Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “security controls”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 37 records · Page 2

International Nuclear Security Nuclear Material Accounting and Control Kit Participant Guides

You work at a facility that stores large amounts of nuclear material in varying containerizations. Management has just approved the establishment of a tamper indicating device program in order to cut down on the effort required to conduct inventories, and to enhance overall control of nuclear materials within the site boundary. You have been assigned, along with your colleagues, to conduct an initial assessment to determine the ideal TID types to be used at your facility. You will apply TIDs to a variety of apparatuses that are representative of the closure mechanisms on different containers and entry points to rooms and vaults onsite.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Testbed and Experiments for Quantum-Conventional Networking

The realization of quantum networks requires the development of devices and methods unprecedented in conventional networks, and yet they critically depend on the latter for implementing foundational blocks and essential operations. We describe a testbed to support the development and testing of their functionality and performance by providing quantum and conventional data planes and devices, together with a secure conventional control plane. It incorporates a variety of entangled photon sources, qubit technologies, detector technologies, photonic components, and supporting conventional switches and workstations. It implements a novel fiber telescoping scheme that provides suites of connections using fiber spools and inground-aerial fiber loops. We briefly summarize a variety of experiments conducted over this testbed including: (i) flex-grid quantum connection experiments, (ii) quantum state and channel tomography, (iii) utilization of quantum key distribution keys to secure conventional encryption and firewall devices, (iv) comparative study of analytical capacity estimates and entanglement throughput, (v) deployed squeezing coexisting with conventional communications, and (iv) measurement of polarization time variation.

Rao, Nageswara [ORNL] (ORCID:0000000234085941)↗

EVs-at-RISC: A Secure and Resilient Interoperable SCM Control System Architecture for Electric Vehicle’s-at-Scale (Final Technical Report)

The EVs-at-RISC project was a five-year research, development, and demonstration initiative to create foundational tools for utility-scale fleet aggregation and Smart Charge Management (SCM) of Electric Vehicles (EV), Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure (EVCI), and related Distributed Energy Resources (DER). Rather than seeking to develop and demonstrate highly perfected SCM algorithms and control strategies, this project instead focused on creating foundational software solutions that enable unprecedented digital interoperability across the communications technologies and vendor platforms used to manage EV , EVCI, and DER, as well as existing energy management infrastructure operated by utilities, grid operators, and aggregators. This project then extends these novel interoperability capabilities to develop and deploy powerful middleware abstractions across grid edge networks and EVCI/DER fleet aggregations incorporating modern software tools and best practices, such as CI/CD, to bring the immense capabilities of infrastructure-as-code and policy-as-code to modern grid edge network environments. This addresses the foremost systemic issues preventing realization of any net operational benefits from scaled deployment of behind-the-meter EV, EVCI, and DER assets in electric power grids and markets today. The results of this approach and project unlock massive potential for new SCM capabilities to be easily prototyped, evaluated, and deployed at-scale within the existing grid edge network infrastructure and EVCI/DER technology ecosystem. The EVs-at-RISC project achieves this by extending Open Field Message Bus (OpenFMB), a conceptual model for digital interoperability and distributed intelligence in traditional front-of-meter utility SCADA networks, validating our hypothesis that OpenFMB could be similarly used to solve systemic digital interoperability issues in behind-the-meter environments and unlock real-world utility-scale SCM capabilities without requiring any new proprietary vendor solutions or significant infrastructure reconfiguration.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Puck and Puck/SAW Loop Seals (Final Report)

