV injuries have been sustained to date. Forty-three injuries have been documented, with some crewmembers sustaining more than one injury in a single landing. The knee was the most likely area of injury (n=9), followed by the back (n=8), then the arm (n=7). CONCLUSION Soyuz landing dynamics are the most comparable analog environment for the anticipated loads associated with Orion and commercial crew vehicle landings. The MDRI under predicts the percentage of Class II injuries experienced during Soyuz landings, but it is better at predicting Class I injury occurrences. However, if contusions/abrasions are included in the minor injury Class I category, then the MDRI vastly under predicts those injuries as well. Given this data, it is important to re-evaluate the expected injury rates for future vehicles and work toward improving the predictive tools for spaceflight use. Spaceflight deconditioning may account for some of the under prediction, and work is ongoing to assess the relationship between landing injuries and impact tolerance changes due to spaceflight deconditioning. Future work includes expanding this study to involve private space missions on new vehicles to better characterize the effects of time in flight, suit and seat design, and vehicle dynamics.

N Newby↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Soyuz Landing Risk Characterization

INTRODUCTION United States On-orbit Segment (USOS) astronauts have been returning to Earth from the International Space Station (ISS) aboard the Russian Soyuz vehicle since 2003. The energetics associated with Soyuz landings are comparable to our next generation of US space vehicles (Orion, Crew Dragon, and Starliner). Soyuz also lands crew in a similar state of spaceflight deconditioning that is anticipated using the future vehicles. A number of injuries have now been observed during these Soyuz landings. Currently it is unknown how Soyuz landing accelerations and the numbers and types of associated injuries relate to the new occupant protection requirements levied upon future space vehicles. Understanding this relationship will allow better quantification of the risk of injury for future spacecraft designs. METHODS An estimate of injury occurrence during Soyuz landings has been determined using data contained in NASA flight medicine databases and supplemented with data collected from crewmembers and flight surgeons. At the time of this abstract, 96 USOS astronauts have returned to Earth in the Soyuz (59 US, 31 International Partner, and 6 spaceflight participants). Of that total, data from 80 individual crew landings has been collected through this study as of September 2023. Injuries are classified either as contusions/abrasions, Class I (minor, no medical follow-up), Class II (moderate, medical follow-up necessary), Class III (severe), or Class IV (life threatening). Current NASA occupant protection standards are primarily based on the Multi-axial Dynamic Response Index (MDRI), which is a simple lumped-parameter spring, mass, damper model tuned to human impact responses in three orthogonal axes. RESULTS Using what is known about Soyuz landing dynamics from airborne and drop test data, the MDRI predicts essentially no Class IV or III injuries, < 1% Class II injuries, and < 5% Class I injuries. Approximately one-third of all USOS crewmembers for whom data has been gathered have suffered some sort of injury related to landing in the Soyuz vehicle. Most of these injuries fall into the contusion/abrasion category (21.3 %) (n.b. This is the percent for whom contusion/abrasion was the worst injury. Those with class I or II injuries typically also received contusions/abrasions). Class I injuries have been sustained by 5.0% of all crew, and Class II injuries have been observed in 3.8%. No Class III or IV injuries have been sustained to date. Forty-three injuries have been documented, with some crewmembers sustaining more than one injury in a single landing. The knee was the most likely area of injury (n=9), followed by the back (n=8), then the arm (n=7). CONCLUSION Soyuz landing dynamics are the most comparable analog environment for the anticipated loads associated with Orion and commercial crew vehicle landings. The MDRI under predicts the percentage of Class II injuries experienced during Soyuz landings, but it is better at predicting Class I injury occurrences. However, if contusions/abrasions are included in the minor injury Class I category, then the MDRI vastly under predicts those injuries as well. Given this data, it is important to re-evaluate the expected injury rates for future vehicles and work toward improving the predictive tools for spaceflight use. Spaceflight deconditioning may account for some of the under prediction, and work is ongoing to assess the relationship between landing injuries and impact tolerance changes due to spaceflight deconditioning. Future work includes expanding this study to involve private space missions on new vehicles to better characterize the effects of time in flight, suit and seat design, and vehicle dynamics.

