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DOE OSTI2020

Proposed guidance for preparing and reviewing a molten salt non-power production or utilization facility application

Development of non-power molten salt reactors (MSRs) are under consideration to further establish an MSR experience base, support the requirements of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section 50.43(e), and provide any additional analyses needed for development of a full-scale MSR. Guidance provided in this report is based on MSRs operating with liquid fuel (i.e., fuel dissolved within a molten salt). These reactors, unless owned by the DOE or DOD, will require licensing by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff. Standard review plan (SRP) guidance for large light water reactors (LWRs) is available in NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants; Light Water Reactor (LWR) Edition. However, NRC staff observed that NUREG-0800 is very cumbersome to apply to non-power reactors “because of the great differences in complexity and hazards between non-power reactors and nuclear power plants.” Therefore, a program to develop performance-based guidance applicable to non-power reactors was initiated. In 1996, NUREG-1537, Parts 1 and 2, Guidelines for Preparing and Reviewing Applications for the Licensing of Non-Power Reactors, was published. Part 1, the format and content guide, suggests a uniform format for presenting information in non-power reactor applications that is acceptable to the NRC staff, but conformance with the format and content is not required. Part 2, the SRP, ensures the quality and uniformity of the staff review of an application. Unfortunately, the application guidelines and SRP do not provide adequate guidance for all advanced non-LWR technologies and applications. This discrepancy eventually led to the 2012 development of interim staff guidance (ISG) for NUREG-1537, which includes criteria for describing and reviewing aqueous homogeneous reactors (AHRs). Specifically, NUREG-1537 ISG, 2012 expanded the original document to address three areas: 1. updated criteria for heterogeneous non-power reactors, 2. criteria for licensing AHRs, and 3. criteria for licensing a Part 50-licensed isotope production facility. In 2015, the US Department of Energy (DOE) opted to build on the AHR NUREG-1537 ISG experience by performing a gap analysis of the guidance that would be used to license a non-power MSR. MSRs represent one of the advanced non-LWR technologies selected by DOE for development through a multiyear cost share award with Southern Company Services. Under this Advanced Reactor Concepts 2015 (DOE Advanced Reactor Concepts [ARC] 15) award program, the DOE tasked Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to evaluate the guidance changes that the NRC may need to consider when licensing an MSR non-power reactor. ORNL staff, with support from Boston Government Services, LLC, focused on five system-related chapters in NUREG-1537 that were considered most relevant to inform the effort that would be required for a non-power MSR applicant. ORNL documented this review in a technical report, ORNL/TM-2018/834, Proposed Guidance for Preparing and Reviewing Molten Salt Non-Power Reactor License Applications (NUREG-1537). The report was subsequently shared with industry and the NRC. The 2018 review was limited in scope, focusing on key system chapters based on the expected significance of each chapter relative to expected differences in addressing advanced non-LWR technologies, specifically non-power MSRs, compared with heterogeneously fueled non-power reactors. In the ORNL report, proposed generic adaptations were suggested for the following NUREG-1537 chapters: Chapter 4, “Reactor Description”; Chapter 5, “Reactor Coolant Systems”; Chapter 6, “Engineered Safety Features”; Chapter 9, “Auxiliary Systems”; Chapter 11, “Radiation Protection Program and Waste Management” The inclusion of Chapter 11 in the previous review effort was intended to provide guidance for categorizing the waste-handling process for an MSR operating with homogenous fuel. The introductions from Parts 1 and 2 of the 2012 NUREG-1537 ISG provide guidance for the application and review of production facilities. After a period of operation, non-power MSRs with homogenous fuel will include gaseous and soluble fission products. The gaseous fission products will be collected and held for decay in an off-gas system. There might also be an initiative to polish or filter the soluble fission products in the fuel salt by some mechanical or chemical means. The treatment and handling of fission products in the non-power MSR fuel salt and the description of this process in the safety analysis report (SAR) must be very precise to avoid the waste treatment facility being construed as a co-located special nuclear material (SNM) fuel cycle facility (see Section 2.3 of this report). Subsequent to the release of ORNL/TM-2018/834, NRC staff expressed a desire to continue the regulatory gap analysis that was begun in that report. This would provide additional clarity and information addressed in certain sections of the original report, while also providing new guidance on certain topics not addressed in the original report. This revision would benefit the NRC staff reviewing applications involving non-power MSR designs and would help developers understand how the NRC staff might approach the review of such applications. The focus of this report is to provide infrastructure support to the NRC staff for the regulatory review of non-power MSRs.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2022