Tamper-indicating devices (TIDs), also known as seals, play a crucial role in various sectors including international nuclear safeguards, arms control, domestic security, and commercial products, by ensuring that monitored or high-value items are not accessed undetected. These devices do not block access but alert to unauthorized tampering. With adversaries' capabilities evolving, there's a pressing need for seals to advance in terms of effectiveness (e.g., better tamper indication and unique identification), and new technology can improve the efficiency of installation and verification. Passive loop seals, widely used in international nuclear safeguards to ensure that continuity of knowledge is maintained on declared items, face stringent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) requirements that surpass those met by commercial products. The metal cup seal (Figure 1, left), a staple IAEA seal, is robust but requires significant resources for post-use verification – specifically, the seal’s unique identity can only be verified at IAEA headquarters after removal from facilities. Further, the seal has been in use for decades and seal types should periodically be replaced to counter adversarial efforts for defeating seals. In 2020, the IAEA outlined about 40 requirements for a new passive loop seal, aiming for in-situ verification, minimal external tool use, unique identification (UID), and clear tamper indication. In response, research and development efforts focused on creating a new passive loop seal that meets these criteria and in 2022 the IAEA announced the completion of the Field Verifiable Passive Loop Seal (FVPS) (Figure 1, right). Concurrently to the IAEA’s efforts, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) designed, developed, and tested two seal versions – Puck and Puck/SAW, with Puck based on the IAEA’s requirements and including a novel visually-obvious tamper response, and Puck/SAW adding additional beneficial capabilities like the ability to receive a unique identifier from a standoff distance and monitoring the wire integrity. Puck/SAW was specifically designed and developed to address sealing applications in dry spent fuel storage facilities, where the number of sealed spent fuel containers results in heavy verification burden and inspector safety issues related to radiation exposure. These efforts are described in this Executive Summary.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Residential Vehicle-to-Home Backup Power Capabilities: Key Findings from a ComEd Beneficial Electrification R&D Pilot

This report summarizes key findings from a collaborative technical study of residential, non-grid-tied vehicle-to-home (V2H) backup power systems in Commonwealth Edison’s (ComEd’s) service territory. The work integrates (1) a feeder-level technoeconomic analysis (TEA) using historical outage-event data and simulated electric-vehicle (EV) driving/charging profiles to estimate potential reliability and customer interruption-cost impacts under V2H and vehicle-to-grid (V2G) adoption scenarios; (2) controlled laboratory performance testing of a representative V2H backup ecosystem to characterize transfer-to-backup behavior, sustained power delivery, efficiency trends, and repeatable reliability limitations; and (3) a cybersecurity assessment aligned with NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0 and ISO/SAE 21434 to evaluate interface-level risk drivers and identify program-relevant mitigations. Results indicate that V2H can provide measurable resilience value, but outcomes are strongly context dependent on outage patterns and the share of events that are “V2H-applicable.” Typical transfer-to-backup behavior clustered on the order of minutes, but rare long-delay edge cases were observed (including an event approaching 30 minutes) and should be treated as a reliability risk. High-power testing showed that peak-rated output is not necessarily continuously deliverable; stable operation may require operation below nameplate ratings and attention to thermal and installation constraints. The cybersecurity assessment highlights a broad attack surface spanning commissioning, home networks, embedded services, and cloud/OTA pathways, motivating minimum controls for secure onboarding, signed updates, patch cadence, and coordinated vulnerability response for any scaled deployment.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Data Centers and Digital Assurance Workshop 3 – Mitigations for Digital Assurance Risks

The third session of the TADA (Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance) Data Centers Cohort, held on November 18, 2025, focused on developing mitigation strategies for digital assurance risks identified in previous workshops. Hosted by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and ScottMadden, the session emphasized the application of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) to data center infrastructure, particularly at the utility–data center interface. Participants revisited and ranked key digital assurance risks, including architecture and interface weaknesses, governance gaps, and AI-enabled threats. The workshop introduced the 12 principles of CIE, advocating for consequence-focused design, engineered controls, and secure information architecture to proactively reduce cyber-physical vulnerabilities. These principles were applied to critical data center systems such as power distribution, UPS, cooling, SCADA/BMS, and grid-forming batteries. The session also addressed governance challenges at the interconnection boundary, highlighting the need for clear roles in telemetry sharing, firmware management, and trip settings. Special attention was given to emerging risks from behind-the-meter (BTM) generation, including reverse-power flow and the integration of small modular reactors (SMRs), which shift data centers from large loads to complex generation nodes. Participants explored how interconnection agreements can serve as enforceable instruments for digital assurance, and reviewed gaps in current standards such as NERC CIP, IEC 62443, and IEEE 1547. The workshop concluded with pathways to standardization, including model agreement language, state-level programs, and expanded NERC guidance. INL also presented tools and frameworks for secure procurement and supplier risk management, reinforcing the need for integrated engineering and policy solutions to secure the evolving data center–grid ecosystem. Session 3 of 3.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Mitigation documentation for the removal of hazardous materials from the engine installation vehicle and manned control car area 25, Nevada national security site, NYE county, Nevada

