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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2004

Markov Jump-Linear Performance Models for Recoverable Flight Control Computers

Single event upsets in digital flight control hardware induced by atmospheric neutrons can reduce system performance and possibly introduce a safety hazard. One method currently under investigation to help mitigate the effects of these upsets is NASA Langley s Recoverable Computer System. In this paper, a Markov jump-linear model is developed for a recoverable flight control system, which will be validated using data from future experiments with simulated and real neutron environments. The method of tracking error analysis and the plan for the experiments are also described.

Zhang, Hong↗
NASA NTRS2016

Assurance of Fault Management: Risk-Significant Adverse Condition Awareness

Fault Management (FM) systems are ranked high in risk-based assessment of criticality within flight software, emphasizing the importance of establishing highly competent domain expertise to provide assurance for NASA projects, especially as spaceflight systems continue to increase in complexity. Insight into specific characteristics of FM architectures seen embedded within safety- and mission-critical software systems analyzed by the NASA Independent Verification Validation (IVV) Program has been enhanced with an FM Technical Reference (TR) suite. Benefits are aimed beyond the IVV community to those that seek ways to efficiently and effectively provide software assurance to reduce the FM risk posture of NASA and other space missions. The identification of particular FM architectures, visibility, and associated IVV techniques provides a TR suite that enables greater assurance that critical software systems will adequately protect against faults and respond to adverse conditions. The role FM has with regard to overall asset protection of flight software systems is being addressed with the development of an adverse condition (AC) database encompassing flight software vulnerabilities.Identification of potential off-nominal conditions and analysis to determine how a system responds to these conditions are important aspects of hazard analysis and fault management. Understanding what ACs the mission may face, and ensuring they are prevented or addressed is the responsibility of the assurance team, which necessarily should have insight into ACs beyond those defined by the project itself. Research efforts sponsored by NASAs Office of Safety and Mission Assurance defined terminology, categorized data fields, and designed a baseline repository that centralizes and compiles a comprehensive listing of ACs and correlated data relevant across many NASA missions. This prototype tool helps projects improve analysis by tracking ACs, and allowing queries based on project, mission type, domain component, causal fault, and other key characteristics. The repository has a firm structure, initial collection of data, and an interface established for informational queries, with plans for integration within the Enterprise Architecture at NASA IVV, enabling support and accessibility across the Agency. The development of an improved workflow process for adaptive, risk-informed FM assurance is currently underway.

Software Verification & Validation↗
NASA NTRS2023

Adaptive Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Reduces Risk of Software Impacting Safety in Artemis Missions

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is asking more of its human spaceflight programs than ever before through the collective Artemis Missions. The NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Program contributes to NASA’s human spaceflight goals by providing IV&V services for NASA’s critical spacecraft and ground software. The IV&V Program is tasked with providing assurance from both individual and integrated mission software perspectives. The Artemis IV&V organization is actively supporting six distinct development efforts: Orion, the Space Launch System (SLS), Exploration Ground Systems (EGS), Mission Control Center (MCC), the Lunar Gateway, and the Human Landing System (HLS), representing a wide diversity of developer organizations, management structures, and development approaches. With much of this extremely complex flight and ground software being essential to human safety both on the ground and in space, Artemis IV&V is likewise challenged to provide more value-added assurance to future Artemis missions within a constrained budget. To meet this challenge, Artemis IV&V employs a variety of novel and evolving “Adaptive IV&V” approaches for planning and executing IV&V analysis to increase both the efficiency and effectiveness of the IV&V Program’s assurance activities, and to address the difficulties imposed by assuring software for a large, highly integrated, multi-mission enterprise managed and executed by physically and organizationally distinct programs. Instilling agile principles like iterative planning cycles, self-organizing teams, and regular retrospectives, into IV&V planning and execution has led to a more rapid turnaround of a minimum viable assurance product and allowed for increased alignment of assurance activities with development progress. Adopting an assurance case methodology has led to greater consistency and clearer communication of assurance design and provided a foundation for long-term maintenance of assurance plans, products, and results across missions. The IV&V-developed Assurance / Safety Case Analytical Network (A-SCAN) framework and tool has enabled the quantification and tracking of system/software risk and confidence. These confidence measures provide a means to repeatedly express the impact of planned and completed assurance work and the remaining residual risk. Applied as part of a “Follow-the-Risk” organizational ethos, this allows consistent rightsizing of analysis rigor and intensity commensurate with the perceived risk of defects, as well as appropriate targeting of the highest risk areas of the software to find safety issues before they can manifest. Finally, the development of the IV&V Advanced Risk Reduction Integrated Software Test and Operations Tri-program Lightweight Environment (ARRISTOTLE), an integrated software-only simulation of Orion, SLS, and EGS systems, has made it possible to independently test integrated pad and flight scenarios and inject faults to observe how the Artemis multi-program, mission software behaves in degraded modes and in response to hazards. These adaptive IV&V investments have enabled Artemis IV&V to become more efficient and effective in IV&V planning and execution and respond more readily to changes in the risk landscape, increasing the breadth and depth of risk reduction possible within the available resources. Residual risk tracking allows IV&V to communicate more effectively with stakeholders, both internal and external at all levels, and inform key decision-making personnel. This evolving assurance design approach provides IV&V surety that work is performed in the highest risk, most value-added areas of the software, to keep our astronauts and ground crews safe and ensure mission success.

