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At least 37 records · Page 2

Hardware Aware Mitigation of Timing Side-Channel Vulnerabilities in Critical Infrastructure Software

Program runtime/timing attacks exploit variations in a program’s execution times to extract sensitive information from the program (e.g. encryption keys, sensitive variable data, intellectual property). State-of-the-art solutions to runtime sidechannel attacks attempt to balance the execution time of the sensitive code for different control flow paths to eliminate the timing leakage. However, during the mitigation process, most techniques do not consider the underlying hardware/device on which the target program is supposed to run on. This can lead to over-fixing (unnecessary extra operations), under-fixing (not solving the imbalance properly), and even failures. We propose DISARM, a joint hardware-software methodology (unlike any existing solution) for mitigating runtime side-channel vulnerabilities that utilizes timing values from real embedded devices to generate targeted software fixes. We implement DISARM to support C/C++/Java source codes and validate it across 22 standard benchmarks. DISARM outperforms state-of-the-art solutions such as PENDULUM and DifFuzzAR in terms of execution time overhead (up to −46%), code size overhead (up to −10%), and correctness (no failures) on five different embedded/edge devices.

Suha, Tasneem [University of Maine]↗

Security Vulnerability and Mitigation in Photovoltaic Systems

Software and firmware vulnerabilities pose security threats to photovoltaic (PV) systems. When patches are not available or cannot be timely applied to fix vulnerabilities, it is important to mitigate vulnerabilities such that they cannot be exploited by attackers or their impacts will be limited when exploited. However, the vulnerability mitigation problem for PV systems has received little attention. This paper analyzes known security vulnerabilities in PV systems, proposes a multi-level mitigation framework and various mitigation strategies including neural network-based attack detection inside inverters, and develops a prototype system as a proof-of-concept for building vulnerability mitigation into PV system design.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Hardware Fuzzing with An Emulator

Bugs in digital logic have led to some significant security vulnerabilities. Hardware bugs are particularly troublesome since they cannot be easily patched. Additionally, if the bug is in the root of trust, all trust built upon it can be vulnerable. Traditional testing either require a deep knowledge of the system, creative attack vectors and lots of human interaction. This is not scalable as there are very few engineers that can wear the hat of a designer, a verification engineer, and a cybersecurity expert. Hardware fuzzing is a relatively new research area in dynamic hardware testing. It has proven to be an effective method for discovering bugs, unexpected behaviors, and security vulnerabilities in software. While hardware fuzzing is new to the hardware domain, it has a strong track record in software testing. Fuzzing is a testing technique that randomly mutates the input data to uncover bugs or vulnerabilities in the design. It is especially good at finding corner cases that test engineers can not envision. Another advantage over other dynamic testing techniques is that, if done well, deep knowledge of the design is not required. Additionally, fuzzing scales well. If the system is set up correctly, it can run unsupervised for weeks if necessary. In this work, we propose using hardware fuzzing to improve the input vector generation for an information flow tracking tool. To get reasonable throughput of test vectors, an emulator is targeted as the execution platform. Efficient emulator execution has some specific requirements.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DISARM: Target Electronic Device Informed Mitigation of Software Runtime Side-Channel Vulnerabilities

Program runtime/timing attacks exploit variations in a program’s execution times to extract sensitive information from the program (e.g. encryption keys, sensitive variable data, intellectual property). State-of-the-art solutions to runtime side-channel attacks attempt to balance the execution time of the sensitive code for different control flow paths to eliminate the timing leakage. However, during the mitigation process, most techniques do not consider the underlying hardware/device on which the target program is supposed to run on. This can lead to over-fixing (unnecessary extra operations), under-fixing (not solving the imbalance properly), and even failures. Here, we propose DISARM, a joint hardware-software methodology (unlike any existing solution) for mitigating runtime side-channel vulnerabilities that utilizes timing values from real embedded devices to generate targeted software fixes. We implement DISARM to support C/C++/Java source codes and validate it across 22 standard benchmarks. DISARM outperforms state-of-the-art solutions such as PENDULUM and DifFuzzaR in terms of execution time overhead, code size overhead, and correctness on five different embedded/edge devices.