The purpose of this letter report is to document the mitigation of adverse effects of a proposed undertaking that would remove hazardous materials from the Engine Installation Vehicle (EIV) in Area 25 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNNSS) in compliance with Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) and the terms of the 2024 Programmatic Agreement among the U.S. Department of Energy and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation Concerning the Protection of Historic Properties on the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada, hereafter referred to as the NNSS PA. The EIV (State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource No. S3057) has been determined individually eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP) under Criteria A and C and as a contributing element to the Nuclear Rocket Development Station (NRDS) Historic District, which is eligible for the NRHP under all four Significance Criteria (Reno et al. 2023; Reed 2024).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Security Assessment of an LBP16-Protocol-Based Computer Numerical Control Machine

Subtractive manufacturing systems, specifically, computer numerical control machines, have revolutionized the manufacturing industry. Computer numerical control machining is the preferred method for producing finished parts due to its efficiency, speed and suitability for high-volume production. Securing computer numerical control machines is a priority. Compromises or disruptions of these machines can result in significant downtime, loss of productivity and financial loss. This study examines the vulnerabilities and risks associated with computer numerical control machines, in particular, systems utilizing the LBP16 protocol for controller-machine communications. The study reveals that an adversary can execute cyber-physical attacks such as sabotage and denial of service. The potential security threats emphasize the importance of implementing robust security measures to mitigate the cyber risks to computer numerical control machines.

Forihat, Yahya [Virginia Commonwealth University, ↗

Methods for safely sharing dual-use genetic data

Background: Some genetic data has dual-use potential. Sharing pathogen data has shown tremendous value. For example therapeutic development and lineage tracking during the COVID pandemic. This data sharing is complicated by the fact that these data have the potential to be used for harm. The genome sequence of a pathogen can be used to enable malicious genetic engineering approaches or to recreate the pathogen from synthetic DNA. Standard data security methods can be applied to genetic data, but when data is shared between institutions, ensuring appropriate security can be difficult. Sensitive data that is shared internationally among a wide array of institutions can be especially difficult to control. Methods for securely storing and sharing genetic data with potential for dual-use are needed to mitigate this potential harm.Results: Here we propose new methods that allow genetic data to be shared in a data format that prevents a nefarious actor from accessing sensitive aspects of the data. Our methods obfuscate raw sequence data by pooling reads from different samples. This approach can ensure that data is secure while stored and during electronic transfer. We demonstrate that by pooling raw sequence data from multiple samples of the same organism, the ability to fully reconstruct any individual sample is prevented. In the pooled data, most genomic information remains, but reads or mutations cannot be directly attributed to any individual sample. To further restrict access to information, regions of a genome can be removed from the reads.Conclusion: Our methods obscure genomic information within raw sequence reads. This method can allow genetic data to be stored and shared while preventing a nefarious actor from being able to perfectly reconstruct an organism. Broad-scale sequence information remains, while fine scale details about specific samples are difficult or impossible to reconstruct. Our software is available at https://github.com/Geneinfosec-Inc/ReadMixer.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

1. Physical Security Engineering by Design for Nuclear Facilities; 2. Nuclear Power Plant Site Security Management – A Security Strategy; 3. The UAE Women in Nuclear Energy Security

