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NASA NTRS2021

Monte Carlo Tree Search Methods for the Earth-Observing Satellite Scheduling Problem

This work explores on-board planning for the single spacecraft, multiple ground station Earth-observing satellite scheduling problem through artificial neural network function approximation of state–action value estimates generated by Monte Carlo tree search (MCTS). An extensive hyperparameter search is conducted for MCTS on the basis of performance, safety, and downlink opportunity utilization to determine the best hyperparameter combination for data generation. A hyperparameter search is also conducted on neural network architectures. The learned behavior of each network is explored, and each network architecture’s robustness to orbits and epochs outside of the training distributions is investigated. Furthermore, each algorithm is compared with a genetic algorithm, which serves to provide a baseline for optimality. MCTS is shown to compute near-optimal solutions in comparison to the genetic algorithm. The state–action value networks are shown to match or exceed the performance of MCTS in six orders of magnitude less execution time, showing promise for execution on board spacecraft.

Adam P. Herrmann↗

NASA NTRS2017

Model-Driven Development of Safety Architectures

We describe the use of model-driven development for safety assurance of a pioneering NASA flight operation involving a fleet of small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) flying beyond visual line of sight. The central idea is to develop a safety architecture that provides the basis for risk assessment and visualization within a safety case, the formal justification of acceptable safety required by the aviation regulatory authority. A safety architecture is composed from a collection of bow tie diagrams (BTDs), a practical approach to manage safety risk by linking the identified hazards to the appropriate mitigation measures. The safety justification for a given unmanned aircraft system (UAS) operation can have many related BTDs. In practice, however, each BTD is independently developed, which poses challenges with respect to incremental development, maintaining consistency across different safety artifacts when changes occur, and in extracting and presenting stakeholder specific information relevant for decision making. We show how a safety architecture reconciles the various BTDs of a system, and, collectively, provide an overarching picture of system safety, by considering them as views of a unified model. We also show how it enables model-driven development of BTDs, replete with validations, transformations, and a range of views. Our approach, which we have implemented in our toolset, AdvoCATE, is illustrated with a running example drawn from a real UAS safety case. The models and some of the innovations described here were instrumental in successfully obtaining regulatory flight approval.

Safety case↗

NASA NTRS2024

Moon to Mars (M2M) Cross Program Utilization Payload Safety Process

It is the goal of Moon to Mars (M2M) to establish a single consolidated set of safety requirements and a safety review process for utilization payloads that will cross program vehicle hatches or operate externally on multiple program vehicles during transport or operation that satisfies Exploration Ground Systems (EGS), Orion, EVA, and Human Surface Mobility Program (EHP), Gateway (GW), and Human Landing System (HLS) programs. This document defines the Cross Program Utilization Payload (xPUP) safety review process for mission effectivity of Artemis III and beyond. This review process will help ensure protection of the overall Moon to Mars integrated system from potential hazards created by cross program payloads that either cross a program vehicle hatch or can interface with more than one M2M lunar exploration program vehicle. The process will identify payload hazards and controls that will protect ground personnel, flight crew, the integrated vehicle, ground equipment, or facilities. This process is also applicable to samples that cross hatches between vehicles including for return to Earth. The xPUP safety review process will be led by one of the M2M programs' integration safety panels, chosen on a per-payload basis. After the lead integration safety panel is determined, the common safety process is established, based on pre-determined criteria, which includes ad-hoc members from other stakeholder programs. Stakeholder programs are those that interface with the utilization payload in any way (e.g., operating on a lunar exploration vehicle or crossing program vehicle hatches). The xPUP will execute this safety review process for flight and ground utilization payload hardware design, its ground support equipment, and landing and recovery in accordance with the applicable safety requirements as specified in M2M-30043: Moon to Mars Cross Program Utilization Payload Safety Requirements. The xPUP safety process will follow the lead integration safety panel’s safety process requirements. Formal agreements will be communicated with the payload developer using the payload integration processes documented in M2M-30037, Artemis Payload Integration Implementation Plan.

payloads↗

NASA NTRS1974

A guide for performing system safety analysis

A general guide is presented for performing system safety analyses of hardware, software, operations and human elements of an aerospace program. The guide describes a progression of activities that can be effectively applied to identify hazards to personnel and equipment during all periods of system development. The general process of performing safety analyses is described; setting forth in a logical order the information and data requirements, the analytical steps, and the results. These analyses are the technical basis of a system safety program. Although the guidance established by this document cannot replace human experience and judgement, it does provide a methodical approach to the identification of hazards and evaluation of risks to the system.