Gerek A Whitman↗
NASA NTRS2023

Adaptive Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Reduces Risk of Software Impacting Safety in Artemis Missions

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is asking more of its human spaceflight programs than ever before through the collective Artemis Missions. The NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Program contributes to NASA’s human spaceflight goals by providing IV&V services for NASA’s critical spacecraft and ground software. The IV&V Program is tasked with providing assurance from both individual and integrated mission software perspectives. The Artemis IV&V organization is actively supporting six distinct development efforts: Orion, the Space Launch System (SLS), Exploration Ground Systems (EGS), Mission Control Center (MCC), the Lunar Gateway, and the Human Landing System (HLS), representing a wide diversity of developer organizations, management structures, and development approaches. With much of this extremely complex flight and ground software being essential to human safety both on the ground and in space, Artemis IV&V is likewise challenged to provide more value-added assurance to future Artemis missions within a constrained budget. To meet this challenge, Artemis IV&V employs a variety of novel and evolving “Adaptive IV&V” approaches for planning and executing IV&V analysis to increase both the efficiency and effectiveness of the IV&V Program’s assurance activities, and to address the difficulties imposed by assuring software for a large, highly integrated, multi-mission enterprise managed and executed by physically and organizationally distinct programs. Instilling agile principles like iterative planning cycles, self-organizing teams, and regular retrospectives, into IV&V planning and execution has led to a more rapid turnaround of a minimum viable assurance product and allowed for increased alignment of assurance activities with development progress. Adopting an assurance case methodology has led to greater consistency and clearer communication of assurance design and provided a foundation for long-term maintenance of assurance plans, products, and results across missions. The IV&V-developed Assurance / Safety Case Analytical Network (A-SCAN) framework and tool has enabled the quantification and tracking of system/software risk and confidence. These confidence measures provide a means to repeatedly express the impact of planned and completed assurance work and the remaining residual risk. Applied as part of a “Follow-the-Risk” organizational ethos, this allows consistent rightsizing of analysis rigor and intensity commensurate with the perceived risk of defects, as well as appropriate targeting of the highest risk areas of the software to find safety issues before they can manifest. Finally, the development of the IV&V Advanced Risk Reduction Integrated Software Test and Operations Tri-program Lightweight Environment (ARRISTOTLE), an integrated software-only simulation of Orion, SLS, and EGS systems, has made it possible to independently test integrated pad and flight scenarios and inject faults to observe how the Artemis multi-program, mission software behaves in degraded modes and in response to hazards. These adaptive IV&V investments have enabled Artemis IV&V to become more efficient and effective in IV&V planning and execution and respond more readily to changes in the risk landscape, increasing the breadth and depth of risk reduction possible within the available resources. Residual risk tracking allows IV&V to communicate more effectively with stakeholders, both internal and external at all levels, and inform key decision-making personnel. This evolving assurance design approach provides IV&V surety that work is performed in the highest risk, most value-added areas of the software, to keep our astronauts and ground crews safe and ensure mission success.