1. Security by design, or SeBD, is a comprehensive approach that integrates the physical protection system of a nuclear plant into every stage of its existence. This includes planning, designing, constructing, commissioning, and operating the facility, using a combination of analytical, physical, technological, and procedural measures. Essentially, SeBD involves intentionally applying and incorporating security into all aspects of design and operation throughout the entire lifecycle of a facility. By implementing this methodology throughout various phases such as program development, process implementation, staff training and procedures management in conjunction with plant equipment, facilities can be optimized to minimize security risks without compromising functional design requirements. This ultimately improves the overall security posture of the site and reduces the need for costly modifications or additional security resources post-design. 2. A site security strategy is a living document that is revised on a periodic or event-driven basis, ensuring that site security operations and corresponding procedures provide long-term, effective protection for the entire nuclear power plant (NPP) site. A site security strategy aims to mitigate threats across the entire NPP site via in-depth defense approaches and mutual support; therefore, if a layer is omitted or altered, then the effect across all layers must be re-evaluated. Therefore, the aim of the site security strategy is to provide an appropriate, scalable security regime that deters, denies, delays, and detects incidents and, equally importantly, reassures legitimate users and the regulator that due diligence and regulatory compliance have been achieved, ensuring that the site is safe and secure. Robust access control for vehicles and pedestrians is at the heart of the strategy. Vehicle and pedestrian searching and screening are seen as the strongest mitigation methods against vehicle- and pedestrian-borne attacks. The security strategy must also be supported through comprehensive staff training and the development of robust processes, procedures, and planning. If all these measures are to be effective, then training must be implemented during each phase of construction, partial operation/commissioning, and full operation. No single element of site security is completely isolated from the influence of other elements. Ideally, consideration of all key elements will result in a security strategy that is integrated and proportional to the threat and that does not over specify individual security solutions through the application of isolated measures but rather applies a holistic, all-encompassing approach. 3. When women enter the labor force, numerous positive outcomes emerge, including increased GDP, educational gains, and decreased maternal mortality. Despite these benefits, women's employment rates and equality vary significantly worldwide as does support for women in the workforce. This paper will explore the multifaceted benefits of women's employment, the factors influencing labor force participation rates, and the urgency to achieve gender equality as outlined in the 2015 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). It will then examine the emerging presence of women in the traditionally male-dominated nuclear field, specifically within the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as a testament to their resilience and determination to break social norms and advance gender equality.

Zineddin, Dr. Z.↗

Artificial Intelligence-Driven Management of Sustainable Energy Resources: Visibility, Operation, and Control

The rapid global transition toward sustainable energy resources (SERs) is reshaping how modern power systems are observed, optimized, and controlled. While SERs have significantly advanced decarbonization, their weather dependence, variability, and inverter-dominated characteristics challenge traditional, centralized, and deterministic grid operation. At the same time, the proliferation of high-resolution data from inverters, smart meters, and sensors offers unprecedented visibility into system dynamics. Yet, it also exceeds the analytical capability of conventional model-based approaches. Artificial intelligence (AI) provides a new foundation for addressing these challenges by bridging physical laws with data-driven learning, enabling accurate state awareness, adaptive operation, and coordinated control across distributed assets. This article examines how AI transforms the management of SER-rich power systems along three critical dimensions: 1) enhancing visibility by inferring behind-the-meter (BTM) activities, assessing SER flexibility, and reconstructing system states from sparse or noisy measurements; 2) improving operation through AI-enhanced SER service provision, volt/var control (VVC), and dynamic operating envelopes (DOE) for efficiency and security; and 3) advancing control by embedding learning-based intelligence into inverter coordination, voltage and frequency regulation, and long-term dispatch. Together, these developments reveal how AI can convert the variability of SERs from an operational challenge into a source of flexibility, resilience, and intelligence, paving the way toward sustainable, adaptive, and self-optimizing power systems.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

FY 2025 Multidimensional Data Correlation Platform: Unified Software Architecture for Advanced Materials and Manufacturing Technologies Data Management and Processing

The Advanced Materials and Manufacturing Technologies (AMMT) program continues to advance a data-driven approach to demonstrate the utility of additive manufacturing for fabricating components for nuclear applications. A key scientific goal is to leverage data to better understand manufacturing outcomes and thereby improve the performance, reliability, and lifespan of nuclear components. Ultimately, this effort supports the development of standards for certification and qualification of additively manufactured components, enabling broader industry adoption. In support of this objective, the AMMT program is building and deploying a data management platform to record, index, analyze, and make available the manufacturing data generated across the AMMT program. In FY 2023, the team conceptualized the architecture of the platform and, in FY 2024, deployed the first functional version at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Manufacturing Demonstration Facility (MDF). In FY 2025, the platform was officially opened to all AMMT members. To enable this expansion, core modifications and enhancements were developed, including improvements to the user interface and workflows for data entry and retrieval. Most notably, robust security and access control mechanisms were implemented to protect data and manage information sharing. This effort featured a logging system, protected views, and controlled access mechanisms. This report documents these enhancements and the transition of the platform into program-wide use.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Building Nuclear-Specific Cybersecurity Expertise in Higher Education