Timing/runtime side-channel↗

Automated Vulnerability Detection (AVUD) for Compiled Smart Grid Software

This project developed and implemented a system for conducting cybersecurity vulnerability detection of smart grid components and systems by performing static analysis of compiled software (“firmware”). The resulting system for automated vulnerability detection (AVUD) was implemented as part of Oak Ridge National Laboratory’s existing test bed for smart meters, the Sustainable Campus Initiative. The work consisted of two phases: the first phase implemented the necessary software and computational models to perform the analysis, and the second phase demonstrated the system on example firmware in partnership with smart meter manufacturer Sensus USA, Inc. The resulting system won an R&D 100 award and has been successfully commercialized, winning a National Laboratory Consortium Commercialization Award.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DEReliction: A Cybersecurity Vulnerability Assessment Methodology for Distributed Energy Resources

With the increasing integration of Distributed Energy Resources (DER) into the electric grid, maintaining grid reliability and resilience requires that these devices remain secure. This paper discusses a cybersecurity vulnerability assessment methodology that incorporates best practices from Sandia National Laboratories, SANS Institute, OWASP Foundation, and other web and Internet of Things (IoT) penetration testing (“pen testing”) programs, courses, and frameworks for assessing the security posture of devices. The methodology involves five sequential steps: (1) Collect Public Information, (2) Extract Hardware Details, (3) Inventory Software Components, (4) Identify Vulnerabilities, and (5) Test Vulnerabilities. Each step uncovers potential weaknesses in both hardware and software components of DER devices, considering adversary tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), and potential attack vectors along the way. The results from the execution of this method on multiple residential- and small commercial-scale photovoltaic (PV) inverters reveled hardware and software vulnerabilities, which highlight the benefit of taking a methodical approach to discover vulnerabilities. While the specific vulnerability details are not shared here, a generalized overview of findings underscore the importance of robust security assessments for DER devices. Adoption of an assessment framework of this kind will identify and mitigate cybersecurity threats and bolster the resilience of DER-integrated electric grids.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Vind: A Blockchain-Enabled Supply Chain Provenance Framework for Energy Delivery Systems

Enterprise-level energy delivery systems (EDSs) depend on different software or hardware vendors to achieve operational efficiency. Critical components of these systems are typically manufactured and integrated by overseas suppliers, which expands the attack surface to adversaries with additional opportunities to infiltrate into EDSs. Due to this reason, the risk management of the EDS supply chain is crucial to ensure that we are knowledgeable about the vulnerabilities in software and hardware components that comprise any critical part, quantifiable risk metrics to assess the severity and exploitability of the attack, and provide remediation solutions that can influence a prioritized mitigation plan. There is a need to realize cyber supply chain risk management for industrial control systems’ hardware, software, and computing and networking services associated with bulk electric system (BES) operations. This article proposes a blockchain-based cyber supply chain provenance platform (“Vind”) for EDSs to realize data provenance in a cyber supply chain ecosystem.

Bandara, Eranga↗

Visualizing a Vulnerability: Its Connections to Hardware and Software

All Hazards Analysis (AHA) is a framework developed by Idaho National Laboratory that provides capabilities to collect, store, analyze, and visualize critical infrastructure information. A core function of AHA is its ability to simulate faults or outages in networks of infrastructure originating from a plethora of causes, ranging from natural disasters to cyberattacks. AHA utilizes Hardware and Software Bills of Material (HBOM and SBOM, respectively) along with Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEVs) to document the potential attack vectors for each piece of infrastructure. The objective of this contribution to AHA was to create a visualization tool that could capture the small details held in each individual artifact as well as preserve the large-scale connections that link them together to aid threat modeling.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Towards Software Bill of Materials in the Nuclear Industry

