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NASA NTRS2016

Design and Development of a Methane Cryogenic Propulsion Stage for Human Mars Exploration

NASA is currently working on the Evolvabe Mars Campaign (EMC) study to outline transportation and mission options for human exploration of Mars. One of the key aspects of the EMC is leveraging current and planned near-term technology investments to build an affordable and evolvable approach to Mars exploration. This leveraging of investments includes the use of high-power Solar Electric Propulsion (SEP) systems evolved from those currently under development in support of the Asteroid Redirect Mission to deliver payloads to Mars. The EMC is considering several transportation options that combine solar electric and chemical propulsion technologies to deliver crew and cargo to Mars. In one primary architecture option, the SEP propulsion system is used to pre-deploy mission elements to Mars while a high-thrust chemical propulsion system is used to send crew on faster ballistic transfers between Earth and Mars. This high-thrust chemical system uses liquid oxygen - liquid methane main propulsion and reaction control systems integrated into the Methane Cryogenic Propulsion Stage (MCPS). Over the past year, there have been several studies completed to provide critical design and development information related to the MCPS. This paper is intended to provide a summary of these efforts. A summary of the current point of departure design for the MCPS is provided as well as an overview of the mission architecture and concept of operations that the MCPS is intended to support. To leverage the capabilities of solar electric propulsion to the greatest extent possible, the EMC architecture pre-deploys the required stages for returning crew from Mars. While this changes the risk posture of the architecture, it provides mass savings by using higher-efficiency systems for interplanetary transfer. However, this does introduce significantly longer flight times to Mars which, in turn, increases the overall lifetime of the stages to as long as 3000 days. This unique aspect to the concept of operations introduces several challenges, specifically related to propellant storage and engine reliability. These challenges and some potential solutions are discussed. Specific focus is provided on two key technology areas; propulsion and cryogenic fluid management. In the area of propulsion development, the development of an integrated methane propulsion system that combines both main propulsion and reaction control is discussed. This includes an overview of potential development paths, areas where development for Mars applications are complementary to development efforts underway in other parts of the aerospace industry, and commonality between the MCPS methane propulsion applications and other Mars elements, including the Mars lander systems. This commonality is a key affordability aspect of the Evolvable Mars Campaign. A similar discussion is provided for cryogenic fluid management technologies including a discussion of how using cryo-propulsion in the Mars transportation application not only provides performance benefits but also leverages decades of technology development investments made by NASA and its aerospace contractor community.

Percy, Thomas K.↗

NASA NTRS2016

Design and Development of a Methane Cryogenic Propulsion Stage for Human Mars Exploration

NASA is currently working on the Evolvabe Mars Campaign (EMC) study to outline transportation and mission options for human exploration of Mars. One of the key aspects of the EMC is leveraging current and planned near-term technology investments to build an affordable and evolvable approach to Mars exploration. This leveraging of investments includes the use of high-power Solar Electric Propulsion (SEP) systems, evolved from those currently under development in support of the Asteroid Redirect Mission (ARM), to deliver payloads to Mars. The EMC is considering several transportation options that combine solar electric and chemical propulsion technologies to deliver crew and cargo to Mars. In one primary architecture option, the SEP propulsion system is used to pre-deploy mission elements to Mars while a high-thrust chemical propulsion system is used to send crew on faster ballistic transfers between Earth and Mars. This high-thrust chemical system uses liquid oxygen - liquid methane main propulsion and reaction control systems integrated into the Methane Cryogenic Propulsion Stage (MCPS). Over the past year, there have been several studies completed to provide critical design and development information related to the MCPS. This paper is intended to provide a summary of these efforts. A summary of the current point of departure design for the MCPS is provided as well as an overview of the mission architecture and concept of operations that the MCPS is intended to support. To leverage the capabilities of solar electric propulsion to the greatest extent possible, the EMC architecture pre-deploys to Mars orbit the stages required for returning crew from Mars. While this changes the risk posture of the architecture, it can provide some mass savings by using higher-efficiency systems for interplanetary transfer. However, this does introduce significantly longer flight times to Mars which, in turn, increases the overall lifetime of the stages to as long as 2500 days. This unique aspect to the concept of operations introduces several challenges, specifically related to propellant storage and engine reliability. These challenges and some potential solutions are discussed. Specific focus is provided on two key technology areas; propulsion and cryogenic fluid management. In the area of propulsion development, the development of an integrated methane propulsion system that combines both main propulsion and reaction control is discussed. This includes an overview of potential development paths, areas where development for Mars applications are complementary to development efforts underway in other parts of the aerospace industry, and commonality between the MCPS methane propulsion applications and other Mars elements, including the Mars lander systems. This commonality is a key affordability aspect of the Evolvable Mars Campaign. A similar discussion is provided for cryogenic fluid management technologies including a discussion of how using cryo propulsion in the Mars transportation application not only provides performance benefits but also leverages decades of technology development investments made by NASA and its aerospace contractor community.