Report on General Hydrogen Safety

Hydrogen is an important resource for many different industries throughout the world, including refining, manufacturing, and as a direct energy source. Hydrogen production, through methods such as steam methane reforming, has been developed over several decades. There is a large global demand for hydrogen from these industries and safe production and distribution are paramount for hydrogen systems. Codes and standards have been developed to reduce the risk associated with hydrogen accidents to the public. These codes and standards are similar to those in other industries in which there is inherent risk to the public, such as gasoline and natural gas production and distribution. Although there will always be a risk to the public in these types of fuels, the codes and standards are developed to reduce the likelihood of an accident occurring and reduce the severity of impact, should one occur. This report reviews the current state of hydrogen in the United States and outlines the codes and standards that ensure safe operation of hydrogen systems. The total hydrogen demand and use in different industries is identified. Additionally, the current landscape of hydrogen production and fueling stations in the United States is outlined. The safety of hydrogen systems is discussed through an overview of the purpose, methods, and content included in codes and standards. As outlined in this safety overview, the risk to the public in operation of hydrogen generation facilities and fueling stations is reduced through implementation of appropriate measures. Codes, such as NFPA 2, ensure that the risk associated with a hydrogen system is no greater than the risk presented by gasoline refueling stations.

08 HYDROGEN↗

DOE OSTI2025

Engineering Design Report: High-Pressure Safety Squib

This project encompassed the mechanical portion of the squib system and included the design and analysis of the valve body, selection of tube and tube fittings, valve mounting, and initiator/detonator selection. The electrical portion of the squib has already been designed by another team and is outside of the scope of the project. Electrical information and requirements provided are only for use in selecting a compatible detonator/initiator.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2024

Impacts of Irradiation Structural Behavior on Thermal Hydraulics Safety Analysis to Support MURR LEU Conversion

The University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR) located in Columbia, Missouri is one of six U.S. High Performance Research Reactors (USHPRR), including one critical facility, that is actively collaborating with U. S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Material Management and Minimization (M3) Office of Reactor Conversion and Uranium Supply to convert from the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU; ≥20 wt% U-235) to low-enriched uranium (LEU; <20 wt% U-235) fuel. A new type of very high-density LEU fuel based on an alloy of uranium and 10 wt% molybdenum (U-10Mo) is expected to allow the conversion to LEU of MURR, as well as four other USHPRR. MURR has been working with the Reactor Conversion Pillar at Argonne to perform fuel element design and fuel cycle performance analyses, steady-state thermal hydraulics safety analysis, and accident safety analyses in preparation for the conversion of MURR and to support a preliminary safety analysis report for conversion to LEU fuels. Subsequent analyses have also been performed, including transition cycles where all-fresh LEU fuel elements are introduced upon conversion and progressing through reactor operations the core is brought to equilibrium. Thermal hydraulics safety analyses performed as part of the above have employed an assumption on channel gap reduction due to burnup-related phenomena including fuel swelling, irradiation creep, and oxide layer buildup. Recently, a series of structural analyses have been performed on the MURR LEU fuel plates and an element due to significant differences between the plate and element designs of the MURR HEU and LEU fuels. In addition, NUREG-1537 indicates that structural phenomena are to be evaluated. Two separate types of structural analyses were performed for the MURR LEU fuel element: fluid-structure interaction (FSI) and irradiation thermo-mechanical. The FSI analysis evaluated the effects of hydraulic forces on the MURR LEU fuel element to quantify the flow-induced plate deflection, and a minimal impact to the channel gap thickness was predicted under prototypic and bounding conditions. The irradiation thermo-mechanical analysis evaluated the effects of fuel swelling, irradiation creep, and thermal expansion for the MURR LEU plates and the element for prototypic thermal and irradiation conditions based on a high-fidelity approach multiphysics approach. Overall, this thermo-mechanical analysis predicts smaller gap thickness changes in previously limiting regions. Larger changes are predicted in the middle of channels, and for end channels where power density is not typically a maximum. An additional thermo-mechanical analysis was performed for the outermost HEU fuel plate, which showed a similar magnitude of deflection as the outermost LEU plate. Due to substantial differences between the channel gap reductions assumed for the previous safety analyses and those predicted by the irradiation thermo-mechanical analysis, a need to evaluate their impact on the thermal hydraulics safety analyses arose. This report presents the results from the steady-state safety analyses for normal operation as well as the accident analyses for the two most limiting accident scenarios.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2025