Large, modern industrial facilities often incorporate thousands of digital assets in their operational technology. Regulated facilities, such as nuclear power plants (NPPs), maintain robust cybersecurity and configuration management programs that often use bills of materials (BOMs) for these assets, including make, model, and version of hardware, firmware, and software. However, these BOMs typically capture only first- or second-tier information provided by the original equipment manufacturer (OEM). Unfortunately, as indicated by the increasing number and sophistication of software supply chain attacks, this level of detail is insufficient for identifying all the potential vulnerabilities and risks in software applications. Software BOMs (SBOMs) provide detailed enumeration of components and dependencies within the product or devices, including firmware. SBOMs can be combined with vulnerability data sources and vendor vulnerability attestations to improve vulnerability management and enable rapid identification of affected components when new software vulnerabilities are discovered. Ideally, SBOMs are created by the OEM prior to installation. However, since this practice is not yet commonplace and since NPPs are typically slow to adopt new technology, most NPPs do not incorporate SBOMs into their asset or configuration management programs. Fortunately, SBOMs can be generated by NPPs on existing digital assets to provide further insight into risk management decisions. This report provides an overview of the current SBOM ecosystem and recommends guidance on how to get started in a “crawl, walk, run” manner to develop and implement a sustainable SBOM program for digital assets in an NPP.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

FIC Vulnerability Profile

The FIC team is engaged with Pacific Northwest National Laboratory’s (PNNL’s) Shamrock Cyber Team to provide cybersecurity analyses of the FIC software. Shamrock offers both Threat-Based Analysis services and Secure Software Development services. These services are ultimately used to understand and mitigate threats against software and to reduce vulnerabilities in software, thus improving overall cybersecurity and informing decision makers. Shamrock’s Secure Software Development services, specifically Static Analysis Security Testing (SAST) and Open-Source Analysis (OSA), produced this Vulnerability Profile.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

VWC-BERT: Scaling Vulnerability–Weakness–Exploit Mapping on Modern AI Accelerators

Defending cybersystems needs accurate mapping of software and hardware vulnerabilities to generalized descriptions of weaknesses, and weaknesses to exploits. These mappings enable cyber defenders to build plans for effective defense and assessment of potential risks to a cybersystem. With close to 170k vulnerabilities, manual mapping is not a feasible option. However, automated mapping is challenging due to limited training data, computational intractability, and limitations in computational natural language processing. Tools based on breakthroughs in Transformer-based language models have been demonstrated to classify vulnerabilities with high accuracy. We make three key contributions in this paper: (1) We present a new framework, \VWCBERT, that augments the Transformer-based hierarchical multi-class classification framework of Das et al. (\textsc{V2W-BERT}) with the ability to map weaknesses to exploits. (2) We implement \VWCBERT~ on modern AI accelerator platforms using two data parallel techniques for the pre-training phase and demonstrate nearly linear speedups across NVIDIA and Graphcore accelerator platforms. We observe nearly linear speedups for up to 16 V100 and 8 A100 GPUs, and about 3.4$\times$ speedup for A100 relative to V100 GPUs. We also observe excellent speedups on Graphcore, with $5.7\times$ speedup on 128 IPUs relative to 16 IPUs. Enabled by scaling, we also demonstrate higher accuracy using a larger language model, RoBERTa-Large. We show up to 87\% accuracy for strict and up to 98\% accuracy for relaxed classification. (3) We develop a novel parallel link manager for the link prediction phase and demonstrate up to 21$\times$ speedup with 16 V100 GPUs relative to one V100 GPU, and thus reducing the runtime from 2.5 hours to 10 minutes. We believe that generalizability and scalability of \VWCBERT~ will benefit both the theoretical development and practical deployment of novel cyberdefense solutions and vulnerability classification.

Das, Siddhartha Shankar↗

The Benefits of a Software Bill of Materials Program at Nuclear Facilities

Software supply chain attacks are becoming increasingly more prevalent in both information communications technology and operational technology environments. Often, a supplier or other entity discloses vulnerability information about software components and subcomponents used in a digital asset, but an asset owner is unable to quickly ascertain if the vulnerable component is installed in their facility. The generation and use of a software bill of materials (SBOM) for installed digital assets can enable an asset owner to quickly identify if and where a component is used, allowing them to evaluate the risk and determine necessary risk treatments. The integration of an SBOM program into a nuclear facility not only improves vulnerability management and risk management processes, it also benefits asset and configuration management, cybersecurity, and supply chain programs. This paper reviews the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy Cybersecurity Crosscutting Technology Development program’s work on integrating an SBOM program into a nuclear facility. It also provides a discussion on the benefits of such a program.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Visualizing Comparisons of Bill of Materials