Brush, J. M.↗

NASA NTRS2015

The SMART-NAS Testbed

The SMART-NAS Testbed for Safe Trajectory Based Operations Project will deliver an evaluation capability, critical to the ATM community, allowing full NextGen and beyond-NextGen concepts to be assessed and developed. To meet this objective a strong focus will be placed on concept integration and validation to enable a gate-to-gate trajectory-based system capability that satisfies a full vision for NextGen. The SMART-NAS for Safe TBO Project consists of six sub-projects. Three of the sub-projects are focused on exploring and developing technologies, concepts and models for evolving and transforming air traffic management operations in the ATM+2 time horizon, while the remaining three sub-projects are focused on developing the tools and capabilities needed for testing these advanced concepts. Function Allocation, Networked Air Traffic Management and Trajectory Based Operations are developing concepts and models. SMART-NAS Test-bed, System Assurance Technologies and Real-time Safety Modeling are developing the tools and capabilities to test these concepts. Simulation and modeling capabilities will include the ability to assess multiple operational scenarios of the national airspace system, accept data feeds, allowing shadowing of actual operations in either real-time, fast-time and/or hybrid modes of operations in distributed environments, and enable integrated examinations of concepts, algorithms, technologies, and NAS architectures. An important focus within this project is to enable the development of a real-time, system-wide safety assurance system. The basis of such a system is a continuum of information acquisition, analysis, and assessment that enables awareness and corrective action to detect and mitigate potential threats to continuous system-wide safety at all levels. This process, which currently can only be done post operations, will be driven towards "real-time" assessments in the 2035 time frame.

Trajectory Based Operations↗

NASA NTRS2023

Technical Basis Related to the Posture of NASA’s Office of Safety and Mission Assurance for the Launch of Radioactive Material Other than Space Nuclear Systems: Volume 1–Overview of Analysis and Results

NASA has launched and reentered payloads containing radioactive material for over 50 years. The isotopes, their quantity, and their form have varied significantly. The handling of this material prior to its integration into the spacecraft at the launch Center (and after its return to Earth after flight, if applicable) falls under the purview of the Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer, while after the radioactive material is integrated into the spacecraft at the launch Center, it falls under the purview of the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance’s (OSMA) Nuclear Flight Safety Program. Historically, OSMA concurrence was required for any launch or reentry involving radioactive material. However, OSMA recently revisited this posture due to changes in the Federal policy in this area, and the significant accrued experience. The current report represents the more quantitative study envisioned in the recent change in posture. More specifically, this document addresses the potential risks and other considerations associated with launching small quantities of radioactive material (below the level requiring the Federally-mandated process in National Security Presidential Memorandum- (NSPM-) 20, “Presidential Memorandum on Launch of Spacecraft Containing Space Nuclear Systems” (USG, 2019) to provide the technical basis for when such activities require OSMA concurrence versus notification, as it relates to nuclear flight safety.

Don Helton↗

NASA NTRS2014

The Evolution of System Safety at NASA

The NASA system safety framework is in the process of change, motivated by the desire to promote an objectives-driven approach to system safety that explicitly focuses system safety efforts on system-level safety performance, and serves to unify, in a purposeful manner, safety-related activities that otherwise might be done in a way that results in gaps, redundancies, or unnecessary work. An objectives-driven approach to system safety affords more flexibility to determine, on a system-specific basis, the means by which adequate safety is achieved and verified. Such flexibility and efficiency is becoming increasingly important in the face of evolving engineering modalities and acquisition models, where, for example, NASA will increasingly rely on commercial providers for transportation services to low-earth orbit. A key element of this objectives-driven approach is the use of the risk-informed safety case (RISC): a structured argument, supported by a body of evidence, that provides a compelling, comprehensible and valid case that a system is or will be adequately safe for a given application in a given environment. The RISC addresses each of the objectives defined for the system, providing a rational basis for making informed risk acceptance decisions at relevant decision points in the system life cycle.