High Flux Isotope Reactor Low-Enriched Uranium High Density Silicide Fuel Preliminary Design Update: System Transient Analysis

As a part of conversion efforts from highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel under direction of the National Nuclear Security Administration of the U.S. Department of Energy, multiple proposed designs of the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) have been created and assessed regarding reactor physics performance metrics, including designs utilizing uranium silicide dispersion fuel (U3Si2-Al). This report updates the previous analyses that evaluated the nuclear safety performance of LEU fuel designs with respect to selected accident events from the HFIR Safety Analysis Report (SAR). Both the Low Density (LD) and High Density (HD) Optimized designs’ reactivity initiated accident fuel performance improved relative to the HEU fuel, attributed to greater 238 U negative Doppler feedback. However, the thermal margins for primary coolant system accidents were reduced with some acceptance criteria unable to be met. The need to resolve reduced thermal margin, open modeling items, and unresolved assumptions was identified.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Drop Analysis of the Advanced Test Reactor Fresh Fuel Shipping Container with Heavier Low-Enriched Uranium Fuel Contents

The Advanced Test Reactor Fresh Fuel Shipping Container (ATR FFSC) is a rectangular stainless steel container used for shipping radioactive material. The container is described in the ATR FFSC Safety Analysis Report (SAR). Per the ATR FFSC SAR, the ATR FFSC is designated a Type AF-96 packaging per the definition of 10 CFR §71.4, and was originally designed to transport high enriched uranium (HEU) reactor fuel elements for the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), the Advanced Test Reactor Critical (ATRC) facility, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Reactor (MITR), and the University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR). The Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA), Office of Material Management and Minimization (M3) is working with the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to develop and qualify new low enriched uranium (LEU) fuels and technologies for use in the ATR, ATRC, MITR, and MURR reactors. The LEU fuel elements will weigh significantly more than the current HEU designs and, combined with their associated Fuel Handling Enclosures for packaging, some configurations will exceed the 50 lbf used in the ATR FFSC qualifying drop tests. There are LEU versions of MITR, MURR, and ATR fuel elements. However, for this evaluation, drop analysis of the ATR FFSC with only the heavier ATR Low Enrichment (LOWE) fuel element is considered in this evaluation because the LOWE fuel element is the heaviest of the considered LEU fuel elements. The ATR HEU fuel element and the ATR LOWE fuel element are identical in every design aspect except for the fuel meat inside the 19 fuel plates. The LEU fuel meats are made using a U-10Mo high-density foil rather than uranium dispersed in aluminum in the HEU fuel elements. The high density of the uranium in the LEU fuel meat increases the LOWE fuel element weight to just under 44 lbf (versus the 22.1 lbf weight of the tested ATR HEU fuel element). ATR fuel elements are placed in a thin-gauge aluminum weldment called a "Fuel Handling Enclosure" during packaging. The Fuel Handling Enclosure is used to cover and protect the element during loading and unloading operations. The ATR Fuel Handling Enclosure weighs about 15 lbf per the drawings in the ATR FFSC SAR and the weight is accounted for in this evaluation. Transporting the heavier LEU fuel elements require evaluation of two issues. The first is the effect of the increased mass of the LEU fuel elements on the survivability of the ATR FFSC package following the requisite drop qualifications. The second is the effect of the increased mass of the fuel plates on the fuel element during the same drops. The ATR FFSC containing an ATR HEU fuel element in an ATR Fuel Handling Enclosure was physically dropped multiple times to qualify the container as a Type AF-96 package. The ATR FFSC SAR describes the drop tests performed with an actual ATR HEU fuel element weighing 22.1 lbf contained in a 14.3 lbf Fuel Handling Enclosure for a total payload of 36.4 lbf. Those drop tests showed that the ATR FFSC maintained containment of the ATR HEU fuel element and the fuel element was not significantly damaged. (Containment herein is not defined as a leak tight but is retention of the radioactive contents.) The purpose of the evaluation is to analytically show that, for a similar set of tests, the ATR FFSC maintains containment of the heavier ATR LOWE fuel element and to assess the damage to the fuel element during the drops. The approach was to create finite element analysis (FEA) models that produce the same results as the physical drops. Those models were then used as the benchmarks for the follow-on analyses using the heavier contents. FEA models of the drops of ATR FFSC using up to a 115 lbf fuel element were run and evaluated. Likewise, drops of a LOWE fuel element weighing 44 lbf in the ATR FFSC were run and evaluated. It is important to note that this report was done at the quality level necessary to be included in a nuclear facility safety basis. However, it is not the intent of this report to conclude the suitability of the ATR FFSC for transporting the heavier payloads. This report only describes the results of the FEA as related to the required drop scenarios. Incorporation of the FEA into the safety basis will be evaluated by the ATR FFSC design authority. The physical drop tests of the HEU fuel element and FEA drop analysis for the LOWE fuel element showed noteworthy damage to the fuel plates. An aluminum protective block was conceived to mitigate the damage. The concept requires the blocks to be placed in the fuel element between the end boxes and fuel plates. Additional FEA drop analyses were performed using the protective block. The addition of the blocks is primarily intended to mitigate the damage to the LOWE fuel element fuel plates. However, FEA drop analyses of the ATR HEU fuel element with the blocks were also performed and included for information.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2024