Gerek Whitman↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA's Identified Risk of Adverse Outcomes due to Inadequate Human Systems Integration Architecture

The NASA Human System Risk Board (HSRB) is responsible for tracking the evolution of the top ~30 human system risks identified to be associated with human spaceflight. As part of this process, the Board is charged with maintaining a consistent, integrated process to evaluate those risks and developing evidence-based risk posture recommendations. Risks are ranked by likelihood and consequence. Intermediate causal relationships between risk contributing factors and countermeasures that link hazards to outcomes are described using Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs). The DAGs are also useful for identifying common factors and countermeasures across the top 30 risks as well as communicating how astronaut exposure to spaceflight hazards leads to meaningful mission-level health and performance outcomes. One of the top risks tracked by the HSRB is The Risk of Adverse Outcomes Due to Inadequate Human-Systems Integration Architecture (HSIA). This risk captures the possibility that due to decreasing real-time ground support during missions beyond LEO, crew will be unable to adequately respond to unanticipated critical malfunctions or detect safety-critical procedural errors. The HSIA risk is ranked red (high) for Lunar surface and Mars missions due to the probability of Loss of Crew and Loss of Mission consequences. This paper describes the evidence that supports the HSIA risk ranking and presents the central narrative of the HSIA risk DAG-- i.e., anomaly detection, diagnosis, intervention, and task performance. Characterizations of the current state of practice for each of the DAG’s central nodes and the future tools needed for successful anomaly response are provided.

human-systems integration architecture↗
DOE OSTI2021

Wood-to-Fuel Demonstration Project for California's Transportation Sector using Autothermal Pyrolysis (Non-Proprietary Summary Process Hazard Assessment)

Frontline has prioritized personnel safety, equipment preservation, and environmental protection throughout the design process of the autothermal pyrolysis unit. To facilitate a safe design, Frontline completed an informal hazards and operability (HAZOP) study and a formal HAZOP study, and employ management of change procedures. The result of these safety procedures is a plant that will function in a safe manner with a limited and acceptable amount of risk. Frontline took an approach it used in previous projects to execute a preliminary, internally facilitated hazards and operability (HAZOP) study. While this HAZOP study was performed without any subsequent change tracking, it enables a group of well-trained engineers to consider the safety implications of each part of the plant in a thorough and methodical manner. Frontline chose to bring in a pyrolysis consultant (Daren Daugaard of Burning Oak Energy) to participate in the review. Following the preliminary HAZOP and once the detailed design work was nearing completion, Frontline performed a formal HAZOP with a third-party facilitator, Jason Stittleburg of Novetus Engineering. Although the plant is not subject to process safety management (PSM) requirements, this formal HAZOP was performed in accordance with OSHA regulations deemed reasonable for PSM. Finally, after the formal HAZOP was conducted, Frontline maintained a safe system by implementing and following management of change procedures on each substantial change to the process. Frontline has kept a record of each subsequent change made to the formal HAZOP P&IDs. The process hazard assessment process allowed Frontline to find and correct several unacceptable configurations within the plant.

09 BIOMASS FUELS↗
NASA NTRS2017

Risk-Significant Adverse Condition Awareness Strengthens Assurance of Fault Management Systems

As spaceflight systems increase in complexity, Fault Management (FM) systems are ranked high in risk-based assessment of software criticality, emphasizing the importance of establishing highly competent domain expertise to provide assurance. Adverse conditions (ACs) and specific vulnerabilities encountered by safety- and mission-critical software systems have been identified through efforts to reduce the risk posture of software-intensive NASA missions. Acknowledgement of potential off-nominal conditions and analysis to determine software system resiliency are important aspects of hazard analysis and FM. A key component of assuring FM is an assessment of how well software addresses susceptibility to failure through consideration of ACs. Focus on significant risk predicted through experienced analysis conducted at the NASA Independent Verification & Validation (IV&V) Program enables the scoping of effective assurance strategies with regard to overall asset protection of complex spaceflight as well as ground systems. Research efforts sponsored by NASAs Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA) defined terminology, categorized data fields, and designed a baseline repository that centralizes and compiles a comprehensive listing of ACs and correlated data relevant across many NASA missions. This prototype tool helps projects improve analysis by tracking ACs and allowing queries based on project, mission type, domain/component, causal fault, and other key characteristics. Vulnerability in off-nominal situations, architectural design weaknesses, and unexpected or undesirable system behaviors in reaction to faults are curtailed with the awareness of ACs and risk-significant scenarios modeled for analysts through this database. Integration within the Enterprise Architecture at NASA IV&V enables interfacing with other tools and datasets, technical support, and accessibility across the Agency. This paper discusses the development of an improved workflow process utilizing this database for adaptive, risk-informed FM assurance that critical software systems will safely and securely protect against faults and respond to ACs in order to achieve successful missions.