The rapid digitalization of nuclear power plants (NPPs) and the deployment of advanced and small modular reactors (A/SMRs) have expanded the cybersecurity attack surface within the nuclear sector. This evolution introduces unique challenges beyond those faced in general information technology (IT), operational technology (OT) and industrial control system (ICS) security, due to nuclear power’s regulatory rigor, safety-critical nature, and operational needs. A pressing workforce gap persists; cybersecurity graduates typically lack nuclear-specific context and retraining them for industry readiness requires 12–18 months, creating a significant burden. This paper addresses this gap by defining the domains of knowledge that nuclear cybersecurity specialists must master, spanning cybersecurity, nuclear engineering, OT/ICS security, and regulatory governance. We propose a curricular framework integrating technical, regulatory, and applied learning components to accelerate workforce readiness. Our approach builds on existing findings that current curricula inadequately integrate nuclear engineering and cybersecurity, shifting the discourse from why specialization is needed to what knowledge must be taught. The recommendations have implications for workforce development and long-term resilience of the nuclear energy sector.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

StructuredFuzzer: Fuzzing Structured Text-Based Control Logic Applications

Rigorous testing methods are essential for ensuring the security and reliability of industrial controller software. Fuzzing, a technique that automatically discovers software bugs, has also proven effective in finding software vulnerabilities. Unsurprisingly, fuzzing has been applied to a wide range of platforms, including programmable logic controllers (PLCs). However, current approaches, such as coverage-guided evolutionary fuzzing implemented in the popular fuzzer American Fuzzy Lop Plus Plus (AFL++), are often inadequate for finding logical errors and bugs in PLC control logic applications. They primarily target generic programming languages like C/C++, Java, and Python, and do not consider the unique characteristics and behaviors of PLCs, which are often programmed using specialized programming languages like Structured Text (ST). Furthermore, these fuzzers are ill suited to deal with complex input structures encapsulated in ST, as they are not specifically designed to generate appropriate input sequences. This renders the application of traditional fuzzing techniques less efficient on these platforms. To address this issue, this paper presents a fuzzing framework designed explicitly for PLC software to discover logic bugs in applications written in ST specified by the IEC 61131-3 standard. The proposed framework incorporates a custom-tailored PLC runtime and a fuzzer designed for the purpose. We demonstrate its effectiveness by fuzzing a collection of ST programs that were crafted for evaluation purposes. We compare the performance against a popular fuzzer, namely, AFL++. The proposed fuzzing framework demonstrated its capabilities in our experiments, successfully detecting logic bugs in the tested PLC control logic applications written in ST. On average, it was at least 83 times faster than AFL++, and in certain cases, for example, it was more than 23,000 times faster.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Advanced Transmission Technologies (ATTs) Supplier Cohort Workshops Cohort Summary [Slides]

This Summary slide deck summarizes the key outcomes of the Advanced Transmission Technologies (ATTs) supplier cohort, part of Idaho National Laboratory’s (INL) Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance (TADA) program. The program aimed to strengthen grid resilience through cybersecurity controls, supply-chain security, and Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) for advanced transmission technologies. The cohort brought together vendors representing the full range of Grid-Enhancing Technologies (GETs), including providers of Dynamic Line Ratings (DLR), Advanced Power Flow Control (APFC), Transmission Topology Optimization (TTO), and High-Performance Conductors (HPCs). Discussions focused on institutional, integration, and operational barriers limiting GET adoption; cybersecurity risks at EMS/SCADA, cloud, and network integration points; and supply-chain transparency issues such as semiconductor dependence and SBOM/HBOM expectations. Participants also addressed operator trust, human-in-the-loop requirements, and challenges with utility adoption, while exploring how CIE can support secure deployment of GETs. This deck represents a consolidated summary of challenges and risks identified by vendors, cross-cutting themes and technology-specific insights from three cohort workshops, and actionable mitigations to guide utilities, vendors, and the Department of Energy in advancing secure, trusted deployment of GETs.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