Pebble Tanker Model for Nuclear Criticality Safety Needs

This report documents a study performed to investigate the requirements for criticality safety benchmark experiments for high-assay, low-enriched uranium (HALEU) fuel in transportation applications. In this work, an exploratory application model, the “Pebble Tanker,” was developed to represent TRISO fuel in a transportation scenario for an analysis of the validation basis in industrial quantities. An aspect of the criticality validation process involves assessing the “similarity” between application and experimental benchmark systems through an integral index parameter evaluation. Here, this includes propagating nuclear data uncertainties and calculating a correlation coefficient (hereinafter referred to as “c k ”) to evaluate the similarity of benchmark experiments compared with the application Pebble Tanker model. Finding sufficient critical benchmark experiments allows for the evaluation of bias and bias uncertainty, thus determining the upper subcritical limit (USL) of the transportation package. A target k eff of ~0.94 was used in this work to establish appropriate modeling conditions, reflecting a reasonable estimate for a USL. Two container models were investigated: one with the Hermes-type pebble and one with the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR)–type pebble. The models were simplified, considering only fuel, containment structure, and either water or air. This allows a focus on the underlying physics of applications involving TRISO fuel pebbles using the Pebble Tanker model. A crucial consideration is the transport package's ability to safely hold pebbles while flooded, maintaining subcritical conditions. Tools available in the SCALE 6.3.1 suite—the CSAS6-Shift, TSUNAMI-3D-Shift, and TSUNAMI-IP sequences—were employed for neutronics and sensitivity and uncertainty (S/U) analysis of the Pebble Tanker. Findings demonstrated sufficient available critical experiment benchmarks to perform a validation of the Pebble Tanker in the most reactive state, i.e., when the Tanker is flooded.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2021

Transformational Challenge Reactor Safety Design and Radionuclide Retention Strategy

An integrated safety design and radionuclide (RN) retention strategy is developed to support the Transformational Challenge Reactor (TCR) demonstration. This demonstration aims to showcase viability for rapid deployment of a novel reactor by leveraging the advances in materials, manufacturing, and computational sciences through a highly integrated and agile design and development approach. This strategy provides a logical description and understanding of how RNs are contained within the facility. Rather than discussing fission product barriers individually between separate design and safety basis reports, this paper provides a consistent description and narrative to better facilitate regulatory interactions and focus safety design efforts. The principal barriers credited include the various coating layers in the tristructural isotropic (TRISO) fuel particle, the silicon carbide (SiC) matrix hosting the particles within the fuel element, the helium pressure boundary, and the confinement system. The choice and assumed performance of the credited barriers are highly conservative, which is a direct reflection of the low hazard that the TCR demonstration presents and the need to simplify and focus the safety review process accordingly. However, the strategy and the associated framework are generalized and may be adopted and tailored to support other advanced reactor demonstration efforts.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Fiberboard Properties and Degradation Rates for Storage of 9975 Shipping Package in KAC (2020 Status Report)