P Greenhalgh↗

NASA NTRS1998

Risk Management

This presentation focuses on the identification of risk management, risk management processes such as: quantification and prioritization; mitigation planning; implementation of risk reduction; and tracking process. It develops examples and answers questions about Risk Management.

Lloyd Thomas↗

NASA NTRS2023

EVA Task and 3D Pose Recognition from Video

Extravehicular Activity (EVA) has been known to involve potential risks of biomechanical stresses and injuries to crewmembers. Gathering of EVA motion patterns is necessary for risk analysis and mitigation. However, many existing techniques, such as motion capture systems, are not only cost-prohibitive but are impractical for retrospective analysis of past missions. In this work, a software tool was developed, which can estimate the 3D poses of a spacesuit from photographs or videos, without using special sensors or equipment. The tool is based on the state-of-the-art artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML) system, which was trained by studying and capturing motion patterns of past and current spacesuit test data. The AI/ML tool was further enhanced using synthetically generated data, in which the suit postures, backgrounds, camera angles and illumination conditions were parametrically adjusted and rendered for training. The tool, incorporated the methodologies of Convolutional Neural Network (CNN), was trained, and tested in the cloud computing environment. The trained model was then applied on new imagery and video to extract estimated joint positions and suit outlines. The joint positions were further processed to capture activity (“digging”), pose labels (“bending”), and other useful downstream information. The model performance on new imagery and video was successfully assessed for accuracy and reliability. This AI/ML based posture recognition tool thus allows for the quantification of injury risk and task performance characterization for both current and past missions and training, which can immensely help to improve EVA task and suit design.

Kyung Han Kim↗

NASA NTRS2011

Analogs and the BHP Risk Reduction Strategy for Future Spaceflight Missions

In preparation for future exploration missions to distant destinations (e.g., Moon, Near Earth Objects (NEO), and Mars), the NASA Human Research Program s (HRP) Behavioral Health and Performance Element (BHP) conducts and supports research to address four human health risks: Risk of Behavioral Conditions; Risk of Psychiatric Conditions; Risk of Performance Decrements Due to Inadequate Cooperation, Coordination, Communication, and Psychosocial Adaptation within a Team; and Risk of Performance Errors due to Sleep Loss, Fatigue, Circadian Desynchronization, and Work Overload (HRP Science Management Plan, 2008). BHP Research, in collaboration with internal and external research investigators, as well as subject matter experts within NASA operations including flight surgeons, astronauts, and mission planners and others within the Mission Operations Directorate (MOD), identifies knowledge and technology gaps within each Risk. BHP Research subsequently manages and conducts research tasks to address and close the gaps, either through risk assessment and quantification, or the development of countermeasures and monitoring technologies. The resulting deliverables, in many instances, also support current Medical Operations and/or Mission Operations for the International Space Station (ISS).

Whitmire, Sandra↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Standard measures in Analogs of Spaceflight

Standard measures are defined as research measures (physiological, performance, or otherwise) that quantify the subject’s health and performance before, during, and after a spaceflight or a spaceflight analog mission. The Standard Measures Cross-Cutting Project (SMCCP) collects and analyzes standard measures that support assessment and quantification of health risks and efficacy of countermeasures and technologies required to prevent or mitigate adverse outcomes from exposure to the spaceflight environment. SMCCP uses the following spaceflight analogs: - Human Exploration Research Analog (HERA) in Houston, TX: 4-person isolation/confinement; nominal mission duration of 45 days; run by the Human Research Program (HRP). SMCCP uses weekly questionnaires to gather data on the crewmembers’ emotional and mental state and collects blood samples biweekly to measure crewmembers’ serum cortisol levels at the start, middle, and end of the mission. - Institute for Biomedical Problems (IBMP) Ground-Based Experimental Complex, called NEK, in Moscow, Russia: 6-person isolation/confinement; duration of 8 months; run by IBMP. Standard measures data collected during NEK are the same as for HERA above. - :envihab in Cologne, Germany: 12-person bed rest facility; closed environment; 30 to 60-day campaigns; run by the German Aerospace Center (DLR). For bedrest studies, SMCCP uses the international standard measures as documented in the International Academy of Astronautics publication titled Guidelines for Standardization of Bed Rest Studies in the Spaceflight Context (June 2014). These international standard measures evaluate potential changes in bone, muscle, cardiovascular, and visual systems, as well as changes in psychology and nutrition. The international standard measures complement those collected during studies by individual investigators and allow comparison of responses across different bed rest and countermeasures durations. In this presentation, we will review available SMCCP data collected during the recent isolation studies in HERA (C6) and NEK (SIRIUS-21), and during the SANS (SM1, SM2) bed rest studies in :envihab. These standard measures datasets are made available to concurrent investigators in the given mission or campaign via data sharing agreements and/or data sharing plans and to other investigators that have been granted retrospective access to the data (researchers with IRB approved protocols, risk custodians) to advance understanding of physiological and behavioral risks associated with these spaceflight analogs.