IV&V↗
NASA NTRS2017

Risk-Significant Adverse Condition Awareness Strengthens Assurance of Fault Management Systems

As spaceflight systems increase in complexity, Fault Management (FM) systems are ranked high in risk-based assessment of software criticality, emphasizing the importance of establishing highly competent domain expertise to provide assurance. Adverse conditions (ACs) and specific vulnerabilities encountered by safety- and mission-critical software systems have been identified through efforts to reduce the risk posture of software-intensive NASA missions. Acknowledgement of potential off-nominal conditions and analysis to determine software system resiliency are important aspects of hazard analysis and FM. A key component of assuring FM is an assessment of how well software addresses susceptibility to failure through consideration of ACs. Focus on significant risk predicted through experienced analysis conducted at the NASA Independent Verification Validation (IVV) Program enables the scoping of effective assurance strategies with regard to overall asset protection of complex spaceflight as well as ground systems. Research efforts sponsored by NASA's Office of Safety and Mission Assurance defined terminology, categorized data fields, and designed a baseline repository that centralizes and compiles a comprehensive listing of ACs and correlated data relevant across many NASA missions. This prototype tool helps projects improve analysis by tracking ACs and allowing queries based on project, mission type, domaincomponent, causal fault, and other key characteristics. Vulnerability in off-nominal situations, architectural design weaknesses, and unexpected or undesirable system behaviors in reaction to faults are curtailed with the awareness of ACs and risk-significant scenarios modeled for analysts through this database. Integration within the Enterprise Architecture at NASA IVV enables interfacing with other tools and datasets, technical support, and accessibility across the Agency. This paper discusses the development of an improved workflow process utilizing this database for adaptive, risk-informed FM assurance that critical software systems will safely and securely protect against faults and respond to ACs in order to achieve successful missions.

Fault management↗
NASA NTRS2013

Solar Flares

Because the Earth resides in the atmosphere of our nearest stellar neighbor, events occurring on the Sun's surface directly affect us by interfering with satellite operations and communications, astronaut safety, and, in extreme circumstances, power grid stability. Solar flares, the most energetic events in our solar system, are a substantial source of hazardous space weather affecting our increasingly technology-dependent society. While flares have been observed using ground-based telescopes for over 150 years, modern space-bourne observatories have provided nearly continuous multi-wavelength flare coverage that cannot be obtained from the ground. We can now probe the origins and evolution of flares by tracking particle acceleration, changes in ionized plasma, and the reorganization of magnetic fields. I will walk through our current understanding of why flares occur and how they affect the Earth and also show several examples of these fantastic explosions.

Savage, Sabrina↗
NASA NTRS2011

Shuttle Communications and Tracking, Avionics, and Electromagnetic Compatibility

By definition, electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) is the capability of components, sub-systems, and systems, to operate in their intended electromagnetic environment, within an established margin of safety, and at design levels of performance. Practice of the discipline itself incorporates knowledge of various aspects of applied physics, materials science, and engineering across the board, and includes control and mitigation of undesirable electromagnetic interaction between intentional and unintentional emitters and receivers of radio frequency energy, both within and external to the vehicle; identification and control of the hazards of non-ionizing electromagnetic radiation to personnel, ordnance, and fuels and propellants; and vehicle and system protection from the direct and indirect effects of lightning and various other forms of electrostatic discharge (ESD) threats, such as triboelectrification and plasma charging. EMC is extremely complex and far-reaching, affecting in some degree every aspect of the vehicle s design and operation. The most successful efforts incorporate EMC design features and techniques throughout design and fabrication of the vehicle s structure and components, as well as appropriate operational considerations with regard to electromagnetic threats in the operational environment, from the beginning of the design effort to the end of the life cycle of the manufactured product. This approach yields the highest design performance with the lowest cost and schedule impact.