Savannah River Site (SRS) stores plutonium materials within model 9975 shipping packages in the K-Area Complex (KAC). The 9975 shipping package consists of a 35 gallon stainless steel drum, Celotex fiberboard insulation, lead shield, and primary and secondary containment vessels. The 9975 shipping package design, performance, and analysis for safe transport of radioactive material are described in the Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP). Celotex fiberboard provides three safety functions: thermal insulation to limit internal temperature during a fire, criticality control, and resistance to package crushing. The fiberboard material must retain its dimensions and density within certain ranges to provide the required impact resistance, criticality control, and fire resistance. The SRS Surveillance Program monitors material performance to establish a basis for service life and ensures the continued integrity of 9975 packages. Fiberboard samples, taken from multiple fiberboard assemblies fabricated from cane and softwood fiberboard, have been conditioning in elevated temperature environments since 2005. The samples are periodically examined to monitor thermal, mechanical, and physical properties, and assess degradation trends. Fiberboard properties of interest that are evaluated to demonstrate acceptable long-term performance include dimensional stability, density, compressive strength, thermal conductivity, and specific heat capacity. Duplicate samples from multiple package sources have been tested to identify the range of variability in fiberboard properties and degradation rates. Baseline and long-term testing of fiberboard material properties have been reported previously; reference 6 summarized experimental results of cane and softwood fiberboard through May 2019 and presented degradation models for the measured properties. This report presents the cumulative data collected through June 2020 and the corresponding updated aging models.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2025

Final Prototype Microreactor Transportation Safety Program

This report fulfills the fiscal year 2025 M2 Milestone M2AT-25PN0802042, Final Microreactor Transportation Safety Program Planning Framework. Microreactors are compact reactors capable of producing less than 50 megawatts of electrical energy. Typically, these reactors are factory-fabricated and designed to be easily transportable by truck, rail, vessel, or air. Microreactor designs often assume that the unit can be transported containing either unirradiated or irradiated fuel. Interest in microreactors is driven by several factors, including the need to generate power at remote locations, military installations, and facilities such as data centers, and in areas recovering from natural disasters.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2025

Impact of U-10Mo HALEU fuel element tolerances on the Massachusetts Institute of Technology reactor safety and operational performance – Thermal hydraulics

The U.S. is coordinating efforts for the conversion of six U.S. High Performance Research Reactors (USHPRR) including one critical facility from highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium (LEU). In order to continue the mission of these reactors, including the Massachusetts of Institute of Technology Reactor (MITR), and achieve similar performance, high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) with a high-density metallic alloy of uranium with 10 wt% molybdenum (U-10Mo) is being evaluated. The impact of the fabrication specification and tolerances was assessed following the preliminary design of the MITR LEU fuel elements using the U-10Mo monolithic alloy. This research focuses on the analysis of fabrication specification impact on thermal hydraulics (TH) characteristic of the MITR LEU core as a function of the variation of the relevant fuel specification parameters (e.g., coolant channel gap thickness, fuel plate thickness, etc.). The analyses are performed based on an all-fresh LEU fuel conversion plan identified in a preliminary safety analysis report submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The reactor power margin to the onset of nucleate boiling (ONB) is assessed under the limiting safety system settings (LSSS), where a scram occurs, to ensure there is sufficient margin to the reactor safety limit, which is defined by the onset of flow instability that occurs after the ONB. The best estimate plus uncertainty approach is employed to analyze this TH characteristic, which yields realistic results while maintaining adequate conservatism, utilizing a statistical uncertainty propagation method with the STAT7 code. The TH characteristic is analyzed as a function of the variability of the specification parameters resulting from the fabrication process. The main findings of this study show that the MITR core can meet the TH safety and operational requirements at the all-LEU initial core startup (cycle 1), selected transition cycles (most reactive cycle and most limiting cycle: cycle 3 and 5, respectively) and equilibrium (cycle 14) cores under all limiting fabrication parameter combinations considered. In addition, the analyses show that the dependency of the core power margin to ONB on those specification parameters that have the most direct impact on TH performance is non-linear but monotonically decreasing within the specification tolerances. The third order polynomial fit curves are reported in detail for selected limiting cases and can serve as a powerful tool for future MITR fuel management in cases such as when HALEU supply is established that may allow additional cycle length or other operational benefits.