Percy, Thomas K.↗

NASA NTRS2010

A Risk Assessment Architecture for Enhanced Engine Operation

On very rare occasions, in-flight emergencies have occurred that required the pilot to utilize the aircraft's capabilities to the fullest extent possible, sometimes using actuators in ways for which they were not intended. For instance, when flight control has been lost due to damage to the hydraulic systems, pilots have had to use engine thrust to maneuver the plane to the ground and in for a landing. To assist the pilot in these situations, research is being performed to enhance the engine operation by making it more responsive or able to generate more thrust. Enabled by modification of the propulsion control, enhanced engine operation can increase the probability of a safe landing during an inflight emergency. However, enhanced engine operation introduces risk as the nominal control limits, such as those on shaft speed, temperature, and acceleration, are exceeded. Therefore, an on-line tool for quantifying this risk must be developed to ensure that the use of an enhanced control mode does not actually increase the overall danger to the aircraft. This paper describes an architecture for the implementation of this tool. It describes the type of data and algorithms required and the information flow, and how the risk based on engine component lifing and operability for enhanced operation is determined.

Litt, Jonathan S.↗

NASA NTRS2011

L-Band System Engineering - Concepts of Use, Systems Performance Requirements, and Architecture

This document is being provided as part of ITT s NASA Glenn Research Center Aerospace Communication Systems Technical Support (ACSTS) contract NNC05CA85C, Task 7: New ATM Requirements-Future Communications, C-band and L-band Communications Standard Development. Task 7 was motivated by the five year technology assessment performed for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) under the joint FAA-EUROCONTROL cooperative research Action Plan (AP-17), also known as the Future Communications Study (FCS). It was based on direction provided by the FAA project-level agreement (PLA FY09_G1M.02-02v1) for "New ATM Requirements-Future Communications." Task 7 was separated into two distinct subtasks, each aligned with specific work elements and deliverable items. Subtask 7-1 addressed C-band airport surface data communications standards development, systems engineering, test bed development, and tests/demonstrations to establish operational capability for what is now referred to as the Aeronautical Mobile Airport Communications System (AeroMACS). Subtask 7-2, which is the subject of this report, focused on preliminary systems engineering and support of joint FAA/EUROCONTROL development and evaluation of a future L-band (960 to 1164 MHz) air/ground (A/G) communication system known as the L-band digital aeronautical communications system (L-DACS), which was defined during the FCS. The proposed L-DACS will be capable of providing ATM services in continental airspace in the 2020+ timeframe. Subtask 7-2 was performed in two phases. Phase I featured development of Concepts of Use, high level functional analyses, performance of initial L-band system safety and security risk assessments, and development of high level requirements and architectures. It also included the aforementioned support of joint L-DACS development and evaluation, including inputs to L-DACS design specifications. Phase II provided a refinement of the systems engineering activities performed during Phase I, along with continued joint FAA/EUROCONTROL L-DACS development and evaluation support.