Standard Measures↗

NASA NTRS2019

The Missing Economic Risks in Assessments of Climate Change Impacts

Economic assessments of the potential future risks of climate change have been omitting or grossly underestimating many of the most serious consequences for lives and livelihoods because these risks are difficult to quantify precisely and lie outside of human experience. Political and business leaders need to understand the scale of these ‘missing risks’ because they could have drastic and potentially catastrophic impacts on citizens, communities and companies. Scientists are growing in confidence about the evidence for the largest potential impacts of climate change and the rising probability that major thresholds in the Earth’s climate system will be breached as global mean surface temperature rises, particularly if warming exceeds 2°C above the pre-industrial level. These impacts include: (1) Destabilisation of ice sheets and glaciers and consequent sea level rise. (2) Stronger tropical cyclones. (3) Extreme heat impacts. (4) More frequent and intense floods and droughts. (5) Disruptions to oceanic and atmospheric circulation. (6) Destruction of biodiversity and collapse of ecosystems. Many of these impacts will grow and occur concurrently across the world as global temperature climbs. Some of these impacts involve thresholds in the climate system beyond which major impacts accelerate, or become irreversible and unstoppable. When a threshold is breached, it might cause one or more other thresholds to be exceeded as well, leading to a cascade of impacts. Many of these impacts could exceed the capacity of human populations to adapt, and would significantly affect and disrupt the lives and livelihoods of hundreds of millions, if not billions, of people worldwide. These impacts would also undermine economic growth and development, exacerbate poverty and destabilise communities. Economic assessments fail to take account of the potential for large concurrent impacts across the world that would cause mass migration, displacement and conflict, with huge loss of life. Economic assessments that are expressed solely in terms of effects on output (e.g. gross domestic product), or that only extrapolate from past experience, or that use inappropriate discounting, do not provide a clear indication of the potential risks to lives and livelihoods. It is likely that there are additional risks that we are not yet anticipating simply because scientists have not yet detected their possibility, as we have entered a period of climate change that is unprecedented in human history. Some advances are being made in improving economic assessments of climate change impacts but much more progress is required if assessments are to offer reliable guidance for political and business leaders on the biggest risks. The lack of firm quantifications is not a reason to ignore these risks, and when the missing risks are taken into account, the case for strong and urgent action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions becomes even more compelling.

DeFries, Ruth↗

NASA NTRS2011

Understanding Pre-Quantitative Risk in Projects

Standard approaches to risk management in projects depend on the ability of teams to identify risks and quantify the probabilities and consequences of these risks (e.g., the 5 x 5 risk matrix). However, long before quantification does - or even can - occur, and long after, teams make decisions based on their pre-quantitative understanding of risk. These decisions can have long-lasting impacts on the project. While significant research has looked at the process of how to quantify risk, our understanding of how teams conceive of and manage pre-quantitative risk is lacking. This paper introduces the concept of pre-quantitative risk and discusses the implications of addressing pre-quantitative risk in projects.

risk levels.↗

NASA NTRS2015

Constructing the Best Reliability Data for the Job: Developing Generic Reliability Data from Alternative Sources When Observed Data Is Not an Alternative

Objective. Describe sources, practices and protocols that may be used to derive a composite generic failure rate supporting the quantification of early design risk and reliability models.