Conversion↗

DOE OSTI2024

ARC-100 Reactor Security-by-Design Summary

This report applies the security-by-design methodology developed in a previous National Nuclear Security Administration–sponsored work to the Advanced Reactor Concepts 100 (ARC-100) sodium-cooled fast reactor (SFR) design. The report contains no proprietary information specific to the ARC 100 reactor. The insights developed in this report are high-level, and generally applicable to other sodium fast reactor designs. The information presented here is the result of a qualitative safety-based analysis and would not inform any potential adversary beyond what would be found in a docketed safety analysis report. The scope of this present report covers ARC-100’s reactor core, used fuel storage, and used fuel assembly wash station. These systems are also compared to a generic SFR design assumed in the previous study. The security assessment results show changes in structures, systems, and components (SSCs) safety importance relative to the generic SFR SSCs. However, the consequence assessment results are the similar to a previously assessed generic SFR. Several SSCs have higher importance rankings than others, and it is recommended that protection efforts are prioritized for these SSCs. This work will continue in the Fiscal Year 2025 for the remaining ARC-100 systems, including cesium trap, sodium cold trap, noble gas decay tanks (dewar bottles), and used fuel dry storage facility, to provide safety-and-security-by-design insights and recommendations on non-core systems. Results from this work will furnish a technical justification for the feasibility of these solutions for the ARC reactor's design and, where applicable, identify any regulatory benefits conferred by the proactive design aspect within a risk management framework. This initiative will contribute to a more secure design of the ARC reactor and support its licensing process.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DOE OSTI2025

ARC-100 Reactor Security-by-Design Summary 2025

This report applies the security-by-design methodology developed in a previous National Nuclear Security Administration–sponsored work to the ARC-100, a sodium-cooled fast reactor (SFR) being developed by ARC Clean Technology, Inc (ARC). The report contains no proprietary information specific to the ARC 100 reactor. The insights developed in this report are high-level, and generally applicable to other sodium fast reactor designs. The information presented here is the result of a qualitative safety-based analysis and would not inform any potential adversary beyond what would be found in a docketed safety analysis report. The scope of this present report covers ARC-100’s reactor core, used fuel storage, used fuel assembly wash station, cesium trap, sodium cold trap, noble gas decay tanks, used fuel dry storage facility, damaged fuel storage facility, and radioactive waste building. These systems are also compared to a generic SFR design assumed in the previous study. The security assessment results show changes in structures, systems, and components (SSCs) safety importance relative to the generic SFR SSCs. Several SSCs have higher importance rankings than others, and it is recommended that protection efforts are prioritized for these SSCs. Results from this work will furnish a technical justification for the feasibility of these solutions for the ARC reactor's design and, where applicable, identify any regulatory benefits conferred by the proactive design aspect within a risk management framework. This initiative will contribute to a more secure design of the ARC reactor and support its licensing process.

21 - SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLAN↗

DOE OSTI2025

Tritium Containment Vessel Response to Thermal and Mechanical Abuse Environments for Fire Safety Assessments

This report evaluates leakage behavior from tritium containment vessels under thermal abuse and combined thermal-mechanical abuse conditions to better understand safety implications for releases occurring in a fire scenario. Surrogate gases were used for all tests in this report. Leakage through the valves from thermal pressurization was observed when heating rates >0.8°C/s were sustained to >300°C. Gas plumes were visualized from vessels that were heated above 260°C and then dropped.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2024

ECAR-6440 Rev 2 MARVEL Hazard Evaluation

This hazard evaluation supports the Microreactor Applications Research, Validation, and Evaluation (MARVEL) Project’s design effort and the development of the preliminary documented safety analysis (PDSA) (addendum to safety analysis report [SAR]-420, “Transient Reactor Test [TREAT] Facility FSAR”) (SAR-420-ADD-1). The hazard evaluation process for the MARVEL project for compliance with the requirements in 10 CFR 830, “Nuclear Safety Management,” follows a process similar to the Licensing Modernization Project (LMP) as outlined in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)-18-04, “Risk-Informed Performance-Based Guidance for Non-Light Water Reactor Licensing Basis Development,” and supporting documents. The LMP process is adapted to fit Department of Energy (DOE) reactor regulatory requirements as applicable and appropriate using a graded approach based on the MARVEL microreactor design. This approach provides reasonable assurance of meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 830 for protection of the public, workers, and environment.