Henriksen, Stephen↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Lessons Learned in Systems Engineering Availability and Recommendations for Mission Technical Leaders

In spaceflight missions at Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), the Mission System Engineer (MSE) is the technical leader of the overall engineering team and also is the Independent Engineering Technical Authority. The responsibility of this role includes the definition of the mission design architecture, concept of operations, and mission requirements, management of risk throughout the development, and verification and validation of the final system performance and function amongst other duties. This responsibility inherently requires time management, enabling focus on a balanced development with appropriate risk. Time is the most valuable resource of the MSE. The system engineer’s availability to interact with the development team (often product or component design leads and technicians, often in different worksites) to discover and mitigate mission risks during development is key to mission success. This paper presents examples from Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter, Landsat 9, and Neutron star Interior Composition ExploreR (NICER) which represent in-house and out-of-house hardware builds. These examples demonstrate how interactions between the Mission Systems Engineers and other project and partner engineers result in discovery of critical risks, leading to early mitigation with significant cost and performance savings. These three missions would have suffered test failures or on-orbit failures had their MSEs not set aside time to visit engineers and technicians that were working on key pieces of space flight hardware. Availability is more than just time; it is openness to listen to concerns and questions. It begins by building a level of trust in the team that it is safe to ask questions or share concerns without the fear of blame or additional workload. It also requires enabling informal conversations (over lunch, coffee, in the clean room, or at the team members desk, etc.) where key information can be exchanged, and team members may even provide an easy-to-implement mitigation idea for another subsystem. Availability is a highly valuable commodity and completely non-obvious to protect and optimize. The natural tendency of engineers is to keep themselves busy with solving problems that they know about. This paper is encouraging MSEs to resist this tendency to try and solve all the complex problems themselves and actively devote daily time to learning and solving problems that are found with informal communications with other team members.

Lessons Learned↗

NASA NTRS2008

Propulsion and Cryogenics Advanced Development (PCAD) Project Propulsion Technologies for the Lunar Lander

The Propulsion and Cryogenics Advanced Development (PCAD) Project in the Exploration Technology Development Program is developing technologies as risk mitigation for Orion and the Lunar Lander. An integrated main and reaction control propulsion system has been identified as a candidate for the Lunar Lander Ascent Module. The propellants used in this integrated system are Liquid Oxygen (LOX)/Liquid Methane (LCH4) propellants. A deep throttle pump fed Liquid Oxygen (LOX)/Liquid Hydrogen (LH2) engine system has been identified for the Lunar Lander Descent Vehicle. The propellant combination and architecture of these propulsion systems are novel and would require risk reduction prior to detailed design and development. The PCAD Project addresses the technology requirements to obtain relevant and necessary test data to further the technology maturity of propulsion hardware utilizing these propellants. This plan and achievements to date will be presented.

Klem, Mark D.↗

DOE OSTI2021

Advance Reactor Operational Technology Architecture Categorization

Seven generation III+ and generation IV nuclear reactor types, based on twelve reactor concepts surveyed, are examined using functional decomposition to extract relevant operational technology (OT) architecture information. This information is compared to existing nuclear power plants (NPPs) OT architectures to highlight novel and emergent cyber risks associated with next generation NPPs. These insights can help inform operational technology architecture requirements that will be unique to a given reactor type. Next generation NPPs have streamlined OT architectures relative to the current generation II commercial NPP fleet. Overall, without compensatory measures that provide sufficient and efficient cybersecurity controls, next generation NPPs will have increased cyber risk. Verification and validation of cyber-physical testbeds and cyber risk assessment methodologies may be an important next step to reduce cyber risk in the OT architecture design and testing phase. Coordination with safety requirements can result in OT architecture design being an iterative process.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

NASA NTRS2011

A Risk Management Architecture for Emergency Integrated Aircraft Control

Enhanced engine operation--operation that is beyond normal limits--has the potential to improve the adaptability and safety of aircraft in emergency situations. Intelligent use of enhanced engine operation to improve the handling qualities of the aircraft requires sophisticated risk estimation techniques and a risk management system that spans the flight and propulsion controllers. In this paper, an architecture that weighs the risks of the emergency and of possible engine performance enhancements to reduce overall risk to the aircraft is described. Two examples of emergency situations are presented to demonstrate the interaction between the flight and propulsion controllers to facilitate the enhanced operation.