Protecting critical infrastructure from cyber attacks, natural disasters, and other disruptions is a priority of the U.S. Government. Critical infrastructure includes providing electricity to homes and businesses, supplying natural gas for heating, and producing renewable energy sources. A loss of these services, as seen in the Solarwinds supply chain attack in 2020 , Texas snowstorm of 2021, the Colonial Pipeline cyber incident of 2021, and the Washington power substation attacks in 2022 result in high costs to consumers, disruption of everyday life, and even death. To protect the infrastructure, we first have to know what equipment we are protecting. The complexity of distributed manufacturing and development coupled with the increasing prevalence of cyber and supply chain attacks necessitates a greater understanding of the hardware and software components that comprise equipment in critical infrastructure. When a vulnerability in a single software library can have disastrous consequences, it is vital to understand critical equipment and systems at a granular level. This need has led to increased energy around the development and incorporation of bill-of-materials (BOM) into existing asset management practices to aid in mitigating, and responding to future attacks \cite{noauthor_software_nodate}. While much of the current research is devoted to creating BOMs, it is equally important to develop methodologies for leveraging BOMs to answer questions, such as: How has my software changed? Are two pieces of equipment equivalent? Does this piece of equipment that just arrived match my historical information? In this work, we demonstrate how BOMs can be represented by graph structures. We then describe how these structures can be fed into a graph comparison algorithm to produce a novel interactive visualization that allows us to not only identify differences in BOMs, but show exactly where they are in the product.

Jones, Rebecca D.↗

Generating SBoMs Utilizing Structured Threat Information Expression JSON bundles

With cyber-attacks on the rise, information is one of the first lines of defense. Now more than ever, security experts and developers need efficient ways to know if their software may be outdated or vulnerable to emerging threats. By generating a Software Bill of Material based on STIX2/JSON bundles, security experts and developers can ensure that they know where to find what can go wrong with their systems before the hackers do. As part of the Infrastructure Expression project, Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is currently working on ways that can aid in the development of efficient SBOMs using Structured Threat Information Expression (STIX). Doing so can provide an efficient first line of defense for detection and monitoring that can be easily used by cyber personnel from beginners to highly skilled experts.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

WISP: Watching grid Infrastructure Stealthily through Proxies (Final Technical Report)

The complex interdependencies of cyber systems (sensors and communications), physical grids and associated electricity market operations make protecting electric power grids a significant challenge. The energy sector is constantly under new, targeted, advanced and dangerous cyber-attacks that have the potential to result in the loss of human life. These threats are further exacerbated by our need to modernize the grid. One focus of cyber security research in smart grids is the securing of the SCADA system through advanced intrusion detection systems (IDS) and bad data detection algorithms in state estimation. These methods either require full knowledge of the system topology and parameters or fail to understand the physical behaviors under attack. WISP (Watching grid Infrastructure Stealthily through Proxies) is designed to provide additional protection to the power grid using only publicly available data. In particular, WISP exploits the spatio-temporal nature of the real time locational marginal prices (LMPs), in conjunction with other information such as bids, weather, outages and load data to analyze anomalous power pricing behaviors and then correlate those observations to localize regions of interest and identify potential cyber events. WISP is non-intrusive as the tool is deployed as a service in the Cloud or on premise and provides reliable information to system operators for enhanced situational awareness, without impeding energy delivery functions. The WISP technology comprises three modules: the data-driven anomaly detection core, the vulnerability and risk analysis and the root cause analysis. The data-driven anomaly detection core performs the tasks of feature selection, anomaly detection and attack region localization. The vulnerability and risk analysis module provides system level information of the vulnerable variables and times, assisting the operators in selecting monitoring and protection nodes. The root cause analysis module takes the detection results and identifies potential operational conditions that contribute to the detected anomalies. In Phase I, we have demonstrated the feasibility and effectiveness of WISP. We developed a realistic electricity market simulator capable of generating normal and attack market data under various operational conditions. We developed a series of cyber-attack detection and analysis algorithms and evaluated them under multiple data sources. Finally, we integrated all modules into an end-to-end software, providing functions for data management, data analytics and visualization. Specifically, we have achieved: (i) real-time data acceptance from external utility interfaces with >99% acceptance rate; (ii) high performance anomaly detection algorithms with >98% detection accuracy and <0.1% false alarm rate; and (iii) ultra-low computing delay <50 milliseconds. Additionally, our team developed algorithms to identify the vulnerable variables in electricity market operations and root cause analysis functions to identify major contributors to the price spikes. These ancillary modules are necessary when deploying WISP in real world industry environment. In Phase II, we have demonstrated the effectiveness of WISP software on realistic largescale power systems. We performed red team testing for the Phase I WISP software and identified software vulnerabilities and implemented corresponding mitigation solutions. We adapted the electricity market simulator for the Texas synthetic 2000-bus system and generated datasets for the false data injection attacks. We created database and visualization interfaces for the Texas system and the ISO New England system. We performed software optimization in terms of operation efficiency, computing speed and detection accuracy. Finally, we tested the software on the Texas system and the ISO New England system and evaluated the detection performance. Overall, we achieved above 89% detection rate, below 3% false alarm rate and below 37 seconds of end-to-end detection delay.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Evaluating Methods of Software Bill of Materials Generation to Enhance Nuclear Power Plant Cybersecurity