21 - SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLAN↗

DOE OSTI1991

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 32, No. 4, October-December 1991]

Nuclear Safety is a review journal that covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. Its scope includes the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, the safety aspects of the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 477 Report on the International Symposium on the Use of Probabilistic Safety Assessment for Operational Safety—PSA '91, S. Chakraborty and M. Khatib-Rahbar; 488 Good Relationships Are Pivotal in Nuclear Data Bases, A. S. Heger and B. V. Koen; 494 Technical Note: The Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel's Evaluation of the Ulysses Space Mission, J. A. Sholtis, Jr., D. A. Huff, L. B. Gray, N. P. Klug, and R. O. Winchester; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 502 The Severe Accident Analysis Program for the Savannah River Nuclear Production Reactors, M. L. Hyder; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 511 A Framework for Selecting Suitable Control Technologies for Nuclear Power Plant Systems, R. A. Kisner; DESIGN FEATURES: 521 Containments for Gas-Cooled Power Reactors History and Status, P.W. Williams; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 537 Indoor Radon: A Natural Risk, N. H. Harley and J.H. Harley; On the Importance of the Atmospheric Parameters in the Fission Products Distribution of a Severe Reactor Accident, M. C. Barla and A. R. Bayulken; Book Review: Health Effects of Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation BEIR V, C. R. Richmond; WASTE AND SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT: 555 Activities Related to Waste and Spent Fuel Management, M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 567 Effects of Component Aging on the Westhinghouse Control Rod Drive System, K. Sullivan and W. Gunther; 577 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher, 580 Selected Safety-Related Events, Compiled by G. A. Murphy; 582 Operating U 8 Power Reactors, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 596 General Administrative Activities, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; 610 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 614 Proposed Rule Changes as of June 30, 1991; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 520 Workshop on PC PRAISE: A Probabilistic Fracture Mechanics Personal Computer Code for Nuclear Power Plant Piping Reliability Assessment; 536 Fifth Workshop on Nuclear Power Plant Containment Integrity; 624 New OECD "International Information System on Occupational Exposure (ISOE)"; 625 Harvard School of Public Health Announces Short Courses; 625 Eighth Power Plant Dynamics, Control and Testing Symposium; 626 Second Training Course on Off-Site Emergency Planning and Response for Nuclear Accidents; 618 The Authors; 622 Reviewers of Nuclear Safety, Vol 32.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI1991

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 32, No. 4, October-December 1991]

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2022

Integrated Risk-Informed Condition Based Maintenance Capability and Automated Platform: Technical Report 3

This project is a collaborative research effort between PKMJ Technical Services LLC, Idaho National Laboratory, and Public Service Enterprise Group (PSEG) Nuclear, LLC. The collaboration, led by PKMJ Technical Services LLC, is part of the industry Funding Opportunity Announcement (FOA) award under Advanced Nuclear Technology Development FOA #DE-FOA-0001817. The pilot demonstration focuses on the Circulating Water System (CWS), an important non-safety-related system that impacts the power generation capability of the plant site. Achieving riskinformed condition-based Predictive Maintenance (PdM) on the CWS will result in significant economic benefits, and the developed methodologies can also be applied to other plant systems. This approach supports an industry goal of ensuring that nuclear power generation remains a viable, economically competitive option in the energy market. Operation and Maintenance (O&M) costs include labor-intensive Preventive Maintenance (PM) programs that involve manually performed inspection, calibration, testing, and maintenance of plant assets at periodic frequencies as well as time-based replacement of assets, irrespective of condition. This project offers an alternative by focusing on riskinformed condition-based maintenance to reduce O&M costs while still maintaining plant health and safety. This report summarizes the progress made toward achieving a risk-informed condition-based maintenance approach. The research and development (R&D) activities presented in this report are associated with development of a nuclear digital platform application, integration of fault signature models, and automated work management processes. The fault signatures and Machine Learning (ML) models are key components in predictive analytics and are heavily leveraged to improve the insights received by existing plant process data sources. Availability of the analysis results within a centralized digital platform enhances efficiency by enabling automation of activities otherwise performed manually. Personnel are presented with enhanced information that can be used to evaluate plant status and risks. Utilizing the enhancements to data analytics supports automated responses, (i.e. issuance of work orders) to address developing equipment faults and thus preventing forced, unplanned shutdowns of components or systems. The R&D activities described within this report lay the foundation for developing and demonstrating a digital automated platform to centralize the implementation of condition monitoring and response to equipment faults. The digital automated platform is cloud-based and designed to enable improved efficiency of plant processes. The digital platform includes content related to maintenance optimization, fault signature analysis, and plant records, which can all be used to support efficiencies when located within a centralized digital platform. These efficiencies could be further enhanced when deployed through industry-wide deployment of the technology to improve insights and processes based upon economies of scale.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