McGlynn, Gregory E.↗

NASA NTRS2020

Medical Data Architecture Platform and Recommended Requirements for A Medical Data System for Exploration Missions

Minimize or reduce the risk of adverse health outcomes and decrements in performance due to in-flight medical capabilities on human exploration missions. To mitigate this risk, the ExMC MDA project addresses the technical limitations identified in ExMC Gap Med 07: We do not have the capability to comprehensively process medically relevant information to support medical operations during exploration missions. This gap identifies that the current in-flight medical data management includes a combination of data collection and distribution methods that are minimally integrated with on-board medical devices and systems. Furthermore, there are a variety of data sources and methods of data collection. For an exploration mission, the seamless management of such data will enable a more medically autonomous crew than the current paradigm of medical data management on the International Space Station. ExMC has recognized that in order to make informed decisions about a medical data architecture framework, current methods for medical data management must not only be understood, but an architecture must also be identified that provides the crew with actionable insight to medical conditions. This medical data architecture will provide the necessary functionality to address the challenges of executing a self-contained medical system that approaches crew health care delivery without assistance from ground support. Hence, the products derived from the third MDA prototype development will directly inform exploration medical system requirements for Level of Care IV in Gateway missions.In fiscal year 2019, the MDA project developed Test Bed 3, the third iteration in a series of prototypes, that featured integrations with cognition tool data, ultrasound image analytics and core Flight Software (cFS). Maintaining a layered architecture design, the framework implemented a plug-in, modular approach in the integration of these external data sources. An early version of MDA Test Bed 3 software was deployed and operated in a simulated analog environment that was part of the Next Space Technologies for Exploration Partnerships (NextSTEP) Gateway tests of multiple habitat prototypes. In addition, the MDA team participated in the Gateway Test and Verification Demonstration, where the MDA cFS applications was integrated with Gateway-in-a-Box software to send and receive medically relevant data over a simulated vehicle network. This software demonstration was given to ExMC and Gateway Program stakeholders at the NASA Johnson Space Center Integrated Power, Avionics and Software (iPAS) facility. Also, the integrated prototypes served as a vehicle to provide Level 5 requirements for the Crew Health and Performance Habitat Data System for Gateway Missions (Medical Level of Care IV). In the upcoming fiscal year, the MDA project will continue to provide systems engineering and vertical prototypes to refine requirements for medical Level of Care IV and inform requirements for Level of Care V.

Krihak, M.↗

NASA NTRS2006

Developing Crew Health Care and Habitability Systems for the Exploration Vision

This paper will discuss the specific mission architectures associated with the NASA Exploration Vision and review the challenges and drivers associated with developing crew health care and habitability systems to manage human system risks. Crew health care systems must be provided to manage crew health within acceptable limits, as well as respond to medical contingencies that may occur during exploration missions. Habitability systems must enable crew performance for the tasks necessary to support the missions. During the summer of 2005, NASA defined its exploration architecture including blueprints for missions to the moon and to Mars. These mission architectures require research and technology development to focus on the operational risks associated with each mission, as well as the risks to long term astronaut health. This paper will review the highest priority risks associated with the various missions and discuss NASA s strategies and plans for performing the research and technology development necessary to manage the risks to acceptable levels.

Laurini, Kathy↗

NASA NTRS2024

Evaluating Liftoff Debris for NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) Prior to the Artemis I Launch