Dezfuli, Homayoon↗

NASA NTRS1994

The use of interactive computer vision and robot hand controllers for enhancing manufacturing safety

Current available robotic systems provide limited support for CAD-based model-driven visualization, sensing algorithm development and integration, and automated graphical planning systems. This paper describes ongoing work which provides the functionality necessary to apply advanced robotics to automated manufacturing and assembly operations. An interface has been built which incorporates 6-DOF tactile manipulation, displays for three dimensional graphical models, and automated tracking functions which depend on automated machine vision. A set of tools for single and multiple focal plane sensor image processing and understanding has been demonstrated which utilizes object recognition models. The resulting tool will enable sensing and planning from computationally simple graphical objects. A synergistic interplay between human and operator vision is created from programmable feedback received from the controller. This approach can be used as the basis for implementing enhanced safety in automated robotics manufacturing, assembly, repair and inspection tasks in both ground and space applications. Thus, an interactive capability has been developed to match the modeled environment to the real task environment for safe and predictable task execution.

Marzwell, Neville I.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Probabilistic Risk Assessment Procedures Guide for NASA Managers and Practitioners (Second Edition)

Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is a comprehensive, structured, and logical analysis method aimed at identifying and assessing risks in complex technological systems for the purpose of cost-effectively improving their safety and performance. NASA's objective is to better understand and effectively manage risk, and thus more effectively ensure mission and programmatic success, and to achieve and maintain high safety standards at NASA. NASA intends to use risk assessment in its programs and projects to support optimal management decision making for the improvement of safety and program performance. In addition to using quantitative/probabilistic risk assessment to improve safety and enhance the safety decision process, NASA has incorporated quantitative risk assessment into its system safety assessment process, which until now has relied primarily on a qualitative representation of risk. Also, NASA has recently adopted the Risk-Informed Decision Making (RIDM) process [1-1] as a valuable addition to supplement existing deterministic and experience-based engineering methods and tools. Over the years, NASA has been a leader in most of the technologies it has employed in its programs. One would think that PRA should be no exception. In fact, it would be natural for NASA to be a leader in PRA because, as a technology pioneer, NASA uses risk assessment and management implicitly or explicitly on a daily basis. NASA has probabilistic safety requirements (thresholds and goals) for crew transportation system missions to the International Space Station (ISS) [1-2]. NASA intends to have probabilistic requirements for any new human spaceflight transportation system acquisition. Methods to perform risk and reliability assessment in the early 1960s originated in U.S. aerospace and missile programs. Fault tree analysis (FTA) is an example. It would have been a reasonable extrapolation to expect that NASA would also become the world leader in the application of PRA. That was, however, not to happen. Early in the Apollo program, estimates of the probability for a successful roundtrip human mission to the moon yielded disappointingly low (and suspect) values and NASA became discouraged from further performing quantitative risk analyses until some two decades later when the methods were more refined, rigorous, and repeatable. Instead, NASA decided to rely primarily on the Hazard Analysis (HA) and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) methods for system safety assessment.