deSilva, K.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Get-Away tether experiment - Experimental plans

The experimental capabilities of the Get-Away Tether Experiment (GATE) are presented and a series of demonstration mission are proposed. The GATE is a free-flying tether system that will develop or demonstrate technology in the areas of tether dynamics (deployment and stabilization, retrieval, stationkeeping, and severance), tether electrodynamics, micrometeor hazards to tethers, and disturbance rejection. The system consists of two subsatellites connected by 1 km of tether. The free-flying system is ejected from the Orbiter via a Getaway Special (GAS) canister. Two dynamics missions are profiled along with a description of electrodynamic mission capabilities. The dynamic interactions of the end body and tether may be observed from the Orbiter or from an on-board video tracking system. Hence, GATE provides a unique, low cost capability to demonstrate various tether technologies, and address critical design and safety issues associated with future tether applications. An assessment of the significant measurable parameters and associated instrumentation is given. Future work and system development projection schedules are also outlined.

Greene, Michael↗
NASA NTRS2019

Method for Tracking and Communicating Aggregate Risk Through the Use of Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) Tools

Large, complex projects can identify a significant number and variety of risks, throughout the project life cycle. These risks are analyzed, mitigated, closed or accepted as independent uncertainties. Once closed or accepted, it is easy for projects to lose awareness of their impact. In reality, each of these risks contributes some amount to the overall risk posture of the project. The ability to track and effectively communicate this aggregate risk has represented a challenge to project management. There have been previous attempts to create a schema to communicate the aggregate effect of risks, without notable success. Most of these attempts have centered on some additive metric derived from the scoring of likelihood and consequence values. This, in and of itself, is a logical approach, but all too often the scores were then aggregated to a level where all context was lost. One weakness has been a lack of attempt to create linkages or logical groups of the risks upon which useful aggregation could then occur. The overall move to model-based (systems) engineering (MBSE) has opened up a vast frontier of opportunities to better integrate all project data. MBSE provides an underlying layer that links data items to each other. Objectives link to requirements, which then link to functions, functions to physical architecture items, and so on, as far down as projects want to model. While it started with a focus on modeling requirements based on things like use cases, efforts are now underway to integrate safety and mission assurance (S&MA) information and analyses, such as risks. This effort, called Model Based Mission Assurance (MBMA), is yielding models that are more useful and are a more accurate representations of the systems. MBSE models, with this ability to link related items, provide a new means of tracking and communicating aggregate risks. In the proposed method, risks are added into the models as distinct items, having attributes that communicate a scoring derived from the likelihood and consequence values as charted on the standard NASA 5x5 risk matrix. Like earlier efforts, each box in the 5x5 has an associated scoring, which may include both a current score and potential post-mitigation/control score. The risk items are then linked to elements of the model, such as system objectives/goals, requirements, functions, or physical architecture items, with "Risk to" relationships. These risks will then be communicated by use of reports generated from the model, detailing all risks and/or hazards linked to model elements. These reports can include aggregate impacts, including a current scoring and potential future state scoring based on the planned mitigations and/or controls. These reports will show all risks, open, accepted, and closed, linked to project objectives or requirements. When run as part of an upcoming risk acceptance discussion, these reports will serve to remind the team of all previous risks that relate to the effected portion of the system. When included as part of periodic program or project reviews, risk reviews, and safety reviews, this method can improve the overall understanding of the system's true risk posture. This proposed method takes full advantage of the advances that modern modeling techniques provide, with a minimal investment of additional time. Utilizing the model environment also enables a near constant access to current state of aggregate risks.

model based mission assurance↗
NASA NTRS2005

Pre-Launch GOES-R Risk Reduction Activities for the Geostationary Lightning Mapper