The SLS Artemis I launch vehicle is the first of several planned Artemis launch vehicles, with a number of design differences from earlier NASA missions that incur liftoff debris risk to the mission. As a test vehicle, the Artemis I hardware also endured environments and tests not planned for future missions, which led to several additional factors contributing to an evolving liftoff debris risk to the SLS vehicle. This paper will summarize these risk factors and address the processes used to evaluate and communicate the risks to support a successful Artemis I launch. It will discuss how the evolving risks that were quantified and evaluated by a Cross-Program team of debris Subject Matter Experts to mitigate liftoff debris hazards and communicate updated risk to the SLS vehicle. This process was performed through the inaugural use of an SLS debris day-of-launch (DOL) standard operating procedure that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions. This paper addresses the risk of liftoff debris, debris released by the vehicle or from the launch pad during liftoff through vehicle tower clear. Expected liftoff debris is well understood from previous NASA programs’ experience and from tests of materials, processes and functions that are known to release liftoff debris. These expected sources were assessed and cleared well ahead of launch day. However, given the ever-changing schedules and environments, processes were in place to evaluate any additional potential liftoff debris risks identified during launch countdown. Although many of the Artemis vehicle hardware components are similar to those on the NASA Shuttle Program, there are important differences in the architecture of the Artemis I vehicle which require new assessments of liftoff debris risk for the Artemis missions. The more favorable Artemis crew module location and surfaces are far less vulnerable to debris impacts; however, the longer vehicle can result in higher liftoff debris impact energies to those components on the aft end of the vehicle. Additionally, the positional change of the RS-25 liquid engines to nearer the Booster nozzle exit plane along with the change in Booster throat plug design is a disadvantage to the overall liftoff debris risk which resulted in additional test and analysis efforts for evaluating the integrated vehicle debris risk. In spite of the comprehensive tests and analyses of Artemis I expected liftoff debris, a number of additional tests/processes were completed prior to the Artemis I mission that were required to support a complete understanding of a new launch vehicle, but increased the risk of releasing liftoff debris. The hardware endured several additional cryogenic loading cycles, including the Green Run tests at Stennis Space Center, Wet Dress Rehearsals at Kennedy Space Center, and multiple launch attempts. Each of these cycles induced stresses in the thermal protection system (TPS) materials, increasing the risk of damage to and release of the TPS. Additionally, induced and weather environmental factors that could increase the likelihood of debris release were significant. Vibrations and stresses in the TPS were induced by a required roll-back to the Vehicle Assembly Building before Hurricane Ian to protect the vehicle from damage by high winds. Wind damage and potential internal stresses to several outer mold line materials on the integrated SLS vehicle and mobile launcher were caused by weathering Hurricane Nicole at Pad 39B the week before launch. A thorough imagery scan of the vehicle was performed after each event and the damage observed was repaired, removed, or assessed and the risk to the mission evaluated. Mitigation of debris risk can occur by tests and analyses to show debris impacted components as damage tolerant, by new/improved processes for prevention of debris availability, or redesign. Risk mitigation processes for Artemis I-specific liftoff debris events and the development and use of the SLS debris day of launch (DOL) procedures that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions will be described.

Space Launch System↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Evaluating Liftoff Debris for NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) Prior to the Artemis I Launch

Space Launch System↗

NASA NTRS2012

An Altair Overview: Designing a Lunar Lander for 21st Century Human Space Exploration

Altair, the lunar lander element of NASA's Constellation program, was conducted in a different design environment than many other NASA projects of similar scope. Because of this relatively unique approach, there are a number of significant success stories that should be considered during the development of any future lunar landers or human spacecraft. This paper is divided into two separate themes; the first is the approach used during the conceptual design studies, including the systematic analysis cycles and the decision making process associated with each: and the second is a summary of the resulting lessons learned that were compiled after looking back at the lifetime of the Project. Altair was terminated before entering Phase B of its design, and was often criticized for being a very heavy and very large vehicle. While there was specific rationale for all of the decisions that led up to that configuration, future design cycles were specifically planned to re-address the mass challenge. Had the project continued, the deliberate, stepwise design process would have converged on an optimized lander design that balanced mass, risk, cost and capabilities. Some of the specific items that will be addressed in this paper include project development strategy, organizational approach and team dynamics, risk-informed design process, mission architecture constraints, mission key driving requirements, model-based systems engineering process, configuration studies, contingency considerations, subsystem overviews and key trade studies. The paper will conclude with a summary of the lessons identified during the Altair project and make suggestions for application to future studies.