Kleinhammer, Roger↗

NASA NTRS2017

A Probabilistic Asteroid Impact Risk Model

Asteroid threat assessment requires the quantification of both the impact likelihood and resulting consequence across the range of possible events. This paper presents a probabilistic asteroid impact risk (PAIR) assessment model developed for this purpose. The model incorporates published impact frequency rates with state-of-the-art consequence assessment tools, applied within a Monte Carlo framework that generates sets of impact scenarios from uncertain parameter distributions. Explicit treatment of atmospheric entry is included to produce energy deposition rates that account for the effects of thermal ablation and object fragmentation. These energy deposition rates are used to model the resulting ground damage, and affected populations are computed for the sampled impact locations. The results for each scenario are aggregated into a distribution of potential outcomes that reflect the range of uncertain impact parameters, population densities, and strike probabilities. As an illustration of the utility of the PAIR model, the results are used to address the question of what minimum size asteroid constitutes a threat to the population. To answer this question, complete distributions of results are combined with a hypothetical risk tolerance posture to provide the minimum size, given sets of initial assumptions. Model outputs demonstrate how such questions can be answered and provide a means for interpreting the effect that input assumptions and uncertainty can have on final risk-based decisions. Model results can be used to prioritize investments to gain knowledge in critical areas or, conversely, to identify areas where additional data has little effect on the metrics of interest.

Asteroid↗

NASA NTRS2016

Towards a Methodology and Tooling for Model-Based Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA)

A Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) aims to identify and assess potential risks to system technical performance requirements for the purpose of furnishing risk insights into project decisions. PRAs have traditionally been conducted manually using software with an isolated data model. As system complexity rises it becomes difficult to ensure consistency between a PRA, the evolving system design, and other engineering analyses; the techniques for conducting PRAs must evolve to meet this challenge. This work presents progress towards a methodology and tooling for conducting a PRA by leveraging data in the system model, embedded for other purposes and analyses, to conduct a PRA. An approach for identifying the appropriate probabilistic equation for each risk scenario from a standard library is presented, which is a significant step towards the quantification of the likelihood of a risk scenario occurrence. The final calculation of the likelihood of occurrence is left as an item of future work. We also present the development of preliminary tooling to carry out the methodology on a well-formed system model. The information needed to conduct the PRA is embedded in a consistent manner in a system model, so the model-based PRA can be regularly executed as the system model changes. The ability to modify the PRA in concert with lifecycle evolution affords a project the opportunity to track the extent to which system modification impacts compliance with requirements. These aspects of this model-based PRA methodology make it capable of managing risk in increasingly complex technical systems.

Schreiner, Samuel S.↗

NASA NTRS2023

Adaptive Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Reduces Risk of Software Impacting Safety in Artemis Missions