The GOES-R Geostationary Lightning Mapper (GLM) is a new instrument planned for GOES-R that will greatly improve storm hazard nowcasting and increase warning lead time day and night. Daytime detection of lightning is a particularly significant technological advance given the fact that the solar illuminated cloud-top signal can exceed the intensity of the lightning signal by a factor of one hundred. Our approach is detailed across three broad themes which include: Data Processing Algorithm Readiness, Forecast Applications, and Radiance Data Mining. These themes address how the data will be processed and distributed, and the algorithms and models for developing, producing, and using the data products. These pre-launch risk reduction activities will accelerate the operational and research use of the GLM data once GOES-R begins on-orbit operations. The GLM will provide unprecedented capabilities for tracking thunderstorms and earlier warning of impending severe and hazardous weather threats. By providing direct information on lightning initiation, propagation, extent, and rate, the GLM will also capture the updraft dynamics and life cycle of convective storms, as well as internal ice precipitation processes. The GLM provides information directly from the heart of the thunderstorm as opposed to cloud-top only. Nowcasting applications enabled by the GLM data will expedite the warning and response time of emergency management systems, improve the dispatch of electric power utility repair crews, and improve airline routing around thunderstorms thereby improving safety and efficiency, saving fuel and reducing delays. The use of GLM data will assist the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the Forest Service in quickly detecting lightning ground strikes that have a high probability of causing fires. Finally, GLM data will help assess the role of thunderstorms and deep convection in global climate, and will improve regional air quality and global chemistry/climate modeling. The GLM has a robust design that benefits and improves upon its strong heritage of NASA-developed LEO predecessors, the Optical Transient Detector (OTD) and the Lightning Imaging Sensor (LIS). GLM will have a substantially larger number of pixels within the focal plane, two lens systems, and multiple Real-Time Event Processors REPS for on-board event detection and data compression to provide continuous observations of the Americas and adjacent oceans.

Goodman, S. J.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Investigating Risks Due to Artemis EVA Tempo Via Probabilistic Risk Assessment

Spaceflight operations pose unique challenges to crew health, safety, and resource management. As space agencies and private companies continue to push the boundaries of human exploration, it is essential to understand the risks associated with Extravehicular Activities (EVAs) and develop strategies to mitigate them. The tempo at which EVAs are conducted – the total number and frequency of these activities – can have a profound impact on medical risks, resource consumption, and overall mission success. Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) provides a powerful framework for evaluating complex systems and identifying potential hazards. Our work employs the Medical Extensible Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment Tool (MEDPRAT) [1] to simulate mission events, occurrence and treatment of medical conditions, and track the utilization of resources. Coupled with the Evidence Library [2], a medical evidence base for exploration-class missions developed by the Exploration Medical Capability within NASA’s Human Research Program, we can estimate these risks with increased fidelity and optimize medical kit contents to meet specific mission requirements. This presentation provides a detailed examination of how EVA tempo influences medical risk estimates for a lunar surface design reference mission. A comprehensive analysis is conducted to assess the additional mass and volume burden imposed on medical kits required to maintain adequate levels of risk mitigation. Furthermore, we estimate the distribution of the number of successful EVAs completed based on the level of task impairment imposed by medical events and flight rules related to specific medical events, such as decompression sickness.

Modeling↗
DOE OSTI2020

GEMINI Case Study

Sandia's GEMINI-Scout Mine Rescue Robot is an unmanned ground vehicle designed to enter potentially hazardous environments to explore, assess, and evaluate dangerous situations first responders may face when conducting a rescue mission. GEMINI is approximately four feet long and two feet tall, which enables the robot to maneuver through small locations on rough terrains caused by earthquakes, fires, or radiological incidents. GEMINI uses track propulsion to climb stairs, travel through gravel and sand pits, pivot in place, and traverse 45-degree climbs with few problems. Furthermore, the vehicle's dual tracked-chassis design allows it to operate in hostile, dark, muddy, high-temperature, and explosive debris-strewn environments, while maintaining efficient ground mobility. The mobility and modularity of the vehicle allow for easy integration of sensors to conduct gas and temperature sensing and offers pan/tilt, zoom color, and thermal camera video streaming capabilities. The vehicle is also able to carry a payload of about 50 pounds of batteries and can handle an additional 200 pounds of payload, whether for additional diagnostics, supplies, or clothing for those trapped in an effected area. GEMINI is remotely operated through a wireless connection and an onboard computer running a customized embedded control application, which directly communicates to all onboard components except for the audio and video systems. When line of sight is not possible, operators use a shockresistant fiber optic cable to ensure continuous functionality of the vehicle. This allows for direct local control of the vehicle, which streams collected data back to the operator for enhanced situational awareness. In addition, the vehicle incorporates safety features such as explosion proof housing to ensure safe electronic operations in hazardous gas or flooded environments; a four-channel video link and two-way audio to ensure located survivors can communicate with operators; and an MSHA-approved multi-gas sensor to monitor air quality.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Hazard Detection Detector Cards