Brown, Kendall K.↗

NASA NTRS2013

High-Pressure Lightweight Thrusters

Returning samples of Martian soil and rock to Earth is of great interest to scientists. There were numerous studies to evaluate Mars Sample Return (MSR) mission architectures, technology needs, development plans, and requirements. The largest propulsion risk element of the MSR mission is the Mars Ascent Vehicle (MAV). Along with the baseline solid-propellant vehicle, liquid propellants have been considered. Similar requirements apply to other lander ascent engines and reaction control systems. The performance of current state-ofthe- art liquid propellant engines can be significantly improved by increasing both combustion temperature and pressure. Pump-fed propulsion is suggested for a single-stage bipropellant MAV. Achieving a 90-percent stage propellant fraction is thought to be possible on a 100-kg scale, including sufficient thrust for lifting off Mars. To increase the performance of storable bipropellant rocket engines, a high-pressure, lightweight combustion chamber was designed. Iridium liner electrodeposition was investigated on complex-shaped thrust chamber mandrels. Dense, uniform iridium liners were produced on chamber and cylindrical mandrels. Carbon/carbon composite (C/C) structures were braided over iridium-lined mandrels and densified by chemical vapor infiltration. Niobium deposition was evaluated for forming a metallic attachment flange on the carbon/ carbon structure. The new thrust chamber was designed to exceed state-of-the-art performance, and was manufactured with an 83-percent weight savings. High-performance C/Cs possess a unique set of properties that make them desirable materials for high-temperature structures used in rocket propulsion components, hypersonic vehicles, and aircraft brakes. In particular, more attention is focused on 3D braided C/Cs due to their mesh-work structure. Research on the properties of C/Cs has shown that the strength of composites is strongly affected by the fiber-matrix interfacial bonding, and that weakening interface realizes pseudo-plastic behavior with significant increase in the tensile strength. The investigation of high-temperature strength of C/Cs under high-rate heating (critical for thrust chambers) shows that tensile and compression strength increases from 70 MPa at room temperature to 110 MPa at 1,773 K, and up to 125 MPa at 2,473 K. Despite these unique properties, the use of C/Cs is limited by its high oxidation rate at elevated temperatures. Lining carbon/carbon chambers with a thin layer of iridium or iridium and rhenium is an innovative way to use proven refractory metals and provide the oxidation barrier necessary to enable the use of carbon/ carbon composites. Due to the lower density of C/Cs as compared to SiC/SiC composites, an iridium liner can be added to the C/C structure and still be below the overall thruster weight. Weight calculations show that C/C, C/C with 50 microns of Ir, and C/C with 100 microns of Ir are of less weight than alternative materials for the same construction.

Holmes, Richard↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

ECLSS Does Not Exist in a Vacuum: Integrated Analysis is Necessary to Inform System Architecture Decisions

Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS) architecture selection has profound implications for mission cost and mass extending far beyond the ECLSS itself. Similarly, other mission architecture decisions – particularly involving transportation systems – can influence optimal ECLSS architectures. Loop closure influences requirements for water, oxygen, and other consumables. System maintainability and reliability influences spares mass and risk. System, consumables, and spares mass interact with transportation system architectures and propellant demands and propulsion element sizing. All these interactions with other systems must be considered when evaluating ECLSS options. Analyses that focus only on maximizing ECLSS loop closure – or minimizing ECLSS mass, or minimizing ECLSS life cycle cost – may lead to sub-optimal or even counterproductive system architecture and investment decisions at the mission level. For example, an ECLSS architecture that minimizes ECLSS lifecycle cost but results in excessively high logistics mass could lead to significantly increased transportation system costs or make interplanetary transportation infeasible. Increased loop closure could result in higher development costs and higher mass if system/spares mass increases outweigh consumables reduction. In addition, systems mass and consumables mass are not directly comparable and have different impacts on propellant requirements, as consumables mass changes over the course of the mission. This paper presents an integrated analysis examining the overall impact of different ECLSS and transportation architectures on mass for a crewed Mars mission, including the habitat and transportation systems as well as consumables, spares, and propellant. Key observations are discussed, along with opportunities for further sensitivity analysis and model development. Overall, ECLSS development activities must consider their impacts at the mission level, as part of an integrated system, rather than in isolation.

Systems Analysis↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Integrated Trajectory, Habitat, and Logistics Analysis and Trade Study for Human Mars Missions

Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS) architecture selection has profound implications for mission cost and mass extending far beyond the ECLSS itself. Similarly, other mission architecture decisions – particularly involving transportation systems – can influence optimal ECLSS architectures. Loop closure influences requirements for water, oxygen, and other consumables. System maintainability and reliability influences spares mass and risk. System, consumables, and spares mass interact with transportation system architectures and propellant demands and propulsion element sizing. All these interactions with other systems must be considered when evaluating ECLSS options. Analyses that focus only on maximizing ECLSS loop closure – or minimizing ECLSS mass, or minimizing ECLSS life cycle cost – may lead to sub-optimal or even counterproductive system architecture and investment decisions at the mission level. For example, an ECLSS architecture that minimizes ECLSS life cycle cost but results in excessively high logistics mass could lead to significantly increased transportation system costs or make interplanetary transportation infeasible. Increased loop closure could result in higher development costs and higher mass if system/spares mass increases outweigh consumables reduction. In addition, systems mass and consumables mass are not directly comparable and have different impacts on propellant requirements, as consumables mass changes over the course of the mission. This paper presents an integrated analysis examining the overall impact of different ECLSS and transportation architectures on mass for a crewed Mars mission, including the habitat and transportation systems as well as consumables, spares, and propellant. Key observations are discussed, along with opportunities for further sensitivity analysis and model development. Overall, ECLSS development activities must consider their impacts at the mission level, as part of an integrated system, rather than in isolation.