Instrumentation and control (I&C) systems in nuclear power plants (NPPs) are potential targets of cyberattacks and can prove deleterious for the safety of the NPPs. A Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) provides a detailed list of the various components and their dependencies in software, which helps in vulnerability and risk assessment for cyber hygiene and situational awareness. For an NPP, the process of generating an accurate SBOM report can be complex due to the legacy systems and firmware binaries involved. While most current SBOM tools are focused more on modern internet technology software, this research provides insights and guidelines for an NPP to generate an accurate and efficient SBOM. Here, the paper proposes a new methodology to help NPPs categorize software and use appropriate tools to generate SBOMs for their digital I&C systems.

SBOM↗

Towards Automatically Matching Security Advisories to CPEs: String Similarity-based Vendor Matching

When a vulnerability is reported by the National Vulnerability Database (NVD), affected products are listed in the structured Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) format. Unfortunately, if the vulnerability is in a software library (e.g., Log4j), it will not include CPEs for each product containing that library. In these cases, security operators need to manually read the vendor's or third-party security advisories to see if their product is affected. However, these advisories do not report affected products in a structured format, which prevents automated processing, This paper makes the first effort towards automatically constructing structured CPEs for the vulnerable products in a non-NVD security advisory from the unstructured data in the advisory. Since this is a very challenging problem, this paper specifically focuses on the initial but key step of matching the un-structured vendor names in security advisories to the structured vendor representations in the standard CPE format. We explore the feasibility of using string similarity to solve the problem. The basic idea is to compare a vendor name from the non-NVD advisory with each vendor in the official CPE dictionary. The CPE vendor with the highest similarity score to the advisory's vendor will be considered as the match. We first conduct an experimental, comparative study of multiple mainstream string similarity metrics for this matching problem. To improve the performance, we then design a new string similarity metric that is adapted from an existing metric by weighing different tokens in the advisory's vendor name differently.

McClanahan, Kylie↗

Cybersecurity Vulnerability Mitigation Framework through Empirical Paradigm: Enhanced Prioritized Gap Analysis

Existing cybersecurity vulnerability assessment tools were designed based on the policies and standards defined by organizations such as the U.S. Department of Energy and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Frameworks such as the cybersecurity capability maturity model (C2M2) and the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) are often used by the critical infrastructure owners and operators to determine the cybersecurity maturity of their facility. Although these frameworks are exceptional at performing qualitative cybersecurity analysis and identifying vulnerabilities, they do not provide a means to perform prioritized mitigation of those vulnerabilities in order to achieve a desired cybersecurity maturity. To address that challenge, we developed a framework and software application called the cybersecurity vulnerability mitigation framework through empirical paradigm (CyFEr). This paper presents the detailed architecture of CyFEr’s enhanced prioritized gap analysis (EPGA) methodology and its application to CSF. The efficacy of the presented framework is demonstrated by comparing against existing similar models and testing against the cyber injects from a real-world cyber-attack that targeted industrial control systems (ICS) in critical infrastructures.

Gourisetti, Sri Nikhil G.↗