Stamatelatos,Michael↗

NASA NTRS1994

Evaluation in context: ATC automation in the field

The process for incorporating advanced technologies into complex aviation systems is as important as the final product itself. This paper described a process that is currently being applied to the development and assessment of an advanced ATC automation system, CTAS. The key element of the process is field exposure early in the system development cycle. The process deviates from current established practices of system development -- where field testing is an implementation endpoint -- and has been deemed necessary by the FAA for streamlining development and bringing system functions to a level of stability and usefulness. Methods and approaches for field assessment are borrowed from human factors engineering, cognitive engineering, and usability engineering and are tailored for the constraints of an operational ATC environment. To date, the focus has been on the qualitative assessment of the match between TMA capabilities and the context for their use. Capturing the users' experience with the automation tool and understanding tool use in the context of the operational environment is important, not only for developing a tool that is an effective problem-solving instrument but also for defining meaningful operational requirements. Such requirements form the basis for certifying the safety and efficiency of the system. CTAS is the first U.S. advanced ATC automation system of its scope and complexity to undergo this field development and assessment process. With the rapid advances in aviation technologies and our limited understanding of their impact on system performance, it is time we opened our eyes to new possibilities for developing, validating, and ultimately certifying complex aviation systems.

Harwood, Kelly↗

NASA NTRS2020

Cyclomatic Complexity and Basis Path Testing Study

The NASA Chief Engineer requested the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) to conduct a study to determine the benefits of cyclomatic complexity and basis path testing (BPT) for software and whether they should be required. The principal focus of the assessment was to assess the use of cyclomatic complexity and BPT on safety-critical software. The purpose was to ensure that safety-critical software is not overly complicated to the point of increasing coding errors and that verification is more robust than for non-safety-critical software. This document contains the outcome of the assessment.

Cyclomatic Complexity; NASA Engineering and Safety↗

NASA NTRS2011

Towards Measurement of Confidence in Safety Cases

Arguments in safety cases are predominantly qualitative. This is partly attributed to the lack of sufficient design and operational data necessary to measure the achievement of high-dependability targets, particularly for safety-critical functions implemented in software. The subjective nature of many forms of evidence, such as expert judgment and process maturity, also contributes to the overwhelming dependence on qualitative arguments. However, where data for quantitative measurements is systematically collected, quantitative arguments provide far more benefits over qualitative arguments, in assessing confidence in the safety case. In this paper, we propose a basis for developing and evaluating integrated qualitative and quantitative safety arguments based on the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) and Bayesian Networks (BN). The approach we propose identifies structures within GSN-based arguments where uncertainties can be quantified. BN are then used to provide a means to reason about confidence in a probabilistic way. We illustrate our approach using a fragment of a safety case for an unmanned aerial system and conclude with some preliminary observations

Denney, Ewen↗

NASA NTRS1982

A system safety model for developmental aircraft programs

Basic tenets of safety as applied to developmental aircraft programs are presented. The integration of safety into the project management aspects of planning, organizing, directing and controlling is illustrated by examples. The basis for project management use of safety and the relationship of these management functions to 'real-world' situations is presented. The rationale which led to the safety-related project decision and the lessons learned as they may apply to future projects are presented.

Amberboy, E. J.↗

NASA NTRS1993

NASA safety program activities in support of the Space Exploration Initiatives Nuclear Propulsion program

The activities of the joint NASA/DOE/DOD Nuclear Propulsion Program Technical Panels have been used as the basis for the current development of safety policies and requirements for the Space Exploration Initiatives (SEI) Nuclear Propulsion Technology development program. The Safety Division of the NASA Office of Safety and Mission Quality has initiated efforts to develop policies for the safe use of nuclear propulsion in space through involvement in the joint agency Nuclear Safety Policy Working Group (NSPWG), encouraged expansion of the initial policy development into proposed programmatic requirements, and suggested further expansion into the overall risk assessment and risk management process for the NASA Exploration Program. Similar efforts are underway within the Department of Energy to ensure the safe development and testing of nuclear propulsion systems on Earth. This paper describes the NASA safety policy related to requirements for the design of systems that may operate where Earth re-entry is a possibility. The expected plan of action is to support and oversee activities related to the technology development of nuclear propulsion in space, and support the overall safety and risk management program being developed for the NASA Exploration Program.