Mars↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Integrated Trajectory, Habitat, and Logistics Analysis and Trade Study for Human Mars Missions

Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS) architecture selection has profound implications for mission cost and mass extending far beyond the ECLSS itself. Similarly, other mission architecture decisions – particularly involving transportation systems – can influence optimal ECLSS architectures. Loop closure influences requirements for water, oxygen, and other consumables. System maintainability and reliability influences spares mass and risk. System, consumables, and spares mass interact with transportation system architectures, including propellant demands and propulsion element sizing. All these interactions with other systems must be considered when evaluating ECLSS options. Analyses that focus only on maximizing ECLSS loop closure – or minimizing ECLSS mass, or minimizing ECLSS life cycle cost – may lead to sub-optimal or even counterproductive system architecture and investment decisions at the mission level. For example, an ECLSS architecture that minimizes ECLSS life cycle cost but results in excessively high logistics mass could lead to significantly increased transportation system costs or make interplanetary transportation infeasible. Increased loop closure could result in higher development costs and higher mass if system/spares mass increases outweigh consumables reduction. In addition, systems mass and consumables mass are not directly comparable and have different impacts on propellant requirements, as consumables mass changes over the course of the mission. This paper presents an integrated analysis examining the overall impact of different ECLSS and transportation architectures on Earth departure mass for a crewed Mars mission, including the habitat and transportation systems as well as consumables, spares, and propellant. Key observations are discussed, along with opportunities for further sensitivity analysis and model development. Overall, ECLSS development activities must consider their impacts at the mission level, as part of an integrated system, rather than in isolation.

Mars↗

NASA NTRS2010

Full Mission Astronaut Radiation Exposure Assessments for Long Duration Lunar Surface Missions

Risk to astronauts due to ionizing radiation exposure is a primary concern for missions beyond Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and will drive mission architecture requirements, mission timelines, and operational practices. Both galactic cosmic ray (GCR) and solar particle event (SPE) environments pose a risk to astronauts for missions beyond LEO. The GCR environment, which is made up of protons and heavier ions covering a broad energy spectrum, is ever present but varies in intensity with the solar cycle, while SPEs are sporadic events, consisting primarily of protons moving outward through the solar system from the sun. The GCR environment is more penetrating and is more difficult to shield than SPE environments, but lacks the intensity to induce acute effects. Large SPEs are rare, but they could result in a lethal dose, if adequate shielding is not provided. For short missions, radiation risk is dominated by the possibility of a large SPE. Longer missions also require planning for large SPEs; adequate shielding must be provided and operational constraints must allow astronauts to move quickly to shielded locations. The dominant risk for longer missions, however, is GCR exposure, which accumulates over time and can lead to late effects such as cancer. SPE exposure, even low level SPE exposure received in heavily shielded locations, will increase this risk. In addition to GCR and SPE environments, the lunar neutron albedo resulting mainly from the interaction of GCRs with regolith will also contribute to astronaut risk. Full mission exposure assessments were performed for proposed long duration lunar surface mission scenarios. In order to accomplish these assessments, radiation shielding models were developed for a proposed lunar habitat and rover. End-to-End mission exposure assessments were performed by first calculating exposure rates for locations in the habitat, rover, and during extra-vehicular activities (EVA). Subsequently, total mission exposures were evaluated for proposed timelines. A number of computational tools and mathematical models, which have been incorporated into NASA's On-Line Tool for the Assessment of Radiation In Space (OLTARIS), were used for this study. These tools include GCR and SPE environment models, human body models, and the HZETRN space radiation transport code, which is used to calculate the transport of the charged particles and neutrons through shielding materials and human tissue. Mission exposure results, assessed in terms of effective dose, are presented for proposed timelines and recommendations are made for improved astronaut shielding and safer operational practice.

Adamczyk, Anne M.↗