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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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The Moon Burst Energetics All-sky Monitor (MoonBEAM)

MoonBEAM is a SmallSat concept placed in cislunar orbit developed to study the progenitors and multimessenger/multiwavelength signals of transient relativistic jets and outflows and determine the conditions that lead to the launching of a transient relativistic jet. The distinguishing advantage of MoonBEAM is the instantaneous all-sky coverage, maximizing the gamma-ray transients observations and providing upper limits for nondetections. Gamma-ray observatories in low Earth orbit are not able to survey the entire sky at a given time due to Earth blockage as well as detector downtime from the high particle activity in the South Atlantic Anomaly region. The long baseline provided from a cislunar orbit, allows MoonBEAM to constrain the localization annulus when combined with a gamma-ray instrument in low Earth orbit utilizing the timing triangulation technique. Improving the localization precision of a gamma-ray burst aids the gravitational wave follow-up community in reducing the region needed to be searched to locate and identify the afterglow and kilanova emission. Furthermore, by providing a different vantage point for a gamma-ray detection, MoonBEAM can help extend the gravitational wave detection horizon by increasing the confidence of a simultaneous marginal gravitational wave signal. Through the all-sky coverage, MoonBEAM will also provide insight into the conditions that lead to a successful relativistic jet, instead of a shock breakout event, or a completely failed jet in the case of core collapse supernovae.

Gamma-ray Bursts↗

NASA NTRS1992

System for Anomaly and Failure Detection (SAFD) system development

This task specified developing the hardware and software necessary to implement the System for Anomaly and Failure Detection (SAFD) algorithm, developed under Technology Test Bed (TTB) Task 21, on the TTB engine stand. This effort involved building two units; one unit to be installed in the Block II Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) Hardware Simulation Lab (HSL) at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), and one unit to be installed at the TTB engine stand. Rocketdyne personnel from the HSL performed the task. The SAFD algorithm was developed as an improvement over the current redline system used in the Space Shuttle Main Engine Controller (SSMEC). Simulation tests and execution against previous hot fire tests demonstrated that the SAFD algorithm can detect engine failure as much as tens of seconds before the redline system recognized the failure. Although the current algorithm only operates during steady state conditions (engine not throttling), work is underway to expand the algorithm to work during transient condition.

Oreilly, D.↗

NASA NTRS2007

Hybrid Automated Diagnosis of Discrete/Continuous Systems

A recently conceived method of automated diagnosis of a complex electromechanical system affords a complete set of capabilities for hybrid diagnosis in the case in which the state of the electromechanical system is characterized by both continuous and discrete values (as represented by analog and digital signals, respectively). The method is an integration of two complementary diagnostic systems: (1) beacon-based exception analysis for multi-missions (BEAM), which is primarily useful in the continuous domain and easily performs diagnoses in the presence of transients; and (2) Livingstone, which is primarily useful in the discrete domain and is typically restricted to quasi-steady conditions. BEAM has been described in several prior NASA Tech Briefs articles: "Software for Autonomous Diagnosis of Complex Systems" (NPO-20803), Vol. 26, No. 3 (March 2002), page 33; "Beacon-Based Exception Analysis for Multimissions" (NPO-20827), Vol. 26, No. 9 (September 2002), page 32; "Wavelet-Based Real-Time Diagnosis of Complex Systems" (NPO-20830), Vol. 27, No. 1 (January 2003), page 67; and "Integrated Formulation of Beacon-Based Exception Analysis for Multimissions" (NPO-21126), Vol. 27, No. 3 (March 2003), page 74. Briefly, BEAM is a complete data-analysis method, implemented in software, for real-time or off-line detection and characterization of faults. The basic premise of BEAM is to characterize a system from all available observations and train the characterization with respect to normal phases of operation. The observations are primarily continuous in nature. BEAM isolates anomalies by analyzing the deviations from nominal for each phase of operation. Livingstone is a model-based reasoner that uses a model of a system, controller commands, and sensor observations to track the system s state, and detect and diagnose faults. Livingstone models a system within the discrete domain. Therefore, continuous sensor readings, as well as time, must be discretized. To reason about continuous systems, Livingstone uses monitors that discretize the sensor readings using trending and thresholding techniques. In development of the a hybrid method, BEAM results were sent to Livingstone to serve as an independent source of evidence that is in addition to the evidence gathered by Livingstone standard monitors. The figure depicts the flow of data in an early version of a hybrid system dedicated to diagnosing a simulated electromechanical system. In effect, BEAM served as a "smart" monitor for Livingstone. BEAM read the simulation data, processed the data to form observations, and stored the observations in a file. A monitor stub synchronized the events recorded by BEAM with the output of the Livingstone standard monitors according to time tags. This information was fed to a real-time interface, which buffered and fed the information to Livingstone, and requested diagnoses at the appropriate times. In a test, the hybrid system was found to correctly identify a failed component in an electromechanical system for which neither BEAM nor Livingstone alone yielded the correct diagnosis.

Park, Han↗

NASA NTRS1992

Technology test bed engine real-time failure control

The Real-Time Failure Control (RTFC) program involves development of a failure detection algorithm, for the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME). This failure detection approach is signal-based and entails monitoring SSME measurement signals based on predetermined as well as on-line computed mean and standard deviation values. Twenty-four engine measurements are monitored in the algorithm and provisions are made to add more parameters if needed. Each of the first values of every measurement signal at the algorithm start is checked against safety limits placed around a pre-computed engine-to-engine mean value (MV) with a bandwidth equal to a given multiple of the pre-computed standard deviation (SD). If several parameters are out of the bounds of these limits a failure is signaled. During the first two seconds (after algorithm start) a moving average (MA) and a SD is computed on-line in real-time. The moving average of each parameter is computed by averaging the incoming signal measurement with the four most recent previous signal measurements. The moving average is updated at every sampling interval (40 msec) and is checked against a similar safety band around the initial signal value for each parameter. If several anomalies are registered, a failure is signaled by the algorithm. At the end of the two-second interval the MA is fixed as the mean value for the rest of the algorithm operation and a safety band is placed above and below this value equal to a multiple of the computed SD. However, the safety band is adjusted by adjusting the mean value when propellant tank repressurization and venting take place. 'Influence Coefficients' are used to make the necessary adjustments to the safety limits of those parameters that are affected by repressurization and venting or valve closure and opening. The MA is, in both cases, continuously updated and checked against the safety band. Once more, if several parameters exceed the limits a failure is signaled. At the start of every scheduled power transient the algorithm is stopped. It is re-initiated after two seconds from the termination of the power transient and the process is repeated. The final report is divided into four major sections. The most encompassing of all is the discussion section that has sub-sections on: (1) RTFC algorithm development, (2) RTFC simulations; (3) RTFC current limitations; and (4) enhancements planned for.

Panossian, Hagop V.↗