Sawyer, J. C., Jr.↗

NASA NTRS1976

Report to the NASA Administrator by the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel on the Space Shuttle Program. Part 1: Observations and Conclusions

Each system was chosen on the basis of its importance with respect to crew safety and mission success. An overview of the systems management is presented. The space shuttle main engine, orbiter thermal protection system, avionics, external tanks and solid rocket boosters were examined. The ground test and ground support equipment programs were studied. Program management was found to have an adequate understanding of the significant ground and flight risks involved.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS1982

Integrated Application of Active Controls (IAAC) technology to an advanced subsonic transport project. ACT/Control/Guidance System study, volume 1

The active control technology (ACT) control/guidance system task of the integrated application of active controls (IAAC) technology project within the NASA energy efficient transport program was documented. The air traffic environment of navigation and air traffic control systems and procedures were extrapolated. An approach to listing flight functions which will be performed by systems and crew of an ACT configured airplane of the 1990s, and a determination of function criticalities to safety of flight, are the basis of candidate integrated ACT/Control/Guidance System architecture. The system mechanizes five active control functions: pitch augmented stability, angle of attack limiting, lateral/directional augmented stability, gust load alleviation, and maneuver load control. The scope and requirements of a program for simulating the integrated ACT avionics and flight deck system, with pilot in the loop, are defined, system and crew interface elements are simulated, and mechanization is recommended. Relationships between system design and crew roles and procedures are evaluated.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS1994

The Charlotte (TM) intra-vehicular robot

NASA has identified telerobotics and telescience as essential technologies to reduce the crew extra-vehicular activity (EVA) and intra-vehicular activity (IVA) workloads. Under this project, we are developing and flight testing a novel IVA robot to relieve the crew of tedious and routine tasks. Through ground telerobotic control of this robot, we will enable ground researchers to routinely interact with experiments in space. Our approach is to develop an IVA robot system incrementally by employing a series of flight tests with increasing complexity. This approach has the advantages of providing an early IVA capability that can assist the crew, demonstrate capabilities that ground researchers can be confident of in planning for future experiments, and allow incremental refinement of system capabilities and insertion of new technology. In parallel with this approach to flight testing, we seek to establish ground test beds, in which the requirements of payload experimenters can be further investigated. In 1993 we reviewed manifested SpaceHab experiments and defined IVA robot requirements to assist in their operation. We also examined previous IVA robot designs and assessed them against flight requirements. We rejected previous design concepts on the basis of threat to crew safety, operability, and maintainability. Based on this insight, we developed an entirely new concept for IVA robotics, the CHARLOTTE robot system. Ground based testing of a prototype version of the system has already proven its ability to perform most common tasks demanded of the crew, including operation of switches, buttons, knobs, dials, and performing video surveys of experiments and switch panels.

Swaim, Patrick L.↗

NASA NTRS2003

A Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) of Human Space Missions for the Advanced Integration Matrix (AIM)

The Advanced Integration Matrix (AIM) Project u7ill study and solve systems-level integration issues for exploration missions beyond Low Earth Orbit (LEO), through the design and development of a ground-based facility for developing revolutionary integrated systems for joint human-robotic missions. This paper describes a Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) of human space missions that was developed to help define the direction and priorities for AIM. Risk analysis is required for all major NASA programs and has been used for shuttle, station, and Mars lander programs. It is a prescribed part of early planning and is necessary during concept definition, even before mission scenarios and system designs exist. PRA cm begin when little failure data are available, and be continually updated and refined as detail becomes available. PRA provides a basis for examining tradeoffs among safety, reliability, performance, and cost. The objective of AIM's PRA is to indicate how risk can be managed and future human space missions enabled by the AIM Project. Many critical events can cause injuries and fatalities to the crew without causing loss of vehicle or mission. Some critical systems are beyond AIM's scope, such as propulsion and guidance. Many failure-causing events can be mitigated by conducting operational tests in AIM, such as testing equipment and evaluating operational procedures, especially in the areas of communications and computers, autonomous operations, life support, thermal design, EVA and rover activities, physiological factors including habitation, medical equipment, and food, and multifunctional tools and repairable systems. AIM is well suited to test and demonstrate the habitat, life support, crew operations, and human interface. Because these account for significant crew, systems performance, and science risks, AIM will help reduce mission risk, and missions beyond LEO are far enough in the future that AIM can have significant impact.

Jones, Harry W.↗