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is asking more of its human spaceflight programs than ever before through the collective Artemis Missions. The NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Program contributes to NASA’s human spaceflight goals by providing IV&V services for NASA’s critical spacecraft and ground software. The IV&V Program is tasked with providing assurance from both individual and integrated mission software perspectives. The Artemis IV&V organization is actively supporting six distinct development efforts: Orion, the Space Launch System (SLS), Exploration Ground Systems (EGS), Mission Control Center (MCC), the Lunar Gateway, and the Human Landing System (HLS), representing a wide diversity of developer organizations, management structures, and development approaches. With much of this extremely complex flight and ground software being essential to human safety both on the ground and in space, Artemis IV&V is likewise challenged to provide more value-added assurance to future Artemis missions within a constrained budget. To meet this challenge, Artemis IV&V employs a variety of novel and evolving “Adaptive IV&V” approaches for planning and executing IV&V analysis to increase both the efficiency and effectiveness of the IV&V Program’s assurance activities, and to address the difficulties imposed by assuring software for a large, highly integrated, multi-mission enterprise managed and executed by physically and organizationally distinct programs. Instilling agile principles like iterative planning cycles, self-organizing teams, and regular retrospectives, into IV&V planning and execution has led to a more rapid turnaround of a minimum viable assurance product and allowed for increased alignment of assurance activities with development progress. Adopting an assurance case methodology has led to greater consistency and clearer communication of assurance design and provided a foundation for long-term maintenance of assurance plans, products, and results across missions. The IV&V-developed Assurance / Safety Case Analytical Network (A-SCAN) framework and tool has enabled the quantification and tracking of system/software risk and confidence. These confidence measures provide a means to repeatedly express the impact of planned and completed assurance work and the remaining residual risk. Applied as part of a “Follow-the-Risk” organizational ethos, this allows consistent rightsizing of analysis rigor and intensity commensurate with the perceived risk of defects, as well as appropriate targeting of the highest risk areas of the software to find safety issues before they can manifest. Finally, the development of the IV&V Advanced Risk Reduction Integrated Software Test and Operations Tri-program Lightweight Environment (ARRISTOTLE), an integrated software-only simulation of Orion, SLS, and EGS systems, has made it possible to independently test integrated pad and flight scenarios and inject faults to observe how the Artemis multi-program, mission software behaves in degraded modes and in response to hazards. These adaptive IV&V investments have enabled Artemis IV&V to become more efficient and effective in IV&V planning and execution and respond more readily to changes in the risk landscape, increasing the breadth and depth of risk reduction possible within the available resources. Residual risk tracking allows IV&V to communicate more effectively with stakeholders, both internal and external at all levels, and inform key decision-making personnel. This evolving assurance design approach provides IV&V surety that work is performed in the highest risk, most value-added areas of the software, to keep our astronauts and ground crews safe and ensure mission success.

Gerek A Whitman↗

NASA NTRS2023

Adaptive Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Reduces Risk of Software Impacting Safety in Artemis Missions

Gerek Whitman↗

NASA NTRS1985

Space Station Power System Advanced Development

The objectives of the Space Station Advanced Development Program are related to the development of a set of design options and/or new capabilities to support Space Station development and operation, taking into account also a quantification of the performance and risk of key state-of-the-art technologies, and a reduction of the cost and schedule risk in Space Station development. Attention is given to the photovoltaic power system, a solar dynamic system, and aspects of power management and distribution. A major issue will be the selection of the power generation system. In view of the advantages of the solar dynamic system, it is attempted to resolve issues associated with this system.

Forestieri, A. F.↗

NASA NTRS2020

Advanced Supersonic Parachute Inflation Research Experiment Preflight Trajectory Modeling and Postflight Reconstruction

The Advanced Supersonic Parachute Inflation Research and Experiments (ASPIRE) was a series of sounding rocket flights aimed at understanding the dynamics of supersonic parachutes that are used for Mars robotic applications. The 2012 Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) had a successful deployment of a supersonic parachute, but based on post-flight analysis of parachute margins, the ASPIRE project was created as a risk-reduction program to improve quantification of these margins and qualify a supersonic parachute for Mars 2020, the follow-on mission to MSL. The first sounding rocket (SR01) flight of ASPIRE occurred near Wallops Island, Virginia on Oct. 4, 2017 and demonstrated the successful deployment and inflation of a MSL build-to-print parachute in flight conditions similar to the 2012 MSL mission. The ASPIRE SR02 and SR03 were successful follow-on flights on Mar. 31, 2018 and Sep. 7, 2018 that demonstrated the new, strengthened supersonic parachute designed for the Mars 2020 project. The SR02 and SR03 parachuteswere targeted to 100% and 140% of the expected flight limit load for Mars 2020 to confirm new margins expected from the strengthened parachute. Prior to all flights, a multi-body flight dynamics simulation was developed to predict the parachute dynamics and was used, in conjunction with other tools, to target Mars-relevant flight conditions. After each flight, the on-board data were used to reconstruct the flight trajectory and to validate the pre-flight dynamics simulation. Post-flight analysis showed that all three tests achieved their targeted conditions and pre-flight modeling bounded the key performance metrics for the parachute. This paper describes the flight mechanics simulation, post-flight reconstruction, and the reconciliation process used to validate the flight models.

Soumyo Dutta↗