This report presents a comprehensive summary of five advanced anomaly detection tools developed and deployed by Oak Ridge National Laboratory in support of the VA’s Health Information Technology modernization. These detectors—Order Path Tracker, Trend Watcher, Pain Pointer, Performance Monitor, and Patient Record Flag Detector—leverage statistical and machine learning methods to monitor workflow disruptions, detect anomalies in care sequences and volumes, identify bottlenecks, and track system-level performance metrics across VistA and Millennium systems. All detectors have been integrated into the Health Data Analytics Platform (HDAP), with most having completed deployment and testing using live data from targeted stations in cardiology and oncology domains. This work enhances VA’s capacity for proactive system surveillance, promotes patient safety, and informs data-driven operational improvements across the EHR ecosystem.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
NASA NTRS2006

Evaluation of Risk and Possible Mitigation Schemes for Previously Unidentified Hazards

In April 2004, the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) was commissioned by NASA's Chief Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) Officer to review and render a technical opinion on the probability of a catastrophic failure related to this scenario: The Space Shuttle Program (SSP) recognized a zero-fault-tolerant design related to an inadvertent firing of the primary reaction control system (RCS) jets on the Orbiter during mated operations with the International Space Station (ISS). It was determined that an un-commanded firing of an RCS jet could cause serious damage or loss of both the SSP Orbiter and the ISS. Several scenarios were suggested in which an un-commanded firing of the RCS jet is possible. These scenarios include an arc track event in the 28-volt heater circuits that could result in a wire-to-wire short to the adjacent reaction control jet wire. In this worst-case scenario, enough current and power could be applied to activate the reaction control jet valves and fire a thruster. The following report summarizes the work that was sponsored by the NESC as part of their assessment of the Orbiter inadvertent firing of a RCS thruster while attached to the ISS.

Linzey, William↗
NASA NTRS2014

GPM Timeline Inhibits For IT Processing

The Safety Inhibit Timeline Tool was created as one approach to capturing and understanding inhibits and controls from IT through launch. Global Precipitation Measurement (GPM) Mission, which launched from Japan in March 2014, was a joint mission under a partnership between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA). GPM was one of the first NASA Goddard in-house programs that extensively used software controls. Using this tool during the GPM buildup allowed a thorough review of inhibit and safety critical software design for hazardous subsystems such as the high gain antenna boom, solar array, and instrument deployments, transmitter turn-on, propulsion system release, and instrument radar turn-on. The GPM safety team developed a methodology to document software safety as part of the standard hazard report. As a result of this process, a new tool safety inhibit timeline was created for management of inhibits and their controls during spacecraft buildup and testing during IT at GSFC and at the launch range in Japan. The Safety Inhibit Timeline Tool was a pathfinder approach for reviewing software that controls the electrical inhibits. The Safety Inhibit Timeline Tool strengthens the Safety Analysts understanding of the removal of inhibits during the IT process with safety critical software. With this tool, the Safety Analyst can confirm proper safe configuration of a spacecraft during each IT test, track inhibit and software configuration changes, and assess software criticality. In addition to understanding inhibits and controls during IT, the tool allows the Safety Analyst to better communicate to engineers and management the changes in inhibit states with each phase of hardware and software testing and the impact of safety risks. Lessons learned from participating in the GPM campaign at NASA and JAXA will be discussed during this session.

Inhibits↗